The commentary by IAIS Visiting Junior Fellows offers a comparative and on-the-ground perspective on Uzbekistan’s road infrastructure, blending personal travel observations with policy analysis. Drawing parallels with Canada’s vast but well-connected highway system, the authors underscore the challenges Uzbekistan faces in developing safe, efficient, and sustainable road networks. They recount travel experiences across regions such as Samarkand, Bukhara, Nukus, and Muynak, highlighting pervasive potholes, uneven surfaces, and risky driving behaviors that undermine road safety. These firsthand accounts are reinforced by statistics from the United Nations and the World Health Organization, which reveal high accident rates and a significant economic cost—2.8% of GDP—associated with road incidents.   The fellows argue that inadequate road conditions not only compromise safety but also limit Uzbekistan’s economic potential. Citing World Bank data, they note that road freight capacity must increase dramatically—by nearly 500% by 2030—to meet future demand. While rail infrastructure, such as the Afrosiyab high-speed service, offers strong intercity connectivity, they suggest roads should prioritize regional and “last-mile” links, particularly to smaller towns and vulnerable areas like Muynak. They highlight opportunities for Uzbekistan to leverage foreign investment, including from the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, to address infrastructure deficits and integrate into emerging Trans-Caspian trade corridors.   Government initiatives, including the 2035 Transport Development Strategy and major projects like the $4.28 billion Tashkent–Andijan expressway, signal a strong political will to modernize the sector. However, the authors caution that large-scale projects should be matched with investments in safety measures, urban traffic management, and long-term maintenance budgets—areas where Canadian experience offers instructive lessons. They also advocate for integrating road safety into design and policy from the outset, noting that consistent enforcement and improved driver discipline are as vital as engineering upgrades.   Ultimately, the piece frames Uzbekistan’s current moment as a rare window of flexibility and ambition—conditions that Canada no longer enjoys due to entrenched infrastructure legacies. By balancing large-scale expressways with regional connectivity, embedding safety in construction, and ensuring sustained maintenance funding, Uzbekistan can lay the foundations for a transport network that boosts economic integration, supports rural communities, and meets the demands of future trade and mobility.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The International Monetary Fund’s report, “World Economic Outlook: Global Economy: Fragile Stability Amid Persistent Uncertainty”, presents updated assessments and forecasts for the global economy for 2025 and 2026.   According to the IMF forecast, global economic growth will be 3% in 2025 and 3.1% in 2026, which is lower than the actual figure for 2024 of 3.3%. Compared to the April issue, the current forecast is more optimistic. This is due to higher-than-expected economic activity at the beginning of the period amid expectations of tariff increases, lower average effective tariffs in the US compared to April estimates, improved financial conditions, including a weaker dollar, and expanded fiscal spending in a number of major economies.   Advanced economies are expected to grow by 1.5% in 2025 and 1.6% in 2026. In the US, economic growth is projected to slow to 1.9% in 2025 amid weaker private demand and a decline in immigration inflows. However, in 2026, growth may accelerate to 2% thanks to increased production volumes resulting from the implementation of the Big Beautiful Bill tax and fiscal measures package. In the euro area, growth is expected to accelerate to 1% in 2025 and 1.2% in 2026. The 0.2 percentage point increase in the forecast for 2025 is due to strong GDP growth in Ireland in the first quarter of this year.   In emerging market and developing economies, growth is forecast by the IMF to be 4.1% in 2025 and 4% in 2026. In particular, China is expected to grow by 4.8% in 2025 thanks to high economic activity in the first half of this year and a significant reduction in tariffs on trade with the US. India is projected to grow by 6.4% in both 2025 and 2026 due to favorable external economic conditions. In the Middle East and Central Asia region, growth is projected to accelerate to 3.4% in 2025 and 3.5% in 2026. In Russia, on the contrary, growth is expected to slow to 0.9% in 2025 and 1% in 2026.   Global inflation is expected to continue to decline, to 4.2% in 2025 and 3.6% in 2026. This is due to weaker demand and lower energy prices. However, inflation forecasts vary from country to country. In the US, consumer price growth will be fueled by tariffs, while in other countries, tariffs may act as a negative demand shock and curb inflationary pressures.   