Central Asia is an important energy region with 3% of the world’s oil reserves, 12% of gas reserves, and significant potential for renewable energy sources. After the start of the war in Ukraine in 2022, the EU has increased its focus on the region, seeing it as a strategic partner for diversifying supplies and the green transition.   As emphasized in the EU Strategy for Central Asia, the goal is not to control resources, but to support reforms, harmonize legislation, and introduce environmental standards. This is being implemented through the Sustainable Energy Connections in Central Asia (2022–2026) initiative and the Global Gateway program, with investments of up to €12 billion in renewable energy, digitalization, and the environment. The EU offers a long-term partnership based on technology and sustainable development, which differs from resource-based strategies.   Today, the EU is one of the region’s largest economic partners, accounting for 22.6% of foreign trade and more than 40% of foreign direct investment. Its involvement in the energy sector takes the form of investment, technological support, and joint development of green solutions.   The EU as an investor in the energy sector of Central Asia. The EU plays a key role in Central Asia’s energy sector, providing not only investment but also access to modern technologies and expert support. In particular, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development is a leading instrument, investing a record €2.26 billion in the region in 2024.   Most of these funds are directed towards sustainable and “green” infrastructure, including the modernization of networks and the construction of renewable energy facilities. Among the countries in the region, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan received the largest amounts of investment.   For reference: key projects include the construction of high-voltage power lines in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the region’s largest solar power plant with energy storage in the Tashkent region, and Central Asia’s first green hydrogen production project in Kazakhstan.   In addition, European companies are actively involved in the region’s energy development. The Italian company Eni owns shares in Kazakhstan’s largest oil and gas projects, while the French company Orano is involved in uranium mining in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. France covers a significant part of its nuclear power plant needs with uranium from the region, and the partnership in the nuclear sector continues to deepen.   The EU plays a leading role in harmonizing energy regulations, using the experience of the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) and the integration of the Balkan markets. Cooperation is conducted in the “5+EU” format and through bilateral agreements. The EU Strategy for Central Asia has been in force since 2019, and in 2023 a Roadmap with about 80 measures for the development of trade, climate, and energy was approved. All countries in the region have joined initiatives to reduce methane emissions and ratified the Paris Agreement. The EU provides technical assistance for energy sector reforms, competition development, and coordination on water resource management.   The EU as a regulator of standards and provider of technological solutions. The EU has a significant influence on Central Asia’s energy sector, spreading its standards, norms, and technologies. Countries in the region, seeking to enter European markets, are adapting to these requirements, from environmental standards to market rules. One example is the EU carbon levy mechanism introduced in 2023. It affects exports of energy-intensive products, including steel, cement, and electricity, and involves the imposition of a carbon charge if the products are manufactured with high greenhouse gas emissions. This puts additional pressure on producers in Central Asia and at the same time creates incentives for modernising production, switching to renewable energy sources and improving energy efficiency. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have already begun to look for ways to reduce the carbon intensity of their products, including with the help of European initiatives and technologies.   For reference: With the support of the EU and the EBRD, the first industrial energy storage system in the region (500 MWh) has been launched in Uzbekistan. European companies such as Siemens, ABB, and Total Eren are participating in the construction of solar power plants, the modernization of substations, and the transition to high-efficiency generation.   III. Balance of opportunities and challenges in energy cooperation with the EU. Cooperation with the EU opens up opportunities for Central Asia to diversify its export markets, primarily by reducing its previous dependence on transit routes through Russia and on exports to volatile or limited markets such as China or the Middle East. More than 70% of Kazakhstan’s oil goes to Europe, with exports in 2024 exceeding 1 million barrels per day, making Kazakhstan the third largest supplier to the EU. After Niger stopped exporting natural uranium in 2023, Kazakhstan became its main supplier, covering over 40% of the EU’s needs. This ensures stable foreign exchange earnings and long-term contracts.   At the same time, direct exports to Europe are limited by the lack of a common border and gas pipelines – oil is transported via the Black Sea and transit countries. In these conditions, the EU’s practical contribution to the development of the region’s energy sector becomes particularly significant: investments are directed towards infrastructure renewal, the construction of power lines, and support for green energy projects. The EU also transfers technology — energy-efficient equipment, digital control systems, modern turbines, and metering systems. This local approach not only strengthens the reliability of energy systems but also prepares Central Asian countries to enter more stable and diverse external markets.   