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Commentary

19 February, 2026

The Global Market of Rare Earth Metals

By Zulkhayo Nishanova, Assistant teacher, UWED Rare earth metals comprise a group of 17 chemical elements used in the production of batteries, permanent magnets, electronics, renewable energy equipment, electric transport, and high-tech industries. These materials play an important role in the global energy transition, digitalization, and the development of modern industry. Global Market and Trends Global reserves of rare earth elements are unevenly distributed. According to the U.S. Geological Survey, a significant share of proven reserves is concentrated in a limited number of countries, including China, Brazil, India, and Australia. The modern market structure is shaped not only by raw material extraction, but also by processing, separation of elements, and the production of high value-added products. Participation in such value chains determines countries’ competitiveness in the global market. Demand for rare earth metals is steadily growing amid the development of green energy, electric mobility, and digital technologies. According to estimates by the International Energy Agency, this growth is structural and long-term in nature and is expected to intensify over the coming decades. Opportunities for Central Asia and Uzbekistan Countries of Central Asia possess promising mineral resource potential and benefit from a favorable geographic location between the markets of Europe and Asia. This creates preconditions for their deeper integration into international supply chains for critical minerals. Uzbekistan views the development of rare earth metals as one of the pillars of industrialization and economic diversification. Ongoing reforms in the field of subsoil use and improvements in the investment climate create favorable conditions for the implementation of projects in geological exploration, mining, and primary processing of raw materials. A prospective participation model envisages phased development: geological exploration and mining with the participation of international partners; establishment of primary processing and beneficiation capacities; in the medium term, localization of selected components manufacturing for the energy and industrial electronics sectors. International Partnerships Uzbekistan is expanding cooperation with a number of foreign partners in the field of critical minerals and processing technologies. Engagement with the European Union, the United States, and Japan is aimed at developing resilient supply chains, attracting investment, introducing environmental and social responsibility standards (ESG), and strengthening technological cooperation. Partnership projects are viewed as a tool to increase domestic value added and strengthen industrial capacity. Conditions for Sustainable Sector Development The development of the rare earth metals sector requires a comprehensive approach that includes: attracting long-term investment; developing processing and research & technological infrastructure; training qualified personnel; introducing modern environmental standards and mechanisms for public engagement. A balanced industrial policy helps avoid locking the country into the role of, exceptionally, a raw material supplier and creates conditions for gradual upgrading along the technological value chain. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

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Commentary

19 February, 2026

Iran Seeks a Shortcut to China

The government of the Islamic Republic of Iran is considering launching a transport corridor between Iran, Afghanistan and China through Afghanistan’s Badakhshan province, which borders China's Xinjiang region. The project involves establishing a rail link between the cities of Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif, as well as the high-altitude Wakhan Valley on the Little Pamir, also known as the 'Roof of the World'. This area was once a central route of the Great Silk Road, which linked East and West. According to Iranian sources, the Wakhan Corridor would halve delivery times from China to Europe, providing a significant advantage over existing supply chains through Central Asian states such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.   A year ago, Iran’s Ministry of Roads and Urban Development unveiled plans for the development of nine transit rail corridors, with an estimated cost of over $10 billion. Some of these cross Afghanistan, including the Five Nations Railway Corridor, which Tehran has promoted since the early 2000s. Another strategic priority appears to be a trans-Afghan corridor to China. Construction of the 225-kilometre Haf-Herat railway line, the first three sections of which were commissioned in 2020, marked the beginning of both projects. The final section is scheduled to open soon. On 22 October 2025, Tehran signed an agreement with Ankara and Kabul to jointly construct a 1,435 mm-gauge railway line from Herat to Mazar-i-Sharif. Iran will allocate an unprecedented $2.5 billion towards this project. The country subsequently intends to extend the railway to the Wakhan through the north-eastern province of Kunduz. Since 2023, Tehran has been negotiating this with the Afghan authorities. Meanwhile, the Taliban are taking practical steps to establish a direct transport link with China. In September 2023, work resumed using Afghan budget funds to gravel the 120-kilometre Wakhan Corridor to the Wakhjir Pass on the border with China, which began in 2019. By the end of 2025, the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development reported that 70 per cent of the work had been completed. The Taliban have repeatedly appealed to Beijing for financial assistance to create transport infrastructure along the Wakhan Corridor, capitalizing on their eastern neighbor’s desire to include Afghanistan in the Belt and Road Initiative. However, due to security concerns, Chinese diplomacy is currently adopting a wait-and-see approach to opening the shared border for trade. Preference is instead given to establishing a link to Afghanistan through Pakistan, via the extension of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to Badakhshan, or through Central Asian countries. In the latter case, Tajikistan could strengthen its position as a transit hub by becoming a reliable conduit between China and Afghanistan. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