According to the IMF report, if tariffs are further increased from August 1, including the introduction of announced duties on copper of up to 50%, this will have a negative impact on global economic growth. Increased uncertainty in trade policy could slow economic activity, weaken companies’ willingness to invest in maintaining and developing trade links, and, as a result, lead to a slowdown in trade and production growth, especially in export-oriented countries. Geopolitical tensions could disrupt global supply chains and trigger an increase in commodity prices. Global trade growth is expected to slow to 2.6% in 2025 and 1.9% in 2026. Countries such as Brazil, France, and the United States are projected to face significant budget deficits amid record-high levels of public debt. This could lead to higher long-term bond yields and tighter global financial conditions.   To reduce uncertainty in trade policy, countries are advised to promote clear and transparent international trade rules. In this situation, it is important to promote multilateral initiatives aimed at addressing global challenges and, where necessary, to use plurilateral or regional approaches to specific issues. According to the IMF, international cooperation in the field of economic policy can mitigate negative spillover effects between countries and provide support to the most vulnerable economies.   Overall, despite signs of a gradual recovery and a partial improvement in macroeconomic conditions, the global economy remains highly uncertain. In this context, the key tasks for countries remain ensuring predictable economic policies, strengthening international cooperation, and modernizing trade rules to enhance the resilience of the global economy.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The global coal market remains highly concentrated, with the majority of production located in Asia. According to data from the Energy Institute (Statistical Review of World Energy 2025), China accounts for 4,780 million tonnes of coal per year—more than half of global production. This makes China not only the largest producer but also the leading consumer of coal. It extracts 4.5 times more than India and nearly 10 times more than the United States. This scale is driven by China’s energy structure, which still heavily relies on coal, despite massive investments in renewables.     India ranks second with 1,085 million tonnes, driven by growing industrial and residential demand for electricity. Indonesia, with 836 million tonnes, is largely export-oriented, supplying coal to Southeast Asia, China, and South Asia.   Among Western nations, the United States (465 Mt) and Australia (463 Mt) remain major producers. Despite green transition policies, both continue to maintain stable output— the U.S. primarily for domestic use, and Australia for export. Russia follows with 427 Mt, maintaining its status as a key player despite sanctions and reduced exports to Europe. Regional suppliers such as Kazakhstan (113 Mt) and Mongolia (107 Mt) continue to strengthen their positions, especially in supplying China.   In Europe, countries like Germany (92 Mt), Poland (85 Mt), and Turkey (87 Mt) continue coal production despite decarbonization goals, largely driven by energy security concerns and the need to replace natural gas imports after the 2022–2023 energy crisis.   In summary, Asia is the undisputed center of global coal production, accounting for over 75% of output. Asian countries are now key players in the global climate agenda, and any shift in their energy policies will have a direct impact on global emissions. The future of coal largely depends on decisions made in Beijing, New Delhi, and Jakarta.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

By Mirjalol Murtozaev The meeting of the foreign ministers of Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan held in Kabul on July 17, 2025, marks an important turning point on the path of regional infrastructure development. At the meeting, a trilateral agreement was signed on the preparation of a feasibility study for the Trans-Afghan railway. This event is not merely a logistical project, but rather the beginning of a new phase in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy based on geoeconomic pragmatism and strategic reality.   