However, Central Asia is an area of active competition. Over the past 20 years, China has invested over $105 billion, mainly in infrastructure projects and raw material assets, while the UAE and Saudi Arabia are financing renewable energy projects, and Russia is maintaining its influence through critical infrastructure such as gas pipelines, power lines, and transport routes. The EU must create more flexible conditions to maintain the interest of countries in the region.   Moreover, cooperation with the EU contributes to the growth of energy professionals’ qualifications: more than 500 specialists from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan have been trained through Erasmus+, European Commission, and other programs, as well as through partnerships with European universities and institutions. They are working on the development of tariff models, energy efficiency, and digital accounting systems.   Investments face barriers: in Kazakhstan, the tariff model has changed, and in Uzbekistan, there are delays in payments from state-owned companies. Fitch Ratings, which assesses the reliability of countries for investors, notes delay in obligations to investors, which required the creation of a special company that officially purchases electricity from private producers – Uzenergosotish – and additional guarantees from international institutions.   Strategic priorities and directions for the development of energy cooperation with the EU. Geopolitical changes and the reorientation of export flows reinforce the importance of Central Asia’s infrastructure connectivity with the EU. The Middle Corridor, a strategic transport route for sustainable logistics, is of particular importance. Kazakhstan is modernizing the ports of Aktau and Kuryk, expanding their throughput capacity and increasing the fleet of Caspian tankers for transporting oil to the port of Alat (Azerbaijan). Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are renovating the port of Turkmenbashi, creating a regional logistics hub.   The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, construction of which began in 2022, will significantly reduce transit times for energy cargoes to Europe. The Trans-Caspian gas pipeline between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan will be able to supply up to 15 billion cubic meters of gas to the EU annually, expanding export opportunities and strengthening the region’s energy autonomy.   To integrate with the European market, Central Asian countries need to eliminate fragmentation in tariffs, standards, and network management. The creation of a Central Asian Energy Community, modeled on the South-East European Energy Community, will provide legal certainty and cross-border electricity trade.   Overall, the potential of the partnership is far from exhausted. With the successful implementation of EU initiatives and the willingness of Central Asian countries to reform, it is possible to create a new energy space from Europe to Central Asia as an important element of global security and climate stability.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

French geopolitical edition CONFLITS Revue de Géopolitique has republished the policy brief by Dr. Islomkhon Gafarov and IAIS volunteer Bositkhon Islamov. The brief was originally published on Geopolitika.no (Norway), reflecting growing international interest in Central and South Asian security dynamics.   The article analyses the uneasy yet strategic “forced cooperation” between Afghanistan and Pakistan amid escalating regional tensions, including the Kashmir crisis, proxy conflicts, and shifting alliances shaped by Chinese mediation and Indian influence.   Read it in French on CONFLITS Revue de Géopolitique   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In his detailed policy brief for The Diplomat, Dr. Islomkhon Gafarov analyses the subtle yet strategic evolution of Russia’s policy toward Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. Rather than treating Afghanistan as a traditional conflict zone, Moscow increasingly views it as part of the broader Central Asian region — both economically and politically. Central to this approach is the introduction of Afghan labor migration into Russia, a policy tool long used by Moscow to build influence in post-Soviet Central Asia. The recent agreement signed during the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum to increase Afghan migration to Russia signals not only pragmatic cooperation but also a deeper attempt to stabilize ties with the Taliban government.   Dr. Gafarov argues that this new migration vector is part of a larger Russian strategy to reshape Afghanistan’s view of Russia — not as a former occupier, but as a partner and economic opportunity. While China continues to dominate headlines with its resource extraction and Belt and Road investments in Afghanistan, Moscow is quietly creating alternative linkages — through employment, humanitarian aid, and infrastructure development. Notably, Russia has even surpassed China in some respects, such as recognizing the Taliban diplomatically and offering direct employment routes to Afghan workers.   