The brief by Abdugani Karimov examines Japan’s political trajectory after the appointment of Sanae Takaichi as Japan’s first female prime minister in October 2025.  It frames her leadership as a shift from cautious pacifism towards “proactive governance” that blends economic intervention, strategic autonomy, and a renewed emphasis on national identity—an approach the author conceptualises as “strategic conservatism.” A substantial part of the brief is devoted to Takaichi’s domestic agenda, presented as a state-led effort to restore growth and public confidence. It highlights fiscal measures such as abolishing the temporary gasoline tax, raising the income-tax exemption threshold, piloting refundable tax credits, and deploying a supplementary budget of roughly 14 trillion yen to support domestic demand and digital infrastructure.  The paper identifies the most consequential economic-security linkage in the return to nuclear energy, including a plan to restart at least 17 reactors by 2030, supported—according to an NHK poll cited in the brief—by 54% of respondents (37% opposed), signalling a notable shift in public attitudes after Fukushima. On foreign and security policy, the brief describes a move from “cautious pacifism” to “controlled assertiveness,” reflected in goals such as raising defence spending to 2% of GDP and prioritising cyber/space defence integration, a Strategic Intelligence Agency, and counter-strike capabilities.  It also outlines a calibrated approach to China via the “three-D” formula—Deterrence, Dialogue, Diversification—combining firmness on sovereignty and technology with maintained diplomatic channels to avoid open confrontation. Finally, the brief argues that Japan’s Central Asia policy under Takaichi is shifting from “quiet diplomacy” to a more multidimensional strategy that connects culture with technology, infrastructure, energy security, and indirect security engagement.  Central Asia is presented as both an energy and logistics corridor and a “balancing platform” amid China’s expanding presence, with the potential revival of the “Central Asia + Japan” framework serving as a vehicle for supply-chain resilience, human-capital development, and high-quality infrastructure cooperation. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Nargiza Umarova explores how transport integration between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan has become both a driver of regional connectivity and a source of strategic competition in Eurasian transit politics. It situates bilateral cooperation in the broader transformation of Central Asian regionalism since 2016, when Uzbekistan reoriented its foreign policy towards deeper engagement with its neighbours and prioritised Central Asia as the core vector of its diplomacy. Within this renewed framework, Tashkent has consistently promoted a vision of Central Asia as a stable and interconnected region, where intraregional trade growth and expanded transit capacity reinforce one another. The brief shows how this vision is reflected in national strategies, including Uzbekistan’s Transport Strategy to 2035, which emphasises the alignment of national transport and communication systems as a precondition for unlocking the region’s full transit potential. The study provides a detailed overview of the current state of transport connectivity between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, underscoring the structural asymmetries created by Uzbekistan’s double-landlocked status and Kazakhstan’s advantageous geography, seaports and direct rail links to both China and Russia. Despite these asymmetries, the two countries have made notable progress in integrating their transport systems, as seen in the growth of bilateral trade to over USD 4.3 billion by the end of 2024 and the expansion of joint infrastructure projects. Key initiatives such as the planned Uchkuduk–Kyzylorda corridor, the Darbaza–Maktaaral railway to decongest the Saryagash checkpoint, the Beineu–Shalkar highway, and the newly launched International Center for Industrial Cooperation “Central Asia” illustrate how connectivity projects are intended not only to shorten distances and reduce travel times, but also to turn border regions into new hubs of industrial and logistics activity linked to transcontinental routes. At the same time, Umarova demonstrates that this integration is accompanied by intensifying competition over control of transit flows and strategic corridors. