By Ismoilova Soliha, UWED undergraduate, intern at IAIS   The parliamentary elections in Slovenia, held on March 22, concluded with a narrow margin between the leading political forces. The «Freedom Movement» (Gibanje Svoboda, GS), headed by Prime Minister Robert Golob, secured approximately 28.5-28.66% of the vote and obtained 29 seats in parliament. While, the Slovenian Democratic Party( Slovenska Demokratska Stranka), led by Janez Janša, received around 27.9-28.1% of the vote. The minimal difference between the two parties underscores a pronounced degree of political polarization within Slovenian society. The electoral campaign was further complicated by serious allegations of foreign interference, involving the Israeli private intelligence firm «Black Cube», which Slovenian authorities have associated with alleged influence operations purportedly benefiting the opposition. These developments have raised significant concerns regarding the integrity of the electoral process, the resilience of democratic institution and broader issues of national sovereignty.   Election campaign and key political actors More than 10 political parties and coalitions participated in the parliamentary elections in Slovenia, with over 1300 candidates representing a wide range of political forces were nominated. Prime Minister Golob’s main political opponent, populist politician and supporter of US President Donald Trump, Janes Janša, previously served as Prime Minister of Slovenia three times. Golob, in turn entered national politics relatively recently, rising to power in 2022 as the leader of a center-left  coalition composed of three parties, making a significant shift in Slovenia’s political landscape. The election campaign of Janez Janša was structured around a clear confrontational logic, positioning the party in opposition to what it described as the «post-socialist left». A central element of the campaign strategy was the mobilization of voters through value-based polarization and competing visions of socio-economic development. The SDS presented itself as a political force aiming to «liberate the Slovenian people from the dominance of Golob’s government». In contrast, the governing center-left coalition led by Robert Golob was framed by its opponents as promoting policies associated with redistribution, egalitarianism and increased state dependence among citizens. In this context, Janša campaign adopted a distinctly adversarial rhetoric, encapsulated in the binary framing of «Us versus them», which reinforced the broader dynamics of political polarization within Slovenia’s electoral landscape.  The main lines of opposition in the SDP campaign emphasized «ambition and meritocracy instead of envy and egalitarianism». Janez Janša framed his political message around the idea of restoring motivation and purpose, arguing that societal progress depends on competition, performance-based rewards and a strong incentive for success as a means of improving the overall welfare of Slovenians. The party also promoted the conception of an «effective state», which prioritizes individual freedom and autonomy over dependence on government structures. This approach included calls for reduced bureaucracy, lower taxation and the creation of a more favorable environment for both citizens and entrepreneurs. Furthermore, the SDP strongly criticized what it described as the government’s migration policy, particularly its perceived lack of distinction between legal and illegal migration. Within this narrative, the party argued that the broader objective of the left was to alter Slovenia’s ethnic and cultural composition as well as the structure of the electorate, in order to secure long-term electoral advantages. On the other hand, the Freedom Movement (Gibanje Svoboda, GS) promoted a program centered on balanced and sustainable development, emphasizing a «green» transition, including plans related to the gradual phase-out of coal-based energy production such as the Šoštanj Thermal Power Plant (TEŠ 6), accompanied by socially just transition measures. The party’s agenda also highlighted innovation-driven economic growth, healthcare system reform and a pro-European, liberal-progressive political orientation. In the social policy domain, particular attention was given to improving quality of life, strengthening support for both younger and older generations and reducing social inequalities. The party sought to present a model of governance that reconciles environmental sustainability with economic competitiveness. Overall, the central message of the campaign was the pursuit of long-term sustainable development across social, environmental and economic dimensions, while reaffirming Slovenia’s role as an active and responsible member of the European Union and the broader European political community. On the economic front, the party set an ambitious objective of positioning Slovenia among the world’s 20 most competitive economies by 2030, accompanied by targeted annual GDP growth of approximately 3-5%. Particular emphasis is placed on strengthening innovation capacity, accelerating the transition to renewable energy sources and advancing digital transformation across key sectors of the economy. In addition, the program prioritizes the modernization of public service, especially in healthcare and education, as central pillars for long-term productivity and sustainable development. The party emphasizes a strong pro-European orientation and alignment of its program with the European Union’s strategic objectives, particularly in the areas of the green transition and climate neutrality. A key priority is promotion of a just decarbonization process (pravično razogljičenje), which includes the gradual phase-out of the TEŠ 6 coal-fired unit by 2030, accompanied by targeted  measures to support workers and regions economically dependent on the coal industry. Both major political forces have devoted significant attention to the future of the Šoštanj Thermal Plant (TEŠ 6), framing it as a central issue in debates over energy, economic policy and national sovereignty. The SDP has strongly criticized the government’s plan to phase out coal-based energy production, arguing that the premature closure of TEŠ 6 could undermine Slovenia’s energy independence and lead to substantial job losses, particularly in regions dependent on the coal industry. In contrast, Golob has justified the planned closure primarily on economic and regulatory grounds. He points to the increasing costs associated with the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) which has significantly raised the price of carbon allowance and consequently, the cost of coal-based electricity generation. With annual CO₂ emissions estimated at approximately 3.1-3.4 million tonnes at full capacity, TEŠ 6 is particularly exposed to rising carbon prices, which in 2026 fluctuated between €72 and €92 per tonne. As a result, the plant has become structurally unprofitable, promoting the government to allocate more than  €400 million in subsidies since 2024 to sustain its operations. Within this framework, the Golob government presents EU ETS obligations as a key economic rationale for the accelerated phase-out of TEŠ 6. Conversely, SDP portray such policies as externally imposed pressures from Brussels, framing the closure as a form of deindustrialization that threatens Slovenia’s energy security, employment, especially in the Šaleška Valley and the long-term stability of the country’s industrial base. The Šaleška Valley region ( including the towns of Velenje and Šoštanj), where TEŠ 6 is located has long been a center of industrial and mining activity, providing employment to several thousand workers directly and indirectly linked to the plant. The prospective closure of the facility therefor entails significant socio-economic risks, including job losses, declining regional incomes and potential increase in electricity and district heating prices for local residents. This issue became a central theme in the campaign of the SDP. Janša repeatedly framed the rapid phase-out of TEŠ 6 as «betrayal of workers» and an act of «energy capitulation», using the issue to mobilize support in industrial regions. In areas with strong ties to the energy and mining sectors, particularly in eastern and northeastern parts of Slovenian support for the SDP has traditionally been higher. In these regions, a considerable segment of the electorate perceived the policies of the «Freedom Movement» as a direct threat to their economic security, contributing  to stronger electoral backing for Janša despite Golob’s broader national appeal. Thus, what initially appears as a technical question of climate and energy policy has evolved into a deeper ideological confrontation between proponents of a progressive «green transition» and those prioritizing national energy sovereignty, industrial stability and economic pragmatism.   