The visit of Japanese Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya to Central Asian states was closely linked to Tokyo’s domestic political and economic agenda. The trip was seen as a preparatory stage for the C5+Japan summit and was intended to give new substance to Japan’s engagement with the region.   Amid growing competition from China, Russia, Turkey, and the EU, Japan seeks to emphasize its willingness to remain a significant partner for Central Asia, relying on economic diplomacy, technological cooperation, and support for structural reforms. A key factor is economic security policy, which has been a central element of Japan’s strategy since 2022. The Economic Security Promotion Act is forcing Tokyo to seek more reliable sources of critical minerals, which determines the importance of cooperation with Uzbekistan for Japan. Tokyo seeks to guarantee long-term access to strategic raw materials, primarily metals for battery production and renewable energy.   Japanese diplomacy is currently characterized by a desire to “make up for lost time”, which highlights the weakness of the country’s political leadership against a backdrop of internal instability and declining popularity of the prime minister. According to experts, the visit yielded important results in the form of agreements in the fields of industry, energy, and logistics, as well as the establishment of a Strategic Dialogue between the foreign ministers.   In its official releases, Japan’s Foreign Ministry notes that Uzbekistan is showing steady economic growth and that bilateral relations with Japan have strengthened significantly, especially after the Uzbek president’s visit to Japan in December 2019.   The launch of the new Strategic Dialogue format sets an institutionalized and predictable rhythm of interaction, which increases the stability of Japan’s relations with Central Asia and forms a coordination mechanism, including the preparation of the agenda for the upcoming C5+Japan summit.   Thanks to the agreements reached, Uzbekistan’s potential for receiving development assistance and access to advanced technologies is expanding. The project in the Surkhandarya region is forming a model of “human security + green growth” that can be scaled up in the Aral Sea region, Fergana, and Kashkadarya.   In addition, the potential for developing educational and humanitarian cooperation is gaining momentum. In particular, scholarship programs, Japanese language studies, and academic exchanges are opening up new opportunities for Uzbek universities to expand dual degree programs and specialist training. The establishment of the first Japanese university in Tashkent will form the basis for long-term cooperation and training personnel for joint initiatives.   Practical steps to maximize the results of the visit cover several areas. It seems appropriate to put forward new initiatives at the C5+Japan summit to deepen cooperation with Japan in areas such as green transport corridors, energy, smart cities, visa programs for IT specialists and engineers, and the organization of a forum on critical minerals.   Thus, Takeshi Iwaya’s visit confirmed Japan’s increased interest in Central Asia and underscored Uzbekistan’s strategic role in supply chains, sustainable development, and humanitarian initiatives. Institutionalizing dialogue, accelerating pilot projects, and establishing the first Japanese university in Tashkent will allow Japan to maximize the results of its diplomatic activity.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The recent trilateral meeting of the foreign ministers of China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan in Kabul was a significant event in regional diplomacy. Organized by China, the meeting aimed to reduce tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan and promote regional stability and economic cooperation, particularly through the expansion of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to Afghanistan.   The sixth trilateral meeting of the foreign ministers of Pakistan, China, and Afghanistan took place on August 20, 2025, in Kabul. This dialogue, institutionalized in 2017, aims to strengthen political trust, coordinate the fight against terrorism, and promote economic integration between the three countries. Pakistani Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, and Afghan Acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi participated in the talks.   During the meeting, the parties focused on several key aspects. First and foremost, significant progress was made in reducing tensions between Islamabad and Kabul, which had previously faced an increase in militant attacks in Pakistan. China acted as a mediator in this process, hosting an informal meeting in Beijing, which led to improved relations and an agreement to upgrade diplomatic ties to embassy level.   A key economic achievement of the meeting was an agreement to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to Afghanistan. CPEC is a multi-billion dollar project aimed at connecting China and Pakistan through a network of roads, railways, and energy pipelines. The expansion of the CPEC to Afghanistan is seen as an important step in stimulating trade, transit, and development in the region. The parties also reaffirmed their commitment to deepening cooperation in trade, transit, regional development, health, education, culture, and the fight against drug trafficking.   