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are simultaneously partners and rivals in shaping the geography of Eurasian transport, particularly along the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (Middle Corridor) and emerging Trans-Afghan links to South Asia. Kazakhstan’s long-standing institutionalisation of the TITR and its ambition to remain the primary logistics hub of Eurasia contrast with Uzbekistan’s efforts to diversify access routes via multimodal corridors that bypass existing Kazakh monopolies, including the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan highway and the planned railway on the Kashgar–Torugart–Makmal–Jalal-Abad–Andijan axis. Parallel initiatives – such as the CASCA+ corridor and competing Afghan transit schemes – risk fragmenting governance frameworks, duplicating infrastructure and diluting Central Asia’s collective bargaining power with external actors like China, the European Union, Turkey and Gulf partners. In its policy conclusions, the brief argues that without stronger coordination mechanisms between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, the region may fall short of realising its full potential as a central bridge in Eurasian connectivity. Umarova calls for the alignment of tariff policies, customs digitalisation, and transport strategies; the creation of unified supervisory structures for Trans-Caspian transit that can reconcile CASCA+ with TITR; and a mutually agreed architecture for Trans-Afghan routes to the Indian Ocean that avoids a zero-sum race for transit rents. She also highlights the importance of reviving earlier regional proposals for a joint strategy and institutional frameworks on transport communications, potentially under UN auspices. Ultimately, the experience of Uzbekistan–Kazakhstan relations is presented as a microcosm of transport-driven regionalism in Central Asia: genuine progress in integration is evident, but only a cooperative, rather than competitive, approach will enable the region to consolidate its position as a resilient and indispensable connector between Europe and Asia. Read on Turan Research Center * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

This policy brief by Saodat Umarova, PhD candidate at the University of World Economy and Diplomacy (UWED), examines how economic and energy cooperation with the European Union has become a key expression of Uzbekistan’s emerging “Western vector” in foreign policy. Against the backdrop of intensifying geopolitical competition and Central Asia’s search for diversified partnerships, the study situates Uzbekistan–EU relations within broader regional dynamics, showing how Tashkent increasingly looks to Europe not only as a market, but as a strategic partner in reform, modernisation and connectivity. The brief first traces the evolution from the 1999 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement to the new Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA), signed in 2025, which upgrades the relationship to a more institutionalised and strategic level. It highlights how the EPCA and Uzbekistan’s accession to the EU’s GSP+ scheme in 2021 have reshaped the legal and economic foundations of bilateral ties, accelerating trade growth and improving market access for Uzbek exports. Particular attention is given to the way trade preferences and regulatory convergence create both opportunities and obligations, linking economic benefits to progress on governance, labour rights and the rule of law. A central part of the analysis is devoted to strategic sectors of cooperation that will define the future architecture of the partnership: energy, the green transition, critical raw materials and digital connectivity. The brief shows how European investment and technology support Uzbekistan’s ambitions in renewables and green hydrogen, while cooperation on critical minerals and infrastructure projects opens pathways for Uzbekistan’s integration into higher value-added segments of global supply chains. At the same time, EU-backed initiatives in digitalisation, cybersecurity and e-governance reinforce Uzbekistan’s bid to position itself as a regional digital and logistics hub. Finally, the author places the bilateral agenda within the larger framework of EU–Central Asia connectivity strategies and Global Gateway investments, underlining both the scale of potential benefits and the structural challenges. She points to the need for sustained reforms in Uzbekistan, credible implementation of EU financial commitments, and careful geopolitical balancing vis-à-vis Russia, China and other external actors. Overall, the brief presents Uzbekistan–EU cooperation as a revealing test case of Uzbekistan’s multi-vector diplomacy: a promising Western-oriented trajectory that can strengthen the country’s resilience and modernisation, provided that both sides manage expectations and maintain long-term political and economic commitment. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Aziza Mukhammedova and Raykhona Abdullaeva examine India’s cautious yet consequential political rapprochement with the Taliban, set against the backdrop of accelerating shifts in South Asia’s geopolitical landscape. It takes as its starting point the 10 October 2025 meeting in New Delhi between Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi – the first high-level bilateral encounter since the Taliban’s return to power in Kabul in August 2021. The authors argue that India’s decision to upgrade its technical mission in Kabul to the level of an embassy does not signal imminent de jure recognition of the Taliban regime, but instead reflects a deliberately calibrated strategy of “maximum engagement without recognition,” allowing New Delhi to protect core interests while maintaining formal political distance.   