Aziza Mukhammedova and Raykhona Abdullaeva examine India’s cautious yet consequential political rapprochement with the Taliban, set against the backdrop of accelerating shifts in South Asia’s geopolitical landscape. It takes as its starting point the 10 October 2025 meeting in New Delhi between Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi – the first high-level bilateral encounter since the Taliban’s return to power in Kabul in August 2021. The authors argue that India’s decision to upgrade its technical mission in Kabul to the level of an embassy does not signal imminent de jure recognition of the Taliban regime, but instead reflects a deliberately calibrated strategy of “maximum engagement without recognition,” allowing New Delhi to protect core interests while maintaining formal political distance.   A key emphasis of the brief is India’s reliance on economic and humanitarian instruments as tools of soft power in Afghanistan. Drawing on trade data from Afghanistan’s National Statistics and Information Authority, the authors show that Afghanistan runs a rare and growing trade surplus with India, making New Delhi a vital source of foreign currency and deepening Kabul’s structural dependence on Indian markets. India’s delivery of wheat, vaccines, medical supplies and other aid since 2021 has further consolidated its image as Afghanistan’s principal humanitarian partner. This blend of trade asymmetry and sustained humanitarian engagement, the brief contends, enables India to lock in influence in Afghanistan while avoiding the political costs of formal recognition of the Taliban, particularly in light of ongoing human rights violations, including gender-based restrictions.   The brief situates this Afghan policy within a wider regional reconfiguration in which India seeks to offset the tightening China–Pakistan axis and emerging subregional alignments. It highlights the rapid warming of relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh, facilitated and encouraged by Beijing, and the deepening of Sino-Pakistani cooperation through the Belt and Road Initiative and the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor. These trends risk marginalising India from key trade and transport routes and heightening its geoeconomic isolation. Simultaneously, the United States’ fluctuating sanctions policy on Iran’s Chabahar port constrains India’s preferred connectivity strategy to Central Asia. Against this backdrop, closer ties with Kabul become less an optional vector of influence and more a strategic necessity for India to retain access to the wider Eurasian space.   In its conclusion the authors argue that India’s engagement with the Taliban is best understood as a defensive adaptation to an unfavourable regional environment rather than a normative shift in favour of the current Afghan authorities. New Delhi is portrayed as operating under conditions in which it can no longer freely choose its partners, but must instead optimise limited options. The authors suggest that India will likely continue to deepen economic and humanitarian ties with Afghanistan while deferring any decision on formal recognition until broader international legitimacy for the Taliban emerges, if at all. In the meantime, India’s Afghan policy remains a high-stakes experiment in damage limitation – an attempt to preserve strategic relevance in a region where other actors increasingly shape the balance of power.   Read on The Diplomat   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Nargiza Umarova’s policy brief examines how Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are increasingly positioning themselves as a joint transport and transit hub linking Central Asia with Iran, the Middle East, and Europe. It highlights Turkmenistan’s pivotal geographical role in connecting Central Asian states to the “warm seas” and underscores the significance of key rail routes such as the Tejen–Serakhs–Mashhad line, which first opened access for Uzbek exporters to global markets via Iran’s Bandar Abbas port. The brief also stresses Tashkent’s growing interest in the Chabahar deep-water port and the broader International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), where Turkmenistan benefits from the Kazakhstan–Turkmenistan–Iran railway as a core north–south axis.   A major focus is placed on emerging multimodal corridors that reinforce this Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan tandem. The Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan–Iran–Türkiye route, on which the first freight train travelled from Tashkent in December 2022, is presented as a promising land bridge to Europe, further consolidated by a 2023 protocol among the four participating states. At the same time, China-supported routes – including China–Kazakhstan–Turkmenistan–Iran–Türkiye and China–Kazakhstan–Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan–Iran–Türkiye – demonstrate Beijing’s interest in diversifying westward supply chains. The policy brief argues that the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway, now under construction, could significantly reconfigure these flows in favour of Tashkent and Bishkek, while Tajikistan’s ambition to connect via new highways will deepen the region’s role in Eurasian connectivity.   