In 2024, the global electricity generation structure once again demonstrated a strong dependence on fossil fuels—coal, natural gas, and oil—which accounted for nearly 60% of total output. Nevertheless, there has been a steady increase in the share of renewable energy sources (32.1%) and a moderate strengthening of nuclear energy’s role (9.1%). This imbalance reflects the complex dynamics of the global energy transition: decarbonization is underway, but remains highly uneven across regions.   The 2024 Global Energy Mix: Coal — 34.5% Natural gas — 23.5% Renewable energy sources (RES) — 32.1% Nuclear energy — 9.1% Oil — 0.7%   Regional Specificities: India maintains the world’s highest coal share at 73.4%, driven by rapidly growing electricity demand. Renewables and nuclear account for only 20.5% and 2.6%, respectively. China remains heavily reliant on coal (58.4%) but continues to expand both RES and nuclear capacity. The United States relies primarily on natural gas (42.6%) as a transitional fuel, supplemented by RES (23.3%) and nuclear power (18%). The European Union leads global decarbonization efforts: RES account for nearly 49% of electricity generation, with an additional 23.6% from nuclear, and only 10.7% from coal.   Key Trends: Renewable energy is experiencing robust growth, especially within the EU. However, its expansion is constrained by generation variability and limited energy storage infrastructure. Nuclear energy remains a stable source of low-carbon electricity, particularly attractive to countries with ambitious climate targets. Natural gas serves as a transitional compromise, particularly in the U.S., though its long-term environmental viability is increasingly questioned.   Strategic Conclusions: Accelerating the energy transition requires systemic investment in RES and grid modernization. Nuclear energy is a key instrument for reliable decarbonization. Natural gas may serve as a bridging resource but cannot substitute for zero-emission solutions. The development of hydrogen energy and its integration with RES offers a promising model for sustainable power generation.   The global power sector in 2024 stands at a crossroads between traditional carbon-intensive paradigms and an emerging green trajectory. While coal and gas continue to dominate, the growing potential of renewables and nuclear power provides grounds for cautious optimism. The central challenge ahead is to ensure a just and technologically resilient energy transition on a global scale.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Shokhrukh Saidov, member of the IAIS Volunteers Club, in his commentary on Kazakhstan’s recent engagement with Afghanistan, argues that the official visit of Deputy Prime Minister Serik Zhumangarin to Kabul from April 21 to 23 marks a significant recalibration of Astana’s regional diplomacy. The author contends that Kazakhstan’s signing of twenty agreements worth $140 million with the Taliban-led administration is not merely transactional but reflects a deliberate strategic shift in Central Asia’s approach to Afghanistan, particularly following Russia’s removal of the Taliban from its list of terrorist organisations. In this context, Kazakhstan emerges as a regional actor intent on balancing economic interests with pragmatic foreign policy adjustments.   The commentary underscores three major pillars driving Kazakhstan’s outreach: transit, trade, and resource diplomacy. Saidov highlights Kazakhstan’s keen interest in transforming itself into a key transit corridor between Russia and the Indian Ocean via Afghanistan. Notably, this vision aligns with Astana’s long-term objective of diversifying trade routes amidst shifting global supply chains and increasing geopolitical fragmentation.   The author also points out the significant surge in sugar exports, alongside opportunities in grain, flour, and confectionery products. With Afghanistan’s population exceeding 41 million, the author suggests that access to this consumer base offers both immediate economic benefits and long-term potential for sustained trade growth. Saidov draws attention to Kazakhstan’s entry into Afghanistan’s mineral sector, highlighting the dispatch of a geological mission to Nuristan Province and the collection of ore samples for analysis. This move, he argues, may herald deeper resource cooperation and introduce Kazakhstan as a technical partner in Afghanistan’s untapped mining economy. The decision to form a joint technical team reflects a commitment to structured and scientific collaboration — potentially positioning Kazakhstan as a regional leader in responsible resource development.   In conclusion, the author argues that Kazakhstan’s engagement with Afghanistan is a calculated policy that transcends economic expediency. It reflects an aspiration to influence the infrastructural and commercial architecture of Central Asia while cautiously navigating a post-American Afghan reality. As Shokhrukh Saidov notes, the broader impact may be a redefinition of regional connectivity, with Astana positioning itself not only as a trade partner but as a strategic bridge linking Russia, Central Asia, and South Asia.   Read on paradigma.uz   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