Election results and their consequences Pre-election polls and analytical forecasts consistently pointed to a highly competitive race, although at various stages of the campaign the momentum appeared to shift in favor of the opposition. In early 20266, the SDP gradually took the lead with several polls indicating support levels ranging from 20% to 28% at times placing it ahead of the ruling party. By February, the gap between the two main political forces had widened to approximately 5% points in favor of the SDP, raising expectations of a potential return of Janez Janša to power. By march, however, the situation had become increasingly uncertain. Aggregated polling data suggested that while the SDP maintained a slight lead at around 29% liberal bloc led by Golob remained electorally competitive, largely due to its coalition-building potential. In the final days before the election, most analysts converged on the assessment that the margin between the two camps would be minimal, likely resulting in a fragmented legislature without a decisive majority. In this context, although the opposition was at times perceived as the frontrunner, the final outcome ultimately confirmed the high volatility of the electorate and the deep polarization of Slovenian society.  The election was marked by high tensions around issues of migration, security and national identity. The «Black Cube» scandal has become a turning point in recent weeks, allegations have surfaced that representatives of an Israeli private intelligence company visited Slovenia, met with individuals associated with the SDP and were involved in leaking recording aimed at discrediting the Golob government on corruption charges. After the news became public, public opinion shifted sharply, support for the SDP declined, while the «Freedom Movement» began to gain momentum. As a result, Golob’s party previously trailing in the polls managed to secure a narrow electoral victory, winning by approximately 0.4-0.6%. The results of the Slovenian elections indicate the emergence of a fragmented political landscape in which no major party commands enough support to govern independently. Under these conditions, coalition-building with smaller parties such as the New Slovenia-Christian Democrats, the Slovenian People’s Party, the Focus Party, the Social Democrats and the Left Party will play a crucial role. This not only complicates the government formation process but also  introduces a degree instability, as governance will rely heavily on fragile inter-party compromises. At the same time, the elections exposed a pronounced level of political polarization. Voting patterns reflect deep structural cleavages, including urban-rural divides, generational differences and conflicts rooted in competing value systems. Voter turnout remained notably high, particularly around issues of identity and security, which further intensified the divisive character of the campaign. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

By Farkhod Nazarov, UWED undergraduate, IAIS research assistant   The constitutional reform of 2026 in Kazakhstan represents one of the most significant stages of the country’s political modernization since gaining independence. The reform is framed by the official authorities as the logical culmination of the transition from a super-presidential model of governance to a more balanced system referred to as a “Just Kazakhstan.” It aims to improve mechanisms of public administration, strengthen state institutions, and enhance their interaction with society in the context of contemporary global challenges. The new Constitution, adopted through a national referendum on March 15, 2026, affects approximately 84% of the text of the previous 1995 Constitution (as amended in 2022). The document is set to enter into force on July 1, 2026. According to the official results published by the Central Referendum Commission, the draft was supported by 7,954,667 voters (87.15%). Voter turnout reached 73.12% of registered voters. These figures rank among the highest in national voting processes in the history of independent Kazakhstan.   Procedure of Preparation, Adoption, and Key Institutional Changes The preparation of the reform began in autumn 2025 at the initiative of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. In his Address to the Nation, the head of state explicitly emphasized the need to develop a “new Fundamental Law that corresponds to the realities of the 21st century.” On January 21, 2026, by Presidential Decree No. 1157, a Constitutional Commission of approximately 30 members was established, including representatives of the Presidential Administration, members of Parliament, qualified legal experts, and scholars. The Commission was tasked with preparing the draft within a highly compressed timeframe. Already on February 11, 2026, the President signed a decree calling for a national referendum, and on February 12, the full draft text was officially published on the state portals “gov.kz” and “election.gov.kz” Thus, only 22 days elapsed between the creation of the Commission and the publication of the draft. Public discussion lasted approximately one month and took place primarily through online platforms, as well as regional meetings organized by local executive bodies. The then-existing bicameral Parliament did not introduce amendments to the draft; instead, the document was submitted to a nationwide vote in its entirety. The scale of the transformation is unprecedented for the post-Soviet period. The previous Constitution consisted of 9 chapters and 98 articles, whereas the new one includes 11 chapters and 96 articles. Approximately 84% of the text has been fully revised or replaced. The key institutional changes can be grouped as follows: First, the reform fundamentally restructures the legislative branch. Instead of a bicameral Parliament (Mazhilis and Senate), a unicameral body – the Kurultai has been established, consisting of 145 deputies elected exclusively through a proportional party-list system. The abolition of the Senate and the concentration of legislative functions within a single body are intended to increase the efficiency of decision-making and eliminate potential delays in the legislative process. Second, the powers of the President in forming key state institutions have been expanded. Under the revised Articles 40–42, the President is granted the authority to appoint the Prosecutor General, the Chairs of the Constitutional and Supreme Courts, the Governor of the National Bank, and the Head of the National Security Committee. The Kurultai is informed of these appointments ex post facto. Third, the position of Vice President, absent in previous constitutional versions, has been reinstated. The Vice President is appointed by the President with the consent of the Kurultai by a simple majority vote and performs duties assigned by the head of state. Fourth, a new body – the Halyk Kenesi (People’s Council) has been established as a consultative-legislative organ under the President. A portion of its members is directly appointed by the President. This institution is intended to provide an additional channel for continuous dialogue between the state and society. Fifth, new provisions have been introduced in Chapter 2 on the rights and freedoms of citizens. Article 29 enshrines digital rights (including the protection of personal data in the digital environment), environmental guarantees have been strengthened, and Article 27 clarifies the definition of marriage as a voluntary union between a man and a woman. Additionally, a provision has been introduced prohibiting foreign funding of political parties and non-governmental organizations engaged in political activities (Article 23).   