Uzbekistan’s interest in the Trans-Afghan railway project has, in fact, been revived against the backdrop of recent global and regional geopolitical changes. In recent years, Uzbekistan had been actively promoting plans to access South Asia through Iran’s Chabahar port. This route was considered promising both in terms of regional diversification and for deepening direct economic ties with India. However, the geopolitical developments of recent months particularly the clashes between Iran and Israel, the worsening of Iran’s relations with Western countries, and India’s insufficient support for Iran during this process have begun to complicate the Chabahar access project. Moreover, signs of warming ties between China, Afghanistan, and Pakistan became evident during their trilateral meeting in Beijing on May 21 of this year. As a result of these factors, Pakistan’s Gwadar and Karachi ports are increasingly being seen as a more stable and reliable alternative. In particular, the opening of a short and cost-effective route to these ports via the Trans-Afghan railway may serve as a solid basis for defining a new strategic direction for Uzbekistan’s foreign trade. In addition, the Pakistani route may offer such advantages as economic efficiency, reduced transit time, and lower logistics costs. Additionally, the Pakistani route may also offer advantages such as economic efficiency, reduced transit time, and lower logistics costs.   The foundations of this railway agreement can be viewed in several stages:   First, despite existing security concerns regarding the Trans-Afghan railway, it is seen as a relatively shorter, more quickly implementable route that currently enjoys political will. The presence of stable dialogue between Tashkent and the current Afghan government is contributing to mutual interests between the two sides. Closer energy and transport ties with Pakistan could further elevate the project to a strategic level.   Second, at a time when the relevance of traditional trade routes in the north is gradually diminishing, and the route through Iran via the Caspian Sea requires large-scale infrastructure investments, the Trans-Afghan transport corridor is becoming a new geoeconomic pivot for the entire Central Asian region. This project is emerging not only as a freight transportation system but also as a key to regional integration, energy diplomacy, and export strategy. The railway also opens the opportunity to transmit electricity through Afghanistan to South Asia. In particular, the implementation of the CASA-1000 project could allow Uzbekistan and neighboring countries to increase export volumes and strengthen their presence in the energy market. Moreover, direct access to the ports of Gwadar and Karachi would enable Uzbekistan to establish stable links with strategic markets along the Indian Ocean. Additionally, this corridor would open pathways to the energy and investment projects of Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar. This would lead not only to economic cooperation but also usher in a new phase of political and diplomatic engagement. From this perspective, the agreement signed in Kabul is not merely an infrastructure deal, but a forward-looking strategic political choice that integrates multi-layered interests.   Third, the Trans-Afghan railway is not only a transport project, but a geoeconomic route that ensures Uzbekistan’s access to the markets of South Asia, India, and the Persian Gulf. Through this route, cargo delivery time will be reduced from 35 days to 5-7 days, and container costs will decrease from $900 to $286. Under such conditions, Uzbekistan can make its export-import operations more competitive and stable. Financial and political support for the project is also crucial. China’s “Belt and Road” initiative, Russia’s transit diplomacy, and Pakistan’s port policy could be directly integrated into this project. This aligns with Uzbekistan’s “multi-vector” foreign policy principle.   Fourth, at the Kabul meeting, the Uzbek Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bakhtiyor Saidov, held talks with Afghanistan’s Prime Minister Mullah Hasan Akhund, Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi, and Interior Minister Khalifa Sirajuddin Haqqani - which is evidence of Tashkent’s increasingly active foreign policy. These meetings can be seen as efforts to deepen consistent political dialogue with the Afghan government, strengthen economic trust, and build security guarantees. It also reflects the desire to view Afghanistan as an integral part of regional integration. Through this, Uzbekistan is implementing the concept of becoming a transit hub between Central and South Asia and serving as a “bridge” in regional diplomacy. Conclusion. The Trans-Afghan railway project represents a real geoeconomic transformation in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy. This initiative envisions not only transport infrastructure but also the creation of political trust, trade security, and regional balance. Under the leadership of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, Uzbekistan’s foreign policy consistently relies on geopolitical pragmatism and the priority of regional stability. Uzbekistan is shaping itself as a normative initiator and a country that defines strategic direction.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