The brief pays special attention to Turkmenistan’s modern port infrastructure, particularly the Turkmenbashi port on the Caspian Sea, which is integral to the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), or Middle Corridor. Against the backdrop of geopolitical tensions and disruptions to key maritime chokepoints such as the Suez Canal and the Strait of Malacca, the author notes a gradual reorientation of some cargo flows from sea to land. In this context, growing freight volumes along the Middle Corridor – projected by the World Bank to more than double by 2030 – create new opportunities for Uzbekistan, including potential annual transit of up to 1.3 million tons of its cargo to Europe via trans-Caspian routes through Turkmenbashi.   Finally, the brief analyses Uzbekistan’s proactive use of transport diplomacy to institutionalise these connectivity initiatives. It emphasises Tashkent’s role in launching the CASCA+ (Central Asia–South Caucasus–Anatolia) corridor, designed to leverage the combined railway and maritime infrastructure of Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye. The recent decision to establish a CASCA+ consortium and to develop a unified digital transport platform, discussed at a ministerial meeting in Tashkent in November 2025, is presented as a key step toward improving logistics efficiency and strengthening the competitive position of Central Asian and South Caucasian states. Overall, the policy brief portrays Uzbekistan as a consistent advocate of regional interconnectivity, using close cooperation with Turkmenistan to build a joint transport and transit “tandem” that supports both economic diversification and broader regional consolidation.   Read on The Diplomat   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In her policy brief “Uzbekistan May Benefit from Herat to Mazar-i-Sharif Railway Project”, published by Jamestown Foundation, Nargiza Umarova analyses the recent agreement between Afghanistan, Iran and Türkiye to jointly build a railway line from Herat to Mazar-i-Sharif as part of the Five Nations Railway Corridor (FNRC) and explores its strategic implications for Uzbekistan. She shows that the FNRC, which connects China with Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Iran and further on to Türkiye and Europe, is conceived as one of the shortest land routes between East Asia and Europe. As such, it not only strengthens Tehran’s and Kabul’s ambitions to deepen trade with China and diversify their eastern trade routes, but also creates a new configuration of East–West connectivity that competes with existing Central Asian transit routes, including the Trans-Caspian “Middle Corridor.”   Umarova argues that this emerging architecture has profound consequences for Uzbekistan’s role as a transit state. On the one hand, the Herat–Mazar-i-Sharif railway could open up new opportunities for Tashkent by providing more direct access to Iran’s road network and seaports, potentially bypassing Turkmenistan and shortening the distance to key export markets. On the other hand, if Uzbekistan remains outside the FNRC, cargo flows between China and Europe may increasingly be redirected via Tajikistan and Iran, eroding Uzbekistan’s current position as a major overland transit hub. The author illustrates this with the gradual development of the Khaf–Herat railway, which already allows significant volumes of cargo to pass between Iran, Afghanistan and European markets and could, if extended north and east, link more tightly to Central Asian and Chinese networks.   The brief places these dynamics in the context of Uzbekistan’s own, sometimes inconsistent, railway diplomacy in Afghanistan. Umarova recalls that Tashkent initially backed the Mazar-i-Sharif–Sheberghan–Maimana–Herat railway project, signed in 2017 and intended to connect to the Khaf–Herat line, but later shifted its attention to an alternative trans-Afghan “Kabul Corridor” towards Pakistan. In parallel, Afghanistan and Tajikistan agreed on a Sher Khan Bandar–Jaloliddini Balkhi line that has stalled due to financing constraints. After the Taliban’s return to power, new proposals emerged, including a Mazar–Herat–Kandahar line pitched to Russia and statements about possible Uzbek participation, but with no clear confirmation from Tashkent. Umarova highlights that the choice of track gauge (1,520 mm CIS standard if built by Russia or Uzbekistan versus 1,435 mm European standard if built by Iran and Türkiye) symbolises competing visions: integrating Afghanistan either into the CIS-centric North–South grid or primarily into the FNRC East–West axis.   