Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Richard Marles’ 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue speech marks a notable shift in tone and ambition for Australian defense diplomacy. This past weekend, the International Institute for Strategic Studies hosted the Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD), where high-ranking political and military leaders shared views on pressing security challenges facing the Indo-Pacific. Amid heightened regional tensions and accelerating technological change, Marles used his platform to call for a reimagining of global arms control architecture – one that moves beyond Cold War-era bilateralism and confronts the unique dynamics of a multipolar Indo-Pacific.   Marles’ remarks departed from Australia’s traditionally cautious stance. Rather than deferring to the arms control leadership of great powers, Australia positioned itself as a powerful voice in advocating for a new multilateral framework that integrates nuclear, conventional, and emerging technologies. In doing so, Marles not only reaffirmed Australia’s commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) but also acknowledged its limitations in a security landscape increasingly defined by asymmetric threats, regional power competition, and the erosion of legacy agreements like New START and the INF Treaty.   Historically, Australia has played a supportive but secondary role in global arms control efforts. While it has been committed to the rules-based international order, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Canberra has largely deferred to the US when it comes to shaping arms control norms and enforcement.   For decades, Australian arms control policy could be characterized by three core features: non-proliferation advocacy, alliance alignment, and regional risk management.   First, Australia’s support of non-proliferation has been a pivotal component of its foreign policy. It has consistently championed the NPT as the cornerstone of global nuclear restraint and has taken pride in its status as a non-nuclear weapons state with exemplary compliance under IAEA safeguards. Australia was also instrumental in the establishment of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (Treaty of Rarotonga), and has used significant political capital to urge allies to distance themselves from nuclear weapons.   Second, Australia’s security posture has been tightly tethered to the United States, particularly through the ANZUS and AUKUS alliances. This alignment extended to arms control: Canberra generally supported U.S. positions in bilateral negotiations such as the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (NEW START) and the now-defunct Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. However, it rarely played a direct role in shaping the terms of these agreements, treating arms control as a domain dominated by the trans-Atlantic superpowers.   Finally, Australia’s regional approach has tended to focus on known proliferation risks, primarily North Korea and, to a lesser extent, Iran. Its arms control diplomacy has typically been reactive and risk-based, concerned more with specific threats to regional stability than wider frameworks. This has translated into strong support for sanctions, maritime interdiction of illicit weapons transfers, and efforts to prevent the spread of missile technology in Southeast Asia.   This limited scope reflected Australia’s strategic calculations: as a middle power with strong non-proliferation credentials but no nuclear arsenal, its influence in arms control was best exerted through multilateral compliance and alliance solidarity. The Cold War-era model of bilateral U.S.-Russia negotiations largely shaped the global arms control environment, and Australia operated within that model.   What Marles’ 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue speech suggests, however, is that this traditional posture may no longer be tenable.   Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles’ 2025 address at the Shangri-La Dialogue marks a significant departure from Australia’s historical approach to arms control. Moving beyond Australia’s traditional support role, Marles calls for the development of new frameworks that reflect the geopolitical and technological complexity of the current era.   Marles’ core argument was unambiguous: bilateral arms control, particularly between the U.S. and Russia, is no longer sufficient in a multipolar, tech-driven world. This speech comes in light of Russian military aggression against its neighbors and its invasion of Ukraine, as well as the U.S. increasingly distancing itself from global partnerships. In recent weeks, the Trump administration has imposed a series of isolationist trade measures — including a 10 per cent tariff on all Australian goods and a planned 50 per cent steel and aluminum tariff — signaling a shift away from the liberal economic order it once championed. Simultaneously, cuts to foreign aid and development assistance have left strategic vacuums in regions where U.S. influence was once decisive. As American foreign policy turns inward, Australia appears to be recalibrating its defense diplomacy, recognizing that reliance on a single great power to underwrite regional security is no longer tenable.   