In the context of regional integration, it is worth noting that Pakistan and Afghanistan previously (in May) agreed on a joint feasibility study for the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (UAP) railway project. This project aims to improve regional connectivity with Central Asia, and Ishaq Dar's visit to Kabul a month before the trilateral meeting was related to the signing of a framework agreement on this project.   Thus, the meeting underscored the three countries’ commitment to regional stability, economic development, and joint efforts to combat terrorism, with the expansion of the CPEC to Afghanistan becoming a central element in achieving these goals.   At the same time, the expansion of the CPEC to Afghanistan also has significant implications for Uzbekistan and its relations with Afghanistan. As a landlocked country, Uzbekistan is actively seeking to expand its trade routes and access to seaports. Afghanistan has historically been an important transit corridor for Uzbekistan, connecting it with South Asia and the Middle East.   Afghanistan's accession to the CPEC could provide Uzbekistan with new, more efficient and secure trade routes through Afghanistan and Pakistan to ports on the Arabian Sea, such as Gwadar. This would reduce Uzbekistan's dependence on existing routes and open up new opportunities for exports and imports. The CPEC project, which includes the development of infrastructure such as roads and railways, will contribute to overall regional connectivity, which is in line with Uzbekistan’s long-term goals of integrating into regional economic processes and creating transport corridors connecting Central Asia with South Asia.   The aforementioned Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (UAP) railway project is a direct testament to Uzbekistan's desire to deepen ties through Afghanistan. The expansion of the CPEC to Afghanistan could complement and accelerate the implementation of this project, creating synergies for the development of transport infrastructure in the region. The Termez-Mazar-Sharif-Kabul-Peshawar railway, which is part of this project, will significantly reduce the time and cost of freight delivery.   Economic stabilization and development in Afghanistan, stimulated by investments under the CPEC, will create new economic opportunities for the parties. This may include increased bilateral trade, joint investment projects, and the development of border infrastructure.   The impact on Uzbek-Afghan relations will be multifaceted. The expansion of the CPEC and joint infrastructure projects, such as the UAP railway, will inevitably lead to deeper cooperation between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. This will contribute to strengthening political dialogue, exchanging experiences, and jointly addressing regional issues. The economic stabilization of Afghanistan through the CPEC may also contribute to overall security in the region, which is a priority for Uzbekistan. A stable and prosperous Afghanistan reduces the risks associated with cross-border crime, extremism, and drug trafficking, which directly affect Uzbekistan's security. In addition, improved transport connectivity and economic development can help strengthen humanitarian and cultural ties between the two countries, given the presence of a significant Uzbek diaspora in northern Afghanistan.   Thus, the Sixth Trilateral Meeting of Foreign Ministers of China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan is an important step towards strengthening regional stability and economic cooperation. The expansion of the CPEC to Afghanistan and the development of the UAP railway project open up new opportunities for all participants, including Uzbekistan. These initiatives not only promote economic development and integration, but also strengthen security and stability in the region, which is a key factor for long-term prosperity. Uzbek-Afghan relations, in turn, will receive a new impetus for development based on common economic interests and the desire for regional stability.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

By Bobur Mingyasharov   In August 2025, the US Department of State designated the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and its sub-unit, the Majid Brigade, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). Additionally, the Majid Brigade was incorporated into the BLA structure, which previously held the status of a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT). This decision is significant not only for regional security but also for the international geopolitical balance.   US–Pakistan Rapprochement. The designation was announced following the visit of Pakistan’s army chief, General Asim Munir, to Washington. It signals the beginning of a new phase in US – Pakistan relations. In recent years, Islamabad has been observed moving closer to Beijing in political and economic terms. In this context, the designation of the BLA as a terrorist organization can be interpreted as a political signal of trust and cooperation from Washington toward Pakistan.   