By Dovud Usmonov, undergraduate student at UWED, intern at IAIS Introduction. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), led by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, achieved an unprecedented victory in the snap elections to Japan’s House of Representatives, marking the party’s largest electoral success since its establishment in 1955. The expanded institutional mandate enables the ruling party to advance its policy agenda despite the evident weakness of the opposition. The victory is largely associated with high levels of public trust in Takaichi’s leadership and an effective mobilization campaign. At the same time, the foreign policy orientation of the Takaichi cabinet, which is focused on technological sovereignty and enhanced national security, creates conditions for a more active Japanese presence across Eurasia, including Central Asia. For the region, this may translate into expanded investment, energy, and technological cooperation. In particular, Uzbekistan may gain new opportunities to deepen engagement in nuclear and renewable energy, digital transformation, and infrastructure modernization. Election Results. The election results demonstrate strong public backing for the Prime Minister while underscoring the diminished political influence of the opposition, which now has limited capacity to shape legislative outcomes. Given the institutional primacy of the House of Representatives within Japan’s legislative system, the ruling party is now positioned to advance legislation with minimal parliamentary resistance. Control over key parliamentary committees further expands the government’s ability to implement its fiscal, technological, and defense priorities. The LDP won 316 of the 465 seats in the lower chamber, securing a two-thirds supermajority – a dramatic increase from its pre-election total of 198 seats. The scale of victory proved so overwhelming that the party effectively allowed opposition candidates to retain a limited parliamentary presence. The main opposition force secured only 49 seats, compared to 167 previously. Particularly notable was the LDP’s performance in the Greater Tokyo metropolitan area, home to more than a quarter of Japan’s population. The opposition succeeded in electing only one representative there, enabling the ruling party to consolidate dominance not only in regional constituencies but also within Japan’s most economically dynamic and politically influential electorate. On 9 February, Takaichi reaffirmed her intention to accelerate preparations for a national referendum on constitutional revision. She also announced plans to introduce legislation by summer eliminating the consumption tax on food products — a politically popular measure that nevertheless carries significant fiscal implications. Takaichi’s Fiscal Policy. The Takaichi administration promotes what it describes a ”responsible and proactive fiscal policy,” framing public spending as a tool to stimulate economic growth while reinforcing long-term fiscal resilience. Financial markets, however, responded cautiously: long-term interest rates rose and the yen weakened, signalling investor uncertainty regarding Japan’s fiscal outlook. The principal concern relates to the proposed two-year suspension of the consumption tax on food products, estimated to cost approximately ¥5 trillion annually. Questions remain over how lost revenues will be offset without expanding deficit financing, as well as whether reinstating the tax after the proposed period will be politically feasible. At the same time, the LDP has announced large-scale strategic investments across 17 priority sectors, including artificial intelligence, semiconductors, space technologies, and shipbuilding. The government expects accelerated economic growth to generate higher tax revenues and improve fiscal sustainability. Nevertheless, uncertainty persists regarding projected returns on these investments, mechanisms for evaluating effectiveness, and the government’s ability to maintain fiscal discipline alongside expanded spending commitments. Political timing constraints further complicate adoption of a full annual budget, increasing reliance on interim fiscal arrangements. Defense Policy. Japan’s political trajectory increasingly reflects the strengthening of its military component, including approval of a record defense budget for 2026 amounting to ¥9 trillion (approximately $58 billion), which is 9.4% increase, compared to 2025. This indicates that a growing share of Tokyo’s political attention and state resources will be directed toward domestic and regional security priorities, particularly in East Asia. To enhance coastal defense capabilities, Japan plans to allocate approximately ¥100 billion for the deployment of integrated aerial, maritime, and underwater unmanned systems. Japan’s transition toward a record defense budget, military modernization, and reinforced alliance architecture with the United States objectively narrows the scope for Japan’s traditional model of external economic engagement, historically centered on investment projects, infrastructure development, and soft-power instruments. Implications for Central Asia and Uzbekistan. The political course pursued by the Takaichi administration, emphasizing technological sovereignty and national security, implies a gradual expansion of Japanese engagement across Eurasia. Within this framework, the “Central Asia + Japan” format acquires renewed strategic relevance as an instrument for diversifying Tokyo’s economic and geopolitical partnerships.  