While Marles does not explicitly remove the U.S. from the equation – he even references Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s reaffirmation of the Indo-Pacific as America’s strategic priority – his speech subtly signals a growing awareness that U.S. leadership alone is no longer sufficient to guarantee regional stability. Instead, Marles positions Australia as both a contributor to and advocate for a more inclusive and distributed model of security governance. Marles’ call for a multilateral arms control framework thus reflects not just a critique of bilateralism, but also a broader strategic response to a less engaged and less predictable United States.   At the same time, Marles linked traditional arms control to emerging technologies and new domains of warfare, such as cyber, space, and autonomous systems. The framing that ‘traditional arms control frameworks are being surpassed without any established method of control to supplement them’ reflects a recognition that deterrence and escalation risks now extend well beyond nuclear warheads and delivery systems. It also suggests that Australia sees arms control not as a relic of the Cold War, but as a living framework that must evolve in parallel with military modernization.   This is a profound shift. Rather than merely supporting international arms control from the sidelines, Australia is signaling its intention to participate in shaping the rules, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. In invoking both the legacy of the NPT and the need for a new ‘architecture of restraint,’ Marles situates Australia as a middle power prepared to bridge the gap between declining bilateralism and a still-unrealized multilateralism in arms control.   This pivot is also framed as consistent with Australia’s strategic modernization under AUKUS. Marles carefully reaffirmed Australia’s compliance with the NPT, particularly in relation to its acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines. But he also argued that this capability would contribute to regional geostrategic balance – in other words, that Australia’s growing military strength is a stabilizing force. By embedding arms control within broader strategic logic, the speech effectively connects non-proliferation norms with hard power realities.   In sum, the speech advances a new doctrine: arms control as a modern, growing Indo-Pacific security imperative, not just a Cold War inheritance.   Building on his critique of bilateral arms control, Marles outlined a forward-looking vision for a multilateral Indo-Pacific security architecture. Recognizing the unique challenges of this diverse and volatile region, Australia aims to leverage its position as a middle power to facilitate cooperative frameworks that transcend traditional alliances and embrace broader multilateralism.   Central to this vision is the integration of multiple actors and mechanisms. Marles emphasized the importance of working closely with established regional institutions such as ASEAN and the Pacific Islands Forum, while simultaneously reinforcing strategic partnerships like the Quad and AUKUS. This multi-layered approach creates an interconnected web of security cooperation that balances the interests of major powers with those of smaller states.   Importantly, Australia’s push for regional arms control does not seek to undermine its alliance with the United States but rather complements it by encouraging burden-sharing and broader responsibility among Indo-Pacific states. By positioning itself as a convener and mediator, Canberra aims to bridge the gap between U.S. leadership and the diverse interests of regional partners, crafting a global order that is both inclusive and resilient.   Moreover, Australia’s advocacy for an inclusive Indo-Pacific security architecture reflects its recognition of the rising strategic ambitions of regional powers such as China, India, Japan, and Indonesia. Marles’ proposal implicitly acknowledges that durable peace and security require not only U.S.-led initiatives but the active engagement and ownership of these key states. The goal is to build mechanisms where cooperation on arms control can be decoupled from broader geopolitical rivalries, fostering dialogue and mutual restraint even amid competition.   Finally, Marles’ vision signals a more proactive Australian diplomatic posture. Rather than passively adapting to shifting great power dynamics, Australia is positioning itself as an agenda-setter and bridge-builder capable of convening diverse interests and facilitating consensus. This elevates Canberra’s diplomatic profile and reflects a broader trend among middle powers seeking to shape global governance through multilateral institutions tailored to contemporary security challenges.   This strategic recalibration aligns with Australia’s broader defense modernization and diplomatic efforts under the AUKUS framework and the 2024 National Defence Strategy. It reflects Canberra’s understanding that sustainable regional stability will depend on a multilateral ‘architecture of restraint’ that adapts to technological innovation, geopolitical complexity, and the erosion of legacy agreements. In this way, Australia is charting a path from the Cold War’s bilateral arms control legacy toward a more pluralistic, regionally embedded framework for peace and security.