Energy Factor. Against this backdrop, US President Donald Trump announced an agreement with Pakistan to develop the country’s significant oil reserves. The agreement also includes provisions for reduced US tariffs on Pakistani products. Pakistan’s Finance Minister, Muhammad Aurangzeb, described this deal as a “win” for bilateral relations.   Although the details of the agreement have not yet been fully disclosed, the energy cooperation elevates trade and investment ties between Islamabad and Washington to a new level. Importantly, this announcement came just one day after the US imposed a 25% tariff on trade with Russia affecting India.   India and China Factors. The US decision to designate the BLA as a terrorist organization may run counter to India’s interests. Previously, the BLA’s attacks had weakened the China – Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which in some ways provided advantages for New Delhi. Now, restricting the group’s activities increases CPEC’s security and strengthens Beijing’s position in the region.   At the same time, the imposition of US trade tariffs on India and the enhancement of energy cooperation with Pakistan create a new strategic environment in South Asia. This development may complicate Washington’s balance of relations with New Delhi.   Conclusion. Overall, the designation of the BLA as a terrorist organization and the energy agreement with Pakistan have a significant impact on regional geopolitical dynamics. On one hand, US – Pakistan relations are entering a new phase; on the other, a complex strategic balance with India and China is being reshaped. This process is expected to generate new diplomatic dynamics and competitive fields in South Asia and neighboring regions.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The commentary by IAIS Visiting Junior Fellows offers a comparative and on-the-ground perspective on Uzbekistan’s road infrastructure, blending personal travel observations with policy analysis. Drawing parallels with Canada’s vast but well-connected highway system, the authors underscore the challenges Uzbekistan faces in developing safe, efficient, and sustainable road networks. They recount travel experiences across regions such as Samarkand, Bukhara, Nukus, and Muynak, highlighting pervasive potholes, uneven surfaces, and risky driving behaviors that undermine road safety. These firsthand accounts are reinforced by statistics from the United Nations and the World Health Organization, which reveal high accident rates and a significant economic cost—2.8% of GDP—associated with road incidents.   The fellows argue that inadequate road conditions not only compromise safety but also limit Uzbekistan’s economic potential. Citing World Bank data, they note that road freight capacity must increase dramatically—by nearly 500% by 2030—to meet future demand. While rail infrastructure, such as the Afrosiyab high-speed service, offers strong intercity connectivity, they suggest roads should prioritize regional and “last-mile” links, particularly to smaller towns and vulnerable areas like Muynak. They highlight opportunities for Uzbekistan to leverage foreign investment, including from the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, to address infrastructure deficits and integrate into emerging Trans-Caspian trade corridors.   Government initiatives, including the 2035 Transport Development Strategy and major projects like the $4.28 billion Tashkent–Andijan expressway, signal a strong political will to modernize the sector. However, the authors caution that large-scale projects should be matched with investments in safety measures, urban traffic management, and long-term maintenance budgets—areas where Canadian experience offers instructive lessons. They also advocate for integrating road safety into design and policy from the outset, noting that consistent enforcement and improved driver discipline are as vital as engineering upgrades.   Ultimately, the piece frames Uzbekistan’s current moment as a rare window of flexibility and ambition—conditions that Canada no longer enjoys due to entrenched infrastructure legacies. By balancing large-scale expressways with regional connectivity, embedding safety in construction, and ensuring sustained maintenance funding, Uzbekistan can lay the foundations for a transport network that boosts economic integration, supports rural communities, and meets the demands of future trade and mobility.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The International Monetary Fund’s report, “World Economic Outlook: Global Economy: Fragile Stability Amid Persistent Uncertainty”, presents updated assessments and forecasts for the global economy for 2025 and 2026.   According to the IMF forecast, global economic growth will be 3% in 2025 and 3.1% in 2026, which is lower than the actual figure for 2024 of 3.3%. Compared to the April issue, the current forecast is more optimistic. This is due to higher-than-expected economic activity at the beginning of the period amid expectations of tariff increases, lower average effective tariffs in the US compared to April estimates, improved financial conditions, including a weaker dollar, and expanded fiscal spending in a number of major economies.   