By Fayziddin Qutbiddinov   The latest SCO summit, held in China in 2025, represents an important stage in the development of multilateral diplomacy in Eurasia. Against the backdrop of intensifying competition among global and major powers and the transformation of the international order, the meeting of SCO member state leaders takes on significant effect, both in terms of regional security and economic relations. Although the SCO summit is positioned as a mechanism to strengthen regional cooperation, in Western political circles the process is often perceived as a tool for bolstering the influence of Russia and China on the Eurasian continent.   According to preliminary statements by NATO Secretary General M. Rutte, NATO points to the growing role of China, Iran, and North Korea in their relations with the collective West, expanding defence cooperation to signal readiness for permanent confrontation with the Western alliance, while simultaneously forcing the transatlantic countries into a long and exhausting confrontation. Based on these assessments, he emphasized that the model of the war in Ukraine could be replicated on other fronts, escalating tensions between the Western bloc and the so-called alliance of autocracies.   According to DW’s analysis, the option proposed by China to enhance regional and international cooperation does not provide absolute guarantees to allies in the implementation of economic and trade agreements, leaving room for flexible interpretation and potential disagreements over the execution of key provisions.   Sinologist A. Chigadayev noted that Kim Jong-un’s visit to China was perceived not only as a political trip, but also as a signal of the legitimacy of his power on the international stage, strengthening his authority in meetings with leaders of major powers. China is North Korea’s key strategic partner in regional security, and the visit demonstrated that the North Korean leader’s regime remains stable and is supported by a strong ally.   Particular attention should be paid to the fact that the SCO summit in China is perceived by a broad Western audience as a strategic move by Beijing to consolidate its role as a competing global leader. China does not limit itself to promoting its own model of economic and political development, the ‘Chinese path’, but actively uses the summit as a platform for shaping new vectors of regional and international cooperation. This is confirmed by the participation of strong regional players, including Russia, India, and other key Eurasian states, which demonstrates the willingness of major regional powers to align with Chinese investment initiatives and strategic projects. Moreover, the summit enables China not only to strengthen its influence in the process of developing joint regional decisions, but also to shape norms and rules that may compete with the existing international standards promoted by Western powers.   Thus, the summit serves as an instrument for legitimizing China’s leadership on the world stage, signalling Beijing’s readiness to actively participate in creating a parallel world order and building the global architecture of contemporary politics. This, in turn, compels the West to closely monitor China’s actions and to develop strategies for engagement with Eurasia.   Alongside expanding its international influence at the summit, China also sought to underscore the technological leadership of its military. According to Carlotta Rinaudo of the International Security Studies Group (Verona), the military showcase in Beijing went beyond a traditional display and turned into a futuristic spectacle. China demonstrated the potential of its armed forces to combine human capabilities with robotic systems, outlining technological leadership in future warfare—while also boosting the domestic prestige of the military and sending a signal to the international community about the country’s growing strategic potential.   Developing this idea, analysts stressed that the vacuum of influence caused by the hesitancy of the American leader created conditions for stronger regional and strategic ties between China and Russia. A vivid confirmation of this is the growth of trade turnover between the two countries, the conclusion of economic agreements, and the implementation of transport projects carried out jointly in the early years of Joe Biden’s presidency.   According to Pete Hegseth, Washington’s main task is to maintain strategic superiority in the military domain, on land, at sea, in the air, and even in space, where the U.S. leads by outpacing competitors through the import of high-tech weaponry and innovative defence systems. At the same time, he noted that Donald Trump had constructive and working relations with Xi Jinping.” These contacts, in his view, could serve as a foundation for seeking opportunities for cooperation and reducing tensions, despite the ongoing strategic rivalry between Washington and Beijing.   In conclusion, the participation of China’s strong regional and strategic partners and the confirmation of their readiness not only to deepen bilateral and multilateral ties, but also to create alternative forms of international cooperation at the SCO summit, to some extent, indicates that this has generated considerable resonance within the Western political and expert community. At the same time, we see that some experts view this event rather sceptically, describing it merely as another occasion for taking photographs.   As Western experts understand it, the summit demonstrated the determination of Eurasian states to place their stake on strengthening mutually beneficial cooperation and building new economic and political architectures capable of competing with Western institutions. Moreover, it confirmed the growing role of China and its strategic partners in international politics, where they are increasingly claiming the status of independent centers of power capable of influencing the formation of a new world order.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