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Uzbekistan is steadily moving towards modernisation and becoming one of the main centres of attraction for investment in the Central Asian region. Thus, the IV Tashkent International Investment Forum became an important event not only for the region but also for the global investment community.   The main achievement of the forum was the signing of investment agreements totalling $30.5 billion. This figure is convincing evidence of the trust placed in Uzbekistan by international financial institutions and business circles. Uzbekistan has confirmed its reputation as a reliable and promising partner with transparent economic policies, a favourable investment climate and clear strategic priorities.   The forum also served as a platform for presenting successful reforms in the banking sector, energy, digitalisation, logistics and agriculture. Particular attention was paid to issues of sustainable development, the green economy and enhancing the role of the private sector.   Overall, the organisation of this Forum demonstrated the high level of professionalism and strategic thinking of the country's leadership, aimed at transforming Uzbekistan into a key investment platform in Central Asia. The Tashkent Investment Forum not only strengthened Uzbekistan's position on the global economic map, but also became a symbol of openness, dynamism and foresight in the country's policies.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The issue of Bulgaria’s accession to the eurozone is not merely about meeting macroeconomic indicators or following institutional procedures. It represents a much deeper process – an effort to build trust, resilience, and a strategic identity within the European Union. Since joining the EU in 2007, Bulgaria has often been seen as a peripheral member of the integration project, a perception shaped by prolonged political instability, weak institutions, and susceptibility to external pressures. Yet in 2025, the country appears to have made a determined attempt to challenge this narrative – viewing the adoption of the euro not just as a technical step, but as a political and economic transformation with the potential to redirect its national development path.   On paper, Bulgaria has reason to be optimistic. Public debt stands at around 24% of GDP, the projected budget deficit for 2025 remains within the permissible 3%, and inflation is stabilizing at 2.8% – well aligned with the targets set by the European Central Bank. The lev has long been pegged to the euro, first through a currency board and, since 2020, within the framework of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II). This has ensured exchange rate stability and helped prepare the country for a smoother transition. The Bulgarian Central Bank and government have been working steadily to strengthen fiscal discipline-cutting inefficient spending, tackling the informal economy, and improving tax administration.   However, the challenge lies not only in economic figures. Internal convergence is still far from complete. Issues such as low labor productivity and insufficient digital skills remain major obstacles. For instance, only about one-third of the population possesses basic digital competencies – well below the EU average. This points to a broader issue: without substantial educational and institutional reforms, the country may struggle to adapt to the financial and economic environment that comes with eurozone membership.   Another complicating factor is political instability. The new coalition government, led by Prime Minister Rosen Zhelyazkov, has declared euro integration a top priority. However, the coalition includes parties with radically divergent views, including openly pro-Russian forces. In May 2025, President Rumen Radev proposed a referendum on euro adoption, signaling that even at the highest political level, unity is fragile. Parliament ultimately rejected the initiative, citing Bulgaria’s obligations as an EU member state.   The potential benefits of adopting the euro are considerable – reduced transaction costs, the elimination of exchange rate risks, and access to the deeper financial markets of the eurozone. Over the long term, it could boost investor confidence and make it easier to attract capital into the Bulgarian economy. Domestically, increased competition could help lower prices and build consumer trust. Yet the risks should not be underestimated. A temporary spike in prices is a common side-effect of euro adoption, particularly if retailers engage in price rounding.   Public perception is another critical aspect. According to recent polls, around 70% of Bulgarians either oppose immediate euro adoption or wish to postpone it. Many fear rising prices, loss of economic sovereignty, and increased external influence. These concerns are amplified by disinformation, especially from pro-Russian parties like “Revival”, which actively circulate myths on social media about “confiscation of savings” and other alarmist scenarios. In response, the government has launched consultation processes, opened information centers, and initiated awareness campaigns, but these efforts remain insufficient.   Cultural dimensions must also be considered. For many Bulgarians, the lev is more than just a currency – it is a symbol of national independence. Abandoning it can feel like surrendering economic control to Brussels and the ECB. However, the experiences of other countries, such as the Baltic states and Croatia, suggest that with a well-planned communication strategy, the transition can be relatively smooth. In Croatia, which joined the eurozone in January 2023, inflation rose only moderately, while foreign investment increased.   