In May 2025, India made significant strides in strengthening energy and trade ties with the Gulf States, especially the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman. These steps are aimed at ensuring stable energy supplies, reducing the trade deficit and expanding India’s strategic influence in the region.   Agreement with UAE: Expanding energy cooperation India and the UAE have signed a number of agreements covering key energy sectors. These include long-term liquefied natural gas (LNG) supply contracts, expansion of oil storage capacity in India and civil nuclear energy cooperation. Notably, India and the UAE have entered into a memorandum of understanding to involve Indian expertise in the operation and maintenance of the Barakah Nuclear Power Plant, the first nuclear power plant in the Arabian Peninsula.   Upcoming agreement with Oman: Diversifying energy supply India is close to concluding a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with Oman. The agreement is expected to be signed soon and will result in duty reductions on about $3 billion worth of Indian exports, including agricultural products, jewelry, and automobiles. In return, India has agreed to reduce duties on some Omani goods such as petrochemicals and aluminum, with limited import volumes.   The strategic importance of the Gulf region Despite increased imports of Russian oil since the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine, India remains dependent on energy supplies from the Gulf. The threat of increased international sanctions on Russian oil underscores the importance of strengthening ties with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states to ensure India's energy security.   Joint renewable energy projects Indian companies are also actively involved in the development of renewable energy in the region. For instance, Jindal Renewables has signed an agreement with OQ Alternative Energy (OQAE) to jointly develop and operate large-scale renewable energy facilities in Oman, including solar and wind power projects.   India’s activism in strengthening energy and trade ties with the Gulf states reflects its desire to secure a stable energy supply, reduce the trade deficit and strengthen its strategic presence in the region. Agreements with the UAE and Oman offer new opportunities for cooperation in the conventional and renewable energy sectors, contributing to India’s sustainable economic development.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The recent open letter endorsed by nine European Union member states represents a significant challenge to the post-World War II human rights architecture that has underpinned the Council of Europe and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) since 1950. Spearheaded by Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and her counterpart – Denmark’s Mette Frederiksen, the signatories seek to recalibrate the Convention’s interpretation to permit more expansive national discretion over migration controls. Their initiative underscores a broader trend within Europe, where concerns about migration flows and domestic political pressures have driven a coalition of governments to question whether supranational legal constraints unduly hamper sovereign decision-making.   At the heart of the nine governments’ argument lies a perception that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has, in recent decades, extended the Convention’s scope beyond the original aspirations of its drafters. By invoking the need to “re-examine whether the Court has over-extended the scope of the Convention”, the letter’s authors effectively posit that shifts in judicial interpretation have upset the balance between collective human rights protections and the prerogatives of democratic states. This critique resonates strongly with electorates in several of the signatory countries, where anti-immigration parties have made substantial electoral gains by framing migration as an existential challenge to national identity and social cohesion.   Concretely, the letter proposes granting states broader latitude to expel foreign nationals who commit serious offences, to suspend certain procedural guarantees when deportation is not feasible, and to counter so-called “instrumentalization” of migrants by hostile external actors. Implicit in these recommendations is a redefinition of human rights obligations in the context of national security and public order. While the desire to deter criminal elements among migrant communities is understandable, the suggested measures risk undermining core Convention guarantees, such as the right to respect for private and family life and the prohibition of collective expulsion, both of which have been central to the ECtHR’s jurisprudence.   Prime Minister Meloni’s call for a “political debate” on the Convention’s capacity to address contemporary issues highlights the tension between legal continuity and evolving policy needs. It reflects a longstanding debate within international law: to what extent should domestic political considerations shape the evolution of treaty obligations? By seeking to anchor the reinterpretation in an “open-minded conversation”, the signatories implicitly acknowledge that any recalibration of the Convention would require not only judicial but also political consensus — a prospect complicated by divergent national interests and the mandatory nature of the Court’s judgments for all 46 Council of Europe members.   The response from Council of Europe Secretary-General Alain Berset was swift and unequivocal. Emphasising that “no judiciary should face political pressure”, Berset underscored that undermining the ECtHR’s independence would erode the very foundations of the rule of law in Europe. His defence of the Court’s role — in particular its ongoing adjudication of human rights violations arising from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine — serves as a potent reminder of the Convention’s unique position as a bulwark against state excess, even in the most fraught geopolitical contexts.   