On September 22, President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev met with Director-General of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala in New York to discuss issues related to Uzbekistan's accession to the WTO. The WTO chief noted the significant progress made by Uzbekistan and expressed hope that all accession procedures would be completed by March 2026.   Uzbekistan applied for WTO membership in 1994. However, in 2005, the accession process was suspended due to the import substitution policy in place at the time. The process resumed in March 2018 after an official application was submitted to the WTO Secretariat. Today, Uzbekistan is at an advanced stage of the accession process. The country plans to join the WTO before the start of the 14th Ministerial Conference, which will be held in Cameroon in 2026. Bilateral negotiations have been completed and market access protocols have been signed with 29 countries. According to Azizbek Urunov, the president’s representative on WTO issues, only three countries remain to fully complete bilateral negotiations. Uzbekistan is actively pursuing reforms aimed at bringing national legislation into line with WTO requirements. These reforms concern the areas of trade in goods, services, intellectual property, and agriculture.   Uzbekistan’s accession to the WTO will accelerate market reforms, increase the predictability of national economic policy, and create the conditions for growth in exports and investment and increased economic productivity. However, in light of increased protectionism on the part of the world's leading economies and the unfolding of trade wars, many experts are skeptical about the future of the multilateral trading system. According to Michael Froman, president of the US Council on Foreign Relations, “The global trading system as we knew it is dead. The WTO has effectively ceased to function because it is unable to negotiate, monitor, or enforce the commitments of its member countries”.   As an alternative to the current multilateral trade regulation system, he proposes “building a new system around open plurilateralism: coalitions of countries that have common interests in certain areas and come together to adopt high standards on specific issues, while remaining open to other countries that share these interests and are willing to implement such standards”. Froman notes that the advantages of the new system are its flexibility and adaptability. At the same time, the proposed system is inferior to the current one in terms of economic efficiency, since its benefits will be distributed only among the participating countries. There is also a risk of a “spaghetti effect” arising from the fact that the same countries may be parties to different plurilateral agreements and have conflicting obligations. Despite these shortcomings, Froman believes that such a network may prove to be more politically stable than a multilateral trading system.   In her speech at a meeting organized by the Peterson Institute for International Economics (USA), WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala emphasized that while many have already declared the “death of the WTO”, others see this as an opportunity to build a stronger and more sustainable trading system. Despite the disruption of global trade due to unilateral measures, the WTO “remains alive”. Before the rise of protectionism by the US and the introduction of retaliatory measures by other countries, 80% of world trade was conducted on the basis of most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment. Currently, this figure has fallen to 72%. At the same time, 75% of world trade in goods is still conducted under WTO terms, which demonstrates the resilience of the multilateral system in times of global uncertainty.   The WTO Director-General noted the need to reform the WTO system to make it more flexible. “My agenda for the next term is to preserve what works, reform what doesn’t, and look to the future by creating new rules and agreements to increase the benefits of international trade”, she emphasized.   Despite the current tensions in global trade, a multilateral agreement on fisheries, ratified by 114 WTO member countries, has come into force for the first time in eight years, demonstrating their commitment to achieving sustainable development through the establishment of new trade rules. At the same time, active work is underway within the WTO platform to conclude a number of plurilateral agreements, for example, in the field of e-commerce. In other words, coalitions of member countries are being formed within the WTO to conclude new agreements aimed at addressing specific issues. According to Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, some WTO members are concerned about the focus on concluding plurilateral agreements, as they may undermine the significance of multilateral agreements. She stressed that there is no need to fear this, as there is a need for a “basket of different tools” to increase the flexibility and resilience of the WTO. Therefore, coalitions of different countries are welcome in the WTO; they do not create a parallel system, but complement the existing mechanism.   The WTO Secretary-General noted that the global trading system was created to ensure the interdependence of countries and has proven its effectiveness over the past 80 years. In particular, as a result of the development of global trade based on transparent regulatory rules, more than 1.5 billion people have been lifted out of absolute poverty. It is now important to ensure the sustainable development of the global economy with a focus on reducing “over-dependence” on individual suppliers and markets. Therefore, the WTO supports the creation of coalitions of members aimed at reducing “over-dependence” and decentralizing supply chains with the broad involvement of countries with relatively low incomes.   Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala expressed her hope that at the Fourteenth Ministerial Conference in Cameroon, WTO member countries would reach a consensus and adopt a package of key reforms that would strengthen the effectiveness of the multilateral trading system. By becoming a full member of the WTO, Uzbekistan will be able to contribute to the improvement of international trade rules, taking into account national interests for the benefit of the prosperity of the people. Uzbekistan’s strategic goal is not only to join the WTO as a new member, but also to become an initiator of the renewal of its rules. The WTO remains the most effective platform for establishing “rules of the game”, and plurilateralism is a key tool for their rapid improvement. The country’s task is to skillfully use these resources to achieve sustainable development and protect its national interests.