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Commentary

12 February, 2026

The Great Rupture: Astonishing Realities Transforming Global Trade

The 56th annual meeting of the World Economic Forum was held under the optimistic theme The Spirit of Dialogue. The serene, snow-capped peaks of the Swiss Alps stood in stark contrast to a global system undergoing profound structural transformation. While 3,000 officials from 130 countries gathered to discuss “planetary boundaries” and “shared prosperity”, private discussions and keynote speeches revealed a more defined perspective. Policymakers now need to go beyond simply managing cycles; they need to address a significant rupture in the global structure. Outdated trade rules have been replaced by new ones focused on security, sovereignty, and dirigisme. For the past decade, world leaders have used the term “transition” to allay their fears. They believed the world was merely transforming into a digital, more environmentally sustainable, yet still interconnected version of the 20th century. Davos 2026 has shattered this sense of certainty. Most now agree that we are experiencing a structural rupture, not a cyclical transition. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney offered the most serious assessment of this week: “Let me be frank. We are not experiencing a transition, but a rupture. This rupture requires more than just adaptation. It requires candor about the true state of affairs”. This “honesty” means recognizing that the rules that have historically governed organizational activity over the past century are no longer as strict as they once were. This rupture marks a definitive departure from the idea of universal cooperation. It forces leaders to stop passively observing and acknowledge a reality characterized by diverse sources of shock and disparate instability. Despite reports of chaos, global trade has demonstrated an unexpected, almost daring, resilience. The Davos Resilience Paradox posits that as geopolitical challenges intensify, trade doesn't cease; instead, it adapts, opening up new, often more complex, avenues of movement. We are constantly engaged in trade and will continue to do so. “Trade is like water flowing in a river. If an obstacle arises, it will move around it”, noted Kristalina Georgieva, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund. This “water” is increasingly flowing through digital and service channels, largely isolated from the challenges associated with physical goods. Trade is accelerating thanks to new bilateral and regional mechanisms. The upcoming EU-Mercosur agreement and the upcoming EU-India agreement, dubbed the “mother of all deals”, demonstrate how trade is opening up innovative avenues for expansion, circumventing traditional international barriers. The most striking statistic of the year is the 262 percent increase in the scale of intervention in industrial policy since 2019. The significant increase in state dirigisme demonstrates that state intervention has evolved from a measure of last resort to a central component of modern economic policy. French President Emmanuel Macron declared, “Protectionism is not the same as protection”, thus reflecting the new doctrine. This shift is driven not only by the need for privacy for individuals; it is driven by four strategic imperatives that have become more significant than mere market efficiency: maintaining the stability of basic goods, maintaining the country's status as a leader in advanced technologies, ensuring that trade is consistent with the planet's resource constraints and climate goals, and using public authority to protect domestic labor markets. The private sector faces the challenge of managing the dramatic increase in government intervention while mitigating the negative impacts and complexities associated with such strict government measures. As the global landscape shifts from unipolarity to multipolarity, the most successful companies are shifting from “reactive risk management”, characterized by asset divestments and market exits, to a proactive approach known as “geopolitical power”. This refers to an organization's ability to leverage geopolitical intelligence to gain strategic business advantages. At its summit, the World Economic Forum established the Geopolitical Leadership Network, signaling the rise of this role to the C-suite. However, a significant disparity remains: only 20% of companies have a geopolitical position reporting directly to the C-suite. The Forum identifies five key components necessary for developing this “skill”: Building consensus between the CEO and the board to move from a wait-and-see approach to proactive opportunity generation. Use of systematic scenario planning and field information obtained from regional groups. Integration of geopolitical specialists into key decision-making structures. Integrating expertise in diplomacy and politics with an understanding of corporate logic and strategy. Ensuring their immediate impact on financial costs, production locations and supply chain configuration. The incident surrounding US President Donald Trump’s proposed purchase of Greenland exemplifies an emerging trade strategy that prioritizes security. After European countries rejected the plan, the administration threatened to impose taxes on eight of them. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte's decisive intervention halted these actions, though the lesson for Davos attendees was clear. Trade measures are currently being applied not for economic but for strategic purposes, which are often difficult to foresee. The concept of “national security” has become an ambiguous one, linked to economic policy, leading corporate executives to not only monitor market trends but also engage in strategic maneuvering. Events in Greenland serve as a stark reminder that, in the current situation, security is determined solely by the discretion of the sovereign power on any given day. As the global trade landscape transforms, the old rules no longer apply. The “disruption” is irreversible, but resilience mechanisms are beginning to emerge. New growth strategies include the “trade technology paradox”, characterized by the development of artificial intelligence and digital tools that level the playing field for small and medium-sized enterprises and developing economies. In modern society, trade extends beyond financial transactions; it encompasses security, sovereignty, and survival. The fundamental advantage in business is no longer simply size, but the speed of adaptation. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