Declared Objectives of the Reform and Assessments by International Experts The official position of the Kazakh authorities presents the new Constitution as a document of a “mature state.” The key declared objectives of the reform include the redistribution of powers among branches of government according to the formula “a strong President – an influential Parliament – an accountable Government,” strengthening the system of checks and balances, promoting a human-centered approach, protecting traditional values, as well as ensuring digital and environmental rights. However, international experts offer a more cautious and неоднозначную assessment. Amnesty International characterizes the draft as a “concerning rollback in human rights and the rule of law,” pointing to the concentration of power in the presidency and restrictions on freedom of expression, assembly, and association due to the ban on foreign funding. Human Rights Watchemphasizes the weakening of checks and balances, the rushed preparation process, and the risks of using the reform to suppress dissent. According to a number of regional experts, these assessments are to a significant extent general in nature and do not fully take into account the specific political and social context of Kazakhstan as a Central Asian state. Citizens of Kazakhstan expressed broad support for the reform, indicating a high level of public approval. More than 10,000 proposals from citizens were submitted through the platform “referendum2026.kz” highlighting the popularity of the document.   Conclusion The constitutional reform in Kazakhstan represents a significant stage in political modernization and has contributed to the creation of a more compact and efficient system of public administration. The declared objectives of strengthening institutions, promoting a human-centered approach, and building a “Just Kazakhstan” received broad public support during the referendum. This experience may serve as a practical example of balancing the efficiency of state institutions with maintaining control over political continuity. Certain mechanisms introduced by the reform – such as the institution of the Vice President, the unicameral legislature, and restrictions on foreign funding – may be adaptable to other governance models, potentially contributing to long-term political stability. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

By Ilyos Shaymardonov, UWED Master’s Student, IAIS Research Intern   Introduction.The outbreak of the US-Iran war in early 2026 shook the global geopolitical architecture and put the strategies of major powers to a direct test. In the view of many experts, this conflict appeared to open the door to ready-made strategic opportunities for China. It was assumed that while the United States was entangled in another costly military campaign in the Middle East, Beijing would seek to fill the resulting vacuum, deepen its ties with Tehran, and accelerate its challenge to American leadership. However, this hypothesis misinterprets how China actually behaves amidst geopolitical instability. An analysis of the situation reveals that China’s response to the US-Iran war demonstrates not expansionism, but a doctrine of calculated restraint. This, in turn, is a deliberate position stemming from China’s firm conviction regarding global economic vulnerabilities, its long-term investments within the framework of the «Belt and Road» initiative, and the belief that systemic stability, not short-term tactical gains, is the primary condition for its sustainable development.   The foundations of the China-Iran strategic partnership: The «Belt and Road» and a 25-year agreement To understand China’s position during the war, one must first understand the nature and depth of the pre-war China-Iran relations. In March 2021, China and Iran signed a 25-year Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement. According to him, China has committed to investing up to $400 billion in the country’s infrastructure and energy sector in exchange for stable supplies of Iranian cheap oil. This agreement directly linked Iran to the «One Belt, One Road» initiative, transforming Tehran into a crucial hub connecting Central Asia with the Persian Gulf, and this corridor would allow China to bypass strategic maritime chokepoints dominated by the U.S. Navy. Iran’s official accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2023 further solidified this closeness in a formal-institutional sense within the network of regional institutions led by China. The strategic logic underlying this partnership is multifaceted. As noted by Iranian expert S. Madani, the «Belt and Road» initiative is not merely an infrastructure program but also serves as an economic tool designed to expand its sphere of influence and acquire resources amidst systemic constraints. For Iran, this initiative serves as a mechanism to maintain institutional stability and bypass sanctions, providing access to markets and capital that are difficult to attain under Western pressure. In this way, China became the primary buyer of Iranian oil, purchasing approximately 90% of the country’s crude exports. The Hudson Institute describes this relationship as crucial for Iran’s economic survival and central to Beijing’s concept of creating a secure land-based energy corridor free from U.S. maritime dominance. From a geopolitical standpoint, this cooperation served China’s overarching interest in establishing a multipolar world order. Iran’s strategic geographic location connecting Central Asia, the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf has given China a diplomatic edge in a region where U.S. influence has historically been dominant. Analysts at the NESA Center observe that China’s geopolitical expansion into the Middle East is being carried out incrementally and in a risk-averse manner to avoid provoking a sharp reaction from regional or international powers. In this process, cooperation with Iran serves as a vehicle for strengthening China’s position in the Middle East without engaging in direct conflict.   Calculated restraint: why is Beijing not joining the war? Despite the depth of Sino-Iranian relations, China’s reaction to a potential US-Iran war has been notably restrained. Beijing lacks a permanent military presence in the Greater Middle East, has no security commitments to Tehran, and does not possess the real capability to shift the military balance in such an intense conflict. Deploying an aircraft carrier group to the region to protect Chinese oil tankers would be an extremely dangerous risk for a navy that is only just beginning to develop its open-sea capabilities. This military restraint is not an admission of weakness but rather a rational response to the U.S.