Central Asia is increasingly viewed as a space for developing resilient logistics and energy corridors and reducing dependence on individual external centers of power. For Uzbekistan, Japan’s current political dynamics open opportunities for deeper cooperation in nuclear and renewable energy, the adoption of Japanese technologies in digitalization and crisis management, and participation in initiatives aimed at diversifying transport and logistics routes. Provided Japan maintains fiscal stability, cooperation may evolve from project-based engagement toward a more institutionalized long-term strategic partnership. At the same time, Japanese engagement in Central Asia may increasingly acquire not only an economic but also a strategic dimension. Japanese initiatives may be interpreted as elements of a broader geopolitical logic aimed at supply-chain diversification and reduced dependence on China. Consequently, regional projects may increasingly be viewed through the prism of major-power competition, even where Central Asian states themselves seek to avoid politicization. Overall, the window of opportunity for deepening Central Asia–Japan cooperation will depend directly on the sustainability of Japan’s domestic policy course and macro-financial stability. Summary. The consolidation of Sanae Takaichi’s political position following the 8 February 2026 elections reflects not merely personal political success but rather the structural consolidation of the Liberal Democratic Party amid internal party transformation, heightened external tensions, and opposition weakness. This political configuration facilitates the pursuit of an innovation-oriented domestic agenda, as demonstrated by the government’s determination to hold a constitutional referendum. The acquisition of a qualified parliamentary majority grants the government an expanded political mandate and institutional capacity to implement an active fiscal and defense agenda. Nevertheless, the long-term sustainability of this course will depend on the cabinet’s ability to balance reform momentum with macro-financial discipline and sustained public trust. Japan’s evolving defense priorities simultaneously enhance Central Asia’s strategic importance for Tokyo while complicating the broader cooperation environment. For Uzbekistan, this necessitates further institutionalization of economic partnership with Japan while preserving balanced multi-vector foreign policy principles and avoiding external geopolitical polarization. Forecasts. First, the LDP’s victory creates an institutional window of at least 2–3 years, during which the Takaichi government will enjoy expanded freedom in pursuing economic and defense policies. Second, the growing China factor and persistent uncertainty surrounding Taiwan virtually guarantee continued increases in Japan’s defense spending and reinforcement of strategic deterrence policies. Japan is likely to invest in measures aimed at mitigating external trade pressure. Third, such a decisive electoral outcome likely represents the peak of the current political cycle. By the 2028 elections, public support may face constraints linked to fiscal burdens, socio-economic expectations, and potential opposition consolidation. However, should the two-year consumption tax suspension be extended beyond its initial timeframe, public confidence may remain moderately high, allowing the LDP under Takaichi to expect similarly favorable, or even stronger electoral outcomes in future elections. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

By Jasurbek Khamrakulov, 3rd year student at UWED The war between Russia and Ukraine has profoundly reshaped the European security system, exposing its weaknesses in military readiness and the defence-industrial capacity of European states. Territorial defence has once again become a priority, defence spending has accelerated, and NATO’s eastern flank has been gradually reinforced, including through the accession of Finland (2023) and Sweden (2024). At the same time, shifts in U.S. strategic priorities under the administration of Donald Trump, along with renewed debates over transatlantic burden-sharing, have intensified European concerns about dependence on American security guarantees. This has prompted a reassessment of strategic autonomy and deeper military cooperation in several key states, including Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. One of the first steps toward strengthening European defence autonomy was the strategic initiative “Readiness 2030,” presented at the European Council meeting on 6 March, 2025. The plan proposes up to EUR 800 bn to reinforce Europe’s defence infrastructure amid heightened security concerns, particularly following the suspension of U.S. military aid to Ukraine and the Oval Office dispute between Trump and Zelenskyy on 28 February 2025. In May 2025, the European Commission launched the “SAFE” financial instrument, a EUR 150 bn fund offering low-cost loans to EU member states for defence projects. At the intergovernmental level, the “E5” format was established in November 2024 as an informal mechanism bringing together the defence ministers of five major European defence spenders – France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and the United Kingdom, to strengthen the European dimension of security amid the ongoing war in Ukraine and the structural transformation of EU and NATO defence policy. This format reflects a growing tendency toward a “core of the willing” within Europe, whereby the largest military and economic powers seek to accelerate decision-making beyond the complex EU consensus procedures, thereby shaping a more flexible and pragmatic model of cooperation. On the bilateral level, following Friedrich Merz’s accession to power in Germany, his first official state visit on 7 May 2025 was to France, aimed at revitalizing cooperation between the EU’s two largest powers, an effort many analysts argue had stalled under his predecessor, Olaf Scholz. A key outcome was the intention to establish a Franco-German Defence and Security Council that would meet regularly to formulate operational responses to shared strategic challenges. According to President Macron, France and Germany intend to accelerate