In August 2023, the BRICS summit decided to invite Saudi Arabia and the UAE to become full members of the organisation from January 2024. These countries see joining BRICS as an opportunity to hedge their economic and geopolitical interests amid changes in the global order, including waning support for the US following attacks on their territories. For Saudi Arabia, it is a move to strengthen its independence and diversify its economic ties, especially with China and India, which is in line with its Vision 2030 strategy.   The UAE sees BRICS as a platform for economic co-operation that will allow it to strengthen trade relations with global partners such as Russia, Brazil, China and India. Joining BRICS is seen as an economic manoeuvre aimed at strengthening the UAE’s role in international trade and finance, as well as diversifying the economy through non-oil sectors.   Read and download the commentary in Russian below

The emergence of a multipolar world and the establishment of a neo-colonial order bring to the forefront issues regarding the future prospects of existing international organizations such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Amidst current geopolitical tensions, the Commonwealth faces turbulence due to the absence of a cohesive strategic vision for its development, further exacerbated by political challenges, economic crises, and ideological conflicts.   Political differences. Diverging viewpoints among CIS members are evident in their systematic absence from the Council of Heads of State summits, with Armenia, Ukraine, and Moldova consistently missing these meetings for several years. Although Armenia remains a member, Prime Minister N. Pashinyan has not attended since 2022, expressing dissatisfaction with Russia’s role in the Karabakh conflict, which favored Azerbaijan. Consequently, Yerevan views the CIS as an ineffective organization, incapable of resolving internal political disputes, and has indicated intentions to exit the organization[1].   Despite this, Russian President Vladimir Putin views the CIS as “a reliable, in-demand, and effective format of cooperation,” even though the summits have devolved into formalities. According to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Diplomatic Academy, only 2% of the agreements signed within the CIS framework have a tangible impact. Western experts warn that if the organization, dominated by Russia, fails to expand its influence, it risks losing relevance on the global stage[2]. This concern is underscored by efforts among Central Asian CIS members to diversify their economies, comply with Western sanctions, and reduce reliance on Russia[3]. Russia’s narrative suggests that the United States and the European Union are encouraging regional distance from Moscow, with fears that Western powers could provoke conflict in Central Asia to justify NATO intervention. To counter this, Moscow has intensified military cooperation with Kyrgyzstan, a Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) member, with the Kyrgyz parliament ratifying an agreement for a unified air defense system with Russia before the 2023 CIS leaders’ summit[4].   Economic challenges. The CIS member states possess significant combined resources, accounting for nearly 30% of global natural gas and coal reserves, 20% of oil, 36% of uranium, 20% of gold, and 13% of arable land. Yet, they have not eliminated trade barriers or fostered favorable tariff conditions. Most members, excluding Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan, have signed the CIS Free Trade Area (FTA), which reduces import duties on numerous goods. However, mutual trade between CIS FTA members accounts for only 11.9% of their total trade volume, signaling a preference for global trade over regional cooperation. For Russia, CIS countries constitute over a third of its foreign trade. Despite this, from 2010 to 2023, total foreign trade among FTA members grew by 25%, while mutual trade increased by only 8%, illustrating a growing focus on external markets over intra-CIS trade[5].   The CIS’s primary economic framework, the “Strategy for Economic Development of the Commonwealth of Independent States until 2030,” aims to promote sustainable economic growth and improve living standards within member states. However, this strategy lacks legal obligations and primarily complements agreements under the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). In recent years, disintegration trends have prevailed, with slowed trade and economic activities among CIS members.   Cultural and value motives. Ongoing tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as territorial disputes between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, diminish the CIS’s appeal to non-Western actors. Experts suggest that, due to Moscow’s waning influence in the South Caucasus, Russia is focusing on Central Asia, leveraging summits to reinforce its regional presence and preserve the status of the Russian language. During the 2023 CIS summit in Bishkek, an agreement was signed to establish an International Russian Language Organization, emphasizing this cultural priority[6].   A significant factor influencing the CIS is the presence of over ten million workers from member countries in Russia, which has substantial economic implications, with remittances to their home countries exceeding $4 billion annually. However, anti-immigrant sentiment is growing in Russia, where 51% of the population opposes living with CIS migrants[7]. In 2023, crimes committed by CIS citizens increased by 6.5% compared to the previous year, further straining relations[8].   