Historical rulings provide a sobering illustration of the stakes involved. The Court’s decisions in cases such as the 2016 Lampedusa expulsions of Tunisian migrants and Denmark’s denial of family reunification to a Syrian refugee in 2021 reflect a commitment to protect individuals against collective enforcement measures and to uphold the right to family life. Meanwhile, pending litigation against the Baltic states and Poland over alleged pushbacks into Belarus highlights the Convention’s reach into situations where national border policies intersect with allegations of hybrid warfare tactics. Such jurisprudence not only safeguards individual rights but also establishes precedents that guide domestic policymaking.   The nine-nation initiative thus poses a dual risk. On one hand, it could diminish the ECtHR’s authority by inviting overt political interference in what must remain an independent judicial process. On the other, it could foster a fragmentation of rights protections across Europe if states begin to contest the binding nature of certain judgments. Either outcome would weaken the Convention’s ability to speak with one voice on matters of fundamental rights, eroding public confidence in the Court’s fairness and impartiality.   From an institutional standpoint, the debate raises profound questions about the viability of multilayered governance in Europe. The ECHR system was designed precisely to mediate tensions between national sovereignty and supranational oversight, providing both a safety-net for individuals and a framework for shared values. Reversing or diluting key aspects of the Convention would undermine this delicate equilibrium, potentially dissuading citizens from seeking redress through the Strasbourg Court and limiting the Convention’s capacity to function as a common yardstick of human rights.   Yet the signatories’ concerns cannot be dismissed outright. Legitimate questions arise over whether the Convention adequately anticipates modern migration dynamics, transnational criminal networks, and asymmetric tactics by non-state and state actors alike. Any constructive reform must therefore reconcile the imperative of human rights protection with the pressing demands of democratic governance and security. This necessitates a measured dialogue that respects both the rule of law and the prerogatives of elected governments.   In navigating this impasse, European states should consider convening a formal consultative process under the auspices of the Council of Europe. Such a mechanism could bring together legal experts, judges, parliamentarians, civil society representatives, and migration authorities to explore targeted amendments or protocol revisions. By fostering transparency and broad stakeholder engagement, it would help ensure that any evolution of the Convention remains rooted in consensus rather than unilateral political manoeuvring. Only through such an inclusive approach can Europe safeguard both the rights of individuals and the integrity of its foundational human rights institutions.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Constructive U.S.-China talks in Geneva have led to a decision that the U.S. will reduce tariffs on Chinese imports, which were imposed from January 2025 on both sides, from 145% to 30%, and China’s retaliatory tariffs on U.S. goods will be reduced from 125% to 10%. Thus, the agreement reached to reduce tariffs by 115% of each side within the next 90 days – to some extent calmed the international economic community.   Against this backdrop, CNN experts note that “global investors are welcoming a thaw in a trade war that has rattled financial markets, disrupted supply chains and heightened fears of recession”. At a news conference in Geneva, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said: “Both delegations agreed that neither side wants a breakdown in relations. We do want trade. We want to achieve a greater balance in trade”. A spokesperson for China’s Ministry of Commerce called the joint statement “an important step by both sides to resolve differences through equitable dialog and consultation, laying the groundwork and creating conditions for further closing gaps and deepening cooperation”.   Following President Trump’s statement to reporters that “the weekend's talks have led to a ”complete reset of the terms of trade between the U.S. and China”, stock markets jumped, according to BBC News reporters, with investors cheering the de-escalation, with the S&P 500 Index jumping more than 3.2%, the Dow Jones Index rising 2.8%, and the Nasdaq up 4.3%. On Wall Street, shares of Target, Home Depot and Nike rose sharply in value, while technology stocks including Nvidia, Amazon, Apple and Facebook Meta also rose sharply. European stock indexes rose, with Hong Kong’s Hang Seng Index ending the day up 3%. The deal sent shares of shipping companies soaring, with Denmark’s Maersk up more than 12% and Germany’s Hapag-Lloyd up 14%. Maersk said the US-China agreement was “a step in the right direction” and that they now hope for a “permanent deal that can provide long-term predictability”. The International Chamber of Commerce said the deal sent a clear signal that the U.S. and China both want to avoid a “hard breakdown in relations”.   J.P.Morgan Research estimates such tariff cuts will continue through the end of 2025 and will have a significant impact on economic growth forecasts, including China’s annual growth forecast to 4.8 percent from a low of 4.1 percent. According to Haibin Zhu, head of research at J.P.Morgan Research, “the magnitude of the temporary tariff cuts is larger than expected and is a surprisingly positive development”. They also predicted that the US Federal Reserve will keep interest rates unchanged in the medium term until December 2025, the probability of recession in the US and globally has also dropped to below 50%.   To summarize, it should be emphasized that the agreement on trade tariffs has helped to ease the confrontation between the two countries and laid the foundation for overcoming uncertainty in trade policy.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