-China rivalry. Analysts from «Foreign Affairs» note that Chinese leaders do not view every U.S. failure as a Chinese success, nor do they believe it is necessary to seize every geopolitical opportunity. Beijing’s calculus will be determined by whether the situation stabilizes or, conversely, descends into chaos. A regional conflict centered on the Strait of Hormuz is, in turn, a source of such chaos. This approach contrasts with the «win-lose» logic ingrained in Washington’s strategic debates. While American analysts view China as the biggest beneficiary of America’s overextension, Beijing sees a destabilizing crisis that threatens the open trading environment which is the foundation of its economic model. China’s diplomacy is meticulously crafted to reflect this very position. While Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi called for maintaining the diplomatic momentum in the negotiations, Xi Jinping openly criticized the US blockade of Iranian ports as a dangerous and irresponsible act and leveraged his ties with Pakistan to urge Iranian negotiators to soften their stance. The Atlantic Council notes that this two-pronged policy-namely, openly condemning U.S. coercive measures while covertly applying diplomatic pressure on Tehran – clearly shows Beijing’s aspiration to present itself as a responsible mediator rather than a sponsor of the war.   Economic vulnerabilities and tensions in the strait of Hormuz The most significant systemic challenge China faces in this conflict is in the energy sector. China is the world’s largest oil importer, with about 70% of the country’s needs met by foreign sources, of which approximately one-third was previously transported through the Strait of Hormuz. The de facto closure of this strategic transit corridor since late February 2026 has dealt a severe blow to China’s energy security. However, Beijing is not panicking, and this composure is the result of many years of meticulous preparation. China had been building up large crude oil reserves since 2025, a time when an oversupply in the global market and low oil prices created a unique opportunity to accumulate reserves at a low cost. Beijing is also consistently pursuing a policy of diversifying its supply sources. Following the restoration of ties temporarily severed by U.S. sanctions, China’s national oil companies have resumed purchasing Russian oil by sea. Meanwhile, the «Power of Siberia 1» pipeline continues to deliver Russian gas in volumes exceeding its designated capacity.  According to an analysis by the Stimson Center, the war has accelerated a simultaneous two-way approach: purchasing from different sources and investing in green energy. Specifically, Beijing is expanding China-Algeria energy agreements through Sinopec and intensifying cooperation in clean energy with Morocco and Egypt to reduce long-term dependence on the Persian Gulf. Disruptions at Qatar’s Ras Laffan liquefied natural gas facility have led to a declaration of force majeure on contracts with Chinese buyers, starkly highlighting the real economic costs Beijing is facing. The rising cost of energy, delays in cargo deliveries, additional insurance payments, and expenses related to rerouting shipping lanes are increasing production costs in China’s export-oriented industries. This, in turn, is causing a decline in global market demand at a time when Chinese manufacturers are facing pressure from excess capacity domestically. None of this aligns with Beijing’s strategic interests, which reinforces the key analytical conclusion that the war is not the geopolitical gift for China that Washington analysts sometimes suggest.   A diplomatic approach and a multipolar worldview The prevailing view emerging from the conflict – that the actions of the U.S. and Israel were an act of aggression, that Iran’s response was reactive in nature, and that this conflict clearly demonstrates the price of American hegemony – is nearly identical to Beijing’s long-standing criticism of U.S. global policy. China’s persistent call for multipolarity is taking on new meaning in the current context. The fact that the economies of more than 145 countries now trade more with China than with the U.S., combined with the serious precautions U.S. allies in Europe and Asia are taking due to energy supply disruptions, reinforces the credibility of a structural basis for a more fragmented international order. China’s vote against UN Security Council sanctions resolutions concerning Iran and the Middle East as early as March 2026, despite calling for Tehran to refrain from direct material support, will strengthen its reputation as a counterweight to Western institutional dominance. An analysis of the Belt and Road Initiative in the Middle East by the Andersen and Sending think tanks sheds light on this matter. These institutions have consistently portrayed China’s infrastructure investments as a strategic threat, often significantly exaggerating the true scale of Belt and Road projects in the region. However, it is precisely this approach that inadvertently validates China’s self-portrayal as a constructive alternative power. The war will accelerate this process, as it will provide clear proof for an argument long made by critics of U.S. hegemony. Namely, that America’s military adventures create such instability that the existing order cannot absorb it without suffering losses.   Limits and long-term implications of China’s strategy China’s strategy of calculated restraint is not without its own weaknesses and contradictions. The most prominent of these is the problem of «dual-use technologies. According to reports from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, China-affiliated firms provided commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran with high-resolution satellite imagery of U.S. military installations, including the Prince Sultan Air Base. Whether such activities are state-sanctioned or are the actions of commercial entities operating in a «gray area» this exposes Beijing to counter-pressure from Washington and undermines its position as a neutral diplomatic intermediary. The long-term strategic loss could be even more severe. China had relied on a self-confident, defiant Iran with nuclear ambitions as the cornerstone of its «Belt and Road» strategy in the Middle East. Having suffered a heavy blow and been caught in a whirlwind of internal conflict, Iran can no longer serve as a reliable factor to distract American attention. The «Belt and Road» projects, which are dependent on Iran’s ports, railway corridors, and energy infrastructure, are now facing even greater instability. The idea of establishing a secure land-based energy corridor that bypasses key maritime points dominated by the U.S. has been dealt a serious blow. Furthermore, China’s long-standing efforts to simultaneously support Iran while balancing relations with the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf have been exposed as inherently contradictory. The Atlantic Council’s scenario analysis outlines four possible trajectories for the post-war geopolitical order, ranging from a limited U.S. success that maintains systemic stability to a scenario where China responds with significant indirect intervention. Such an intervention would include providing advanced intelligence and logistical support to Iranian forces, as well as applying coordinated pressure in parallel theaters like the Taiwan Strait, thereby transforming the regional conflict into a systemic confrontation. Beijing will definitely prefer the first direction. Any escalation in the second direction would mean a defeat, not a victory, of the Chinese strategy.   Conclusion. China’s role in the geopolitics of the US-Iran war is neither consistent with the statement that «Beijing is the main beneficiary of the war» nor with the dismissive statement that «China is simply not in this process». Evidence suggests that Beijing is following a well-thought-out doctrine of restraint. It bears real economic costs and skillfully manages structural vulnerabilities in the energy sector. It is using the diplomatic fallout from American military action to advance its own idea of a multipolar world and is conducting covert pressure through channels that preserve the possibility of rejection. This position reflects a strategic culture that sees systemic stability as a necessary condition for national power and sees America’s excessive expansion as a cautionary lesson rather than an opportunity to expand. This war, however, exposed the limitations of a grand strategy built on weak cooperation. A weakened Iran, disrupted Belt and Road corridors, and tight control over the transfer of dual-use technologies are all losses that Beijing did not choose and cannot easily compensate for. Whether China’s abandonment of tactical options in favor of strategic patience serves its long-term interests in the Middle East will depend on how and how quickly the war ends. The oversimplified «win-lose» pattern that prevails in Washington’s China-related debates is more of a blur than an illumination. In this crisis, China’s strength lies not in what it has done, but in what it has managed to discipline itself not to do. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The global economy is undergoing one of the largest infrastructural technological shifts since the Industrial Revolution, driven by the formation of a global artificial intelligence infrastructure. The global economic architecture has entered a qualitatively new phase of technological development, the key feature of which is the transition from a predominantly software-based model of the digital economy to a capital-intensive infrastructural model of artificial intelligence (AI). While in previous decades software products and intellectual property were the main drivers of value growth for technology companies, the material computing infrastructure is now becoming the foundation of economic dynamics. This involves the construction of large data centers, the procurement of specialized graphics processing units (GPUs), the creation of cooling systems, and the development of energy grids capable of supporting the operation of high-performance computing clusters. In effect, a new technological ecosystem is taking shape, where the physical provisioning of computing power is acquiring strategic importance comparable to the role of transportation infrastructure or energy systems during the industrial era. Statistics on the distribution of data centers by country provide insight into the actual configuration of the global AI infrastructure. As of early 2026, there are approximately 10,800large data centers worldwide, and their geographic distribution is highly uneven. The United States remains the absolute leader, where about 3,960 centers are located, accounting for approximately 37% of the global infrastructure. Thus, the US possesses nearly four out of every ten data centers globally, providing the country with a significant technological advantage in cloud computing and AI systems development. Significantly smaller, yet notable infrastructural clusters have been established in the United Kingdom (498), Germany (470), China (365), and France (335). Other major players include Japan (249), Australia (268), India (275), and Brazil (198). Notably, despite active state support, China currently lags behind several European countries in terms of the number of data centers. The geographical structure of this infrastructure indicates a high concentration of computing power in the developed economies of North America, Europe, and East Asia, while a significant portion of countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America possesses only limited capabilities for hosting such facilities. This asymmetry creates a persistent gap in access to computing resources and increases the dependence of many nations on the infrastructure of leading technological hubs. The scale of investment in AI infrastructure has already reached levels comparable to the largest industrial projects in history. According to available estimates, the aggregate capital expenditures of the four largest US tech corporations—Microsoft, Alphabet, Meta, and Amazon—amounted to between $370 billion and $700 billion by the end of 2025. If current growth rates persist, their investments could exceed 2% of the US GDP. For historical comparison, a similar scale of capital investment was observed during the construction of the US national railway network in the 19th century, which laid the foundation for the country’s industrial leadership for decades to come. Unlike those projects, however, the current technological infrastructure is being built primarily by private capital and with a significantly higher degree of uncertainty regarding future economic returns. At the same time, concerns are increasingly voiced within the expert community regarding the possible formation of an infrastructural bubble in the computing power market. Major tech companies are building massive data centers and purchasing millions of specialized processors based on expectations that new generations of AI models will drive a sharp increase in labor productivity and create fundamentally new markets for digital services. However, the actual scale of commercial demand for such capacities remains uncertain. If the anticipated economic impact of AI adoption falls short of projections, a significant portion of the built infrastructure may end up underutilized. Unlike traditional infrastructure assets, such as transportation systems or energy grids, data center equipment has a relatively short technological lifecycle. Specialized chips become obsolete within just three to four years, requiring constant upgrades and additional investments. Consequently, the risk of accumulating unneeded computing power is compounded by the rapid rate of technological obsolescence of the equipment, making the current industry development model particularly sensitive to demand fluctuations. A prime example of mounting financial risks is the situation surrounding the American corporation Oracle. The company, long considered one of the key players in enterprise software and cloud solutions, found itself under significant debt pressure by the spring of this year. According to various estimates, its total debt obligations exceeded $137 billion. In a high-interest-rate environment, such a debt burden severely limits the company’s ability to further expand its infrastructure projects. Major rating agencies already warn about the likelihood of downgrading the company’s credit rating to the high-risk category. Attempts to raise additional funding through bond and stock issuances provoked a negative market reaction, resulting in the company’s stock price more than halving since the fall of 2025. Corporate circles are discussing possible measures for massive staff reductions and the revision of investment plans. A particular vulnerability of the current financial structure is the interdependence between large tech companies and AI developers. For instance, the massive Stargate infrastructure project, aimed at developing computing power for the leading developer OpenAI, entails Oracle’s participation as a major cloud infrastructure provider. Meanwhile, OpenAI itself remains an unprofitable company, with projected operating losses that could amount to approximately $14 billion in 2026. A complex system of mutual investments and financial flows has formed within the industry, where funds invested by some tech companies into AI developers are subsequently channeled to pay for the cloud services of other companies, which, in turn, use the acquired resources to purchase equipment from processor manufacturers. Such a closed-loop financing structure amplifies systemic risks, as a failure in any single element of the chain could trigger a chain reaction in a market valued at trillions of dollars. In addition to financial constraints, the development of AI infrastructure faces severe energy barriers. Modern data centers require massive amounts of electricity, and their consumption continues to grow rapidly. According to estimates by American think tanks, in the coming years, data centers could consume up to 17% of all electricity generated in the US. This load puts significant strain on existing power grids, many of which were built decades ago and are not designed for such intensive consumption. In a number of regions, including the states of Virginia and Texas, action plans are being discussed in the event of