UK policy since the beginning of 2025 has entered a phase of adjusting strategic priorities against the backdrop of a changing global configuration. The focus is on strengthening defence and trade and economic cooperation with the EU. This not only marks a reset of relations after Brexit, but also represents a subtle diplomatic manoeuvre aimed at not severing ties with Washington, while strengthening the autonomy of the European vector of British foreign policy.   The leading trend here is the priority of defence cooperation, which, in fact, becomes the entry point to a broader political and economic convergence. Support for Ukraine, the development of joint defence technologies and the participation of the British military-industrial complex in the mechanisms of the new EU defence fund (€150 billion) represent a pragmatic choice dictated by the need to adapt to the growing fragmentation of the transatlantic security architecture. It is particularly noteworthy that in the context of weakening US guarantees and an unstable global economy, it is security that becomes the basis for further integration steps.   London’s statement on “shared values” becomes symbolic, which, although it does not mention Trump directly, actually opposes his approach to international affairs —  unilateralism, tariff protectionism and deviation from climate commitments. The UK demonstrates its intention to act in unison with the EU in supporting Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders, protecting the global trading system and implementing the Paris Agreement. In doing so, it sends a clear message that the sustainability of the international order and multilateral engagement remain a priority.   However, such an active rapprochement with Brussels raises domestic and foreign policy dilemmas. Firstly, there is a risk of irritating Washington, especially if the incoming Trump administration again bets on a tough trade policy. Secondly, the British establishment must manoeuvre between the interests of British farmers, industrialists and hardline sovereignty supporters, which limits the scope for deep regulatory integration with the EU. The fact that London has made clear its unwillingness to lower standards in the food and car industries suggests a desire to preserve autonomy in critically sensitive sectors while seeking US easing.   The complexity of the UK's position is further exacerbated by the fact that the country essentially acts as a bridge between two competing economic and political centres — the EU and the US. This gives London certain opportunities to mediate and strengthen its own role on the world stage, but requires strategic consistency and diplomatic malleability. If the Starmer government manages to implement the outlined “defence cooperation – economic dialogue – climate solidarity” nexus, it could become a model for a new type of Europe+ relationship — without membership, but with deep cooperation in key areas.   In conclusion, the current reset in UK-EU relations is not just a tactical choice, but a response to shifts in the system of international relations itself. With the erosion of US global leadership and growing instability in Eastern Europe, it is regional alliances based on values, security and pragmatism that are becoming points of resilience. The UK, after a painful break with the EU, could once again become one of the pillars of European stability, provided it manages to maintain a balance between the transatlantic and continental dimensions of its policy.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The escalation of trade and economic tensions between China and the United States could significantly affect the global oil market. According to industry analysts, if the conflict deepens and China’s economic growth slows, the increase in the country’s oil demand could be halved — from 180,000 barrels per day to 90,000 barrels per day. This decline would particularly affect the diesel fuel sector, heavily used in industry and transportation, as well as the petrochemical industry, which is closely tied to exports and manufacturing supply chains.   China traditionally plays a key role as one of the largest oil consumers in the world. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), China accounts for about 15% of global oil demand, and any fluctuations in its economy are immediately reflected in global oil prices. However, as noted by Rystad Energy, the market has recently become less sensitive to geopolitical events — including the US-Iran nuclear talks and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. This may be due to market participants pricing in long-term volatility and reacting less sharply to individual political developments than in the past.   Nonetheless, US-China relations remain a major source of uncertainty. In particular, the potential lifting of US sanctions against certain Chinese oil refineries is under discussion, which could stimulate crude oil imports and domestic refining activity.   