Analysts foresee several potential development models for the CIS, all of which will ultimately depend on Russia’s political and economic actions[9]. Three primary scenarios are identified:   Status quo preservation: The CIS continues operating without significant political or structural changes, functioning as a formal dialogue platform for post-Soviet leaders.   Stagnation and reintegration: A phase of stagnation, followed by potential reintegration processes. However, this scenario is unlikely without a firm stance from Russia, which may reduce CIS membership as the geopolitical memory of the Soviet Union fades in former republics. Russia’s failure to develop a comprehensive post-Soviet engagement strategy contributes to this outcome.   Continued stagnation: The Commonwealth structures and relations remain stagnant, with increasing emphasis on bilateral relations rather than multilateral cooperation. In this case, the CIS may gradually dissolve, transitioning into a more flexible, interstate network characterized by both cooperation and rivalry.   In conclusion, the CIS faces an uncertain future. Its declining membership and limited regional influence raise concerns, particularly among full members wary of Russia’s dominance. Rather than serving as an effective alliance for regional development, the CIS increasingly symbolizes Russia’s desire to maintain its influence over the region.   [1] Гордейчик, А., О Нынешнем Состоянии СНГ и Перспективах Его Развития. Retrieved from: https://evolutio.info/ru/journal-menu/1999-1/1999-1-gordeychik [2] Попов В.И. Современная дипломатия: теория и практика. Дипломатия – наука и искусство: курс лекций –3-е изд. – Москва: международные отношения, 2022. [3] Caspian Policy Center, CPC. (March 2023) The Beginning of An End to the CIS? Retrieved from: https://www.caspianpolicy.org/research/security/the-beginning-of-an-end-to-the-cis [4] Russia-Kyrgyzstan Agreement on a Joint Regional Air Defence System Ratified by the Dum (2023) Retrieved from: https://pacsto.org/events/soglashenie-mezhdu-rf-i-kyrgyzstanom-o-sozdanii. [5] Статкомитет СНГ (2024). Retrieved from:  https://new.cisstat.org/cis-countries [6] Daryo.uz, Kazakhstan’s President Proposes International Russian Language Organization at CIS Summit, Daryo.Uz, October 13, 2023b. [7] Kirillova, K., Anti-Immigrant Sentiments in Russia Lurk Behind Deep Social Issues, Jamestown, May 9, 2024. [8] Asia-Plus, A., Uzbekistan Tops CIS Member Nations in Terms of Number of Crimes Committed in Russia, Tajikistan News ASIA-Plus. [9] Тезисы Совета по внешней и оборонной политике (2005). «Содружество Независимых Государств: Есть ли будущее?» Retrieved from: https://svop.ru/public/docs_2005_11_21_1350646825.pdf   Download the commentary

Over the past two decades, the South Asian region has emerged as a critical region influencing global trends and international developments. Key factors include India's rapid rise on the global stage and the initiation of the international North-South transport corridor. Additionally, India and Pakistan's accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the escalating Kashmir conflict, heightened nuclear tensions between Delhi and Islamabad, Pakistan's strategic shift from being a close US ally towards closer ties with China, and the inclusion of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor in the Belt and Road Initiative are also notable developments. The US-Afghanistan war, the rise of international terrorist networks, the return of Taliban rule in Afghanistan, and subsequent dialogues with the Taliban further underscore the region’s geopolitical complexity. In analyzing US foreign policy towards South Asia, it is evident that the United States has adopted distinct approaches towards the region's two principal actors, India and Pakistan. US foreign policy has shifted over time, sometimes prioritizing India, at other times focusing more on Pakistan, and during certain periods such as the 1990s, balancing both. Currently, US relations with Pakistan and India are conducted through separate, differentiated policies. Relations with Pakistan are primarily security-oriented, while US engagement with India is framed more strategically and economically. A historical analysis of US foreign policy in South Asia reveals a dynamic evolution. The contemporary US approach to the region began after World War II, following independence of India and Pakistan. Studies by Nawaz M., Shaheen M., and Saif A. have typically divided US foreign policy into three or four distinct phases. However, our research, delineates seven distinct periods of US foreign policy development: 1947-1965, 1965-1979, 1979-1989, 1989-1998, 1998-2001, 2001-2021, and 2021 onwards. Major events that have shaped US foreign policy in South Asia include the establishment of India and Pakistan, the Vietnam War, the Soviet-Afghan War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, the events of September 11, and the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Each of these events has precipitated substantial shifts in US foreign policy in the region.   Our research produced a table titled "Genesis of US Foreign Policy in South Asia", which outlines these seven pivotal periods. This tool provides a valuable framework for scholars and students analyzing U.S. foreign policy in the region, offering a concise and structured overview of its evolution.   *** By increasing the intensity of color, you can notice the increase or decrease in the importance of South Asia in US foreign policy   From 1947 to 1965, US foreign policy in South Asia primarily focused on “containing” the global spread of communism. During this period, the region held strategic rather than economic value for the US, with Pakistan viewed as a reliable partner in building an anti-communist buffer across the Middle East and South Asia. In contrast, US-India relations were minimal, largely due to India’s leadership in the Non-Aligned Movement, which distanced itself from Cold War power dynamics. From 1965 to 1979, US foreign policy in South Asia became more passive, as attention shifted towards the Vietnam War (1965-1973) and Southeast Asia. This resulted in a reduced US presence in South Asia and a growing distance from Pakistan. The US did not intervene in the India-Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971. The Soviet-Afghan War (1979 to 1989) marked a significant shift in US focus back to South Asia, as Pakistan became a pivotal ally in the US efforts to counter the Soviet Union’s influence in Afghanistan. This period saw Pakistan take center stage in U.S. strategic calculations. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in 1989 initiated a new phase (1989-1998), as Washington sought to consolidate its global leadership. During this time, the US expressed growing interest in India's emerging economy, while maintaining Pakistan’s strategic importance in the region. From 1998 to 2001, relations between the US and South Asia deteriorated, particularly following nuclear tests conducted by both India and Pakistan, which heightened regional tensions and triggered international concern. The events of September 11, 2001, reoriented US foreign policy towards South Asia, particularly in the context of the US-led war on terror (2001-2021). Pakistan became a key partner as a logistical and operational based for US efforts in Afghanistan, while US-India relations flourished economically, driven by a shared interest in countering China’s rising influence in the Indo-Pacific. From 2021 to the present, US foreign policy in South Asia has been influenced by the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan. Pakistan’s strategic role in US foreign policy has significantly diminished, though cooperation in counterterrorism remains. Meanwhile, India has gained prominence, with US designating it as a “Major Defense Partner”, reflecting a broader shift in US priorities toward economic and defense cooperation with India.   In conclusion, an analysis of the genesis of US foreign policy in South Asia reveals a cyclical pattern of engagement and disengagement. During the Cold War, the region was viewed through the lens of containing communism, with Pakistan serving as the main partner. In the modern era, India’s stable economy and democratic governance system have made it a favorable partner for the US, while Pakistan continues to hold importance in counterterrorism efforts.   Download the commentary below

In his new publication, Alexander Schrier, a Visiting Research Fellow at the Centre for American Studies, provides a nuanced analysis of the strategic potential for cooperation between Uzbekistan and Mexico, two nations separated by vast geographical distance yet connected by shared challenges and opportunities. The commentary highlights that despite minimal economic exchanges and a significant distance of over 13,000 kilometers, both countries confront parallel issues, including the surge in undocumented migration, environmental sustainability, and the rapid evolution of the digital economy.   Author argues that by forging closer diplomatic ties, particularly through the establishment of reciprocal embassies, Uzbekistan and Mexico could initiate a fruitful exchange of expertise in these critical areas. Such collaboration could lead to the development of innovative solutions to mutual challenges, foster deeper bilateral relations, and enhance their respective roles on the global stage. The analysis underscores the transformative potential of this partnership in addressing not only bilateral concerns but also broader regional and global issues.   Read and download the commentary below

Uzbekistan has long been demonstrating a calculated and strategic pragmatism dealing effectively with its foreign policy towards the Taliban-led government in Afghanistan. What might appear as mere diplomatic exchanges on the surface is, in fact, part of a broader and more sophisticated approach by Uzbekistan to secure its national interests in a volatile region. The high-level visits by Uzbek officials, including Minister of Investment, Industry, and Trade Laziz Qudratov and Prime Minister Abdulla Aripov, reflect this nuanced strategy. These visits, along with other economic engagements, are seemingly emblematic of Uzbekistan’s pragmatic foreign policy, which prioritizes economic leverage over formal diplomatic ties due to the current situation around Afghanistan.   The July 3rd business forum held in Tashkent, which brought Afghan entrepreneurs to the negotiating table, was not an isolated event but part of a series of deliberate moves by Uzbekistan to deepen economic ties with Afghanistan. This forum, followed by high-level visits, including the October 2023 visit by Uzbekistan’s Deputy Prime Minister to Kabul, underscores the importance Uzbekistan places on economic convergence with its neighbour. During the October visit, both parties agreed to increase bilateral trade to $3 billion, a significant commitment that illustrates the depth of economic engagement between the two countries.   