grid overloads and power outages. In response to this situation, US federal regulatory agencies have initiated stricter rules for connecting large data centers to the national power grid. The new regulatory policy effectively requires tech corporations to independently invest in the construction of generating capacities and the modernization of regional energy infrastructure. This has led to the emergence of a new trend, dubbed the tech-led "nuclear renaissance" within the expert community. Microsoft initiated a project to modernize and restart a reactor at the Three Mile Island nuclear plant, costing approximately $1.6 billion. Amazon acquired exclusive rights to use the power output of the Susquehanna nuclear power plant, while Google signed contracts for the development and deployment of small modular reactors (SMRs). Thus, tech corporations are gradually transforming not only into digital infrastructure operators but also into major investors in the energy sector. Nvidia continues to play a pivotal role in the new technological ecosystem, having effectively become the monopoly supplier of specialized GPUs for AI systems. The company’s market capitalization is approaching $3 trillion, with up to 90% of its revenue coming from the data center segment. However, this position is also facing new challenges. Tighter US export restrictions have limited the supply of specialized processors to the Chinese market and have already led to multibillion-dollar write-offs. Simultaneously, the technological rivalry between the US and China is intensifying. China is implementing an alternative model for computing infrastructure development based on centralized state planning. The national "Eastern Data, Western Computing" program envisions locating large computing centers in regions with affordable electricity and favorable climatic conditions. This allows for a significant increase in data center energy efficiency and a reduction in operational costs. According to some estimates, China’s technological hardware lag behind the US could narrow to a matter of months. At the same time, the Chinese AI operational model entails significant resources being directed toward internal control, data verification, and compliance with state information security standards, which reduces the efficiency of computing power utilization. An additional factor amplifying the strategic importance of AI infrastructure is its rapidly growing role in the military domain. In recent years, leading powers have increasingly viewed computing power and machine learning algorithms as key elements of future military superiority. Unlike previous technological revolutions, where individual types of weapons played a decisive role, the current phase is characterized by the integration of AI into decision-making, reconnaissance, and operations management systems. This means that control over computing infrastructure is gradually turning into a critical factor for national security and military balance. As of today, one of the most prominent examples of AI application in combat conditions has been the military conflict in the Middle East. During the military campaign against Iran, US military structures have been actively utilizing Project Maven, a system developed by Palantir. The system is designed to process massive arrays of intelligence data coming from satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and other sensor platforms. It automatically identifies potential targets, ranks them by priority, and generates recommendations for operators. The system also integrates Claude, a large language model by Anthropic, which is used to process intelligence reports and accelerate information analysis. According to military experts, the application of such algorithms has allowed for a sharp increase in the speed of operations: in the first 24 hours of the campaign alone, over a thousand targets were identified and struck in the area of operations, and by mid-March, that number had exceeded three thousand. The algorithms are capable of generating up to a thousand target recommendations per hour, which significantly exceeds the capabilities of traditional human analysis. This experience has revealed both the advantages and limitations of such technologies. Proponents of AI application point to increased strike accuracy and the reduction of human error in intelligence analysis; however, the effectiveness of such systems decreases in complex weather conditions and when decoys are used. Furthermore, the use of civilian AI models in military operations has already sparked legal and political disputes between defense departments and tech companies. Nevertheless, military leadership views AI as a crucial tool for reconnaissance and targeting, and the ongoing campaign in the Middle East has become one of the most large-scale tests of these technologies. In a broader context, this indicates that the rivalry between the US and China in the sphere of computing power is acquiring a military-strategic dimension. Amid the rapid growth of computing capabilities, international discussions on regulating the sector are intensifying, including limits on the volume of computing resources held by private companies and the licensing of high-performance GPU usage. Until recently, this idea was considered fringe, but today it is gradually entering the agenda of intergovernmental consultations. The formation of the global AI infrastructure is becoming one of the key economic processes of the decade. On the one hand, it unlocks new sources of growth; on the other hand, massive investments and energy constraints create significant systemic risks. Strategically, this signals the formation of a new foundation for the global balance of power. While in the 20th century the key factors of influence were industrial potential, energy resources, and nuclear technology, today these are joined by a state’s ability to provision massive computing capacities and control AI infrastructure. This makes the possession of a sovereign computing base one of the core conditions for maintaining economic and technological independence in the long term. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

By Islamov Bositkhon, UWED undergraduate, intern at IAIS   On April 8, the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran succeeded in reaching a temporary two-week ceasefire following a 40-day armed confrontation. U.S. President Donald Trump, as well as the Iranian leadership, acknowledged Pakistan’s significant role in facilitating this agreement, emphasizing the effectiveness of its mediation efforts in preventing further escalation of the conflict. In this context, a legitimate question arises: why did Pakistan—rather than other regional actors such as Turkey or Egypt – assume the key mediating role between the conflicting parties?   Pakistan–Iran Relations Pakistan and Iran share a long border exceeding 900 kilometers, which objectively creates a high degree of interdependence in the sphere of security. Iran was the first country to recognize Pakistan’s independence in 1947, while Pakistan, in turn, recognized the Islamic Republic of Iran following the Iranian Revolution. Despite these historical ties, bilateral relations have been characterized by ambivalence. In the 1990s, the two states adopted divergent positions on the Afghan issue, which contributed to tensions. During the 2000s, relations gradually improved; however, in January 2024, an armed incident occurred in which both sides launched missile strikes on each other’s territories, justifying their actions as counterterrorism operations. Nevertheless, the crisis was rapidly de-escalated, indicating the existence of functional mechanisms for conflict management. A significant improvement in relations took place in 2025 amid a series of regional crises, including a short-term war between Israel and Iran, as well as an armed confrontation between India and Pakistan. Pakistan adopted a more explicit position by condemning Israel’s actions, in contrast to India, which maintained neutrality. This strengthened the perception of Pakistan as a more predictable and reliable partner for Iran. At the same time, Pakistan began to demonstrate rapprochement with the United States. Notably, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, Asim Munir, visited the White House in June 2025 and held talks with President Trump.Furthermore, Pakistan proposed nominating Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize. This dual orientation in foreign policy enabled Pakistan to occupy a unique position as a “bridge” between Washington and Tehran. A key factor lies in Pakistan’s distinctive diplomatic status. Following the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Iran has lacked direct diplomatic relations with the United States. Under these circumstances, Iranian interests in the United States have traditionally been represented through Pakistani diplomatic channels.   