The brief also delves into the geopolitical competition emerging in Afghanistan between Russia and China. With Beijing expanding its grip on Afghan resources and logistics, Russia is pushing back through digital infrastructure projects and the launch of the Trans-Afghan railway in cooperation with Uzbekistan. A recent annulment of a major Chinese oil deal by the Afghan government may offer Moscow an opening to enhance its presence in the energy sector. This competition is nuanced, as both powers maintain informal boundaries in Central Asia but appear to be increasingly contesting influence in Afghanistan.   At the same time, Russia’s outreach to Afghanistan is shaped by the lingering trauma of the Soviet-Afghan war. Dr. Gafarov notes how Moscow is seeking to overwrite these historical memories with soft power initiatives — from flour shipments to cultural programs — while simultaneously addressing contemporary security threats. Russia views economic engagement not only as a lever of influence but also as a counter-radicalization measure, attempting to stem the growth of terrorist groups like ISKP through stability and development.   Ultimately, the policy brief paints a picture of Russia slowly integrating Afghanistan into its wider Central Asian policy framework. By opening labor pathways and positioning itself as a dependable partner amid regional deportations and Western disengagement, Moscow is crafting a new narrative. As Dr. Gafarov concludes, this could mark the beginning of a lasting Russian presence in Afghanistan’s economic and political fabric — an evolution not through military intervention, but through migration, market access, and diplomacy.   Read the brief   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

As Dr. Islomkhon Gafarov and Bositkhon Islamov argue in their policy brief on Geopolitika.no, the evolving dynamics between Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2025 reflect a complex interplay of coercive diplomacy, regional rivalries, and domestic insecurities. Following the Kashmir escalation in April–May 2025, relations between Islamabad and Kabul entered a phase of what the authors call “forced cooperation”. While Pakistani authorities claimed tactical success in managing the Kashmir front, the brief underscores that this stability is conditional on calm along the Afghan border. The authors point to Pakistan’s elevation of the Afghan Taliban envoy’s status to ambassador as a defensive maneuver meant to pre-empt any Afghan-Indian rapprochement that could leave Islamabad regionally isolated.   Dr. Gafarov and Mr. Islamov emphasize the significance of China’s diplomatic engagement, particularly the informal trilateral meeting hosted in Beijing in May 2025. Chaired by Foreign Minister Wang Yi, this initiative aims not only to preserve Chinese interests, such as the security of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, but also to reshape the regional balance through a nascent Beijing-Kabul-Islamabad axis. Yet the authors caution that structural impediments to Afghan-Pakistani cooperation remain acute, foremost among them the threat posed by Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). With operational bases reportedly spread across Kunar, Nangarhar, Khost, and Paktika provinces, and links to al-Qaeda and ISKP, the TTP has become a transnational destabilizer whose reach has grown precisely because of the lack of coordinated counterterrorism between the two states.   The brief further highlights how the security conflict is assuming new technological dimensions, noting with concern the emergence of Taliban drone capabilities allegedly developed at repurposed Western military installations in Kabul and Logar. With technical support traced to Russia, Iran, and China, this innovation marks a shift toward proxy warfare marked by deniability and technological escalation. In parallel, Baloch separatism, particularly the operations of the BLA, adds a layer of internal vulnerability to Pakistan’s strategic calculus, with attacks on transport infrastructure and railways threatening the viability of long-term regional integration projects such as CPEC and TAPI.   A particularly troubling trend identified by the authors is the emergence of a new militant actor, Tehrik-e-Taliban Kashmir (TTK), which aims to destabilize both India and Pakistan in pursuit of an Islamist order. Dr. Gafarov and Mr. Islamov argue that the group’s potential links to the Afghan Taliban could not only rupture Kabul’s fragile relations with Islamabad but also jeopardize its emerging diplomatic engagements with India and China. Compounding these threats is Pakistan’s mass deportation campaign against Afghan refugees, which the authors view as both a humanitarian crisis and a security liability, as displaced populations become vulnerable to recruitment by extremist factions operating in under-governed Afghan territories.   Ultimately, the authors conclude that mounting tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan pose a direct challenge to regional connectivity and development. Cross-border trade disruptions, disputes over transboundary water management, and insecurity along strategic corridors such as Balochistan and the Durand Line jeopardize major infrastructure efforts including CASA-1000 and TAPI. While the Termez–Kabul route is deemed the most viable corridor in the short term, sustained instability could force regional actors to redirect investments toward more reliable alternatives such as the Iranian port of Chabahar. Thus, despite episodic diplomatic gestures and Chinese mediation, Dr. Gafarov and Mr. Islamov portray a regional order where mistrust, militancy, and misaligned interests continue to outpace cooperation.   