In his insightful commentary, Akbar Mavlonov, Associate Research Fellow at IAIS, discusses Central Asia’s pivotal role in global energy dynamics, exploring the diverse aspects of energy security in the area, analyzing its effects on international relations, economic advancement, and environmental sustainability.   Endowed with significant reservoirs of oil, natural gas, and renewable energy sources, Central Asia not only drives global energy markets but also propels its own economic development. However, the region's energy landscape is complex due to geopolitical intricacies influenced by major powers such as Russia, China, the United States, and the European Union. The strategic significance of pipelines, exemplified by the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline, highlights the convergence of economic and geopolitical interests.   In navigating these complexities, Central Asia occupies a critical position in shaping sustainable development in the region and beyond, positioning itself as a significant player in global energy relations.   Read the commentary   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In November 2024, the COP29 climate conference will take place in Baku, Azerbaijan. One of the most discussed aspects of the event is the invitation extended to a representative of the Taliban government. This decision has raised many questions, as the Taliban’s government is not officially recognized by most countries and does not meet many international standards. Despite these challenges, the invitation has been issued, and there are several key reasons behind this move.   First and foremost, it is important to recognize that climate change is a global issue that requires cooperation from all countries, regardless of their political situation. In previous COP summits, representatives from countries with different political systems, even those in conflict or strained relations, have still come together to discuss urgent environmental issues. Climate change is not confined to any one country or region—it affects the entire planet. Solving it requires collaboration at every level.   The Taliban’s inclusion in the COP29 agenda might also be linked to efforts to engage countries that, due to political isolation or internal instability, would otherwise be excluded from global discussions. Afghanistan, despite its challenging political situation, is facing serious environmental problems such as droughts, deforestation, and land degradation. These issues are directly connected to climate change, and involving the Taliban in the conference not only highlights the region’s environmental challenges but also sets the stage for future cooperation on these issues.   Furthermore, the invitation to the Taliban could be part of a broader international strategy where climate diplomacy is used as a tool to open communication with isolated regimes. This move may indicate a growing recognition that to effectively address global challenges, the international community must be prepared to engage with different political realities. While the Taliban is not recognized by many countries, its participation in international forums like COP29 can help strengthen its diplomatic standing.   Another important aspect is the political dimension. The invitation to the Taliban can be seen as a step toward recognizing their government on the international stage. This event strengthens the Taliban’s position, allowing them to demonstrate their ability to engage with the global community on important issues like climate change. While this invitation does not imply immediate official recognition, it could be interpreted as a signal that international actors are exploring ways for more constructive dialogue with the new Afghan regime, particularly on issues where cooperation is essential.   In summary, the invitation extended to the Taliban for COP29 is not just a diplomatic gesture aimed at involving all countries in tackling the climate crisis; it is also part of a broader strategy of an incremental recognition Afghanistan and its government on the international stage. Ultimately, this event could play a significant role in shaping future relations between the Taliban and the rest of the world.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Recently, the Taliban government has appeared to ramp up promotions addressing literacy measures among population. The Ministry of Education states that over 4,000 literacy classes have been established across the country in the current academic year alone. The ministry further reports that last year, it successfully set up more than 9,000 similar classes, extending educational opportunities to tens of thousands of Afghans.   Ministry of Education spokesperson Mansoor Ahmad Hamza noted that in 2023, the number of new literacy courses reached 4,583, with nearly 86,000 people actively participating in these learning programs. A year ago, the Ministry announced comparable achievements, citing the creation of over 9,000 classes attended by more than 49,000 students.   However, despite these ambitious claims, several critical questions make it challenging to fully evaluate the efficacy and truthfulness of these initiatives. For one, it remains unclear whether these programs include girls and women, whose rights to education in Afghanistan are severely restricted. There are also doubts about the accuracy of the data provided, as no independent sources outside the Taliban’s official channels have confirmed the establishment of this many classes. In a climate of restricted access to independent information, it is difficult to verify these figures and assess their transparency.   