Pakistan–United States Relations: From Tension to Pragmatic Rapprochement Historically, relations between the United States and Pakistan have been complex. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Washington repeatedly accused Islamabad of insufficient efforts in combating terrorism. The peak of tensions occurred in 2011, when U.S. forces eliminated the leader of Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, on Pakistani territory without prior notification to Pakistani authorities. Nevertheless, beginning in mid-2025, a gradual normalization of relations has been observed, driven by the pragmatic interests of both sides. Pakistan undertook a number of steps toward the Trump administration, which contributed to the restoration of political dialogue.   The Strategic Importance of the Middle East for Pakistan: Energy Dependence The Middle East holds critical importance for Pakistan, primarily in the energy domain. More than 80% of its imported oil originates from countries in the region, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, with the Strait of Hormuz serving as the key transit route. With the outbreak of the conflict on February 28, Iran significantly restricted maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, triggering a global energy crisis. For Pakistan, the consequences were particularly severe: by early April, fuel prices had risen by approximately 54%, leading to widespread social protests and intensifying inflationary pressures. An additional factor was the collective security agreement between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, concluded in September 2025. In essence, it resembles the principle of collective defense analogous to Article 5 of NATO. In the context of Iranian missile strikes on Saudi territory, Pakistan faced the risk of direct involvement in the conflict. Such a scenario could have led to large-scale escalation, including the activation of terrorist groups in the border regions of Balochistan and Sistan.   Pakistan’s Diplomatic Initiatives Pakistan actively promoted the negotiation process. An important step was the meeting of foreign ministersfrom Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan, initiated by Islamabad, aimed at developing potential scenarios for conflict resolution. Subsequently, Pakistan’s Deputy PM, Ishaq Dar, visited China, where the parties formulated a comprehensive settlement plan consisting of five key points designed to facilitate de-escalation and stabilization. The reconciliation achieved between the conflicting parties is expected to be further developed through negotiations in Islamabad, scheduled for April 10, with all sides having agreed to participate.   Conclusion In conclusion, Pakistan’s mediation efforts proved effective in facilitating conflict resolution. Owing to a unique combination of factors acceptable to both the American and Iranian governments, Pakistan emerged as a platform through which the conflicting parties were able to exchange information—something that previous negotiation rounds in Qatar and Oman had failed to achieve. Given the existential implications of the Iran–U.S. conflict for Pakistan, its authorities acted actively and decisively despite considerable challenges and pressure from both sides. Moreover, Pakistan engaged both regional and global actors, including China, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt, in its diplomatic initiatives. Thus, the success of Pakistan’s mediation can be attributed not only to its diplomatic efforts but also to a unique combination of strategic, economic, and geopolitical factors that positioned it as the most effective mediator within this particular configuration of the conflict. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Co-authored with Roksana Izzatova, UWED undergraduate and intern at IAIS The parliamentary elections held in Hungary on April 12 of the current year constitute an event whose significance is determined not so much by the country’s weight in the European economy, which accounts for approximately 1.1% of EU GDP and around 2% of the bloc’s population, as by the systemic role that Hungary has acquired in European politics over the sixteen years of V. Orbán’s rule. According to data following the count of approximately 99% of ballots, the opposition party “Tisza” led by P. Magyar is set to obtain a constitutional majority of 138 seats out of 199 in parliament, while V. Orbán’s “Fidesz” secures only 55 seats. High voter mobilisation and a record turnout of 79.5% proved to be among the key factors behind such a decisive result. I. Factors behind V. Orbán’s defeat and the transformation of the previous model. The electoral outcome is conditioned by a combination of internal and external factors that collectively undermined the stability of Viktor Orbán’s political system. First, anti-corruption mobilisation played a decisive role. According to independent researchers, over the years of Fidesz rule approximately €28 billion was diverted from the economy in favour of structures affiliated with the authorities. As a consequence, corruption came to be perceived as systemic and brazen, which eroded trust even among the traditional Fidesz electorate. Péter Magyar successfully capitalised on this demand politically, placing the fight against corruption at the centre of his campaign. Second, economic discontent constituted an important factor. Economic stagnation, rising prices accompanied by low wages, and the deteriorating state of healthcare and education intensified critical sentiments. This enabled the opposition to shift the campaign’s focus away from ideological issues towards everyday socioeconomic concerns. Third, the consolidation of the opposition and the specific character of the electoral system played a significant role. Unlike previous elections, opposition forces rallied around the Tisza party, making it possible to exploit a system previously adapted to the dominance of Fidesz. Fourth, the external political context and the “Trump effect” proved to be an important factor. Support from D. Trump and J. D. Vance, rather than strengthening Orbán’s position, turned out to be insufficiently effective. Against the backdrop of growing anti-American sentiment in Europe and tensions linked to US foreign policy, this association reduced the attractiveness of Fidesz for part of the electorate. Consequently, the transatlantic alignment of right-wing forces became a factor of electoral risk rather than an advantage. Fifth, a considerable role was played by the shift in perceptions of V. Orbán’s foreign policy orientation. His alignment with Russia, the blocking of EU decisions, and the critical rhetoric towards Ukraine came to be viewed as a factor of Hungary’s international isolation rather than as the defence of sovereignty. Sixth, sociodemographic changes, in particular the increased political activity of young people, were of significant importance. Up to two-thirds of voters under the age of 30 opposed V. Orbán, and the mass