The accelerating campaign for the US Congressional elections this November highlights deepening partisan polarization and a profound structural realignment of the American political system. Formally, the Republican Party retains control over both houses of Congress and the executive branch, but its political capabilities are increasingly constrained by internal divisions, growing public dissatisfaction with the administration's foreign policy course, and mounting socio-economic pressure. At the same time, the Democratic Party, despite its own internal heterogeneity, is gaining an opportunity to consolidate on an anti-Trump platform and use the White House's managerial missteps as a factor for electoral mobilization. A distinct feature of the current period is that the struggle is unfolding simultaneously on several levels. The first level is the interparty confrontation between Republicans and Democrats for control of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The second level is the intraparty struggle among the Republicans themselves—between the pro-Trump MAGA wing, centrists, and traditional conservatives. The third level is the internal redistribution of roles within the Democratic Party among the traditional party establishment, moderates, and left-leaning progressive groups. Collectively, this makes the Congressional elections not merely a contest of party machines, but an arena for a broader conflict over the future configuration of American power. The Republican Party. A key feature of the modern Republican camp remains its high dependence on the figure of Donald Trump. In its current form, MAGA is not a classic ideological platform of American conservatism, but a personalized political structure in which the central source of legitimacy is Trump himself, his rhetoric, his behavioral style, and his ability to sustain the mobilization of the most active segment of the party's electorate. This provides Republicans with short-term mobilization energy, but simultaneously weakens the institutional resilience of the party itself, as intraparty loyalty is increasingly built not around a stable platform, but around political devotion to the leader. Against this backdrop, three distinct lines are becoming increasingly apparent within the Republican Party. The first is the core pro-Trump faction, ready to support any agenda changes as long as they come from Donald Trump. The second consists of more establishment conservatives and party pragmatists, for whom the electoral popularity of candidates, control over Congress, and the governability of institutions remain the priorities. The third is the provisional post-Trump wing, which has not yet taken organizational shape but is already tied to the question of who will inherit the Republican base once Donald Trump's political cycle concludes. It is precisely at the intersection of these vectors that the main intraparty struggle is unfolding. An additional factor driving growing intraparty tension is the Iranian campaign, which has exacerbated the contradiction between foreign policy hawks and electoral pragmatists within the administration and the party. A segment of the Republican establishment operates on the premise that betting on military escalation demonstrates resolve and bolsters the image of a strong government. Another segment, conversely, associates the war with rising domestic costs, deteriorating public sentiment, and the risk of defeat in the Congressional elections. In this context, even the cautious distancing of certain figures—such as Vice President J.D. Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio—from the Iranian policy line should be viewed not as an isolated incident, but as a symptom of a deepening divergence between ideological mobilization and electoral calculation. A serious indicator of this problem has been the personnel turbulence within the executive branch. The resignation of Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem demonstrated that even the most sensitive and traditionally advantageous areas for Republicans—primarily immigration policy and homeland security—are ceasing to function automatically as a resource for consolidation. On the contrary, amidst scandals, managerial failures, and public conflict, they are beginning to be associated with the instability of the administration itself. This is particularly sensitive for the election campaign, as the immigration issue remains a core element of Republican identity. Another factor of intraparty tension has been tariff policy. Within the MAGA sphere, protectionism remains a crucial element of economic nationalism and a symbol of the struggle to restore the US industrial base. However, the Supreme Court ruling striking down the tariffs imposed by Donald Trump, along with plaintiffs' demands for the refund of substantial sums associated with their application, demonstrate that Trump's trade policy is no longer perceived exclusively as a political asset. The gap between the mobilization benefits of tough tariff rhetoric and its actual administrative, legal, and economic consequences is becoming increasingly apparent. As a result, the divergence between proponents of ideological loyalty to the protectionist course and the interests of more pragmatic business groups is widening within the Republican Party. The Democratic Party. Unlike the Republicans, the crisis facing the Democrats is not personalist but coalitional in nature. The Democratic Party comprises the party establishment, moderate centrists, left-wing progressives, and a radical wing that opposes corporations and military conflicts. Under normal circumstances, such fragmentation would create significant difficulties in formulating a unified strategy. However, at present, the shared rejection of Donald Trump pushes internal disputes to the background and unites the party into a broad coalition. The political logic of the Democrats is built around several interconnected vectors. First, the defense of institutions and portraying Donald Trump as a figure accelerating the erosion of traditional mechanisms of American democracy. Second, the effort to link the White House's foreign policy course with domestic socio-economic consequences, primarily the rising cost of living. Third, the use of anti-war and anti-crisis rhetoric to mobilize both moderate and progressive voters. As a result, Democrats are gaining the opportunity to unite various party segments around a common thesis: the current administration is increasing external risks without offering society either a sustainable strategy or domestic economic compensation. Despite this, internal differences within the Democratic Party have not disappeared. The party center and traditional establishment tend to emphasize restoring predictable governance, defending the rule of law, and institutional containment of the administration. The left wing seeks to use the situation to expand the social agenda, criticize the militarization of foreign policy, and exert pressure on corporate-financial groups. Nevertheless, in the short term, these differences serve to broaden the electoral reach rather than disorganize the party. Moderates and progressives appeal to different voter segments, but in the current cycle, they operate within a shared anti-Trump framework. The Iranian Crisis as a Factor in Political Polarization. The key external factor accelerating domestic political confrontation has been the war with Iran. Unlike the traditional "rally 'round the flag" logic, the military campaign has not led to an increase in support for the administration. In the early weeks of the conflict, support for military action remained consistently low or fluctuated at a level that failed to form a stable public majority. In most polls, approval for the military campaign stood in the range of about 40%, while the share