As Dr. Islomkhon Gafarov and Bositkhon Islamov argue in their policy brief on Geopolitika.no, the evolving dynamics between Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2025 reflect a complex interplay of coercive diplomacy, regional rivalries, and domestic insecurities. Following the Kashmir escalation in April–May 2025, relations between Islamabad and Kabul entered a phase of what the authors call “forced cooperation”. While Pakistani authorities claimed tactical success in managing the Kashmir front, the brief underscores that this stability is conditional on calm along the Afghan border. The authors point to Pakistan’s elevation of the Afghan Taliban envoy’s status to ambassador as a defensive maneuver meant to pre-empt any Afghan-Indian rapprochement that could leave Islamabad regionally isolated.
Dr. Gafarov and Mr. Islamov emphasize the significance of China’s diplomatic engagement, particularly the informal trilateral meeting hosted in Beijing in May 2025. Chaired by Foreign Minister Wang Yi, this initiative aims not only to preserve Chinese interests, such as the security of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, but also to reshape the regional balance through a nascent Beijing-Kabul-Islamabad axis. Yet the authors caution that structural impediments to Afghan-Pakistani cooperation remain acute, foremost among them the threat posed by Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). With operational bases reportedly spread across Kunar, Nangarhar, Khost, and Paktika provinces, and links to al-Qaeda and ISKP, the TTP has become a transnational destabilizer whose reach has grown precisely because of the lack of coordinated counterterrorism between the two states.
The brief further highlights how the security conflict is assuming new technological dimensions, noting with concern the emergence of Taliban drone capabilities allegedly developed at repurposed Western military installations in Kabul and Logar. With technical support traced to Russia, Iran, and China, this innovation marks a shift toward proxy warfare marked by deniability and technological escalation. In parallel, Baloch separatism, particularly the operations of the BLA, adds a layer of internal vulnerability to Pakistan’s strategic calculus, with attacks on transport infrastructure and railways threatening the viability of long-term regional integration projects such as CPEC and TAPI.
A particularly troubling trend identified by the authors is the emergence of a new militant actor, Tehrik-e-Taliban Kashmir (TTK), which aims to destabilize both India and Pakistan in pursuit of an Islamist order. Dr. Gafarov and Mr. Islamov argue that the group’s potential links to the Afghan Taliban could not only rupture Kabul’s fragile relations with Islamabad but also jeopardize its emerging diplomatic engagements with India and China. Compounding these threats is Pakistan’s mass deportation campaign against Afghan refugees, which the authors view as both a humanitarian crisis and a security liability, as displaced populations become vulnerable to recruitment by extremist factions operating in under-governed Afghan territories.
Ultimately, the authors conclude that mounting tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan pose a direct challenge to regional connectivity and development. Cross-border trade disruptions, disputes over transboundary water management, and insecurity along strategic corridors such as Balochistan and the Durand Line jeopardize major infrastructure efforts including CASA-1000 and TAPI. While the Termez–Kabul route is deemed the most viable corridor in the short term, sustained instability could force regional actors to redirect investments toward more reliable alternatives such as the Iranian port of Chabahar. Thus, despite episodic diplomatic gestures and Chinese mediation, Dr. Gafarov and Mr. Islamov portray a regional order where mistrust, militancy, and misaligned interests continue to outpace cooperation.
* The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.