mobilisation of the urban electorate became one of the key factors in the opposition’s victory. II. Prospects for the Transformation of Hungary’s Political Course. At his first major press conference following the election victory, P. Magyar outlined the following priorities: The foremost priority is the earliest possible restoration of Hungary’s access to European Union funds, given that the European Commission has suspended the disbursement of €17 billion out of the €27 billion allocated to Hungary and has refused to approve Budapest’s plan for a €150 billion credit instrument intended to stimulate defence production in the bloc’s member states. To that end, he presented a four-component plan encompassing anti-corruption measures, accession to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, the restoration of the independence of the judiciary and investigative institutions, the guarantee of press freedom, as well as the depoliticisation of universities and the protection of academic freedom. The second major direction identified by P. Magyar is consideration of Hungary’s accession to the eurozone. He linked this issue to the objective of macroeconomic stabilisation, while emphasising that a final decision should be made following an assessment of the budgetary position and consultations with economic stakeholders. With regard to Ukraine, he made clear that Budapest would seek to normalise bilateral relations and expressed readiness for political dialogue with Kyiv. He simultaneously emphasised that Ukraine should not be compelled to accept peace on the basis of territorial concessions, while also declaring his opposition to Ukraine’s accelerated accession to the EU in the foreseeable future. Magyar also stated that he supports Hungary’s withdrawal from the EU’s €90 billion credit package programme for Ukraine, citing Hungary’s poor budgetary position. Despite more critical rhetoric directed at Moscow, the prime minister-elect made clear that in energy policy Hungary would proceed primarily from economic expediency. He declared his intention to continue purchasing Russian energy resources if they remain the most cost-effective option, indicating the preservation of elements of pragmatic continuity even as the overall foreign policy tone undergoes a general change. On the migration issue, P. Magyar effectively confirmed the course of strict border control. He came out against the EU Migration Pact, announced his intention to maintain the border fence on the southern frontier, and made clear that the new government does not intend to accept intra-EU mechanisms for the distribution of irregular migrants. It was also underscored that Hungary must resolve the matter of daily fines amounting to €1 million, which it faces for non-compliance with a previous ruling of the European Court of Justice concerning the treatment of migrants. At the same time, Hungary’s policy within the OTS will in all likelihood maintain institutional continuity, yet acquire a more pragmatic and depoliticised character. Budapest is unlikely to withdraw from the organisation, given Hungary’s status as an observer state, the presence of an OTS representation in Budapest, and the already well-established network of economic, educational, and politico-diplomatic contacts. The new course will be built not on exploiting the Turkic vector as a symbol of foreign policy alternative to Brussels, but on its functionalisation as a channel for transport, investment, energy, and educational cooperation. In this sense, Hungary under P. Magyar may retain the role of a European partner within the OTS, albeit in a less ideologised and more coherent form aligned with the general European line. Thus, Hungary is transitioning from the model of “confrontational sovereignism” to a model of limited pro-European pragmatism. In domestic policy, the key task will be the reform of Fidesz’s institutional legacy. Over the years of V. Orbán’s rule, entrenched mechanisms of control were established ranging from constitutional norms to a network of loyal actors in the economy and the media. Even with a constitutional majority, the new authorities will encounter institutional resistance. Nevertheless, reforms of the judicial system and the restoration of the rule of law, the depoliticisation of the media and the curtailment of oligarchic structures’ influence, anti-corruption reforms, and a revision of the public procurement system are all to be expected. III. European and International Implications. These elections may be assessed as an indicator of the resilience of the nationalist wave in Central Europe. The change of power in Budapest will inevitably prompt a recalibration of political calculations for a broad range of actors. The results of the elections in Hungary carry consequences that extend far beyond the national level. First, they signify a weakening of the right-wing populist bloc in Europe. V. Orbán was a key figure for Eurosceptic and nationalist forces, including parties in France, Germany, and Italy. His departure from power reduces their institutional influence and reshapes the configuration of transnational networks of right-wing movements. Second, the elections reflect a crisis of the transatlantic right-wing alliance. Support for V. Orbán from the Trump Administration and American conservatives not only failed to assist him but actually became a risk factor. This may have implications for the United States as well, where Democrats are already interpreting the election results as a potential signal for domestic politics. Third, of significance is the redistribution of power within the EU. The opposition’s victory strengthens the position of the European Commission and reduces the influence of states inclined to block decisions. This may accelerate decision-making on Ukraine, sanctions policy, and questions of the rule of law. Fourth, the consequences for Russia are of a dual nature. On the one hand, Moscow loses one of its partners within the EU; on the other, the pragmatic course of P. Magyar and the persisting energy interdependence mean that Russia will retain channels of influence, albeit in a more limited form. IV. Implications for Central Asia and Uzbekistan. For Central Asia, the maintenance of a stable liberal-pro-European orientation within the EU would be of generally positive significance. Above all, this creates a more reliable foundation for the long-term access of Central Asian states to grant resources, concessional financing, technical assistance, and blended finance instruments, and increases the likelihood that already announced initiatives will not be impeded by political disputes within the EU. In practical terms, this yields several advantages for the region. First, more consistent progress on infrastructure and logistics projects becomes more probable, above all along the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor, which the EU regards as a strategically important direction for diversifying routes and supply chains. Second, the basis for financing projects in the areas of water management, climate resilience, and energy modernisation is strengthened: the EIB has already announced its intention to provide €365 million, which is expected to mobilise up to €1 billion in investments in sustainable transport, water management, and climate resilience in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Third, European support in the field of human capital is preserved and expanded through the DARÍA and Erasmus+ programmes, which is of particular importance for workforce training, university mobility, and the adaptation of the regional economy to new technological requirements. Collectively, this strengthens the international agency of Central Asia: the region gains the opportunity to engage with Brussels not as a collection of disparate states, but as a more disciplined and resource-endowed centre of power with a long-term interest in the region. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.