of those opposed was significantly higher. Furthermore, the most stable characteristic of public opinion has been not merely lukewarm support, but extremely high partisan polarization regarding the conflict. Among Republicans, support for the strike on Iran remained high, whereas nearly unanimous opposition prevailed among Democrats. Independent voters also leaned more frequently toward a critical or cautious stance. This indicates that the conflict did not become an issue of national security capable of temporarily suspending partisan divisions. On the contrary, the war entered American politics from the outset as a polarizing factor, amplifying the already existing fault lines between and within the parties. A significant factor has been the problem of strategic communication: the administration failed to foster a clear public understanding of the campaign's ultimate goals. In an environment of informational uncertainty, voters are inclined to rely not on a rational assessment of the policy course, but on their baseline level of trust in the president. As a result, military actions are perceived by a substantial portion of the electorate not as a consolidating factor, but as a risky maneuver that deepens the internal divide. The Energy Shock and its Electoral Consequences. The most palpable channel through which the external crisis has transformed into a domestic political problem is the rise in fuel prices. The energy shock in the US has taken on not only a macroeconomic but also a direct electoral dimension. The rising cost of gasoline and diesel rapidly affected traditionally Democratic and Republican states alike, as well as swing states. Crucially, the impact hit not only coastal regions sensitive to foreign supplies, but also those states upon which the outcome of the battle for Congress heavily depends. Foreign policy escalation has morphed into a matter of everyday well-being in the minds of citizens. For a significant portion of the electorate, the conflict with Iran ceased to be a question of geopolitics, having transformed into a catalyst for inflation and reduced purchasing power. This poses a critical challenge for Donald Trump's administration, whose political capital is rooted in the promise of economic stability. The contradiction between the foreign policy course and domestic economic priorities threatens the cohesion of the Republican electoral base. As a consequence, Congress is becoming an arena not only for competition between the two parties but also for a more complex conflict between different models of US political development. For Republicans, the struggle is simultaneously about maintaining their majority and determining whether the party will remain an instrument of personal mobilization around Donald Trump or begin to return to a more institutional model. For Democrats, the task lies not only in securing mandates but also in utilizing the electoral cycle as a mechanism for institutional containment of the White House. Of particular significance is the fact that interparty conflict is increasingly intertwining with intraparty struggles. Any administration decision regarding Iran, tariffs, immigration, or personnel matters immediately impacts not only relations between Republicans and Democrats but also the balance of power within the parties themselves. This is exactly what makes the current cycle qualitatively different. It is unfolding not as a battle between two relatively cohesive political blocs, but as a multiple overlay of external conflict, intraparty fragmentation, institutional overload, and public distrust. Thus, the 2026 US Congressional election campaign reflects not merely another phase of electoral competition, but a broader crisis within the American political system. At the interparty level, it takes the form of a clash between the Republican model of personalized mobilization and the Democratic coalition of institutional containment. At the intraparty level, the conflict among the pro-Trump core, the center, and potential successors of the post-Trump era is intensifying within the Republican ranks, while Democrats are temporarily smoothing over their own contradictions through shared anti-Trump consolidation. The Iranian crisis, rising fuel prices, the administration's personnel instability, disputes over tariff policy, and the upcoming renewal of Congress heighten the sense of managerial overload within the American system. Under these conditions, the battle for the House of Representatives and the Senate becomes a struggle not only over the distribution of mandates but also over which model of political governance will dominate the US in the coming years. This is precisely why the 2026 elections should be viewed as a crucial milestone in the transformation of American politics. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The report “Employment and Social Trends 2026” prepared by the Department of Macroeconomic Policy and Jobs of the ILO Research Department reveals an interesting phenomenon about how the labor market changes in a stable economic situation. At first glance, the global economic system appears to be functioning with remarkable stability. Looking ahead to 2026, the global unemployment rate is projected to remain at a historically low 4.9%. In the traditional lexicon of twentieth-century economics, this would be hailed as a triumph. However, this “resilience” is a mathematical mask—a mirage that obscures a deepening crisis of job quality and social equity. While the headline figures suggest stability, the ground reality for billions is defined by “decent work deficits”. We are currently operating in a climate of “high uncertainty”, where economic and trade policy volatility has effectively frozen the progress of the last two decades. The resilience we see is not the resilience of flourishing markets, but a stagnant equilibrium where the momentum for better working conditions has ground to a halt. For half a century, the social contract of the developed world was anchored in a single, unwavering promise: an advanced education is your shield against economic obsolescence. Generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) has not just dented this shield; it is arguably melting it down. We are witnessing a startling paradox where workers with advanced education in high-income countries face higher automation risks than their less-educated peers. This is particularly acute for the 15-24 age demographic. Young graduates, who traditionally used “entry-level” roles as a springboard into high-skilled careers, now find those very roles being automated. This is more than a labor market shift; it is the death of the traditional meritocratic contract. In high-income economies, the specific occupational structures—built on information processing and cognitive routine—are precisely the territories AI is now colonizing. The “educational shield” has become a target. The most harrowing evidence of our stalled progress is found in the depths of working poverty. Globally, 284 million workers still live on less than US$3 a day. The “crawling pace” of progress here is staggering: while extreme working poverty declined by 15 percentage points in the decade prior to 2015, that progress has plummeted to a mere 3.1 percentage point decline over the last ten years. Even more disturbing is the geographical divergence of this suffering. While the global aggregate suggests slow improvement, the share of extreme working poor in low-income countries actually rose by 0.8 percentage points between 2015 and 2025. This data shatters the illusion that growth at the top eventually secures dignity at the bottom. “Relying on economic growth alone is insufficient to deliver meaningful progress in decent work.” — Gilbert F. Houngbo, ILO Director-General. The global labor market is trapped in a two-speed demographic