In conclusion, Umarova contends that the simultaneous development of the FNRC and of the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway, which is expected to shorten the China–Europe route by roughly 900 kilometres when linked to the Southern Corridor via Iran and Türkiye, creates both a risk and a window of opportunity for Uzbekistan. If Tashkent does not actively seek involvement in the FNRC—potentially through a China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan–Tajikistan–Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Iran chain—it may see transit flows bypass its territory. If, however, it positions itself as a bridge between the new East–West corridor and existing Central Asian and Eurasian routes, Uzbekistan can become a direct beneficiary of the Herat–Mazar-i-Sharif railway and consolidate its status as a key node in the evolving Eurasian transport system.   Read on Jamestown Foundation   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The C5+1 summit held in Washington, D.C., on November 6, 2025, was a landmark event, marking a qualitative transformation in relations between the United States and the five Central Asian republics. Timed to the platform’s tenth anniversary and hosted for the first time at the presidential level at the White House with President Donald Trump, the summit demonstrated a shift from predominantly declarative dialogue to the finalization of major economic agreements.   The summit took place against a backdrop of fundamental shifts in global geopolitics. Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and intensifying U.S.-China competition have created a unique window of opportunity for Central Asian nations to diversify their foreign ties. For Washington, it has created an urgent need to strengthen its position in a strategically vital and resource-rich region that, in President Trump’s words, “previous American presidents neglected this region completely”. Underscoring this new level of engagement, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced his intention to visit all five Central Asian countries in 2026 as part of a broader diplomatic effort to strengthen ties.   Hosting the summit in Washington D.C. itself, rather than on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly as in the past, was a significant political signal. This step, along with the U.S. Senate’s adoption of a resolution affirming the strategic importance of the format, highlights the region’s elevated status in U.S. foreign policy priorities. In the resolution, the Senate officially “affirms the strategic importance of the C5+1 platform in promoting regional sovereignty, stability, and shared security interests with the United States”. As experts noted during discussions at the Atlantic Council, the C5+1 format, launched in 2015, has evolved from a symbolic platform for dialogue into a mechanism for implementing concrete, pragmatic projects. This was facilitated by Central Asia’s own transformation, as the region has evolved from one plagued by contradictions into a more consolidated and proactive player with its own agenda.   The centerpiece of the summit was a large-scale package of trade and economic agreements. The core of this package was an accord with Uzbekistan, with President Trump announcing Tashkent’s plans to purchase and invest approximately $35 billion in key U.S. sectors over the next three years, with that figure expected to exceed $100 billion over the next decade.   The groundwork for these agreements was laid during a series of working meetings of the Uzbek delegation in Washington, which resulted in deals aimed at modernizing industrial infrastructure, introducing resource-efficient agricultural technologies, and strengthening cooperation in cybersecurity and artificial intelligence. Discussions with John Jovanovic, head of the U.S. Export-Import Bank (Eximbank), focused on financing projects in energy and transport. Talks with Ben Black, CEO of the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), centered on accelerating the creation of a joint investment platform. A meeting with Shilpan Amin, Global Executive Director of General Motors International, addressed long-term cooperation in the automotive sector.   Kazakhstan, for its part, signed a substantial package of 29 agreements totaling approximately $17 billion. Key projects include a $2.5 billion deal with John Deere to localize the production of agricultural machinery. In the mining sector, a $1.1 billion agreement was finalized between Tau-Ken Samruk and Cove Capital for the joint development of one of the world’s largest untapped tungsten deposits.   