By Shokhruzbek Gulmetov   The Iran-Israel confrontation has evolved beyond a regional dispute, drawing close attention from the wider international community. In response to recent developments, major global players have taken clear positions, reflecting their respective strategic interests. India, long viewed as a key partner of the Islamic Republic of Iran and consistently recognizing Tehran’s regional significance, has taken a cautious and calibrated approach. Unlike several other members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), New Delhi refrained from issuing any direct condemnation of Israel, instead calling for de-escalation and maintaining a position of formal neutrality, albeit with subtle indications of diplomatic alignment with Tel Aviv.   Converging Political Outlooks To understand India’s motives for abstaining from condemning Israel’s actions, it is essential to examine the nature of India-Israel relations, particularly in the political and strategic domains. New Delhi’s decision not to align with the joint SCO position reveals a pragmatic approach to foreign policy. When both parties to a conflict represent important partners, states often opt for neutrality, guided by national interests and long-term strategic calculations.   In India’s case, cooperation with Israel has been steadily expanding across sectors such as defense, technology, and intelligence. Following the October 2023 attacks by Hamas on Israeli territory, India expressed solidarity with Tel Aviv. In turn, during India’s “Sindhur” operation on Pakistani territory, Israel offered diplomatic support to India, a move that drew concern from the international community due to reports of civilian casualties.   In April 2025, Israeli President Isaac Herzog, during a meeting with India’s new ambassador, emphasized the importance of deepening bilateral ties, especially in the field of geostrategic cooperation. He also noted Israel’s generally favorable perception of India. On the morning of June 13, 2025, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for a ceasefire in Gaza. India abstained from the vote, despite traditional Israeli allies such as France, the United Kingdom, and Germany having supported the resolution.   India’s behavior reflects its effort to maintain a delicate balance in its relationships with key partners, particularly Israel. However, its abstention on a humanitarian resolution raises questions, especially given the alignment of Indian and Israeli approaches to various developments in the Muslim world. This position may be interpreted as a lack of sufficient sensitivity to the humanitarian aspects of the conflict.   New Delhi’s Economic Priorities India-Israel relations are rooted not only in political alignment but also in expanding economic cooperation, which New Delhi considers more promising than its projects with Iran, such as the Chabahar Port or the North-South Transport Corridor. In February 2025, the India-Israel Business Forum brought together over 100 leading companies. At the forum, Israel’s Minister of Economy emphasized the geopolitical importance of strengthening partnerships with India and the United States, reflecting Tel Aviv’s strategic pivot toward Asia.   Economic data highlights New Delhi’s pragmatic choice: in 2024, trade between India and Iran totaled USD 4.13 billion, whereas trade with Israel reached USD 6.53 billion, despite a decline from 2023, when it had exceeded USD 10 billion. Indian Minister of Commerce and Industry Piyush Goyal stated that trade volumes between India and Israel should be increased tenfold, underscoring the prioritization of economic dialogue with Israel.   Beyond bilateral projects, multilateral economic initiatives also play a crucial role in bringing India and Israel closer together. Notable among them are the I2U2 coalition (India, Israel, the U.S., and the UAE) and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). I2U2 focuses on key areas, including food security, sustainable energy, and the private sector. It envisions up to USD 2 billion in investments for agro-industrial parks in India, along with projects to reach 500 GW of clean energy capacity by 2030.   Initiated with U.S. support, IMEC offers India direct and stable access to Middle Eastern and European markets, circumventing unstable transit routes. Amid sanctions on Iran and Russia, New Delhi views IMEC as a more reliable and advantageous alternative to the North-South Corridor. For the U.S., IMEC represents not only an infrastructure initiative but also a strategic counterweight to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, as well as a vehicle for deepening ties with India in the context of regional balancing.   India’s participation in these multilateral formats strengthens its economic ties with Israel and the U.S., while also helping explain New Delhi’s cautious foreign policy stance in the Iran-Israel context.   