Apparently though, these engagements might not just only be about trade; they seem to serve as a means for Uzbekistan to establish a form of an economic leverage over the Taliban government to ensure that the latter could not weaponize water issue between two countries. Given the geopolitical uncertainty in the region and the unrecognized status of the Taliban government, Uzbekistan is crafting a foreign policy that allows it to protect its interests without the need for a formal diplomatic recognition. This strategy reflects a careful balancing act, where the economic relations are used as a credible means to influence and potentially control the outcomes in bilateral relations.   In some perspective, Uzbekistan’s increasing focus on economic ties with Afghanistan is rooted in several strategic considerations. One of the most pressing issues for Uzbekistan is water security. The country’s agricultural sector, which is vital for its economy, depends heavily on Amu Darya’s water resources that in part originate in Afghanistan. With the Taliban now in control, Uzbekistan faces the risk of potential blackmail or manipulation over water rights, a scenario that could have devastating consequences for its agricultural output and, by extension, its food security.   By fostering strong economic ties, Uzbekistan, to some extent, aims to create a form of co-dependency that could deter the Taliban from using water as a bargaining chip. The promise of increased trade and economic collaboration offers Taliban certain incentives for maintaining stable and cooperative relationship with Uzbekistan. In this way, Uzbekistan is thought to be building a buffer against potential threats to its water security, ensuring that any attempt by the Taliban to leverage water resources could be met with a strong economic response, including the possibility of decoupling trade relations.   This approach is particularly pragmatic given the current geopolitical landscape. The Taliban government, though unrecognized by the international community, controls significant resources and territory. For Uzbekistan, engaging with the Taliban on economic terms allows it to navigate the complexities of the situation without compromising its own standing in the international arena. By focusing on trade rather than formal diplomatic ties, Uzbekistan could pursue its interests while maintaining flexibility in its foreign policy.   The visits by Uzbek officials to Kabul, including the recent high-profile visit by Prime Minister Abdulla Aripov, are more than just diplomatic gestures. They are part of a broader strategy that emphasizes pragmatism over ideology. Uzbekistan recognizes the reality of the Taliban’s control over Afghanistan and the need to engage with them on practical terms. This approach reflects a departure from traditional diplomacy, where recognition and formal ties are often prerequisites for engagement. Instead, Uzbekistan is prioritizing its national interests using economic tools through building a set of influences ensuring stability in its relations with Afghanistan.   This pragmatism is also evident in Uzbekistan’s broader foreign policy. The country has been careful to balance its relationships with major powers, including Russia, China, and the United States, while also fostering regional cooperation in Central Asia. In its dealings with Afghanistan, Uzbekistan is applying the same principles, seeking to avoid entanglement in ideological conflicts while focusing on tangible benefits such as trade and security. This approach allows Uzbekistan to navigate the complexities of the region while maintaining its sovereignty and independence.   Apart from hedging against some potential challenges Taliban might create, by establishing a strong economic relationship with Afghanistan, Uzbekistan could position itself as a key player in the region, capable of influencing outcomes and ensuring its own security. The potential for increased trade and economic collaboration could also bring substantial benefits to Uzbekistan’s economy, particularly in sectors such as agriculture and energy.   Conclusion Uzbekistan’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan under the Taliban is a carefully crafted strategy that prioritizes economic convergence over a formal diplomatic tie. By focusing on trade and economic collaboration, Uzbekistan is potentially building some leverages that could protect its interests in the face of possible challenges, particularly concerning water security. This pragmatic approach reflects a broader shift in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy, where national interests take precedence over ideology. As Uzbekistan continues to navigate the complexities of its relationship with Afghanistan, its strategy of economic engagement could prove to be a powerful tool in ensuring stability and security in the region.

The security dynamics between China and the Central Asian nations of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan evolved predominantly through formal diplomatic channels, bilateral agreements, and the institutional framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.   China has collaborated with regional governments in areas such as counterterrorism, military trainings, and intelligence sharing.   Driven primarily by market demand, specifics of the local law system, and adaptation to the security challenges that Chinese enterprises face in the region, this phenomenon may also harbor the potential for the Chinese state to project power in the region should it wish to.   Read the commentary on Carnegie Endowments’ website