The recent speech delivered by U.S. Vice President J. D. Vance at the Munich Security Conference — calling for a fundamental reassessment of global and European security arrangements — has catalysed a moment of reflection within Europe regarding its own strategic posture. European institutions, approaches, and value frameworks will retain their continuity; however, their future development will increasingly unfold with the prospect of limited — or minimal — U.S. involvement in mind. In this context, a recalibration of Europe’s approach towards China, India, Central and South Asia, the Middle East, and the Caucasus appears increasingly likely. There is a particular interest in the Caucasus and Central Asia, which can play the role of a bridge between East and West. The geopolitical location of these regions makes them very attractive for the European Union, which was confirmed during the First European Union – Central Asia Summit, which ended on April 4 in Samarkand with the signing of the Joint Declaration.
Summit Outcomes. The comprehensive mobilisation of the EU’s bureaucratic apparatus ensured that the summit’s outcomes were elevated to a structured and systemic level of cooperation. A formalised framework for bilateral engagement was established, including regular meetings of foreign ministers, working groups, and high-level platforms.
Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to deepening economic and investment ties. The European Union currently stands as Central Asia’s second-largest trading partner after China. As noted by President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, trade turnover between the two regions reached €54 billion in 2024. Significantly, an agreement was reached to establish a regional office of the European Investment Bank (EIB) in Uzbekistan — a move reflecting the substantial volume of European investments in regional initiatives, which already account for 40% of all foreign investment in Central Asia. Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, also announced the launch of a new €12 billion Global Gateway investment package, aimed at supporting cooperation in infrastructure, digital connectivity, water and energy sectors, and critical raw materials. The EU also reaffirmed its intention to continue implementing its 2019 Strategy for Central Asia in key areas such as the green transition, climate change mitigation, energy, and sustainable agriculture.
In addition, the EU expressed its readiness to continue its Global Strategy for Central Asia (2019) in key areas such as green transition, climate change, energy, sustainable agriculture, as well as increased support for education programs through Erasmus+, Horizon Europe, Digital Education, Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions.
In the domain of security, both sides outlined plans to intensify collaboration on counter-terrorism, extremism, drug trafficking, and organised crime, while also advancing border and migration management through platforms such as LEICA and BOMCA.
The Eurasian Highway. The Summit reiterated the particular importance of developing a network of extensive logistics routes and supply chains against the backdrop of ever deepening global fragmentation and geopolitical instability in key transportation hubs of international trade. In this regard, the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), better known as the Middle Corridor, connecting China with Europe via Central Asia, the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea, is of greatest interest to the EU. European institutions have already pledged €10 billion to support it during an investment forum in Brussels in January 2024. Global Gateway is therefore recognized as the main instrument of infrastructure cooperation between the EU and Central Asia. Thus, trade is no longer merely a pursuit of the shortest or least costly routes — it is an urgent quest for the most reliable, resilient, and politically sustainable supply chains that can endure uncertainty and reinforce strategic autonomy.
Region-to-Region Cooperation. The summit further affirmed the EU’s comprehensive support for regional integration in Central Asia. In recent years, Brussels has consistently advanced region-wide initiatives rather than focusing exclusively on bilateral channels. Alongside robust bilateral engagements that underpin effective collaboration, Central Asian states are also being encouraged to look beyond the C5+1 format and explore strategic partnerships with Azerbaijan. Such cooperation could pave the way for the EU to craft an alternative to its traditional Eastern Partnership — namely, a new Trans-Caspian Partnership.
This evolution necessitates more tailored engagement with subregions of Europe that play vital roles in transit and energy connectivity. Central Asia already maintains solid linkages with the Baltic states, which have proven themselves to be dynamic economic and investment partners. These established ties may serve as a foundation for expanding relations with the Nordic countries, thereby supporting external economic diversification and fostering a more multi-tiered political dialogue.
The Afghan Dilemma. In the broader context of global transformations, the European Union may soon revisit its policy towards Afghanistan. While the EU has exercised caution in dealing with Kabul, its strategic ally — the United States — has begun to signal a tentative re-engagement, evidenced by the informal visit to Afghanistan by former U.S. Special Representative Zalmay Khalilzad in March 2025. Nevertheless, Brussels remains wary of moving too quickly, for several reasons.
First, the EU is sensitive to reputational risks drawing criticism from the democratic world.
Second, a renewed relationship with Kabul could lead to internal discourse shifts within the EU, given the electorate’s profound divergence from the Taliban on matters of civil society and governance.
Third, within Europe’s current strategic calculus, Afghanistan is often perceived as peripheral to core continental interests. However, if Europe were to place greater emphasis on deeper cooperation with Central Asia, Afghanistan could acquire newfound relevance as a strategic node.
In this regard, the EU may prefer a mediated approach, engaging Afghanistan indirectly through trusted regional partners. Uzbekistan stands out as a compelling intermediary. European policymakers recognise Tashkent’s pivotal role in Afghan affairs, particularly in the shared interest of fostering Afghanistan’s development through economic integration. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s proposal — voiced at the European Union – Central Asia Summit — to involve Afghanistan in regional economic processes closely aligns with the EU’s vision. Such initiatives may well draw the attention of European financial institutions towards investment opportunities in Afghanistan, representing a vital step towards enhancing the country’s economic stability.
* The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.