At a joint business forum in Kazan (Republic of Tatarstan, Russian Federation), Russia and Afghanistan considered the prospects for developing the Russia-Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan and Russia-Caspian Sea-Turkmenistan-Afghanistan multimodal transit corridors.   This development brings clarity to the understanding of Moscow’s long-term vision for shaping Afghanistan’s transportation architecture. It is noteworthy that along with the overland route through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the Russian side has begun to openly discuss the possibility of connecting to Afghanistan via the Caspian Sea using Turkmenistan’s port and railroad infrastructure. This approach signals Russia’s desire to diversify its supply routes to South Asia in order to pre-empt the risk of excessive dependence on one or another transit country.   The idea to establish multimodal transportation along the North-South axis through Afghanistan was initiated by Uzbekistan. In 2022, Tashkent proposed to launch an interregional route Belarus-Russia-Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan with a length of 5532 kilometers. A year later, the parties signed a memorandum on its implementation. Since then, Russia has been noticeably active on the trans-Afghan track and has already announced its participation in the preparation of a feasibility study of the Trans-Afghan railroad project.   As is known, Uzbekistan is promoting the concept of the Kabul corridor, which involves laying railroad tracks from Mazar-e-Sharif (Afghanistan) to Peshawar (Pakistan). The work was planned to start in the fall of 2021. However, due to an unexpected change of power in Afghanistan, the process was suspended and then resumed again. Meanwhile, in 2024, Turkmenistan in partnership with Kazakhstan presented an alternative version of the Trans-Afghan railroad along the Torghundi-Herat-Kandahar-Spin-Buldak route with access to Pakistani ports in the Indian Ocean. Russia appears to be interested in the operation of both the Kabul and Kandahar corridors.   In September 2024, Turkmenistan started laying the first section of the Torghundi-Herat railroad (115 km), which is planned to be extended to the Pakistani border via Kandahar. Part of the project’s $500 million cost will be borne by Kazakhstan.   Following their February visit to Tashkent, the Taliban said they had reached an agreement with the Uzbek side on the construction of the Mazar-e-Sharif-Herat railroad, although Uzbekistan’s specialized agency did not confirm this information. Here we should also emphasize that one of the two routes, which, judging by the reports of the Russian Ministry of Transport, was agreed upon for the preparation of the feasibility study of the Trans-Afghan railroad, starts from the city of Mazar-e-Sharif, connecting Afghanistan’s Herat, Dilaram, Kandahar with the border town of Chaman in Pakistan. It follows that the Taliban government intends to turn Herat into the country’s main transit hub, which would give major shippers such as Russia the opportunity to connect to different branches of the Trans-Afghan Railway – west via Kandahar or east via Kabul. Connecting the routes would probably allow Afghanistan to attract more transit cargo, which, in addition to economic benefits, would bring the local government considerable geopolitical dividends. However, this plan may cause a conflict of interests for Central Asian states involved in trans-Afghan communications.   A trade route across the Caspian Sea to Afghanistan is sure to irritate Tashkent, which is making great efforts to build the Termez-Mazar-e-Sharif-Kabul-Peshawar railroad, which is supposed to complete the process of creating a direct rail link between East Asia, Eurasia and the Indian peninsula. The efficiency of any transportation corridor depends on the freight base. If the Russia-Caspian Sea-Turkmenistan-Afghanistan multimodal route is launched, a significant volume of supplies from north to south may be reoriented to the sea route due to its low cost and the enormous cargo capacity of sea vessels. Regardless of which transport and through which Central Asian country transit flows to Afghanistan will be directed, the Kabul corridor will have to compete for their transportation, which will be a serious challenge for the region.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In Uzbekistan, I noticed a striking trend: nearly every political science researcher I met interpreted U.S. foreign policy through the framework of classical International Relations (IR) theory. They spoke in terms of realism, liberalism, and constructivism, assuming that the United States behaved according to strategic interest, institutional norms, or ideological values. But when I read about the Trump administration, none of those models seemed to fit. How could IR theory explain slashing embassies and diplomatic missions, or cozying up to adversaries while tariffing allies? The discrepancy between theoretical models and political reality wasn’t just confusing — it revealed something deeper: that the traditional IR playbook is no longer equipped to explain a second Trump administration.   Then, the burning question emerges: if International Relations cannot explain Trump, what can? This commentary calls for a psychopolitical approach, specifically blending Trump’s desire for ego, performance, and chaos.   