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12 February, 2026

Humanitarian Aid: U.S. Policy Dilemmas in Post-Withdrawal Afghanistan

After the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Afghanistan, Washington confronted a complex and enduring dilemma: how to provide humanitarian assistance to a population in acute need without conferring political legitimacy or material benefit upon the Taliban, now governing as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA). Since August 2021, the United States has attempted to navigate this challenge by relying on international organizations and nongovernmental actors to deliver aid, while simultaneously maintaining sanctions on Taliban leadership and restricting direct engagement with de facto authorities. This balancing act has increasingly shaped U.S. legislative, diplomatic, and humanitarian policy toward Afghanistan. Central to this approach is the effort to prevent U.S. taxpayer funds from being diverted – directly or indirectly – to the Taliban. The No Tax Dollars for Terrorists Act represents the most recent and formalized expression of this objective. Introduced into Congress on January 23, 2025, the bill requires the Department of State to develop and implement a strategy aimed at discouraging foreign governments, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations from providing financial or material support to the Taliban, including through the misuse of U.S.-funded foreign assistance. Although still in the early stages of the legislative process, the bill signals a tightening of U.S. oversight and a potential recalibration of American engagement in Afghanistan. The legislation aligns with broader efforts to audit and reassess U.S. foreign aid following the withdrawal. A 2024 audit conducted by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) identified significant weaknesses in the oversight of approximately $2.9 billion in U.S. assistance delivered after 2021. The report stated: “… remain concerned that the Department of State and USAID lack visibility into how funds are expended once they are transferred to international organizations, and that these funds may not be used as intended.” While some of these claims remain contested, the findings reinforced concerns within Congress that humanitarian channels were vulnerable to exploitation in a context where the Taliban exercised territorial and administrative control. Supporters of the No Tax Dollars for Terrorists Act frame the legislation not only as a fiscal safeguard but as a moral obligation. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jim Risch has emphasized the human cost of the two-decade war, noting that more than 2,000 U.S. service members were killed and over 20,000 wounded. In this context, he characterized any transfer of U.S. funds to the IEA as “a betrayal of the victims of the war,” arguing that preventing such outcomes is a matter of accountability to both American taxpayers and those who served in Afghanistan. The bill was introduced by Senator Tim Sheehy and co-sponsored by Senators Bill Hagerty, Tommy Tuberville, and Steve Daines, all of whom have advocated a stricter approach to foreign assistance that could benefit the Taliban. The human consequences of these policy shifts are increasingly visible. A recent report by The New York Times argues that the suspension of U.S. humanitarian assistance has had serious and damaging effects on the daily lives of ordinary Afghans. Drawing on field research conducted in five provinces, the report documents how the halt in American funding disrupted programs that many families depended on for food security, healthcare, and basic survival. According to the findings, low-income households, internally displaced persons, and communities reliant on emergency assistance have been disproportionately affected. The reduction in funding has also constrained the capacity of humanitarian organizations operating on the ground. Some programs have been forced to scale down, while others have ceased operations entirely, increasing pressure on local communities already grappling with unemployment, rising prices, and prolonged economic decline. In the absence of sufficient alternative funding, the withdrawal of U.S. support has compounded existing vulnerabilities and intensified poverty in both urban and rural areas. These developments highlight a deeper structural problem underlying Afghanistan’s post-withdrawal crisis. For more than two decades, international assistance functioned not merely as emergency relief, but as a substitute for core state responsibilities, financing and delivering services such as healthcare, nutrition, and social protection. When U.S. and international aid was reduced, the effects were immediate and severe, revealing the extent to which essential services remained dependent on external actors. As a result, debates over the No Tax Dollars for Terrorists Act and U.S. funding decisions are not only about aid diversion or sanctions compliance. They reflect a broader unresolved tension between humanitarian imperatives and political accountability.  It seems that responsibility for essential services in Afghanistan was diffused across international actors, while authority within the country evolved separately. Successes were attributed to partnership; failures were explained through insecurity, access constraints, or funding shortfalls, rather than deficiencies in governance. Over time, the boundary between humanitarian support and functional substitution blurred. As international assistance has declined, particularly following recent U.S. funding cuts, that distortion has become central to how Afghanistan’s crisis is interpreted. The withdrawal of aid is increasingly framed as the primary cause of humanitarian harm, obscuring the question of who bears responsibility for sustaining basic services once power is consolidated domestically. This framing risks conflating the prevention of suffering with the assumption of permanent obligation, transforming humanitarian support from a tool of relief into a substitute for governance. The current debate over aid, economic self-reliance, and humanitarian collapse cannot be understood without confronting this unresolved dependency. Afghanistan’s crisis is not occurring in a vacuum of authority. It is unfolding under a governing system that exercises control over territory, labor, access, and social policy, and therefore shapes humanitarian outcomes directly. Any assessment of aid withdrawal must therefore account not only for donor decisions, but for governing choices made within Afghanistan after the transition of power. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