Bulgaria’s experience is also of relevance to Uzbekistan. Firstly, as Bulgaria becomes a more predictable partner in terms of institutions, macroeconomic governance, and regulatory transparency, it opens promising avenues for deeper cooperation, especially in pharmaceuticals, agri-processing, IT, and light industry. Secondly, Bulgaria could serve as a gateway for Uzbekistan to access the eurozone market through joint ventures, trade offices, and integration into European logistics chains. And thirdly, Bulgaria’s evolving relationship with the ECB offers valuable lessons for Uzbekistan, should it choose to engage more deeply with global financial institutions in the future.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The outlook for the global economy has deteriorated significantly compared to previous forecasts for 2025. Tariff increases and trade policy uncertainty are expected to strain supply chains, raise production costs, and prompt businesses to postpone or reduce investments. This is stated in the information on the global economic situation and prospects published in early June 2025 by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA-UN). Global economic growth is projected to slow to 2.4% in 2025, compared with 2.9% in 2024. At the same time, the growth rate of developed economies will be 1.3% in 2025, compared with 1.8% in 2024, reflecting weakening private investment, trade tensions and ongoing political uncertainty.   DESA-UN predicts an economic downturn in the North American region. Growth in the United States in 2025 will be only 1.6%, which is significantly lower than the 2.8% figure in 2024. In Canada, economic growth is also forecast to decline to 1.6%, which is a decrease from the January forecast of 1.8%. This slowdown is attributed to weakening domestic demand, as increased tariffs raise prices for durable consumer goods, curbing consumption. Tariff incentives under the Agreement between the United States, Mexico and Canada are expected to mitigate some of the negative effects.   The alarming economy of the European Union, which, according to DESA-UN, will grow by only 1.0% in 2025. Major challenges include rising trade barriers, increased political uncertainty, and slowing growth in the United States and China. Most of all, according to forecasts, the prospects have deteriorated for countries that depend on production and have strong trade ties with the United States, such as Germany. Service-oriented countries such as Croatia, Greece, Portugal, and Spain are predicted to be more resilient, driven by high consumer spending and a sustained recovery in the tourism and hospitality industries.   The forecasts of DESA-UN regarding economic growth in the CIS are particularly alarming, where it is expected to slow down sharply - from 4.5% in 2024 to 2.5% in 2025. The Russian economy will grow by only 1.5% due to labor shortages and tight monetary policy. Lower oil and gas prices further worsen the financial prospects of energy exporting countries in the region. Some CIS countries, which are heavily dependent on intermediary trade with Russia, are also facing declining growth prospects.   In the developed countries of the Asia-Pacific region, global trade tensions and slowing external demand worsen economic growth prospects for 2025. Japan’s economy is projected to grow by 0.7%, according to DESA-UN forecasts, as lower consumption continues to put pressure on the economy. The Republic of Korea is experiencing a slow recovery in domestic demand, despite ongoing efforts to ease monetary policy.   According to the forecasts of DESA-UN, the situation in world trade is alarming, which will slow down sharply: trade volume growth will fall to 1.6% in 2025, compared with 3.3% in 2024. Falling prices for key commodities, including oil, industrial metals, and minerals, reflect declining global demand, which creates additional challenges for resource-dependent economies. Trade in services remains resilient, helped by the rapid spread of digital services, which currently account for 14% of global exports. Industries such as education, finance, and healthcare have benefited from the widespread adoption of artificial intelligence.   It is also worrying that at the beginning of 2025, three times as many central banks lowered interest rates. According to DESA-UN, the European Central Bank lowered interest rates amid slowing inflation and stagnating economic growth. Many central banks in developing countries are gradually easing monetary policy as inflation declines. Brazil, however, has raised interest rates to combat persistent inflation.   According to the forecasts of DESA-UN, the fiscal policy of many countries is becoming more and more limited, although the scope of its application varies greatly. The United States has a significant budget deficit, which is projected to exceed 6% of GDP in 2025. Several EU member states are using relaxed budget rules to cover higher defense spending, while China is expanding fiscal incentives to support economic growth. In contrast, most developing countries face high levels of debt and limited fiscal capacity. Government interest payments have increased significantly in most developing countries. The ongoing trade conflict, growing uncertainty and deteriorating global economic conditions are likely to exacerbate the debt problems of developing countries, further limiting their ability to boost economic growth.   