On the other hand, seasonal factors favor price growth. Rystad Energy forecasts that during the summer months, the price of Brent crude oil could exceed $70 per barrel, mainly driven by seasonal increases in fuel consumption. As of April, Brent prices are hovering around $67, and any positive signals from China could support further price growth.   Thus, the trade war between the United States and China acts not only as a macroeconomic challenge but also as a structural risk for the oil industry, influencing demand dynamics from the world’s largest importer and refiner of oil. Amid geopolitical turbulence, China increasingly serves as a “barometer” through which market participants gauge the resilience of oil demand and the potential for future price growth.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The Central Asian countries continue to strengthen the water management system based on a proactive institutional approach. The 89th meeting of the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC) was held in April this year in Samarkand. One of the priority issues on the agenda of the meeting was the approval of agreed interstate water withdrawal limits for Central Asian countries for the growing season 2025 in the Syrdarya and Amudarya river basins.    Water withdrawal limits of the countries for the growing season 2025 in the Syrdarya river basin were approved in the following volume: Kazakhstan (Dustlik canal) – 909 million cubic metres; Kyrgyzstan – 270 million cubic metres; Tajikistan – 1.9 billion cubic metres; Uzbekistan – 8.8 billion cubic metres.   Water withdrawal limits for the growing season 2025 for the Amudarya river basin totalled 39.723 million m³ in total, of which Tajikistan accounts for 7.003 million m³, Turkmenistan — for 15.500 million m³, and Uzbekistan — for 16.020 million m³. Additionally, 5.150 million m³ of water is allocated for ecological and sanitary-ecological needs, including water supply to the river delta and the Aral Sea.   The meeting also confirmed the readiness of the Central Asian states to deepen the institutional framework for cooperation, where the emphasis was placed on improving the contractual and legal framework of the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS) and participation in international initiatives and strengthening the capacity and image of IFAS in the international arena. In this context, ICWC members were also tasked to assist in the organisation of a regional forum within the framework of the High-Level Interstate Conference on Glacier Conservation scheduled for 29-31 May 2025 in Dushanbe, Tajikistan.   These joint efforts reflect the aspirations of the Central Asian countries to effectively manage shared water resources, balancing the needs of agriculture, energy production and environmental conservation. It is worth noting separately that water reserves in upper reservoirs by the beginning of the growing season have increased by 1.47 billion m³ compared to 2024, which creates an additional resource buffer.   All this forms a steady trend: from technical synchronisation to institutional strengthening and strategic coordination. It is in such decisions that the practical value of water diplomacy — as a basis for environmental and political stability in Central Asia - is manifested.   Regular meetings reaffirm the strategic importance of transboundary water use coordination for sustainable development in Central Asia. Under conditions of changing climate and uneven water availability in the region, water diplomacy is transforming from a declarative slogan into an applied tool for joint regional management. The next, 90th ICWC meeting is planned for August 2025 and will be held in Astana, Republic of Kazakhstan.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The Financial Times, referring to the fact that “many manufacturers are forced to pay duties on both imports and exports”, focuses on foreign manufacturers in China, which are forced to pay duties of 125% on imports of components and then 145% on exports to the U.S., thus twice falling under the impact of trade duties from the U.S., which, as noted undermines their activities.   It should be noted that it is not only Chinese companies that have been hit, but also American companies doing big business in China. This is due to the fact that there are a number of foreign companies operating in China that are not American but rely on American raw materials, which puts them in the position of having to pay both American and Chinese duties on the same goods. At the same time, “some large American manufacturers, including smartphone makers and some electronics manufacturers, have secured temporary relief from Trump”.   According to China’s General Administration of Customs, “wholly or partly foreign companies in the country last year accounted for $980bn of Chinese exports, or more than a quarter, and $820bn of imports, or more than a third”, and that “China recorded a record trade surplus of nearly $1 trillion in 2024”. An important factor is that China’s export mechanism has been driven in whole or in part by foreign companies that have sought to take advantage of China’s huge and inexpensive labour market to produce goods.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.