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10 February, 2026

The Central Asian States Should Coordinate their Strategic Initiatives in Afghanistan

The events of recent weeks demonstrate Central Asian states’ determination to promote their own infrastructure projects in Afghanistan. Some of these initiatives are being implemented despite continuing tensions on the Afghan-Pakistani border and the conflictual nature of relations between New Delhi and Islamabad. At the end of January, Kazakhstan’s ambassador to Pakistan announced that Astana was ready to finance the construction of the Torghundi-Herat-Kandahar-Spin Boldak railway, also known as the Western Trans-Afghan Railway, at a cost of around $7 billion. This decision is obviously motivated by the country’s desire to strengthen its position in north-south transit transport, encompassing existing routes through Iran and new transport corridors crossing Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Astana has expressed its support for the launch of the Kabul Corridor along the Termez-Naibabad-Maidanshahr-Logar-Kharlachi route proposed by Uzbekistan in 2018. In July 2025, the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (UAP) railway project entered a new stage of development when a trilateral intergovernmental framework agreement on the joint development of the project's feasibility study was signed. On 4 February 2026, Uzbekistan ratified the agreement and agreed with Pakistan to begin field studies on the transport corridor. The UAP project is paving the way for a new north-south trade route through Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. This route will provide the fastest land connection between Europe, Russia and South Asia, eliminating the need for sea crossings. Against this backdrop, Tashkent has proposed the creation of a multimodal corridor connecting Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, which is three times shorter than sea delivery routes. Astana’s participation in the project was discussed during bilateral talks held during Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s state visit to Pakistan on 4 February 2026. The parties also discussed the prospects for the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) Railway Corridor. Kazakhstan joined the initiative to construction a railway from Torghundi to Spin Boldak in Kandahar Province in 2024 at the invitation of the Turkmen side. In July 2025, Astana and Kabul signed a memorandum to implement the project. Kazakhstan pledged to allocate $500 million towards the construction of a railway line to Herat and the necessary accompanying infrastructure, including a logistics hub in northern Afghanistan. The stake has now been raised to cover the entire budget for the Western Trans-Afghan Route. Astana’s active interest in the TAP project may be linked to the current dynamics of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas transport corridor's development. Work began on laying the Afghan section of the 1,840-kilometre pipeline in December 2024. It is expected to reach Herat Province by the end of 2026. Russia is paying close attention to TAPI, viewing it as an opportunity to diversify and stabilize its energy exports following the loss of the premium European market. In this context, Kazakhstan can expect to earn transit profits, providing additional hope for the profitability of the railway from Torghundi to Spin Boldak, as the two transport routes will clearly be synchronized. On 1 February 2026, a meeting was held in Herat between Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, Afghanistan’s Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs, and Rashid Meredov, Turkmenistan’s Foreign Minister. They discussed the progress of construction of the TAPI gas pipeline, the power line between Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, and the Torghundi-Herat railway. Both Ashgabat and Kabul are seeking to accelerate the TAPI project. At a recent meeting between Turkmenistan’s Ambassador, Khoja Ovezov, and Afghanistan’s Minister of Mines and Petroleum, Hedayatullah Badri, they noted the rapid pace of work on the Afghan section of the gas pipeline. According to the available data, part of the route has already been prepared for pipe installation. The dynamic development of relations with Afghanistan raises the question for Central Asian states to strengthen mutual coordination to ensure their infrastructure initiatives have complementary political and economic effects. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