Read on Geopolitika.no   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In the 21st century, artificial intelligence (AI) has evolved from a technological innovation into a key instrument of global strategic competition. The relevance of this issue stems from the fact that the outcome of the AI race may redistribute centers of global influence, alter the balance of power in international politics, transform the principles of digital regulation, and establish new standards for the economy, defense, and societal governance. In this context, particular attention is drawn to the United States and China—two leading technological powers whose ambitions, strategies, and resources shape the architecture of the global AI landscape and largely determine its developmental trajectory.   Current Landscape of AI Development. The United States maintains a significant lead in private investment in AI: in 2024, American sector investments reached $109.1 billion, compared to $9.3 billion in China. Similarly, in 2023, the United States attracted approximately $67.2 billion in private AI funding, while China secured only $7.8 billion. American startups also lead in venture financing: from 2013 to 2023, U.S.-based AI companies received around $335 billion in venture capital, compared to $104 billion in China. Quantitatively, the United States also surpasses China: according to the Stanford AI Index, there are over 10,000 actively funded AI companies worldwide, of which 5,509 are American and 1,446 are Chinese.   In contrast, China has taken the lead in scientific output. According to Stanford HAI, Chinese researchers publish more AI-related articles. The Global AI Readiness Index indicates that China ranks first globally in terms of scientific publications, overtaking the United States, which ranks third. However, in the overall government readiness index, the United States retains the top position, while China ranks 16th, reflecting the stronger institutional and infrastructural maturity of the U.S.   The United States has developed a number of leading large language models (GPT-4/OpenAI, Gemini/Google, Claude/Anthropic, etc.) that have gained global prominence. Chinese companies are also creating comparable systems. For instance, Baidu’s chatbot Ernie Bot reached over 200 million users by April 2024. Nevertheless, Western products still dominate in reach: according to Al Jazeera, ChatGPT recorded around 1.86 billion views annually, whereas Ernie received only 14.9 million. The Chinese government requires formal approval of all generative AI services prior to deployment, whereas in the U.S., regulation is gradually taking shape.   AI is being actively integrated into both the military and civilian spheres in both countries, encompassing areas such as autonomous systems, intelligence, cybersecurity, medicine, transportation, and surveillance technologies.   Government Strategy and Support. Both nations have set technological leadership as a key strategic goal. Since 2020, the United States has enacted the National AI Initiative Act, established the National AI Office (Select Subcommittee on Artificial Intelligence), and adopted funding plans (such as under the CHIPS Act) to support AI research. In October 2023, the Biden Administration issued an Executive Order on the "Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development of AI," introducing requirements for red-teaming and the development of safety and privacy standards. In January 2025, the Trump Administration signed an Executive Order on “Removing Barriers” explicitly proclaiming a policy to “sustain global U.S. dominance in AI”.   China's national strategy is clearly oriented toward 2030. The “New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan” launched in 2017, aims to make China the global AI leader by 2030. AI is a priority in the country’s 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025). The government is investing billions and has established “national AI teams” including Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, SenseTime, iFlytek, among others, as designated leaders by the State Council. At the same time, China is actively refining its regulatory framework. Between 2021 and 2023, the country introduced its first national regulations for algorithms—covering content recommendation, “deep synthesis” (deepfakes), and generative models. For example, the 2023 Interagency Measures stipulate that AI-generated outputs must be “truthful and accurate” and must not contradict the “core values of socialism”. Developers of major models are required to register their algorithms and undergo government security assessments. These measures reflect the essence of China's approach: centralized control over information and ideological content.   Ethics and Regulation. The ethical and regulatory approaches of the two countries differ markedly. In the U.S., openness is encouraged: most AI laboratories publish their code and datasets, and debates focus on ethics and privacy under existing legislation (e.g., GDPR, California Consumer Privacy Act) and frameworks (AI Bill of Rights, NIST Framework). Freedom of development remains high, fostering innovation through competition.   In China, efforts are geared toward strict state oversight. Regulatory bodies require pre-approval of content, and comprehensive algorithmic rules have been enacted. According to international assessments, China ranks outside the top 30 in categories related to AI governance and ethics. Thus, China prioritizes centralized supervision and censorship, while the U.S. relies on market-based competition and self-regulatory mechanisms (e.g., audits, open standards).   Forecasts and Expert Assessments. Competition is expected to intensify over the next 5–10 years. RAND Corporation (2025) projects that China may reach parity with the U.S. in terms of top-tier AI model quality within the year. In response, U.S. authorities have adopted a dual-track strategy: restricting technological exports to China while accelerating domestic innovation through major investments and light-touch regulation. However, breakthroughs by Chinese companies such as DeepSeek, Alibaba Cloud, Baidu, and Tencent are significantly narrowing the technological gap, casting doubt on the long-term dominance of the U.S.   