crisis that further distorts our understanding of “resilience”. In high-income countries, the labor force is shrinking and ageing. This creates a “mirage” of stability: the 4.9% unemployment rate is maintained not by a surge in job creation, but by a structural decline in the number of available workers as the population retires. Conversely, low-income countries are home to a massive cohort of young people. This should be a “demographic dividend”—a surge of human potential to drive GDP. Instead, it is a missed opportunity. Weak productivity growth in these regions means the economy cannot absorb this talent into quality roles, leaving a generation of young workers with high expectations and no viable path to the middle class. Perhaps the greatest roadblock to global social justice is the “informality trap”, now ensnaring 2.1 billion workers—57.7% of the global workforce. These individuals exist in the economic shadows, devoid of social protection, workplace safety, or legal recourse. Worryingly, global informality is trending upward due to a “composition effect”. Global employment is currently growing fastest in Africa and Southern Asia—the very regions where informality is already the norm. As the center of gravity for the global workforce shifts toward these regions, the aggregate quality of work declines. This structural shift acts as an anchor, dragging down global standards even as individual nations attempt to modernize. Trade, once the primary ladder for developing nations, has become a source of profound volatility. Trade policy uncertainty (TPU) is now a direct tax on the worker’s wallet. ILO modelling indicates that moderate increases in TPU reduce real wages for both skilled and unskilled labor. The impact is geographically surgical: income losses reach up to 0.45% in South-Eastern Asia and 0.3% in Europe and Southern Asia. While digitally delivered services offer a rare growth spot—now reaching 14.5% of global exports—the broader ability to fix these labor market fractures is being choked by an “invisible hand”: rising sovereign debt. Global public debt is projected to surpass 100% of global GDP by 2029. The growing debt burden limits governments’ financial resources, which in turn restricts their ability to invest in education, social protection, and the "social justice" programs needed to reduce the gap in decent work. The evidence suggests that GDP growth has become an ineffective tool, unable to create a future of dignity for the majority. A “resilient” economy that permits working poverty to rise in its most vulnerable regions while high-skilled graduates face automation is not a successful economy; it is a stagnant one.True resilience requires a paradigm shift that moves beyond raw production toward the deliberate reduction of work deficits. We must move from data to action, acknowledging that if the most educated are now the most exposed, and the most resilient economies are the most stagnant, the old rules no longer apply. Are we prepared for a world where the traditional path to success has become a dead end, and the “invisible hand” of debt is the only thing left guiding our fiscal future? Consequently, Uzbekistan's policy must shift toward a strategy that combines education reform with the changing labor market, focusing on the creation of high-quality, formal, and promising jobs rather than relying solely on economic growth measures. The government must, in particular, align higher education and vocational training with prevailing trends of digitalization and automation, prioritizing the development of non-routine, analytical, and technological competencies, while simultaneously taking measures to mitigate the informal economy and expand social protection. This course of action is justified by the fact that traditional education does not guarantee employment security, that shortcomings in job quality persist despite stable macroeconomic indicators, and that without targeted intervention, Uzbekistan risks underutilizing its demographic potential and facing similar stagnation dynamics observed globally. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

This policy brief explores the historical evolution and present condition of the global investment climate, showing how the concept of investment has developed from classical economic thought to contemporary approaches centred on innovation, risk, and institutional quality. Drawing on the ideas of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, John Maynard Keynes, Joseph Schumpeter, and Paul Romer, the study places current investment trends within a broader theoretical framework and demonstrates how traditional understandings of capital allocation have been reshaped by the realities of the modern global economy. A central focus of the brief is the transformation of global foreign direct investment flows in the period from 2019 to 2025. Using UNCTAD data, the author analyses how the COVID-19 pandemic, geopolitical tensions, high interest rates, protectionist trends, and global uncertainty have affected investor behaviour. The brief highlights that although investment flows have shown signs of recovery after the pandemic shock, this recovery remains uneven, fragile, and highly sensitive to political and economic disruptions. The study also pays particular attention to changing regional and sectoral patterns of investment. It shows that developing economies, especially in Asia, are playing an increasingly important role in attracting global capital, while green energy, digital technologies, ICT, and innovation-driven sectors are becoming more prominent in investment decision-making. In this context, ESG principles are presented not as an auxiliary consideration, but as an increasingly important determinant of long-term investment attractiveness and global competitiveness. In conclusion, the policy brief argues that improving the global investment climate requires a comprehensive approach based on legal stability, macroeconomic predictability, institutional trust, technological readiness, and sustainable development strategies. It offers practical recommendations for states, international organisations, and investors, emphasising that the future of global investment will depend not only on capital availability, but also on the ability to create reliable, innovative, and resilient economic environments. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

By  Shohrukhkhon Bekhzodiy  &  Sarvarbek Turaev, UWED undergraduates, interns at IAIS   Authority Without Purpose The United States of America remains the most powerful state in the contemporary international system across all key aggregate indicators. The country's defense budget in 2025 reached approximately $850 billion, exceeding the combined expenditure of the next nine states globally. The United States maintains approximately 750 military installations abroad, commands the world’s only carrier fleet capable of simultaneous operations across all oceans, and fields an armed force with the logistical capacity to project power to any theater of military operations. Yet it is precisely this uncontested dominance that gives rise to a fundamental question: why does a state possessing such unprecedented military and economic potential systematically fail to achieve its declared strategic objectives? The United States is losing global influence not as a consequence of rising competitor power, but as a result of a systemic inability to convert available potential into durable strategic outcomes. This incapacity is not the product of errors made by any particular administration; it is institutional in origin and reproduces itself regardless of who occupies the White House. Military power is deployed without political strategy. Economic coercion dismantles the dependencies upon which American leverage depends. Diplomatic commitments