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07 February, 2026

A New Stage in Uzbekistan’s Foreign Policy: Analytical Review of the State Visit to Pakistan

by Zulkhumor Makhmudova, PhD Candidate at UWED In recent years, Uzbekistan’s foreign policy has prioritized regional integration and the development of alternative transport-logistics routes. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s official visit to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, marked by a high-level diplomatic protocol and political attention, demonstrates that bilateral relations have entered a qualitatively new stage. The escort of the Uzbek President’s aircraft by the Pakistan Air Force, and the simultaneous reception by both the President and the Prime Minister of Pakistan, is not merely ceremonial but a symbolic signal of significant geopolitical meaning. Pakistan is a parliamentary republic where real executive power rests with the Prime Minister, while the President performs mostly ceremonial and representative functions. Therefore, the reception of a foreign head of state by both the President and Prime Minister simultaneously is rare in protocol practice. This reflects several key political messages: the visit carries maximum political weight; Pakistan’s internal political institutions have reached a consensus on closer ties with Uzbekistan; and engagement with Uzbekistan represents a long-term strategic approach rather than a temporary government initiative. The military escort further underscores the strategic partnership and trust placed in Uzbekistan in matters of security. President Mirziyoyev’s meeting with the Commander of the Pakistan Armed Forces, Field Marshal Asim Munir, indicates the emergence of a new strategic direction in Uzbekistan’s foreign and security policy. The meeting, held at Pakistan’s leading defense-industrial complex, underscores that cooperation extends beyond political-diplomatic dialogue to include practical industrial-military collaboration. This reflects Uzbekistan’s pragmatic approach to strengthening its defense capabilities through technology transfer, experience sharing, and industrial cooperation. The development of a dedicated “roadmap” for military-technical cooperation demonstrates that this initiative is institutionalized and long-term rather than ad hoc. Negotiations with Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Ishaq Dar, highlighted the institutionalization of Uzbekistan–Pakistan relations. The establishment of a Strategic Partnership Council, along with permanent coordinating mechanisms between foreign ministries, moves bilateral relations beyond personal diplomacy toward sustainable institutional frameworks. Such institutionalization signifies the elevation of relations to a “strategic partnership” level, expanding Uzbekistan’s maneuverability in South Asian affairs and increasing predictability and stability in interstate relations. The current stage of Uzbekistan–Pakistan economic relations reflects a transition from quantitative growth to qualitative deepening. Expansion of trade and the formation of an investment portfolio indicate a convergence of economic interests. Geoeconomically, Pakistan provides Uzbekistan with access to the Indian Ocean region; therefore, plans to increase trade volume to $2 billion have strategic significance. Preferential trade agreements, logistical improvements, and the removal of technical barriers serve to broaden Uzbekistan’s export geography, while the $3.5 billion investment portfolio demonstrates the long-term, complex, and institutional nature of bilateral cooperation, enhancing Uzbekistan’s attractiveness for South Asian investors. Transport and logistics cooperation is a central element of the strategic partnership. The acceleration of the Trans-Afghan Railway and the development of the Pakistan–China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan transport corridor play a key geostrategic role, connecting Uzbekistan to seaports and significantly expanding transit and trade opportunities. From an international relations perspective, these projects help mitigate the “geopolitical disconnect” between Central and South Asia, with Pakistan providing alternative and relatively stable transport routes. Subnational and regional cooperation initiatives further strengthen economic stability and integration. Humanitarian and cultural cooperation remains an important supportive component, reinforcing political and economic rapprochement through social engagement. Initiatives such as pilgrimage tourism, cultural exchanges, and joint projects on historical heritage serve to cultivate positive public opinion and legitimize strategic partnership. Leveraging shared historical and civilizational heritage enhances the cultural and long-term sustainability of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy. Overall, President Mirziyoyev’s visit to Pakistan demonstrates that Uzbekistan–Pakistan relations are evolving not only at a bilateral level but also as a strategic response to regional and global developments. In the context of fluctuating global energy prices, competition over transcontinental trade routes, and increasing regional security challenges, this visit enables Uzbekistan to establish a new engagement format that safeguards its economic and security interests while strengthening its position in both regional and global affairs. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.