joint programmes and develop new capabilities in addition to tanks, long-range missiles, and combat aircraft. Subsequently, at the 37th UK–France Summit held on 8–10 July 2025 and attended by President Macron and Prime Minister Starmer, further steps were taken to enhance not only bilateral defence ties but also broader European security. In particular, the two sides launched “Lancaster House 2.0” to modernize defence cooperation and establish “Combined Joint Forces” capable of large-scale combat operations and fully compatible with NATO. In addition, the Northwood Declaration reaffirmed the two countries’ “longstanding and resolute commitment to nuclear cooperation.” As a result of deepening UK–France nuclear coordination, it has become increasingly evident that “any serious threat to Europe would now trigger a joint response”. A week later, on 17 July 2025 in London, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz signed a historic Treaty on Friendship and Bilateral Cooperation. Central to the agreement are its defence provisions, which establish a mutual assistance clause obliging both countries to provide support in the event of an armed attack. These commitments build upon the 2024 “Trinity House Agreement” on defence cooperation concluded under Olaf Scholz. The treaty also provides for the joint development of a new high-precision strike capability to strengthen conventional deterrence in Europe. Notably, German anti-submarine warfare aircraft were granted access to operate from British bases, while German crews will receive training on the UK’s P-8A maritime patrol aircraft. For Prime Minister Starmer, the defence pact with Germany represents a calculated strategic step aimed at restoring close engagement with key European powers in the post-Brexit context. At the same time, the “Weimar Triangle”, bringing together Germany, France, and Poland, has regained strategic relevance. In September 2025, the three countries called for significantly deeper integration of Ukraine into the European security and defence framework, emphasizing the need to move toward a more structured role for Kyiv within European defence mechanisms. Regarding recent initiatives, on 28 January German Finance Minister Lars Klingbeil and his French counterpart Roland Lescure held an online meeting with the finance ministers of Poland, Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands as part of the newly proposed “E6” format, designed to strengthen closer defence coordination among major European economic actors. The proposal has been described as a “two-speed” approach intended to circumvent slower consensus-based decision-making among all 27 EU member states, particularly on defence-related measures. One of the four key pillars of the initiative, according to Klingbeil, is increased defence spending. Complementing these initiatives, Germany’s 2026 federal budget allocates EUR 82.69 bn to the Bundeswehr, alongside an additional EUR 25.5 bn from the special defence fund. Chancellor Merz has publicly declared his ambition for Germany to become “the strongest army in Europe,” reaffirming at the World Economic Forum in Davos plans to raise defence expenditure to 5% of GDP. In a broader context, the firm stance taken by European leaders, that only Greenland and Denmark have the right to decide Greenland’s future, following renewed public pressure from the U.S. president regarding the Danish territory, has further prompted Europe to reflect on the need for new institutional reforms in the field of security. With the of the Munich Security Conference taking place, UK Defence Secretary John Healey announced that spending on long-range hypersonic weapons would exceed £400 million this year. The government also underscored the importance of joint missile development with France, Germany, and Italy, marking a broader push for coordinated European capability development. During the conference, Prime Minister Keir Starmer stressed the “urgent need” to deepen defence cooperation between the United Kingdom and Europe. He noted that, ten years after Brexit, the UK is seeking a new phase in its relationship with the continent, shaped by the long-term threat posed by Russia and the need for Europe to assume greater responsibility for its own security. Starmer supported reopening discussions on potential UK participation in the “SAFE” programme and is considering the creation of an intergovernmental European defence mechanism open to all European democracies. At the same time, he emphasized that strengthening European defence autonomy does not imply weakening ties with the United States or moving away from NATO, describing the Alliance as “the most effective defence alliance in history.” The prevailing European rhetoric toward NATO suggests that trust in the alliance as the cornerstone of collective security remains intact, even amid tensions surrounding Greenland. Despite the ambitions and measured steps taken by European leaders, significant divergences in interests and priorities persist. One of the most prominent recent defence initiatives, the Future Combat Air System (FCAS)programme, aimed at developing a sixth-generation European fighter jet through cooperation between Airbus, Dassault Aviation, and Spain has entered a serious crisis due to deep disagreements among industrial and governmental stakeholders over governance, technical specifications, and strategic requirements, particularly between Paris and Berlin. France insists on developing a single aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons and operating from aircraft carriers, a requirement Germany does not consider necessary, which has substantially slowed progress and pushed the programme to the brink of collapse. In response, Airbus executives have proposed a compromise involving two distinct fighter platforms linked by a shared digital system in order to preserve cooperation. However, this solution has yet to resolve the underlying strategic and industrial tensions. In this term, alternative scenarios are increasingly being discussed. Germany may expand its procurement of U.S.