are violated with regularity, undermining the very possibility of trust in the American word. Alliances that historically multiplied American power are being transformed into relationships of coercion from which partners seek to disengage. Domestically, a political system incapable of ensuring strategic continuity renders any long-term American commitment structurally unreliable. Since the early 2000s, the United States has conducted large-scale military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria. The aggregate direct costs of these conflicts exceeded several trillion dollars. The outcomes speak for themselves: Afghanistan returned to Taliban control within days of the American withdrawal; Iraq became an arena of Iranian influence that was substantially amplified as a direct consequence of American intervention; Libya fragmented into competing armed factions; and Syria was, until recently, de facto partitioned among Russia, Iran, and Turkey, none of which represented Washington's preferred actors. This pattern is not attributable to tactical miscalculation or circumstantial misfortune. It is structural in nature. American armed forces demonstrate high effectiveness at the operational level. They are capable of defeating adversaries, seizing territory, and neutralizing discrete threats. However, military victory and political stabilization constitute fundamentally distinct objectives. An army can break a state, but it cannot build one. It is precisely this systemic incapacity that recurs from one conflict to the next. The legal dimension of this problem is equally significant. The United States Constitution originally distributed war powers between two branches of government. By law, Congress declares war, and the President wages it. In practice, however, this system has long ceased to function as designed. The pivotal moment was the War Powers Resolution of 1973, enacted in the aftermath of the Vietnam War with the aim of restoring Congressional oversight of decisions to use force. The Resolution stipulated that the President must terminate any unauthorized military operation within 60 days absent explicit Congressional authorization. This appeared to be a reasonable constraining mechanism. In practice, it was systematically dismantled by legal counsel across administrations of both parties. The Reagan administration maintained that strikes against Iranian vessels in the Persian Gulf in 1987 to 1988 constituted “isolated incidents” that did not trigger the 60-day clock. The Obama administration argued that sustained bombing of Libya beyond 60 days did not constitute "hostilities" within the meaning of the Resolution. The Biden administration contended that a yearlong campaign against the Houthis in Yemen required no Congressional authorization because the Houthis had fired first on American vessels. Each successive administration produced new legal justifications, and each generation of lawyers inherited the precedents of its predecessor, not by overturning them, but by building upon them. The result is a system in which a single individual may initiate war without parliamentary deliberation, without public articulation of success criteria, and without genuine accountability for outcomes. It is within this system that the attack on Iran under Operation “Epic Fury” became possible, carried out without a formal declaration of war and without a Congressional vote. The problem here is not the character of any particular president. The problem is that the institutional architecture designed to ensure deliberateness in military decisions was gradually, lawfully, and with the complicity of all branches of government dismantled. This arrangement is not neutral in its consequences. A war initiated without broad political consensus and without clearly defined success criteria is, with high probability, a war that will be poorly managed, poorly concluded, and inadequately understood after its termination. Such is the historical record of the past two decades. Ideological Reorientation: From International Leadership to Transactionalism Throughout much of the postwar period, the United States grounded its global presence in a conceptual framework that transcended narrow national interest. The liberal international order, for which Washington served as architect, rested on the assumption that open markets, multilateral institutions, and collective security arrangements served the interests of both the United States and its partners. This logic of mutual benefit conferred a degree of legitimacy upon American leadership in the eyes of the international community. The current approach constitutes a fundamental departure from this tradition. American foreign policy is increasingly organized around a model that may be characterized as “transactional extractivism,” wherein every international interaction is evaluated in terms of what Washington receives immediately, rather than what long-term strategic order it sustains. Allies are perceived not as partners in a collective security system, but as debtors obligated to pay for protection rendered. International institutions are regarded primarily as constraints rather than instruments. Multilateral formats are replaced by bilateral negotiations in which America’s structural superiority guarantees an asymmetric outcome. An important qualification must be acknowledged. Criticism of the former multilateral model is not without foundation. Global climate mechanisms systematically failed to meet declared targets amid rising emissions. The World Trade Organization proved incapable of disciplining China's subsidy policies. The International Atomic Energy Agency did not prevent nuclear proliferation by Iran or North Korea. The wager of the 1990s and 2000s that deep integration of China into the global economy would transform its political behavior proved to be strategically naive. In this sense, demands for a reassessment of the international architecture rest on genuine grounds. Nevertheless, a fundamental distinction exists between reforming instruments and destroying them. The institutions, alliances, and norms that the United States constructed over eight decades constituted not a burden but a multiplier of American power. They enabled Washington to shape the international agenda without recourse to direct coercion at every turn. By abandoning these instruments in pursuit of short-term tactical gains, the United States does not liberate itself from constraints; it voluntarily dismantles the architecture of its own influence. III. Alliance Erosion and Weakening Diplomacy The aggregate power of the American alliance system has historically far exceeded what the country could achieve unilaterally. NATO, bilateral security agreements in the Asia-Pacific region, and partnerships in the Middle East together formed a global network that provided Washington with persistent presence, intelligence-sharing, logistical support, and political legitimacy on a scale unattainable by any competitor. The current trajectory of engagement with allies is eroding this model. The question of burden-sharing within NATO has been reformulated from a discussion of shared responsibility into an ultimatum: pay more, or commitments will be reconsidered. Such language transforms a collective security alliance into something resembling a system of commercial patronage, where protection is provided in exchange for financial contribution rather than on the basis of shared values and strategic interests. The consequences have been swift. Canada, bound to the United States by the most extensive trade, intelligence, and defense ties in the Western world, is openly reorienting its foreign economic strategy. The current government has embarked on a course of trading partner diversification, concluded new agreements with Indonesia and India, and initiated