Nevertheless, despite these uncertainties, two potentially positive aspects of the Taliban’s current policy emerge. First, the fact that literacy is gaining prominence as a government priority indicates a possible shift in their policy focus. Based on their official statements, it is evident that the Taliban is actively working to enhance the country’s educational system and increase literacy rates. In turn, this could be a constructive step towards Afghanistan’s long-term development, where literacy and basic education play essential roles in fostering economic growth and social stability.   Second, should the reported figures be partially exaggerated or inaccurate, their dissemination still suggests an effort by the Taliban to cultivate a more favourable image on the global stage. Spreading information about such initiatives may indicate a willingness to acknowledge the significance of international standards in human rights and education. Essentially, this could imply that the Taliban recognizes that, to engage sustainably with the global community, it must respect not only traditional Islamic norms but also values accepted in other countries. Such approach may be part of a strategy to legitimize their rule and gradually establish a more positive reputation worldwide.   In sum, although there are various concerns about the credibility and accessibility of information, the Taliban’s claims regarding literacy improvements highlight some potentially positive trends in their governance. Enhancing literacy and advancing the educational system could represent meaningful steps toward Afghanistan’s growth and stability, as well as reflect a willingness to adapt to and recognize international norms. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The commentary analyses the current state and dynamics of foreign direct investment (FDI) attraction in Uzbekistan’s economy, viewing FDI as a key element for sustainable economic growth, technological development and job creation. Since 2017, the country has implemented many reforms aimed at attracting investors and improving the investment climate, including the introduction of laws on special economic zones and currency operations, which has led to the creation of numerous economic and industrial zones.   The paper notes that one of the strategic goals laid out in the Strategy “Uzbekistan – 2030” is to attract $110bn FDI, support public-private partnerships and increase investment in fixed capital. However, successful achievement of these goals requires improvement of the institutional environment, including the rule of law and protection of property rights, which play an important role for foreign investors.   Analyses of FDI between 2016 and 2022 show significant growth in industry, especially in textiles and chemicals, and in the energy sector. However, investment in high-tech and export-oriented sectors such as engineering and pharmaceuticals remains low, highlighting the need to create a more attractive environment in these sectors.   In addition, there have been changes in the geographical composition of FDI in recent years: the share of investment from China continues to increase, but there has also been an increase in investment from Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Regionally, FDI growth has been strongest in the Syr Darya, Samarkand and Navoi regions, where free economic zones have helped to attract FDI and spread investment more evenly across the country.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.   Download and read the commentary (in Uzbek) here

In August 2023, the BRICS summit decided to invite Saudi Arabia and the UAE to become full members of the organisation from January 2024. These countries see joining BRICS as an opportunity to hedge their economic and geopolitical interests amid changes in the global order, including waning support for the US following attacks on their territories. For Saudi Arabia, it is a move to strengthen its independence and diversify its economic ties, especially with China and India, which is in line with its Vision 2030 strategy.   The UAE sees BRICS as a platform for economic co-operation that will allow it to strengthen trade relations with global partners such as Russia, Brazil, China and India. Joining BRICS is seen as an economic manoeuvre aimed at strengthening the UAE’s role in international trade and finance, as well as diversifying the economy through non-oil sectors.   Read and download the commentary in Russian below

The emergence of a multipolar world and the establishment of a neo-colonial order bring to the forefront issues regarding the future prospects of existing international organizations such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Amidst current geopolitical tensions, the Commonwealth faces turbulence due to the absence of a cohesive strategic vision for its development, further exacerbated by political challenges, economic crises, and ideological conflicts.   Political differences. Diverging viewpoints among CIS members are evident in their systematic absence from the Council of Heads of State summits, with Armenia, Ukraine, and Moldova consistently missing these meetings for several years. Although Armenia remains a member, Prime Minister N. Pashinyan has not attended since 2022, expressing dissatisfaction with Russia’s role in the Karabakh conflict, which favored Azerbaijan. Consequently, Yerevan views the CIS as an ineffective organization, incapable of resolving internal political disputes, and has indicated intentions to exit the organization[1].   