Advanced economies are expected to grow by 1.5% in 2025 and 1.6% in 2026. In the US, economic growth is projected to slow to 1.9% in 2025 amid weaker private demand and a decline in immigration inflows. However, in 2026, growth may accelerate to 2% thanks to increased production volumes resulting from the implementation of the Big Beautiful Bill tax and fiscal measures package. In the euro area, growth is expected to accelerate to 1% in 2025 and 1.2% in 2026. The 0.2 percentage point increase in the forecast for 2025 is due to strong GDP growth in Ireland in the first quarter of this year.   In emerging market and developing economies, growth is forecast by the IMF to be 4.1% in 2025 and 4% in 2026. In particular, China is expected to grow by 4.8% in 2025 thanks to high economic activity in the first half of this year and a significant reduction in tariffs on trade with the US. India is projected to grow by 6.4% in both 2025 and 2026 due to favorable external economic conditions. In the Middle East and Central Asia region, growth is projected to accelerate to 3.4% in 2025 and 3.5% in 2026. In Russia, on the contrary, growth is expected to slow to 0.9% in 2025 and 1% in 2026.   Global inflation is expected to continue to decline, to 4.2% in 2025 and 3.6% in 2026. This is due to weaker demand and lower energy prices. However, inflation forecasts vary from country to country. In the US, consumer price growth will be fueled by tariffs, while in other countries, tariffs may act as a negative demand shock and curb inflationary pressures.   According to the IMF report, if tariffs are further increased from August 1, including the introduction of announced duties on copper of up to 50%, this will have a negative impact on global economic growth. Increased uncertainty in trade policy could slow economic activity, weaken companies’ willingness to invest in maintaining and developing trade links, and, as a result, lead to a slowdown in trade and production growth, especially in export-oriented countries. Geopolitical tensions could disrupt global supply chains and trigger an increase in commodity prices. Global trade growth is expected to slow to 2.6% in 2025 and 1.9% in 2026. Countries such as Brazil, France, and the United States are projected to face significant budget deficits amid record-high levels of public debt. This could lead to higher long-term bond yields and tighter global financial conditions.   To reduce uncertainty in trade policy, countries are advised to promote clear and transparent international trade rules. In this situation, it is important to promote multilateral initiatives aimed at addressing global challenges and, where necessary, to use plurilateral or regional approaches to specific issues. According to the IMF, international cooperation in the field of economic policy can mitigate negative spillover effects between countries and provide support to the most vulnerable economies.   Overall, despite signs of a gradual recovery and a partial improvement in macroeconomic conditions, the global economy remains highly uncertain. In this context, the key tasks for countries remain ensuring predictable economic policies, strengthening international cooperation, and modernizing trade rules to enhance the resilience of the global economy.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The global coal market remains highly concentrated, with the majority of production located in Asia. According to data from the Energy Institute (Statistical Review of World Energy 2025), China accounts for 4,780 million tonnes of coal per year—more than half of global production. This makes China not only the largest producer but also the leading consumer of coal. It extracts 4.5 times more than India and nearly 10 times more than the United States. This scale is driven by China’s energy structure, which still heavily relies on coal, despite massive investments in renewables.     India ranks second with 1,085 million tonnes, driven by growing industrial and residential demand for electricity. Indonesia, with 836 million tonnes, is largely export-oriented, supplying coal to Southeast Asia, China, and South Asia.   Among Western nations, the United States (465 Mt) and Australia (463 Mt) remain major producers. Despite green transition policies, both continue to maintain stable output— the U.S. primarily for domestic use, and Australia for export. Russia follows with 427 Mt, maintaining its status as a key player despite sanctions and reduced exports to Europe. Regional suppliers such as Kazakhstan (113 Mt) and Mongolia (107 Mt) continue to strengthen their positions, especially in supplying China.   In Europe, countries like Germany (92 Mt), Poland (85 Mt), and Turkey (87 Mt) continue coal production despite decarbonization goals, largely driven by energy security concerns and the need to replace natural gas imports after the 2022–2023 energy crisis.   In summary, Asia is the undisputed center of global coal production, accounting for over 75% of output. Asian countries are now key players in the global climate agenda, and any shift in their energy policies will have a direct impact on global emissions. The future of coal largely depends on decisions made in Beijing, New Delhi, and Jakarta.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.