Firstly, Trump is guided by ego. Unlike leaders driven by national interests or institutional norms, his foreign policy decisions consistently reflect a desire for personal validation and dominance. When Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky – who is more popular than President Trump in the US – visited Washington, Trump couldn’t stand being overshadowed. He publicly undermined Zelensky in front of the cameras, trying to reassert his own authority. Similarly, after Pope Francis passed away earlier this year, Trump responded not with statesmanship, but with spectacle: he circulated an AI-generated image of himself as Pope, seemingly to redirect public attention from a strong critic who had once labeled his immigration stance “not Christian”. Countries like South Africa, Canada, and the UK have found themselves forced to navigate Trump’s ego with extreme caution, offering delicate praise while hoping to avoid public ambushes – though such efforts often fell short. Traditional IR theories would assume that these actions serve a broader national purpose and advance U.S. interests in some way. Yet, Trump’s ego-driven decisions have failed to deliver meaningful gains for American foreign policy. These incidents are not isolated; rather, they reveal a consistent pattern where Trump’s foreign policy prioritizes his ego above all else, subordinating diplomacy to personal image and emotional gratification.   Secondly, Trump’s approach to international relations is performative. His decisions are shaped by how they play to a domestic audience, specifically how they reinforce his image as a successful dealmaker. Humanitarian aid was cut because its benefits weren’t easily visible to voters – regardless of consequences such as 91,000 dead adults and 190,000 dead children, or the destabilizing effects on already fragile regions like the Middle East. Domestically, as a result of Trump’s proposed Medicaid cuts, an adult will die every 18 minutes according to work by Boston University. Even when judged by the economic criteria Trump claimed to prioritize, his policies are counterproductive: his trade wars and tariffs are projected to shrink long-term U.S. GDP by 6% and reduce real wages by 5%. These contradictions reveal a deeper truth: Trump’s foreign policy isn’t about economic outcomes (like some IR theories propose), but about appearances. When countries hit by tariffs respond, they cannot take the analytical route like Japan and attempt to negotiate tariffs. Rather, they must appear specifically to Trump’s desire to create a performative atmosphere, engaging in public appeasement – such as what India has pursued. The language of money and “deals” was never a coherent strategy, but a performance designed to reinforce his brand as a tough, no-nonsense leader who puts “America First”.   Thirdly, Trump thrives on creating chaos. He requires constant attention, staying one step ahead of the media. By creating scandal after scandal every week, outrage fatigue sets in, and legitimate criticism can be brushed off as part of a never-ending “witch hunt.” He frequently discusses annexing Canada, invading Greenland, or building a luxury resort in Gaza. He accepted multi-million-dollar jets from monarchies, and renamed the Gulf of Mexico. These actions are highly strategic, not to advance the goals of the US, but to make Trump appear stronger. IR as a field rests on an assumption of stability and analysis, where decisions are nuanced and temporally-appropriate. For Trump, chaos becomes a political tool, and confusion creates conditions for him to take control.   Through ego, performance, and chaos, a psychopolitical model emerges through which countries can interpret the actions of President Trump – not as a foreign leader in a traditional sense, but as a spectacle. Classic International Relations theory fails to account for a leader who puts attention over alliances, optics over outcomes, and personal gain over national strategy. For countries like Uzbekistan, using IR as a frame means that it is impossible to understand the actions and motivations of President Trump. His behaviour isn’t simply an anomaly within IR, but something entirely outside of it. To make sense of Trump’s actions, we must go beyond IR and reckon with a broader truth: the traditional playbook is no longer just outdated – it’s irrelevant in a Trump-led world.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

According to the World Food Programme, more than 340 million people in the world today suffer from severe food insecurity. Behind each of these figures are, in fact, specific people. Moreover, almost two million of them are on the verge of starvation, and their condition is qualified as catastrophic. That is, people are currently dying not from disease or old age, but from lack of the most basic things, namely, food.   At the same time, according to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the world wastes about 1 billion tonnes of food per year, or one fifth of all food available to consumers. Food waste not only adds to the problem of hunger, but also causes serious environmental damage. They are responsible for about 10 per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions. Reducing food waste is therefore a key step towards food security, climate protection and resource efficiency.   We highlight that the bulk of food waste (about 60%) is generated by households, with the rest distributed between catering (28%) and retail (12%). In addition, about 13% of food is lost before it reaches the shelves, namely at the stages of harvesting, storage and transport.   Countries around the world, such as Uzbekistan, are increasingly introducing various technological solutions to reduce food waste. Against this background, an important direction, in our opinion, is the strengthening of anthropological factors, such as an ingrained tradition of careful and respectful attitude to food that has existed since ancient times. This has direct relevance to Uzbekistan, where it is not just a cultural peculiarity, but also a part of folk ethics. And today, despite the growth of consumption and urbanisation, it is important to continue to support this attitude in families in our country.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.