-made F-35 aircraft, while France, according to some analysts, could pursue the independent development of a national fighter platform, should a common European solution prove unattainable. This situation underlines the structural difficulties inherent in building fully integrated European defence projects. Taken together, the initiatives outlined above suggest not merely an expansion of cooperation, but the gradual emergence of a “functional core” of European defence, centred on Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Poland. These states command the largest military budgets in Europe, possess advanced defence-industrial bases, and, in the case of Paris and London, maintain nuclear capabilities. However, this emerging core remains hybrid and only partially institutionalized. The United Kingdom operates outside the EU framework, promoting intergovernmental mechanisms open to all European democracies, while France traditionally prioritizes strengthening the European dimension within the EU. Germany occupies an intermediate position. Although it supports deeper European integration, Berlin continues to rely heavily on transatlantic solutions, as reflected in its reliance on American weapons systems. Crises, such as the FCAS programme illustrate how divergences in strategic requirements, capability preferences, and industrial burden-sharing can hinder integration efforts. Thus, a new core of European defence is indeed taking shape, but it is unlikely to evolve into a centralized structure in the near term. Cooperation will more likely rest on overlapping bilateral and multilateral arrangements united by a shared objective to increase Europe’s responsibility for its own security. A central priority will be maintaining a balance between EU strategic autonomy and the transatlantic alliance, ensuring that the strengthening of European defence capabilities reinforces the European pillar within NATO. In this scenario, the actions of the emerging core inside NATO would aim to reduce excessive dependence on the United States without undermining the structure of collective defence. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The modern architecture of European security, which for decades has been based on American guarantees and the concept of the “end of history”, is today undergoing significant transformation. Recent years’ events have demonstrated that the era of minimal defense spending under the protection of transatlantic partnership is passing through a period of substantial change. The transformation of the global order, characterized by shifts in the balance of power among great powers, poses important strategic questions for the European Union. The situation is complicated by the fact that the United States, in its 2025 National Security Strategy, called to “resist Europe’s current course”, while the introduction of trade tariffs on partners has shown the need to revise existing agreements. Even while maintaining formal commitments under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, US strategic priorities are shifting toward managing competition with China. To ensure its security and protect citizens’ interests, Europe should transition to a more active role in defense matters, developing its own integrated military potential. The historically established European dependence on the US in defense matters has created a dangerous illusion of security, which has led to the degradation of national armed forces and deep fragmentation of the military-industrial complex. The role of the United States in the European security system has traditionally been highly significant, including not only the provision of security guarantees but also the provision of critically important capabilities without which European armed forces have limited capacity to conduct prolonged high-intensity operations. This refers to strategic intelligence, satellite communications, aerial refueling, and heavy transport aviation. The conflict in Ukraine revealed that European militaries, structured for expeditionary missions and crisis response, must strengthen their capacity for high-intensity warfare, where scale of production, logistics, and resilient procurement matter as much as technology. Even if the conflict stabilizes, Europe still needs a robust security system: Russia continues to expand its military potential, which requires constant readiness along NATO‘s eastern flank. As long as European security relies on American guarantees, projects aimed at European defense autonomy face limits. Against this backdrop, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz announced talks with French President Emmanuel Macron and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer on extending French and British nuclear deterrence guarantees to the European level. This move shifts what was once a theoretical debate about the “Europeanization” of nuclear forces into practical policy. Analysis of the current state of EU countries’ capabilities in conventional weapons reveals a fundamental paradox: with total military spending exceeding 290 billion euros, Europe’s actual combat readiness remains low. Despite NATO countries agreeing to increase spending to 3.5% of GDP by 2035, the financial component alone cannot solve the structural problem. The significant US defense budget, approaching 1 trillion dollars, allows Washington to invest in research and development (R&D) amounts comparable to the combined military budgets of the largest European countries. This creates a situation of technological gap, where the acquisition of American weapons often becomes a preferable solution for Europe in terms of cost-effectiveness. The main opportunity