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s address at the 80th session of the UN General Assembly signaled a qualitative shift in Central Asia’s path toward regional consolidation. His statement that the region has “transformed from a space of closed borders and unresolved disputes into a zone of peace, good-neighborliness, and partnership” carries not only symbolic, but also practical significance.   Since 2017, the region has achieved results once deemed unattainable. Over eight years, the volume of mutual trade, investment, and transport flows has increased fivefold. Joint investment funds and cross-border trade zones have been established, industrial cooperation mechanisms developed, and major infrastructure projects launched. For the international community, Central Asia now exemplifies how political will and regional solidarity can reshape an entire geopolitical landscape.   Equally important is the emergence of a new regional identity. For the first time in its modern history, Central Asia is positioning itself not as an object of external strategies, but as an autonomous subject of international relations. This is reflected in the growth of regional agency, the articulation of a common agenda, and the advancement of initiatives generated from within the region itself.   Particular weight in President Mirziyoyev’s address was given to practical proposals: holding an international forum on Central Asian economic development under the auspices of ECOSOC and UNCTAD; establishing a regional hub for green technologies in partnership with UNIDO; developing joint programs on the rational use of water resources and demographic sustainability. These initiatives align seamlessly with the global sustainable development agenda and demonstrate the region’s readiness not only to address its own challenges, but also to contribute to resolving issues of global concern.   Of strategic importance is the proposal to adopt a UN General Assembly resolution supporting the efforts of Central Asian states to deepen regional partnership and economic integration. Such a resolution would consolidate the achievements of recent years at the level of international law and further strengthen the region’s standing as a zone of sustainable peace and development.   In sum, Central Asia is entering an era of implementation. The region has moved from symbolic declarations to tangible outcomes and concrete initiatives, shaping its own model of consolidation while steadily expanding its influence on international processes.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Azerbaijan is strengthening its political and economic ties with the Taliban government by playing an active role in creating and developing promising transport routes to South Asia. At the forefront is the Lapis Lazuli Corridor, launched in 2018 through a joint initiative of Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Georgia and Turkmenistan, similar to the ancient route of the Great Silk Road.   On July 2, 2025, on the sidelines of the Economic Cooperation Organization summit in Khankendi, Azerbaijan, Abdul Ghani Baradar, Afghanistan’s Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs, met with Azerbaijani Prime Minister Ali Asadov. They emphasized Baku’s readiness to increase export and import volumes with Afghanistan. They also discussed prospects for developing deliveries in the South Asia-Caucasus-Europe direction. This would involve expanding the Lapis Lazuli Corridor to Pakistan and India, enabling participants to attract transit cargo from India and the EU. Trade between these two economic giants has grown steadily and reached $137 billion in 2024.   However, the transit corridor from Europe to India via the South Caucasus, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan could threaten the viability of the Belarus-Russia-Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-Indian Ocean ports multimodal corridor suggested by Uzbekistan. This initiative is linked to the Trans-Afghan Railway project (also known as the Kabul Corridor), which would run from Termez to Naibabad, Maidanshahr, Logar and Kharlachi, with a projected carrying capacity of up to 20 million tons per year. If the Lapis Lazuli Corridor is activated in an expanded version, Tashkent risks losing these flows, as the cargo will bypass the country.   It is highly probable that the Lapis Lazuli Corridor will be integrated with the western Trans-Afghan Railway along the Torghundi-Herat-Kandahar-Spin Buldak route. This route is being promoted by Ashgabat and Astana as an alternative to the Kabul Corridor, which would also conflict with Uzbekistan’s interests.   Russia may be seriously interested in the Lapis Lazuli Corridor, particularly given that Moscow has already announced its intention to establish a connection with Afghanistan via the Caspian Sea, making use of Turkmenistan’s port and railway infrastructure.   To maintain and increase its competitive advantages in the trans-Eurasian and trans-Afghan transport sectors, Uzbekistan must strengthen its coordination with neighbouring partner countries, including Azerbaijan, regarding transport and transit issues. Consideration should be given to extending the Middle Corridor to Afghanistan via Uzbekistan, with the possibility of continuing the route to Pakistan through the Kabul Corridor.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In global politics, the words and actions of major powers are often the first to be scrutinized, which can foster a misleading perception of their outsized role in advancing key decisions and initiatives. Yet this is not always the case. Smaller states, too, are capable of setting the tone on the international agenda. A vivid example of this was seen at the anniversary summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Tianjin, China.   The Central Asian states form the very core of the SCO. At their current stage of development, they are emerging as responsible actors in international relations, increasingly aware of the need to pool efforts in building a shared regional destiny. The first signs of this long-anticipated regional cohesion can be discerned in the remarkable alignment of positions on pressing foreign-policy issues.   