Summing up, it should be noted that the weakening of the global economy threatens progress and raises questions. What will these processes lead to in the global economy: a recession or is it the eve of an economic crisis? As we see, slowing growth and declining trade in goods are hindering poverty reduction, increasing inequality, and limiting resources for sustainable development initiatives.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Travelling across Uzbekistan over the past month has brought many surprises, but none more striking, as a filmmaker, than the country’s extraordinary emphasis on video production quality: from student-run social media accounts to educational institutions, music videos, and flight safety videos.   Our initial visits to various universities hinted at the trend of professional media production early on, where even student-organized events like Model United Nations or debates are captured by a multi-person media team with professional broadcast-grade cameras and lighting equipment. For some of the university events that we visited, there was also the presence of state television network stations. As we travelled to regions outside of Tashkent, visiting language learning centers, the trend continued. Even in the less well-funded centers with fewer students and visibly limited teaching resources, the tour always included a visit to the “media corner” with new generation mirrorless cameras, two key lights with softboxes, a set of lapel microphones, and RGB light tubes. These setups, albeit elaborate and requiring a level of professional knowledge to operate, are surprisingly consistent across the regions, despite the clear differences in the centres’ scale and aims.    A collage of stills sampled from various learning centres’ Instagram   Where does this homogeneity in video production come from? Is this the result of smaller businesses following the playbook of established centers to attract businesses? The answer seems to stem from both culture and economy.    Unlike North America, where polished professional content posted on social media, especially vertical video content, is deemed inauthentic, curated, and therefore eschewed, Uzbekistan’s approach to video content mirrors the attitude of East Asia. In China or Japan, people are used to seeing professional cinematography along with livestreams aiming to promote goods, and associate the refined video quality with trust in the product. Prosumer-level cameras produced vertical videos are much more prevalent in Asian countries. A similar logic applies in Uzbekistan: learning centers dedicate considerable energy to their online image, catering to an algorithm and population that favours short-form videos.    Unlike the public schools that we visited, where the administrators and managers are mostly people who are over the age of 30, the newly established language learning centres and private schools are increasingly run by young people. One English educational facility that we visited in Qarshi was independently run by two sisters aged 21 and 17. For them, social media is the primary channel for outreach and enrollment. Multiple owners of these centres attribute most of their marketing conversion success to their professional media presence. Branding is paramount, and with an ever-growing online course market that is offered by these centres, social media promotion will not go away soon. Once a specific formula of enrollment is proven to work, in this case, a professionally-lit person standing in front of an RGB light tube-lit bookshelf explaining the tricks of getting acceptances from selective US universities, others will follow. Through these videos, we can get a peek into the role that social media will play in the future of Uzbekistan’s education system. The entrepreneurial drive is unmistakable, with youths sharing information to help others going through the same challenging paths. Though the potential “generation loss” from over-replication of content production, a phenomenon amplified by the social media platforms, is especially worth watching out for when informing others about education.    Music videos we saw similarly echoed the sentiment of youth to move closer towards American culture. As opposed to Asian, European, and Latin American music videos with distinct feels, most contemporary music videos that currently top the Uzbek chart are produced very much in the same aesthetics as their American counterparts: Grains, film emulation, bold colourful typography, and filled American pop cultural references. But such a trend in youth may not represent the overall cultural leaning of Uzbekistan.    For our return journey to Tashkent, we boarded a flight on Uzbekistan Airways. Flight safety video is always an interesting point of comparison, especially for the flag carriers of nations. The videos form a singular; specific comparison point that condenses the larger cultural direction of the country while telling us how the country wants to represent itself on the world stage for foreign travellers. Comparatively, the style of Uzbekistan Airways’ video sits at an interesting middle ground.    