for improving the efficiency of European approaches is connected with strengthening coordination and eliminating duplication of functions at the national level. The main constraint remains the institutional architecture of the EU: defense decisions still require consensus, and differences in strategic cultures (from Polish mobilization logic to Southern European priorities in the Mediterranean) create certain complexities for unified planning. Each state seeks to preserve its own industrial base, which leads to small production runs and weak economies of scale. National defense ministries often resist deeper integration to protect existing structures and domestic contracts. Experts estimate that the lack of integration costs Europe €25–30 billion annually, while joint procurement could reduce rearmament costs by half. For comparison: if the US operates one main type of battle tank, the M1 Abrams, European countries’ armies have seventeen different types. A similar situation is observed regarding infantry fighting vehicles, artillery systems, and aviation. Such diversity of armaments creates logistical challenges, complicating joint operations without additional coordination and support, which requires attention given the US shift in focus toward the Indo-Pacific region. The fifth-generation F-35 fighter program is an illustrative example. Large-scale purchases of this aircraft by Germany, Poland, and the Netherlands mean technological dependence on American partners. By acquiring the F-35, European countries gain access to an advanced digital ecosystem, which provides a high level of technological capabilities while maintaining a certain interdependence. Meanwhile, approximately 78% of all defense procurement by European countries over the past two years has been directed to external suppliers, predominantly American companies through the Foreign Military Sales mechanism. This reflects the competitiveness of the American defense industry, but also points to the need to develop the European technological base to ensure greater balance. The conflict in Ukraine has shown the importance of diversifying supply sources: European production faced difficulties in making up the deficit of 155mm caliber shells, while high-tech systems such as HIMARS, Patriot missiles, and real-time intelligence came predominantly from American partners. This underscores the importance of developing indigenous production capabilities to enhance the resilience of the European security system. Fragmented procurement reduces economic efficiency and burdens national budgets. Today, defense also functions as industrial policy: production of munitions, drones, cyber defense systems, and space-based intelligence can sustain Europe’s broader technological competitiveness. The current geopolitical environment forces Europe to rethink the foundations of transatlantic relations, as the concept of burden-sharing gains practical meaning. Budget constraints in the United States may reshape American military presence across regions. The European Union faces a choice: deepen defense integration and strengthen its role as an autonomous security actor, or maintain the current model of dependence on external support. By building more integrated defense structures, the EU can create effective coordination mechanisms. A first step could involve forming Rapid Deployment Forces numbering 50,000–100,000 personnel, with major contributions from countries such as Spain and Italy. These forces would operate under unified command and coordinate with Eastern European militaries. Financial integration would support this process, including potential European defense bonds to fund long-term innovation. For genuine autonomy, Europe should integrate procurement and intelligence cooperation by establishing a unified EU intelligence coordination service and a European Security Council that includes the United Kingdom. A symbolic step could involve appointing a European general as Supreme Commander of joint forces in Europe, reflecting Europe’s growing responsibility for its own defense. Such measures find public support: according to polls, only 19% of Europeans fully trust their national armies, while 60% positively evaluate the idea of pan-European defense structures. Political will for such changes is gradually forming: leading politicians are actively discussing the possibility of transferring part of procurement coordination powers to the supranational level. The path to strategic autonomy will require European leaders to balance national interests and collective security goals. A more independent Europe can become a more effective and predictable partner for the US, capable of independently solving stabilization tasks in neighboring regions, thereby allowing American partners to concentrate resources on global priorities. The development of European military potential is viewed not as a weakening of transatlantic partnership but as a way to strengthen it through more balanced distribution of responsibility. On the path to this goal, there are differences in approaches between countries due to historical features and different strategic cultures, however, joint projects for developing a new generation fighter and tank platforms create the foundation for a new model of cooperation. Thus, a more integrated and effective European defense system will allow the continent to play a more active role in determining the contours of the future world order and will strengthen transatlantic partnership on a more equal basis. Strategic autonomy is viewed not as an alternative to existing alliances but as an important condition for ensuring European security in a changing international environment. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In her analytical article, Nargiza Umarova examines the drivers behind the growing engagement of Central Asian states in Afghanistan and its implications for the emerging architecture of regional connectivity. The author notes that the state visits of the leaders of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to Pakistan in early 2026 reflect a shift toward a more pragmatic model of cooperation based on transport corridors, industrial collaboration and energy interdependence. The article focuses on the rapid advancement of trans-Afghan railway projects and the development of new North–South transport routes. Particular attention is given to the Western Trans-Afghan Railway and the Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan project, which are viewed as key components of Central Asia’s strategy to gain alternative access to the Indian Ocean through Pakistani ports. According to the author, the increasing interest in these initiatives stems not only from the region’s geographical isolation but also from broader shifts in global logistics amid rising geopolitical uncertainty. Ms. Umarova also explores the intersection between transport initiatives and energy infrastructure, including the development of the TAPI gas pipeline and the role of external actors. She argues that the expansion of regional transit ambitions requires stronger coordination among Central Asian states, as competing initiatives may reduce the overall political and economic impact. In conclusion, the author highlights the need to institutionalize dialogue among the countries of the region and to develop a coordinated approach toward engagement with Afghanistan and Pakistan. Only through the synchronization of infrastructure strategies, she suggests, can Central Asia strengthen its role in the evolving Eurasian transport system. Read the article on CACI Analyst’s website * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In her analytical piece, Nargiza Umarova examines how Iran has emerged as a central actor in the ongoing reconfiguration of Eurasian transport routes. Against the backdrop of geopolitical instability, sanctions pressure on Tehran, and disruptions along the Northern Corridor, the article shows how Iran is intensifying transport diplomacy with Central Asian states to position itself as a key land bridge linking East Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. The Southern Corridor is presented not as an abstract alternative, but as a practical response to shifting trade geographies and mounting risks in traditional routes. A central argument of the article is that the Southern Corridor aligns the strategic interests of several actors at once. For China, constrained by maritime insecurity and the war in Ukraine, trans-Iranian routes offer a technically efficient, container-friendly overland option for high-value exports to the EU. For Iran, large-scale investments in rail infrastructure—including new transit corridors and cross-border links—are designed to consolidate its role as the shortest East–West land route. For Central Asia, participation in these projects enhances transit competitiveness, diversifies export pathways, and reduces over-dependence on any single corridor or partner. In her conclusions, the author stresses that the strategic value of the Southern Corridor goes beyond logistics. Access to Iran’s ports on the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean opens new north–south dimensions for Central Asian trade, reinforcing the region’s global connectivity. At the same time, she argues that sustained progress will require harmonized transport policies, unified documentation standards, and a collective approach to managing geopolitical risks related to Iran, making transport diplomacy a key instrument of Central Asia’s long-term strategic autonomy. Read on CACI Analyst * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In his article, Timur Dadabaev analyzes the evolution of Japan’s policy toward Central Asia, noting that in 2025 Tokyo placed particular emphasis on cooperation in the field of artificial intelligence within the Central Asia + Japan format. Unlike infrastructure- and technology-driven models, Japan promotes AI primarily as a tool for institutional development, governance, and human capital formation. The author emphasizes that Japan’s approach differs markedly from the strategies of other Asian actors. While China and the Republic of Korea focus on digital infrastructure and corporate-led technological projects, Japan prioritizes the integration of AI into existing administrative processes—particularly in public administration, customs, and logistics. In this context, artificial intelligence is not treated as an autonomous technology, but rather as a means of enhancing the efficiency of state institutions. According to Prof. Dadabaev, this model helps reduce the political and administrative risks associated with AI adoption. At the same time, it may contribute to the entrenchment of external governance standards. Since algorithms and analytical frameworks are often developed outside the region, Central Asian states risk reproducing external conceptions of efficiency, risk, and good governance without sufficient local adaptation. Special attention is given to the application of AI in transport and logistics connectivity, including along the Trans-Caspian route. While the digitalization of procedures can reduce costs and improve the predictability of trade, the author stresses the importance of developing domestic analytical capacities in order to avoid dependence on external data and regulatory standards. In conclusion, Prof. Dadabaev argues that participation in AI diplomacy requires Central Asian states not only to adapt technologically, but also to build institutional readiness to shape and govern their own AI systems. Without this, the benefits of cooperation may remain asymmetric and could ultimately constrain the region’s strategic autonomy. Read on East Asia Forum * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.