diplomatic rapprochement with Beijing. This is not an ideological rupture. It is the pragmatic response of a state that has concluded its principal partner is unreliable. Europe displays analogous dynamics. NATO member states are indeed increasing defense expenditures, and their aggregate volume has grown by more than 100 percent since 2019, driven primarily by countries on the eastern flank. However, this increase does not reflect confidence in American guarantees; it is a response to their evident unreliability. European governments are arming themselves because they cannot afford to rely on Washington. The diplomatic picture is no more encouraging. In Ukraine, the promise to end the war within 24 hours yielded more than a year of inconclusive negotiations during which the United States periodically adopted positions that objectively aligned with Russian demands. In February 2025, Washington voted alongside Moscow in the United Nations on resolutions relating to the Russian invasion. On Gaza, the United States exercised its veto power in the Security Council six times against ceasefire resolutions, even as combat operations continued and famine conditions in the enclave were confirmed. The January 2025 ceasefire collapsed within weeks after Israel resumed its strikes. The Iranian case merits separate analysis. In 2015, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was functioning: Iran had dismantled two-thirds of its centrifuges, removed 98 percent of its enriched uranium, and opened facilities to International Atomic Energy Agency inspections. In 2018, the United States unilaterally withdrew from the agreement. By March 2025, Iran had accumulated more than 275 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent, sufficient for several nuclear warheads upon further enrichment. Negotiations initiated in April 2025 reached an impasse. The United States demanded the complete cessation of enrichment; Iran refused. In June 2025, Operation “Midnight Hammer” destroyed key facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. However, Iran's stockpiles of highly enriched uranium appear to have been evacuated in advance, and their location remains unknown. On February 28, 2026, Operation “Epic Fury” followed, in the course of which Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei was killed and missile production facilities, the naval fleet, and dual-use installations were destroyed. Tactically, the operation achieved its stated objectives. Strategically, it created a fundamentally new problem: a state whose nuclear infrastructure has been destroyed, but whose knowledge and motivation remain intact and are now reinforced by an existential imperative to acquire deterrent capability at any cost. The concluding logic of all three cases is identical: the United States entered each situation with maximum coercive potential and exited with a worse outcome than it had at the outset. The Domestic Foundations of External Weakness An analysis of American foreign policy dysfunction would be incomplete without examining its domestic political determinants. Several interconnected structural processes undermine the capacity of the United States to conduct coherent international policy irrespective of the personnel of any given administration. The first is deep partisan polarization, which renders strategic continuity practically unattainable. The divergence between the foreign policy courses of successive administrations is so pronounced that allies are compelled to recalculate long-term projections with every change in the White House. An international agreement concluded by one president may be denounced by his successor within the first week of office. This is precisely what occurred with the JCPOA in 2018 and with the Paris Climate Agreement. Notably, within the Republican Party itself, a significant gap has emerged between traditional conservative internationalism and the current administration's course. A number of Republican senators publicly expressed concern over the curtailment of support for Ukraine and the weakening of the American position in NATO, yet party discipline under Trump's second term proved sufficiently rigid to suppress this dissent at the level of actual votes. The second process is mounting public discontent, which since 2025 has assumed organized forms. The "No Kings" movement became one of the most significant episodes of civic protest in recent American history. The first wave occurred on June 14, 2025. According to organizers’ estimates, between four and six million people participated in actions across more than 2,100 cities. The second wave in October 2025 encompassed approximately 2,700 locations nationwide, drawing an estimated five to seven million participants by various accounts. The third wave occurred on March 28, 2026, against the backdrop of the war with Iran and continuing mass deportations, and was announced by organizers as the largest day of nonviolent action in American history. The movement's name itself reflected the substance of its grievances: protesters invoked the foundational principle of American statecraft, according to which power belongs to the people and not to an officeholder who has arrogated monarchical authority. Of particular note, the third wave of protests was explicitly directed against the war with Iran, a rare instance in which domestic political dissent was directly linked to a specific foreign policy operation. These processes mutually reinforce one another. Polarization forecloses strategic continuity. Public discontent narrows the domestic political mandate for global leadership. Taken together, they indicate that the defanging of the American predator is predominantly systemic rather than personal in origin. It is embedded in the institutional architecture of American politics and will not disappear with any change of administration. Conclusion The United States possesses the greatest aggregate power potential in the contemporary international system, and yet it exhibits a persistent inability to convert that potential into durable strategic outcomes. The gap between available power and achieved results is not incidental but structurally determined. This gap is produced at the intersection of several interacting deficits: the displacement of strategic conception by transactional calculation; the destruction of the influence multipliers constituted by alliances and institutions; the deployment of economic instruments in a manner that accelerates the diversification of dependencies; the exhaustion of diplomatic credibility in key conflict zones; and the absence of a domestic political architecture capable of ensuring strategic continuity. At the same time, it would be erroneous to interpret the foregoing analysis as a forecast of irreversible decline. The United States retains structural advantages without parallel: geographic security, the depth of its technological base, control over the world's reserve currency, and military capacity that exceeds any competitor. The question is not whether the United States has lost its potential. The question is whether it is capable of constructing the political and institutional architecture that would allow that potential to be realized. If the current trajectory persists, the international system will adapt, not because others become stronger, but because predictability and reliability will migrate to other nodes of the system. A predator that has lost the capacity for consistent action does not disappear from the ecosystem. It simply ceases to defineit. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The contemporary international order is undergoing a period of profound and accelerating transformation. Armed conflicts, great-power rivalry, and the erosion of multilateral institutions are reshaping the global strategic landscape in ways that affect even regions far removed from the epicenters of crisis. Central Asia, long accustomed to navigating a complex web of external pressures through careful multi-vector diplomacy, now finds itself confronting a qualitatively new environment — one defined by cascading instability, structural geopolitical competition, and the fragmentation of the rules-based order that previously offered small- and medium-sized states a degree of protection and predictability. Against this backdrop, the countries of Central Asia face a dual challenge: managing an expanding array of external risks while simultaneously identifying and seizing the strategic opportunities that this turbulent moment presents. The very forces that generate vulnerability — the restructuring of global trade, the rise of overland transit demand, and the weakening of universal governance frameworks — also create openings for a more assertive and coordinated regional posture. Therefore, it is crucial to understand the principal challenges stemming from growing international instability and outlines the foreign policy priorities through which Central Asian states can strengthen their resilience, expand their agency, and secure a more favorable position in the emerging world order. First. The formation of a multilayered conflict environment around Central Asia. Central Asia is increasingly finding itself in an environment of mounting external turbulence that is taking on the character of a “conflict trap.” The simultaneous development of armed and political crises in Ukraine, the Middle East, and South Asia is creating a cascading and interconnected configuration of instability. At the same time, the potential escalation of tensions in East Asia, particularly around the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan, could further complicate the region’s strategic environment. Under these conditions, the space for foreign policy maneuver for the states of Central Asia is narrowing, while decision-making is increasingly taking place amid high uncertainty and the absence of optimal scenarios. Second. The deepening of structural contradictions resulting from rivalry among major powers. Geopolitical and military-political confrontation between leading global centers of power is creating not merely situational but long-term structural constraints for the countries of Central Asia. The region is entering a phase in which the previous logic of seeking the most advantageous and relatively balanced solutions is giving way to the politics of “non-ideal choice.” In other words, virtually any strategy in the current international environment will be accompanied by costs, compromises, and heightened political risks. This objectively increases the importance of coordinating tactical and strategic approaches at the regional level, since isolated actions by individual states are becoming less effective. Third. Rising vulnerability to energy, transport-communication, and raw material shocks. Contemporary international crises are increasingly demonstrating the dependence of the global economy on a limited number of critically important routes and hubs. Disruptions in maritime logistics, the blocking of specific straits and transport corridors, and the withdrawal of scarce resources from the market create systemic shocks far beyond the conflict zones themselves. For Central Asia, this means heightened risks related to supply disruptions, rising transit costs, price volatility, and restricted access to strategically important materials. Since some critical goods do not have rapid infrastructural or technological substitutes, external crises begin to directly affect the region’s economic resilience. Fourth. The erosion of international legal norms and the weakening of universal institutions. One of the most alarming trends is the transition from a regime of “double standards” to a situation in which common standards are increasingly losing even their formal binding force. Whereas previously international law was violated while still retaining symbolic legitimacy, there is now a growing risk of an order in which norms cease to function as a common regulatory framework. Major international actors are increasingly acting not as providers of stability but as independent sources of destabilization. For the states of Central Asia, this means a shrinking space in which universal norms and institutions can be relied upon as mechanisms for protecting the interests of small and medium-sized states. Fifth. The shift from universal multilateralism to selective coalitions. A steady shift is underway from the previous model of relatively universal multilateral engagement toward a system of pragmatic, situational, and narrowly targeted coalitions. This transformation is intensifying the asymmetry of global politics: states with limited influence resources are increasingly finding themselves not as full-fledged subjects, but as objects of external influence and competitive struggle. For Central Asia, this creates the risk of limited agency, where strategic decisions affecting the region are increasingly made without its direct participation. Sixth. The growing transactional nature of world politics and the personalization of the future order. The once-established construct of a “rules-based order” is no longer performing the role of a common normative framework. Increasingly visible is the tendency toward the emergence of a new international environment based less on institutions and more on flexible arrangements among individual centers of power and their leaders. This signals a return to a pre-universalist logic of international relations, in which security and stability are determined not by law, but by balances of capability and bargains among stronger actors. For the countries of Central Asia, such an environment is objectively less predictable and less favorable. Seventh. The fragmentation of global trade as a factor of external pressure on the region. The global trading system is undergoing profound structural transformation. Trade policy is increasingly being used not as an instrument of liberalization, but as a means of strategic competition, pressure, and redistribution of advantages. Discriminatory measures are intensifying, tariff and non-tariff restrictions are gaining significance, and supply chains are being restructured on political rather than purely economic grounds. For Central Asia, this means the need to adapt to a less open, less predictable, and more bloc-based global economy, in which access to markets, technologies, and logistics routes increasingly depends on foreign policy circumstances. Opportunities and Priorities for Foreign Policy Action by the Countries of Central Asia First. Strengthening regional coordination as the foundation of strategic resilience. Under conditions of mounting international instability, coordinated regional approaches are becoming increasingly important for the countries of Central Asia. This concerns not only consultations, but also the formation of a shared understanding of key external risks, security priorities, transport connectivity, and trade and economic adaptation. The greater the level of external pressure and geopolitical competition, the more important it becomes for the region to develop coordinated tactical and strategic actions. This will not eliminate external threats, but it can increase resilience, reduce vulnerability, and strengthen the region’s collective negotiating position. Second. Enhancing Central Asia’s role as a land-based transit space. The growing risks associated with maritime logistics are objectively increasing the significance of overland transport routes. In this context, Central Asia has an opportunity to strengthen its importance as a connecting space between China, Europe, South Asia, and the Middle East. For Uzbekistan, this trend