At the Tianjin summit, the leaders of the Central Asian states spoke with remarkable unanimity on strengthening regional security, dismantling trade barriers, harnessing water, energy and transit potential more effectively, and attracting investment to promising sectors of industrial production — including the extraction and processing of critical minerals. Importantly, these priorities were articulated not from a position of petitioning for support, but from one of agency and initiative. Hence the bold and forward-looking ideas placed on the table before the larger “Shanghai family”. One proposal in particular deserves closer attention.   The President of Uzbekistan advanced the initiative of creating a unified SCO transport space — in essence, a call for an extensive network of digitalized transport corridors linking all SCO members, irrespective of geography.   At the heart of this significant initiative lies a structural challenge: the fragmented integration of road and railway networks among SCO countries. For instance, India and Pakistan — the largest states in South Asia and full members of the SCO — lack direct access to Central Asia and to the northern latitudes of Eurasia, such as Russia and Belarus. Existing routes between these macro-regions are prohibitively long and costly, significantly constraining trade flows.   Consider also the case of Iran. As a pivotal actor in Eurasia’s transit architecture and a participant in the Southern Railway Corridor linking East and Central Asia with Europe, Iran nevertheless remains insufficiently integrated into the transport networks of the Central Asian republics — and more broadly, the CIS space, many of whose members are part of the SCO. Divergent transport regulations, shipping documentation, technical standards, and border-customs regimes undermine the effective functioning of interregional transport corridors, with predictable negative consequences.   Uzbekistan is preparing to operationalize the Trans-Afghan (Kabul) Corridor — the Termez–Naybabad–Maidanshahr–Logar–Kharlachi route — envisioned as a transport bridge connecting Europe, China and South Asia. This project is expected to dovetail with the ambitious China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan high-mountain railway and the Northern Corridor. Together, they will dramatically expand the export and transit capacity of Central Asian states, securing long-sought direct rail access to the Indian Ocean ports.   Preliminary estimates indicate that Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan could attract an additional transit flow of up to 20 million tons annually, while Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan could receive as much as 5 million tons per year. To prepare for such a prospect, Uzbekistan is already urging SCO partners to institutionalize the concept of a unified transport space. Its realization would ostensibly fall under the purview of the Council for the Integration of Railway Spaces of SCO Countries, the establishment of which — with headquarters in Tashkent — was proposed a year ago.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The visit of Japanese Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya to Central Asian states was closely linked to Tokyo’s domestic political and economic agenda. The trip was seen as a preparatory stage for the C5+Japan summit and was intended to give new substance to Japan’s engagement with the region.   Amid growing competition from China, Russia, Turkey, and the EU, Japan seeks to emphasize its willingness to remain a significant partner for Central Asia, relying on economic diplomacy, technological cooperation, and support for structural reforms. A key factor is economic security policy, which has been a central element of Japan’s strategy since 2022. The Economic Security Promotion Act is forcing Tokyo to seek more reliable sources of critical minerals, which determines the importance of cooperation with Uzbekistan for Japan. Tokyo seeks to guarantee long-term access to strategic raw materials, primarily metals for battery production and renewable energy.   Japanese diplomacy is currently characterized by a desire to “make up for lost time”, which highlights the weakness of the country’s political leadership against a backdrop of internal instability and declining popularity of the prime minister. According to experts, the visit yielded important results in the form of agreements in the fields of industry, energy, and logistics, as well as the establishment of a Strategic Dialogue between the foreign ministers.   In its official releases, Japan’s Foreign Ministry notes that Uzbekistan is showing steady economic growth and that bilateral relations with Japan have strengthened significantly, especially after the Uzbek president’s visit to Japan in December 2019.   The launch of the new Strategic Dialogue format sets an institutionalized and predictable rhythm of interaction, which increases the stability of Japan’s relations with Central Asia and forms a coordination mechanism, including the preparation of the agenda for the upcoming C5+Japan summit.   Thanks to the agreements reached, Uzbekistan’s potential for receiving development assistance and access to advanced technologies is expanding. The project in the Surkhandarya region is forming a model of “human security + green growth” that can be scaled up in the Aral Sea region, Fergana, and Kashkadarya.   In addition, the potential for developing educational and humanitarian cooperation is gaining momentum. In particular, scholarship programs, Japanese language studies, and academic exchanges are opening up new opportunities for Uzbek universities to expand dual degree programs and specialist training. The establishment of the first Japanese university in Tashkent will form the basis for long-term cooperation and training personnel for joint initiatives.   Practical steps to maximize the results of the visit cover several areas. It seems appropriate to put forward new initiatives at the C5+Japan summit to deepen cooperation with Japan in areas such as green transport corridors, energy, smart cities, visa programs for IT specialists and engineers, and the organization of a forum on critical minerals.   Thus, Takeshi Iwaya’s visit confirmed Japan’s increased interest in Central Asia and underscored Uzbekistan’s strategic role in supply chains, sustainable development, and humanitarian initiatives. Institutionalizing dialogue, accelerating pilot projects, and establishing the first Japanese university in Tashkent will allow Japan to maximize the results of its diplomatic activity.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.