In the high-tech, Kazakhstan signed memorandums of understanding worth around $300 million with BETA Technologies and Joby Aero Inc. to develop electric aviation and air taxi services. In finance, the National Investment Corporation of the National Bank of Kazakhstan concluded agreements worth $1 billion with leading U.S. funds, including Brookfield Asset Management and Cerberus Capital Management. A significant outcome was the announcement of Kazakhstan’s first industrial investment project in the U.S.: a $130 million memorandum signed by 1Thirty Holding to build a chemical complex.   The summit also marked breakthroughs in aviation and communications. Plans were announced for the sale of over 40 Boeing aircraft in total. The national carrier, Air Astana, signed a letter of intent for 18 new Boeing 787-9 Dreamliner wide-body jets. Tajikistan’s Somon Air plans to acquire up to 14 aircraft, while Uzbekistan Airways finalized its order for 8 Dreamliner jets. In digital communications, a landmark event was the announcement of a partnership between Elon Musk’s Starlink and the telecommunications group Veon. This agreement, Starlink’s largest direct-to-cell deal, will provide service to over 150 million potential customers, beginning with Beeline in Kazakhstan.   An analysis of these deals, however, reveals their complex nature. As some economists have noted, many of the announced agreements essentially represent a capital outflow from Central Asia to the U.S. (through leasing and credit for the purchase of aircraft, equipment, and locomotives), an approach some experts have compared to that of the Persian Gulf states. The only major direct investment into the region appears to be the tungsten mining project in Kazakhstan. This structure reflects the existing model of foreign economic exchange: the export of raw materials in return for the import of high-tech products.   This dynamic showcases the transactional, “tit-for-tat” approach characteristic of the Trump Administration. For the United States, the benefit is clear and immediate: support for its domestic manufacturers and the creation of jobs. For the Central Asian nations, the long-term gain depends on less certain factors, such as the successful localization of production and a unaffected transfer of technological expertise. A more immediate victory appears to be the revitalization of substantive discussions in the U.S. Congress regarding the repeal of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, a Cold War-era trade restriction that, according to a consensus among lawmakers and experts, has long been obsolete and yet stands as a barrier to a full-fledged economic partnership that could provide stability and predictability for investors.   A key driver of the Trump Administration’s decisive engagement is strategic competition with China, particularly over access to critical minerals. Washington is seeking to diversify its supply chains to reduce its dependence on Beijing, which controls approximately 70% of global rare earth mining and 90% of processing, and whose supply restrictions have already created challenges for certain sectors of the U.S. economy. Against this backdrop, Central Asia, with its generous reserves of tungsten, uranium, antimony, copper, and lithium, becomes a vital partner for the United States. This theme was central to the summit, with even Tajikistan’s President E. Rahmon highlighting his country’s readiness to attract American investment to develop rare and strategic resources. However, the region’s nations are insisting on the development of the full production value chain, from geological exploration to finished products, to avoid remaining mere suppliers of raw materials. Turkmenistan’s interests were more narrowly focused, linked to hopes of securing U.S. support for the long-planned TAPI pipeline (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India). While no concrete decisions were made, the summit provided Ashgabat with a platform to re-emphasize the project in the context of global energy security and the diversification of supply routes bypassing Russia.   For the Central Asian nations, the summit was a crucial opportunity to advance their multi-vector foreign policies. The war in Ukraine has served as a powerful catalyst for the region’s search for alternative economic partners and trade routes. In this context, the U.S. is seen as an important counterweight not only to Russia’s influence but also to China’s. Washington’s active support for the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (the “Middle Corridor”) fully aligns with these aspirations. Furthermore, recent agreements to develop the “Zangezur Corridor” with U.S. participation, now dubbed the “Trump Route”, are viewed as a bottleneck through which the U.S. and its allies are opening a path to Central Asia.   