opens the prospect of reinforcing its role as one of the key overland transit hubs. This is not only about economic gain, but also about the formation of a new foreign policy resource: a state that ensures transport connectivity acquires additional weight in the regional and interregional architecture. Third. Developing digital connectivity as an element of external economic resilience. Under conditions of geopolitical fragmentation, not only physical but also digital trade infrastructure is becoming increasingly important. A state’s ability to ensure the resilience of digital platforms, standards compatibility, the reliability of legal regimes, and technological interoperability is becoming a critical factor in maintaining access to external markets. For Uzbekistan and other countries of the region, a priority task is the transition from isolated digital initiatives to a comprehensive state policy in this sphere. Such a policy should include the harmonization of standards, institutional development, workforce training, and the expansion of regional coordination. Digital connectivity can become a factor in diversifying external economic ties and reducing costs amid growing global regulatory fragmentation. Fourth. Diversifying foreign policy and foreign economic ties. In a situation where the international system is becoming less universal and more competitive, the ability of states to avoid excessive dependence on any one direction, one market, or one external center of power becomes especially important. For the countries of Central Asia, this means the need to deepen a multi-vector approach based on pragmatism, flexibility, and the protection of their own interests. Diversification of partnerships enables the region not only to reduce external risks, but also to expand the space for independent maneuver in a polarized international environment. Fifth. Enhancing the region’s agency amid the crisis of global governance. The weakening of universal institutions and the growing role of selective formats do not necessarily imply only losses for Central Asia. If supported by a coordinated policy, this also opens opportunities to enhance its own agency through participation in new cooperation formats, the promotion of regional initiatives, and the strengthening of Central Asia’s status as an independent geopolitical and geo-economic space. Under the new conditions, those actors will benefit most who are able not only to adapt, but also to propose functional solutions in the areas of transit, logistics, energy, digital connectivity, and interregional interaction. Sixth. Transitioning from reactive to proactive foreign policy. The contemporary international environment requires the countries of Central Asia not only to respond to external crises, but also to develop a forward-looking strategy. Such a strategy should be aimed at early risk identification, creating mechanisms of external economic resilience, advancing beneficial transport and digital projects, and institutionally anchoring regional interests in the external sphere. A proactive approach is especially important in conditions where delays in decision-making may result in the loss of strategic opportunities. Conclusion Contemporary international instability is reshaping the strategic environment of Central Asia in ways that are both profound and enduring. The region faces a confluence of challenges that would have been difficult to anticipate even a decade ago: a multilayered conflict environment on its periphery, the structural deepening of great-power rivalry, the fragmentation of global trade, the erosion of international legal norms, and the steady retreat from universal multilateralism toward selective, transactional arrangements among dominant powers. Taken together, these trends are narrowing the space for passive, reactive foreign policy and demanding from the states of Central Asia a level of strategic clarity and regional cohesion that has not always characterized their collective responses in the past. At the same time, it would be a mistake to interpret this moment exclusively through the lens of threat and vulnerability. History repeatedly demonstrates that periods of systemic international transformation, however disruptive, tend to redistribute influence and open new avenues for actors who are prepared to act with foresight and purpose. Central Asia is no exception to this dynamic. The growing importance of overland transit routes in an era of maritime disruption, the rising premium on digital connectivity and regulatory interoperability, and the increasing demand for stable and reliable regional partners in an otherwise volatile Eurasian space — all of these trends position Central Asia as a region of genuine and growing strategic relevance. Realizing this potential, however, is neither automatic nor guaranteed. It requires the countries of the region to move decisively from adaptation to agency — from responding to external pressures to actively shaping the conditions of their engagement with the wider world. This means investing in the institutional foundations of regional coordination, so that shared interests translate into coherent and consistent collective positions rather than remaining aspirational declarations. It means accelerating the development of transport and digital infrastructure not merely as economic projects, but as instruments of foreign policy that expand the region's connectivity and reduce its dependence on any single external partner. And it means cultivating the diplomatic flexibility and strategic patience necessary to navigate a world in which alignments are fluid, leverage is contested, and the costs of miscalculation are rising. For Uzbekistan and its Central Asian neighbors, the path forward lies in embracing a proactive foreign policy paradigm — one grounded in pragmatism, reinforced by regional solidarity, and oriented toward the long-term construction of resilience rather than short-term crisis management. The current international environment, for all its uncertainty, rewards those who are able to define their interests clearly, pursue them consistently, and present themselves as indispensable nodes in the networks of connectivity, trade, and cooperation that the emerging world order will depend upon. Central Asia has the geographic position, the human capital, and the political will to be such an actor. The task now is to translate that potential into a coherent and sustained strategic vision — one that secures stability, expands agency, and affirms the region's place not at the margins, but at the functional heart of a reconfigured Eurasian space. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In recent years, the government of Afghanistan has expanded its technological capabilities for monitoring the population. Improvements in the technical infrastructure have enabled the authorities to introduce new forms of control that go beyond traditional methods. In the context of the policies pursued by the Taliban, this trend can be viewed not only as a process of modernization, but also as part of a broader strategy aimed at strengthening state governance. The digitalisation of control mechanisms creates a model resembling the concept of the “panopticon” - an ideal model of prison  introduced into the social sciences by french philosopher Michel Foucault. Within this framework, the key factor is not actual surveillance, but the perception of its constant possibility. The model assumes that individuals adjust their behavior under the perception of continuous observation, which fosters self-discipline. Thus, this mechanism enables the state to shift from practicing reactive policies to the functioning of a disciplinary form of power. From the perspective of the Afghan government, a key driver of this policy is the intention of the Taliban to mitigate