The majority of the wealthy Middle Eastern airlines’ videos, like their country, cater towards a Western cultural sensibility. Qatar Airways includes Kevin Hart as the narrator of their video, with Qatarian cultural elements only as a mosaic in the background. Uzbekistan Airways’ video is still close in style to Western carriers. Like the videos of Air Canada or Air France, each different segment—seat belt, recline, life jacket—is filmed in a different region of the country to showcase the breadth of the country. Demonstrations of the aircraft's safety features are blended into other elements or settings. The overhead bins are handmade Uzbek baskets outside a bazaar, and the illuminated emergency lights are worked into the alley of Shah-i-Zinda.    While Western in form, the video’s core is still deeply Uzbek. Uzbek costumes and music dominate the video throughout. Air Astana’s video offers a very close point of comparison. The safety demonstration film is similarly shot in various locations across Kazakhstan, with demonstrations of safety features integrated into a hybrid setting. However, it feels more Western-focused. As opposed to the traditional music that Uzbekistan Airways uses, Air Astana remixes the cultural music motif with electro-pop, removing a layer of cultural pride felt in the video of Uzbekistan Airways. Sceneries like the Registan Square and the Ayaz Kala draw people in to learn about the culture of Uzbekistan, rather than portraying the country as a hospital wonderland for Western tourists.    Uzbekistan is evolving rapidly. From anecdotal observations and informal conversations on this trip, we can clearly see an overwhelming attraction to American culture in the youth population. Nonetheless, like the larger conversation surrounding the country’s international relations politics, navigating external influence while preserving internal identity will be key. In its media, education, and cultural exports, Uzbekistan stands at a crossroads—and how it chooses to tell its story will shape not only how it is seen by the world, but how this and the next generation sees itself.    * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The International Monetary Fund’s report (“World Economic Outlook: A Critical Juncture amid Policy Shifts”) presented very interesting historical facts, estimates and forecasts of the global economy in 2025 and 2026.   According to the IMF forecast, global growth rates will be lower and will be in the range of 2.8% in 2025 and 3% in 2026, compared with the level of 3.3%, which was predicted for both years back in January 2025. Growth in advanced economies is expected to reach 1.4% in 2025, while growth in the United States may slow to 1.8% due to increased uncertainty about economic policy, trade tensions and weakening demand dynamics. Economic growth in the euro area will also slow down by 0.2% to 0.8%. In emerging and developing economies, growth will slow to 3.7% in 2025 and 3.9% in 2026. At the same time, growth is expected to decline significantly for the countries most affected by recent trade measures, such as China. Global overall inflation is projected to decline slightly more slowly than expected in January 2025, reaching 4.3% in 2025 and 3.6% in 2026. At the same time, the forecast for 2025 has been significantly adjusted upward for advanced economies, while it has been slightly lowered for emerging and developing countries. Governments of advanced economies are also expected to tighten fiscal policy on average in 2025-26 and, to a lesser extent, in 2027.   As noted in the IMF report, a rapid escalation of trade tensions and an extremely high level of uncertainty in global politics will have a significant impact on global economic activity. The forecast is dominated by the position that further increased uncertainty in trade policy may lead to an even greater slowdown in global economic growth in the short and long term. Thus, global trade growth is expected to slow down to 1.7 percentage points in 2025. This forecast reflects the strengthening of tariff restrictions affecting trade flows.   The IMF forecasts that growth in Central Asia will accelerate from an estimated 2.4 percent in 2024 to 3.0 percent in 2025 and 3.5 percent in 2026. GDP growth in Central Asian countries is projected as follows: in Kazakhstan in 2025 – 4.9%, in 2026 – 4.3%; Kyrgyzstan in 2025 – 6.8%, in 2026 – 5.3%; Tajikistan in 2025 – 6.7%, in 2026 – 5.0%; Turkmenistan in 2025 – 2.3%, in 2026 – 2.3%; Uzbekistan in 2025 – 5.9%, in 2026 – 5.8%.   In connection with the emerging trends in the global economy, the IMF in its report calls for prudent actions and increased cooperation, emphasizing that the first priority should be to restore stability in trade policy and develop mutually beneficial agreements. According to the IMF, the global economy needs a clear and predictable trading system that addresses long-standing weaknesses in international trade rules, including the widespread use of non-tariff barriers or other trade-distorting measures. This will require improved cooperation.   Summing up, it should be noted that the situation in the global economy has changed dramatically, and government agencies in almost many countries are reviewing the priorities of their foreign and domestic economic policies.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.