A key emphasis of the brief is India’s reliance on economic and humanitarian instruments as tools of soft power in Afghanistan. Drawing on trade data from Afghanistan’s National Statistics and Information Authority, the authors show that Afghanistan runs a rare and growing trade surplus with India, making New Delhi a vital source of foreign currency and deepening Kabul’s structural dependence on Indian markets. India’s delivery of wheat, vaccines, medical supplies and other aid since 2021 has further consolidated its image as Afghanistan’s principal humanitarian partner. This blend of trade asymmetry and sustained humanitarian engagement, the brief contends, enables India to lock in influence in Afghanistan while avoiding the political costs of formal recognition of the Taliban, particularly in light of ongoing human rights violations, including gender-based restrictions.   The brief situates this Afghan policy within a wider regional reconfiguration in which India seeks to offset the tightening China–Pakistan axis and emerging subregional alignments. It highlights the rapid warming of relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh, facilitated and encouraged by Beijing, and the deepening of Sino-Pakistani cooperation through the Belt and Road Initiative and the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor. These trends risk marginalising India from key trade and transport routes and heightening its geoeconomic isolation. Simultaneously, the United States’ fluctuating sanctions policy on Iran’s Chabahar port constrains India’s preferred connectivity strategy to Central Asia. Against this backdrop, closer ties with Kabul become less an optional vector of influence and more a strategic necessity for India to retain access to the wider Eurasian space.   In its conclusion the authors argue that India’s engagement with the Taliban is best understood as a defensive adaptation to an unfavourable regional environment rather than a normative shift in favour of the current Afghan authorities. New Delhi is portrayed as operating under conditions in which it can no longer freely choose its partners, but must instead optimise limited options. The authors suggest that India will likely continue to deepen economic and humanitarian ties with Afghanistan while deferring any decision on formal recognition until broader international legitimacy for the Taliban emerges, if at all. In the meantime, India’s Afghan policy remains a high-stakes experiment in damage limitation – an attempt to preserve strategic relevance in a region where other actors increasingly shape the balance of power.   Read on The Diplomat   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Nargiza Umarova’s policy brief examines how Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are increasingly positioning themselves as a joint transport and transit hub linking Central Asia with Iran, the Middle East, and Europe. It highlights Turkmenistan’s pivotal geographical role in connecting Central Asian states to the “warm seas” and underscores the significance of key rail routes such as the Tejen–Serakhs–Mashhad line, which first opened access for Uzbek exporters to global markets via Iran’s Bandar Abbas port. The brief also stresses Tashkent’s growing interest in the Chabahar deep-water port and the broader International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), where Turkmenistan benefits from the Kazakhstan–Turkmenistan–Iran railway as a core north–south axis.   A major focus is placed on emerging multimodal corridors that reinforce this Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan tandem. The Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan–Iran–Türkiye route, on which the first freight train travelled from Tashkent in December 2022, is presented as a promising land bridge to Europe, further consolidated by a 2023 protocol among the four participating states. At the same time, China-supported routes – including China–Kazakhstan–Turkmenistan–Iran–Türkiye and China–Kazakhstan–Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan–Iran–Türkiye – demonstrate Beijing’s interest in diversifying westward supply chains. The policy brief argues that the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway, now under construction, could significantly reconfigure these flows in favour of Tashkent and Bishkek, while Tajikistan’s ambition to connect via new highways will deepen the region’s role in Eurasian connectivity.   The brief pays special attention to Turkmenistan’s modern port infrastructure, particularly the Turkmenbashi port on the Caspian Sea, which is integral to the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), or Middle Corridor. Against the backdrop of geopolitical tensions and disruptions to key maritime chokepoints such as the Suez Canal and the Strait of Malacca, the author notes a gradual reorientation of some cargo flows from sea to land. In this context, growing freight volumes along the Middle Corridor – projected by the World Bank to more than double by 2030 – create new opportunities for Uzbekistan, including potential annual transit of up to 1.3 million tons of its cargo to Europe via trans-Caspian routes through Turkmenbashi.   