Despite this, Russian President Vladimir Putin views the CIS as “a reliable, in-demand, and effective format of cooperation,” even though the summits have devolved into formalities. According to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Diplomatic Academy, only 2% of the agreements signed within the CIS framework have a tangible impact. Western experts warn that if the organization, dominated by Russia, fails to expand its influence, it risks losing relevance on the global stage[2]. This concern is underscored by efforts among Central Asian CIS members to diversify their economies, comply with Western sanctions, and reduce reliance on Russia[3]. Russia’s narrative suggests that the United States and the European Union are encouraging regional distance from Moscow, with fears that Western powers could provoke conflict in Central Asia to justify NATO intervention. To counter this, Moscow has intensified military cooperation with Kyrgyzstan, a Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) member, with the Kyrgyz parliament ratifying an agreement for a unified air defense system with Russia before the 2023 CIS leaders’ summit[4].   Economic challenges. The CIS member states possess significant combined resources, accounting for nearly 30% of global natural gas and coal reserves, 20% of oil, 36% of uranium, 20% of gold, and 13% of arable land. Yet, they have not eliminated trade barriers or fostered favorable tariff conditions. Most members, excluding Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan, have signed the CIS Free Trade Area (FTA), which reduces import duties on numerous goods. However, mutual trade between CIS FTA members accounts for only 11.9% of their total trade volume, signaling a preference for global trade over regional cooperation. For Russia, CIS countries constitute over a third of its foreign trade. Despite this, from 2010 to 2023, total foreign trade among FTA members grew by 25%, while mutual trade increased by only 8%, illustrating a growing focus on external markets over intra-CIS trade[5].   The CIS’s primary economic framework, the “Strategy for Economic Development of the Commonwealth of Independent States until 2030,” aims to promote sustainable economic growth and improve living standards within member states. However, this strategy lacks legal obligations and primarily complements agreements under the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). In recent years, disintegration trends have prevailed, with slowed trade and economic activities among CIS members.   Cultural and value motives. Ongoing tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as territorial disputes between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, diminish the CIS’s appeal to non-Western actors. Experts suggest that, due to Moscow’s waning influence in the South Caucasus, Russia is focusing on Central Asia, leveraging summits to reinforce its regional presence and preserve the status of the Russian language. During the 2023 CIS summit in Bishkek, an agreement was signed to establish an International Russian Language Organization, emphasizing this cultural priority[6].   A significant factor influencing the CIS is the presence of over ten million workers from member countries in Russia, which has substantial economic implications, with remittances to their home countries exceeding $4 billion annually. However, anti-immigrant sentiment is growing in Russia, where 51% of the population opposes living with CIS migrants[7]. In 2023, crimes committed by CIS citizens increased by 6.5% compared to the previous year, further straining relations[8].   Analysts foresee several potential development models for the CIS, all of which will ultimately depend on Russia’s political and economic actions[9]. Three primary scenarios are identified:   Status quo preservation: The CIS continues operating without significant political or structural changes, functioning as a formal dialogue platform for post-Soviet leaders.   Stagnation and reintegration: A phase of stagnation, followed by potential reintegration processes. However, this scenario is unlikely without a firm stance from Russia, which may reduce CIS membership as the geopolitical memory of the Soviet Union fades in former republics. Russia’s failure to develop a comprehensive post-Soviet engagement strategy contributes to this outcome.   Continued stagnation: The Commonwealth structures and relations remain stagnant, with increasing emphasis on bilateral relations rather than multilateral cooperation. In this case, the CIS may gradually dissolve, transitioning into a more flexible, interstate network characterized by both cooperation and rivalry.   In conclusion, the CIS faces an uncertain future. Its declining membership and limited regional influence raise concerns, particularly among full members wary of Russia’s dominance. Rather than serving as an effective alliance for regional development, the CIS increasingly symbolizes Russia’s desire to maintain its influence over the region.   [1] Гордейчик, А., О Нынешнем Состоянии СНГ и Перспективах Его Развития. Retrieved from: https://evolutio.info/ru/journal-menu/1999-1/1999-1-gordeychik [2] Попов В.И. Современная дипломатия: теория и практика. Дипломатия – наука и искусство: курс лекций –3-е изд. – Москва: международные отношения, 2022. [3] Caspian Policy Center, CPC. (March 2023) The Beginning of An End to the CIS? Retrieved from: https://www.caspianpolicy.org/research/security/the-beginning-of-an-end-to-the-cis [4] Russia-Kyrgyzstan Agreement on a Joint Regional Air Defence System Ratified by the Dum (2023) Retrieved from: https://pacsto.org/events/soglashenie-mezhdu-rf-i-kyrgyzstanom-o-sozdanii. [5] Статкомитет СНГ (2024). Retrieved from:  https://new.cisstat.org/cis-countries [6] Daryo.uz, Kazakhstan’s President Proposes International Russian Language Organization at CIS Summit, Daryo.Uz, October 13, 2023b. [7] Kirillova, K., Anti-Immigrant Sentiments in Russia Lurk Behind Deep Social Issues, Jamestown, May 9, 2024. [8] Asia-Plus, A., Uzbekistan Tops CIS Member Nations in Terms of Number of Crimes Committed in Russia, Tajikistan News ASIA-Plus. [9] Тезисы Совета по внешней и оборонной политике (2005). «Содружество Независимых Государств: Есть ли будущее?» Retrieved from: https://svop.ru/public/docs_2005_11_21_1350646825.pdf   Download the commentary