social and political fragmentation, which is perceived as a major threat to regime stability. The integration of advanced surveillance technologies and the control of the information space create conditions for a transition from reactive repression to more preventive forms of social regulation. The absence of mechanisms aligned with international legal standards creates a favorable environment for the institutionalization of this model of control. This is manifested in the following ways: Firstly, in recent years, the Taliban government has demonstrated an increased interest in the systematic collection of information about the population. Since 2023, the Taliban authorities have consistently employed technological resources to strengthen and expand state control. The existence of sufficient digital infrastructure creates conditions for the authorities to establish monitoring mechanisms and broadens their capacity to carry out political persecution. According to a 2025 investigative report by the BBC, at the time the Taliban came to power, approximately 850 surveillance cameras were installed in the Afghan capital. However, since 2023, their number has increased sharply: around 90,000 cameras of manufactured in China have been installed in Kabul alone. The software allows the cameras to recognize individuals, display their images and classify each person by age, gender, and features such as the presence of a beard or a mask. This rapid expansion of surveillance systems has raised concerns within the international community. The human rights organization Human Rights Watch has warned that Afghanistan lacks data protection laws regulating the storage and use of collected footage. However, according to government statements, the data is stored for only three months, after which it is deleted and not shared with other agencies. Representatives of the Afghan Ministry of Interior claim that the cameras significantly contribute to improved security and a reduction in crime rates. Despite these claims, surveillance cameras may also be used to intensify control over civilians, particularly women in public spaces. Although local authorities assert that crime rates have significantly declined following the installation of surveillance systems, these claims cannot be independently verified. Given the opacity of Afghan legislation, it is also difficult to confirm the actual purposes for which the collected data is used. Furthermore, numerous documented cases of abuse and persecution of civilians cast doubt on official statements regarding the use of such data. Secondly, the policy of the Taliban is aimed at managing potential sources of internal instability. From the perspective of the Taliban leadership, fragmentation of the country represents a key risk that could weaken central authority. The implementation of such policies is accompanied by restrictions on the rights of ethnic and religious minorities. The institutionalization of these measures reinforces structural inequalities and creates conditions for the escalation of interethnic and interreligious tensions. Beyond the capital, surveillance cameras have also been installed in other regions of Afghanistan. These provinces, which border Kabul, possess both strategic geographical importance and a significant share of non-Pashtun populations, increasing their relevance in terms of maintaining control and political stability. The deployment of cameras in areas characterized by ethnic and religious diversity suggests that these technologies may be used not only for security purposes, as officially stated, but also as tools for monitoring groups perceived as insufficiently aligned with the regime. Between 2021 and 2025, international organizations have documented numerous cases of extrajudicial killings, torture, and raids against ethnic minorities carried out by representatives of the Taliban. Reports by international human rights organisations indicate that marginalized religious and ethnic groups were deliberately deprived of humanitarian assistance, as well as access to essential services and public sector employment. Thirdly, in addition to access to advanced surveillance technologies, the Taliban possesses a substantial database of biometric and personal data left behind by Western countries in August 2021. One such database is the electronic identity system (e-Tazkira), launched in 2018 under the administration of Ashraf Ghani and still in operation today. It contains personal and biometric data of Afghan citizens, including iris scans, fingerprints, photographs, occupation, native language, home addresses, and family members’ names. According to a statement by the National Statistics and Information Agency, by the end of 2025 up to 17 million electronic identity cards had been issued, six million of which were distributed after the Taliban came to power. Moreover, the Taliban government has gone beyond the traditional use of biometric data and is collecting information on categories of the population that were previously outside the scope of state attention. According to the International Organization for Migration, the Afghan government is collecting biometric data on homeless people, beggars and criminals. The scale of coverage and the pace of ID issuance demonstrate the Taliban’s level of interest in biometric data collection and the integration of the Tazkira system into administrative governance. Reports also suggest that the Taliban has access to portable biometric identification devices previously used by the United States military. These devices enable the rapid collection of iris and fingerprint data. The data stored on devices left behind by the United States and other Western donors was reportedly not protected by basic security measures. International human rights organizations have repeatedly warned about the risk that such biometric data could be used by the Taliban to target perceived opponents, former military personnel and political activists. In addition, according to local media, the cost of obtaining identification documents is prohibitively high for much of the population: the official fee is 500 Afghanis (around 7 US dollars) for adults and 200 Afghanis for minors. However, the shortage of document issuance centers forces many citizens to incur additional transportation costs, and in remote areas where in-person visits are not possible, processing fees can reach up to 200 US dollars. Such financial barriers have concrete practical consequences: as the absence of an identity document deprives citizens of the ability to obtain a visa and, consequently, to leave the country. It also restricts access to basic services such as education, healthcare, and humanitarian aid, for which identification is often a mandatory requirement. Discontent is also fueled by the system’s ethnic classification, which divides major ethnic groups into smaller subcategories, statistically diluting the representation of ethnic minorities. Thus, based on the actions undertaken by the Taliban leadership, it can be concluded that territorial and social fragmentation are viewed as key internal risks capable of undermining regime stability. The integration of biometric databases and surveillance technologies is forming a new infrastructure of power with characteristics of a disciplinary mechanism. Moreover, the new Criminal Procedure Code adopted in January 2026 institutionalizes this approach at the legal level and represents a logical continuation of the domestic political strategy. Its adoption signals the effective consolidation of power by the political elite in Afghanistan. Under such conditions, the vulnerability of regional, ethnic, and religious minorities increases, creating a high risk of escalating internal conflicts and deepening social inequalities. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.