Despite the announced deals, the American presence faces China’s deeply entrenched influence in the region. According to analysts, Chinese investments are structural and long-term in nature. The American approach, especially under President Trump, appears more transactional. Historically, U.S. attention to the region has been episodic, leading Central Asian leaders to be cautious about long-term prospects. The real question is whether the U.S. is prepared to invest in creating full value chains within Central Asia, including raw material processing and guaranteed offtake agreements, as China already does. The answer to this will determine whether Washington can mount a serious challenge to Beijing for long-term influence.   Beyond resources and geopolitics, significant attention was given to human capital and social development. The Kazakh delegation signed a package of agreements worth around $50 million in education and science with leading American universities and companies. A key project will be the establishment of the new Ulytau Technical University in Zhezkazgan with the participation of the Colorado School of Mines. In the financial sector, the National Bank of Kazakhstan and Visa signed a memorandum of cooperation. In healthcare, Samruk-Kazyna and Ashmore Investment Advisors announced a $150 million project to create the first Western-branded multi-profile clinic in Kazakhstan.   In addition to economic agreements, the summit was marked by important diplomatic developments. One was the announcement that Kazakhstan would join the Abraham Accords. While the move is largely symbolic, it is a clear signal of Astana’s willingness to align with Washington-led international initiatives.   However, this step should also be viewed in the broader context of Israel’s increased engagement in the region. According to Israeli diplomatic sources, since 2023 Israel has been deliberately working to deepen ties with the countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus. This strategy has several objectives: first, to create a counterweight to Iranian influence; second, to contain Türkiye’s regional ambitions; and third, to counter the spread of radicalism, especially following attempted attacks on Israeli facilities in the region after the flare-up in Gaza. For the U.S., Kazakhstan’s inclusion in this format is a diplomatic breakthrough, while for Kazakhstan itself, it is a pragmatic step within its multi-vector policy that strengthens ties with a key U.S. ally in the Middle East.   The summit also showcased the region’s aspiration for greater efficiency. President S. Mirziyoyev put forward several initiatives aimed at institutionalizing the C5+1 format, proposing the establishment of a permanent secretariat, a Coordinating Council on Investment and Trade, and a Central Asian Investment Partnership Fund. The offer to host the next summit in Samarkand also signals Uzbekistan’s desire to play a more active role in shaping the regional agenda.   In conclusion, experts agree that the C5+1 summit in Washington marked not just another stage of dialogue, but a qualitative shift in the relationship. The United States, concerned about the security of its industrial supply chains, has found willing partners in the nations of Central Asia. In turn, the region’s countries, seeking to diversify their economies, see the U.S. as a source of needed investment and technology. Despite this progress, a realistic perspective is essential: China’s economic footprint in the region remains many times larger than that of the U.S., while Moscow remains both the primary security guarantor for the region’s nations and a principal potential threat to their stability. The geographic proximity to Russia and China obliges the Central Asian states to continue pursuing a cautious foreign policy. The ultimate success of this new phase of cooperation with the U.S. will depend not on sound declarations, but on the consistent and successful implementation of the agreements signed.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

This policy brief, co-authored by Aziza Mukhammedova, Jalal Ud Din Kakar, and Zil E Huma, examines Pakistan’s long-standing reliance on militant proxies in Afghanistan through the lens of the “boomerang effect” – the idea that short-sighted strategic choices eventually return to undermine the security of the state that made them. Taking the Durand Line as both a geographic and symbolic starting point, the authors trace how this unresolved, colonial-era border dispute, combined with Pakistan’s search for “strategic depth” in Afghanistan, has produced a security environment that Islamabad can no longer effectively manage. The brief situates the current spike in cross-border tensions, retaliatory strikes and mutual accusations between Kabul and Islamabad within this longer history of proxy warfare and miscalculated geopolitical engineering.   