Finally, the brief analyses Uzbekistan’s proactive use of transport diplomacy to institutionalise these connectivity initiatives. It emphasises Tashkent’s role in launching the CASCA+ (Central Asia–South Caucasus–Anatolia) corridor, designed to leverage the combined railway and maritime infrastructure of Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye. The recent decision to establish a CASCA+ consortium and to develop a unified digital transport platform, discussed at a ministerial meeting in Tashkent in November 2025, is presented as a key step toward improving logistics efficiency and strengthening the competitive position of Central Asian and South Caucasian states. Overall, the policy brief portrays Uzbekistan as a consistent advocate of regional interconnectivity, using close cooperation with Turkmenistan to build a joint transport and transit “tandem” that supports both economic diversification and broader regional consolidation.   Read on The Diplomat   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In her policy brief “Uzbekistan May Benefit from Herat to Mazar-i-Sharif Railway Project”, published by Jamestown Foundation, Nargiza Umarova analyses the recent agreement between Afghanistan, Iran and Türkiye to jointly build a railway line from Herat to Mazar-i-Sharif as part of the Five Nations Railway Corridor (FNRC) and explores its strategic implications for Uzbekistan. She shows that the FNRC, which connects China with Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Iran and further on to Türkiye and Europe, is conceived as one of the shortest land routes between East Asia and Europe. As such, it not only strengthens Tehran’s and Kabul’s ambitions to deepen trade with China and diversify their eastern trade routes, but also creates a new configuration of East–West connectivity that competes with existing Central Asian transit routes, including the Trans-Caspian “Middle Corridor.”   Umarova argues that this emerging architecture has profound consequences for Uzbekistan’s role as a transit state. On the one hand, the Herat–Mazar-i-Sharif railway could open up new opportunities for Tashkent by providing more direct access to Iran’s road network and seaports, potentially bypassing Turkmenistan and shortening the distance to key export markets. On the other hand, if Uzbekistan remains outside the FNRC, cargo flows between China and Europe may increasingly be redirected via Tajikistan and Iran, eroding Uzbekistan’s current position as a major overland transit hub. The author illustrates this with the gradual development of the Khaf–Herat railway, which already allows significant volumes of cargo to pass between Iran, Afghanistan and European markets and could, if extended north and east, link more tightly to Central Asian and Chinese networks.   The brief places these dynamics in the context of Uzbekistan’s own, sometimes inconsistent, railway diplomacy in Afghanistan. Umarova recalls that Tashkent initially backed the Mazar-i-Sharif–Sheberghan–Maimana–Herat railway project, signed in 2017 and intended to connect to the Khaf–Herat line, but later shifted its attention to an alternative trans-Afghan “Kabul Corridor” towards Pakistan. In parallel, Afghanistan and Tajikistan agreed on a Sher Khan Bandar–Jaloliddini Balkhi line that has stalled due to financing constraints. After the Taliban’s return to power, new proposals emerged, including a Mazar–Herat–Kandahar line pitched to Russia and statements about possible Uzbek participation, but with no clear confirmation from Tashkent. Umarova highlights that the choice of track gauge (1,520 mm CIS standard if built by Russia or Uzbekistan versus 1,435 mm European standard if built by Iran and Türkiye) symbolises competing visions: integrating Afghanistan either into the CIS-centric North–South grid or primarily into the FNRC East–West axis.   In conclusion, Umarova contends that the simultaneous development of the FNRC and of the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway, which is expected to shorten the China–Europe route by roughly 900 kilometres when linked to the Southern Corridor via Iran and Türkiye, creates both a risk and a window of opportunity for Uzbekistan. If Tashkent does not actively seek involvement in the FNRC—potentially through a China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan–Tajikistan–Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Iran chain—it may see transit flows bypass its territory. If, however, it positions itself as a bridge between the new East–West corridor and existing Central Asian and Eurasian routes, Uzbekistan can become a direct beneficiary of the Herat–Mazar-i-Sharif railway and consolidate its status as a key node in the evolving Eurasian transport system.   Read on Jamestown Foundation   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.