Military-Technical Cooperation Israel has proven to be a reliable strategic partner for India, particularly in enhancing its defense capabilities during periods of heightened tensions with Pakistan. During Operation Sindhur, Israel provided substantial support, including medium-range air defense systems such as the Barak 8, as well as precision strike drones like the HAROP. The latter, classified as loitering munitions, proved effective in targeted strikes against strategic enemy assets.   The effectiveness of Israeli drones was also observed during the conflict in Karabakh, where they were deployed by Azerbaijan. India-Israel military-technical cooperation goes beyond arms deliveries. It encompasses joint exercises, cybersecurity collaboration, joint development of advanced defense technologies, and training of personnel. This comprehensive approach enhances not only operational interoperability but also the strategic resilience of the partnership.   Support in the Sphere of Digital Diplomacy Beyond conventional military cooperation, Israel’s support for India extends into the digital realm. Digital diplomacy has emerged as a vital instrument for strengthening bilateral relations, particularly in the absence of a shared border. On various online platforms, there is a noticeable level of mutual understanding and friendly interaction between the governmental institutions of the two countries and their civil societies. Through digital channels, New Delhi and Tel Aviv successfully carry out joint cultural, educational, and scientific initiatives, significantly contributing to the development of a positive bilateral image and mutual trust between the peoples.   Conclusion An analysis of India-Israel relations highlights New Delhi’s pragmatic and adaptive foreign policy, which aims to balance interests amid shifting global dynamics. In the context of rising tensions, including the Iran-Israel conflict, India avoids unilateral positions while maintaining ties with key actors.   Cooperation with Israel in technology, security, and trade is important but not exclusive. India preserves strategic flexibility and remains open to recalibrating partnerships based on regional shifts and national priorities, avoiding rigid commitments in favor of diplomatic maneuverability.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The issue of water resources in Central Asia is becoming increasingly relevant. A number of experts, especially on social media, are making alarming predictions about a possible acute shortage of fresh water in the region by 2050. These estimates are based on climate change, population growth, and the dominance of the agricultural sector in water consumption.   It should be noted that over 90% of all water used in Central Asia is consumed by agriculture. In Uzbekistan, this figure is about 92%, with a significant portion of water resources going to irrigate rice and cotton. For comparison, in developed countries, agriculture accounts for 30 to 40% of available water. Meanwhile, less than 8% of water in the region is used for domestic and drinking water supply. This means that the water shortage for the population is not critical – the main challenge is to optimize water use in the agricultural sector.   Uzbekistan is taking steps to overcome this imbalance. Recognizing the scale of water risks, the country has begun implementing a set of water policy reforms in recent years. Among the priorities are the modernization of irrigation infrastructure, the introduction of water-saving technologies, the expansion of drip and sprinkler irrigation methods, and the digitization of water use accounting processes. The state is investing in hydraulic structures and improving water resource management models, with a focus on international cooperation, especially in transboundary river basins.   One of the key areas is the diversification of agriculture and the transition to crops with lower water requirements. In this context, an important step was the decision taken in 2025 to review approaches to rice cultivation, one of the most water-intensive crops. As an alternative, farmers are being offered a transition to crops that are more resistant to climate change and less dependent on intensive irrigation.   At the same time, resource-saving technologies will be introduced in rice cultivation and new varieties adapted to extreme temperatures and droughts will be used. From 2026, a pilot project on rice cultivation using drip irrigation will be expanded. Currently, rice is mainly grown on flooded fields. It is important that international experts, including specialists from the KOPIA center (South Korea), will be actively involved in this process.   Thus, Uzbekistan is demonstrating a strategic approach to water management issues and a readiness to take practical action in the face of growing water shortages. A set of preventive measures aimed at rationalizing water use and revising agricultural policy can serve as a benchmark for other countries in the region and contribute to the formation of sustainable water security in Central Asia.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.