The authors show how Pakistan’s early recognition and sustained support of the Taliban, including during the anti-Soviet jihad and later as a “friendly” regime in Kabul, was driven by the desire to counter Indian influence and secure a compliant government next door. However, over time this supposed asset turned into an autonomous actor with its own priorities. The Taliban’s refusal to compromise on the Durand Line, the persistence of Afghan Pashtun nationalism, and Kabul’s diversification of foreign ties with China, Russia, Qatar and even India have gradually eroded Pakistan’s leverage. The brief portrays this evolution as a classic case of strategic blowback: a patron that once shaped the proxy’s rise is now confronted with a neighbour unwilling to fully accommodate its security demands.   A central focus of the analysis is the emergence of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) as a direct threat to Pakistan’s internal security. Drawing on the Global Terrorism Index, the authors highlight a 91 percent surge in TTP activity since 2023, with 482 attacks recorded in 2024 after the Taliban’s return to power. They argue that safe havens across the border, combined with Kabul’s reluctance to decisively confront TTP, have emboldened the group. At the same time, Kabul accuses Islamabad of links with IS-K, while Pakistan charges Afghanistan with using TTP and BLA as proxies – a mutual blame game that entrenches mistrust and fuels recurring clashes along the Durand Line.   In conclusion, the brief contends that Pakistan is now paying the full price of its proxy-centred doctrine. Instead of a secure western flank, Islamabad faces a hostile or at best unreliable neighbour, mounting militant violence in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, and growing pressure on flagship projects such as the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor. The need to divert military and political attention to the western border, just as India strengthens its diplomatic presence in Kabul, further complicates Pakistan’s strategic posture. The authors argue that this “boomerang effect” not only exposes the limits of proxy warfare as a long-term strategy, but also raises fundamental questions about Pakistan’s civil–military decision-making and the urgent necessity of moving towards more cooperative, rule-based regional security arrangements.   Read on Eurasia Review   Jalal Ud Din Kakar works as a Research Fellow at the Center for Security Strategy and Policy Research and a PhD International Relations scholar at the School of Integrated Social Sciences, The University of Lahore. Zil E Huma, Mir Chakar Khan Rind University, Sibi, Balochistan   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

This policy brief by Nargiza Umarova argues that renewed U.S. sanctions on Iran’s Chabahar Port and India’s parallel deepening of trade ties with Russia and the EAEU are reshaping Central Asia’s southern connectivity choices. Although Uzbekistan had explored building logistics facilities at Chabahar, those plans have not materialised—signalling Tashkent’s caution as the port again falls under sanctions and as returns look uncertain for a country accounting for only a small share of India–Central Asia trade. At the same time, Chabahar remains central to the INSTC and to India–Iran–Russia supply chains, which incentivises Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and others to keep the route alive.   Against this backdrop, Tashkent is pivoting to an alternative: a faster, more direct land bridge to South Asia via the Trans-Afghan (Kabul) Corridor. Since 2022, Uzbekistan has promoted a multimodal Belarus–Russia–Kazakhstan–Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan route, designed to cut North Eurasia–South Asia delivery times to about 20 days. The centrepiece is the Termez–Naibabad–Maidanshahr–Logar–Kharlachi railway, backed by a July 17 intergovernmental agreement on a feasibility study with Afghanistan and Pakistan. Preliminary estimates suggest freight volumes could reach 22 million tonnes by 2030 and 34 million tonnes by 2040, much of it in transit to larger markets, including India.   Umarova emphasises that corridor choice is not merely logistical but strategic. Extending Lapis Lazuli and INSTC pathways could divert South Asia–Europe flows toward the Caspian littoral (Turkmenistan–Azerbaijan), diluting Uzbekistan’s role as a trans-Eurasian hub. By contrast, a functioning Kabul Corridor would anchor Tashkent in the shortest Eurasia–South Asia axis, lessen dependence on Iranian infrastructure, and align with India’s interest in diversified, overland access—provided political risk in Afghanistan is managed.   The brief concludes with pragmatic prescriptions: move first and fast on the Kabul Corridor with broad Central Asian buy-in; engage New Delhi diplomatically to secure support and cargo; and pursue an SCO-wide “single transport space” to integrate standards, schedules and financing. In parallel, keep a hedging option open at Chabahar to preserve flexibility, but treat it as supplementary to a primary Trans-Afghan strategy that maximises Uzbekistan’s connectivity, resilience and transit revenues.   Read on Jamestown Foundation   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.