One of the most notable examples of such progress is the company DeepSeek. Founded in 2023, it launched its R1 chatbot in January 2025, which quickly became the most downloaded free app in the U.S. App Store. The model demonstrated performance comparable to GPT-4, especially in tasks involving logical reasoning and mathematics, while consuming significantly fewer resources due to its Mixture-of-Experts architecture. This enabled DeepSeek to train its model at 42% lower cost than Western counterparts while achieving higher throughput. Despite its success, the company has already faced international scrutiny regarding the risks of misinformation.   Meanwhile, Chinese experts such as Song-Chun Zhu—professor, director, and head of the AI Institute at Peking University, often referred to as the “godfather” of Chinese AI—state that China is “fully capable of setting the agenda”  in the era of generative AI, thanks to the rapid development of its research and startup ecosystem. Thus, the future of AI leadership depends on how effectively the U.S. can leverage its advantages and whether China can continue to close the gap dynamically.   Overall, most forecasts are skeptical of the notion of inevitable hegemony by a single country. Independent analyses suggest that the AI race is not a “Cold War” between two superpowers, but rather a long-term technological process with strengths in different areas. While the United States leads in investment, models, and commercial innovation, China excels in implementation scale and data volume. The fate of AI leadership in the coming decade will largely depend on which country better leverages its ecosystem and resources, retains top talent, and finds a balance between openness and security.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Nargiza Umarova outlines the strategic rationale behind Uzbekistan’s efforts to establish a West-South transport axis as part of its broader ambition to emerge as a key logistics hub in Eurasia. She argues that Uzbekistan’s current participation in Europe-bound freight flows remains disproportionately low, just 2.3 percent of Central Asia’s total, despite the country’s advantageous geographic location. This marginal role, she notes, represents both a structural limitation and a latent opportunity. As European interest in Central Asian connectivity intensifies, particularly through the diversification of transport routes away from Russian infrastructure, Uzbekistan is positioning itself to fill a growing demand for new, geopolitically neutral corridors.   Umarova situates this development within the evolving geopolitical and economic relationship between Central Asia and the European Union. The EU, now Uzbekistan’s third-largest trading partner after China and Russia, has already seen a rise in bilateral trade turnover, particularly under the GSP+ trade preference scheme. Uzbekistan’s exports to Europe — dominated by chemicals and uranium — reflect both the scale and the narrow base of current exchanges. Thus, she argues, the expansion of transport connectivity is not just about logistics but about fundamentally restructuring Uzbekistan’s economic integration with global markets, enabling more diversified, higher-value exports over time.   To that end, Umarova highlights two transformative infrastructure initiatives. The first is the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway, which will shorten trade routes between East Asia and Europe by nearly 900 kilometers. This railway is designed to turn the Southern Corridor, previously marginalized by sanctions on Iran and logistical difficulties, into a competitive monomodal artery for transcontinental trade. Although she acknowledges that the mountainous terrain in Kyrgyzstan may limit its scalability compared to Kazakhstan’s flatter routes, Umarova argues that the southern path offers new geoeconomic options, particularly through potential linkages to the Middle East and Africa via Iran and Türkiye.   The second initiative she examines is the Termez–Mazar-i-Sharif–Kabul–Peshawar railway, which aims to create a direct land connection from Central Asia to South Asia and the Indian Ocean. In Umarova’s assessment, this so-called Kabul Corridor has the potential to redefine regional transit flows by offering an alternative to traditional northward routes through Russia. If successfully linked to the Northern and Middle Corridors, the Afghan route could connect Northern Europe, Russia, Belarus, the Caucasus, and parts of Southern Europe to India and the Gulf, with Uzbekistan serving as the pivotal junction. This would not only enhance the country’s logistical profile but also elevate its geostrategic relevance in a fragmenting global order.   Umarova concludes that while Uzbekistan cannot fully compete with Kazakhstan’s dominance in regional freight due to its lack of Caspian Sea access and more limited rail infrastructure, these new corridors offer pathways to mitigate existing imbalances. The key, she asserts, is not to replicate Kazakhstan’s model, but to develop complementary routes that serve new geographies and actors. If Uzbekistan succeeds in establishing itself as an indispensable link between Europe, South Asia, and the Middle East, it could profoundly shift the regional transport matrix and secure a stronger role in the international economic system.   Read on The Diplomat   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.