Co-authored with Bositkhon Islamov , UWED undergraduate, intern at IAIS
Kazakhstan’s policy towards Afghanistan is entering a phase of accelerated economic and institutional engagement. Without formally recognizing the government established by the Taliban movement, Astana is consistently expanding diplomatic contacts, trade mechanisms, transport projects, and sectoral cooperation. The visit to Kabul on 19–21 June 2026 by a Kazakh delegation led by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Economy Serik Zhumangarin represented the most concentrated manifestation of this course. The signing of 25commercial agreements supplemented approximately 20 arrangements worth USD 140 million reached in April2025. Kazakhstan is thus moving from isolated contacts towards a multi-level model of presence encompassing trade, transport, raw-material extraction, education, technology, and security.
The political foundation of Kazakhstan’s course lies in normalizing relations without formal recognition. Astana seeks to separate the question of the Taliban government’s status under international law from the practical necessity of engaging with Afghanistan’s de facto authorities. In December 2023, the Taliban movement was removed from Kazakhstan’s national list of terrorist organizations, eliminating the principal domestic legal restrictions on official contacts. As early as April of the same year, representatives of the new Afghan authorities assumed control of the Afghan embassy building in Astana. These decisions established the political basis for a transition from cautious dialogue to regular interagency and economic engagement.
This model allows Kazakhstan to remain aligned with the broader position of the international community while avoiding being outpaced by other regional states in access to the Afghan market. As a result, non-recognition ceases to be an obstacle to practical cooperation and becomes a form of political distance that enables Astana to minimize reputational and sanctions-related risks.
The trade strategy is primarily aimed at consolidating Afghanistan as a market for Kazakh products. In 2025, bilateral trade amounted to USD 541.8 million, of which USD 519 million was attributable to Kazakh exports and only USD 22.8 million to imports from Afghanistan. This imbalance persisted in the first quarter of 2026: of USD 242.6 million in mutual trade, USD 240.1 million was generated by Kazakhstan’s exports.
Supplies consist mainly of wheat, flour, vegetable oil, medicines, and other mass-consumption goods. The opening of a Kazakhstan trade house in Herat demonstrates an intention to move from episodic transactions to a permanent infrastructure for promoting products. However, the jointly declared target of increasing trade turnover to USD 3 billion appears excessively ambitious without an expansion of Afghan exports, the development of payment mechanisms, and lower transport costs. The current model makes Afghanistan dependent on Kazakh supplies, while the Afghan market’s limited purchasing power simultaneously constrains the sustainability of trade.
The transport dimension forms part of a broader strategy to diversify Kazakhstan’s external routes.Constraints along northern corridors, geopolitical tensions surrounding Russia, and the risk of secondary sanctions are increasing Astana’s interest in obtaining access to South Asian ports. In this context, Afghan territory is viewed as a potential link connecting Kazakhstan with Pakistan, India, the Middle East, and the Indian Ocean.
The most advanced initiative is the Torghundi–Herat railway project, with a prospective extension through Kandahar to Spin Boldak and the Pakistani border. In parallel, Kazakhstan is participating in the development of the Khaf–Herat section and discussing general principles for establishing a railway connection between Central and South Asia. The strategic value of these routes lies not only in expanding exports, but also in reducing dependence on a limited number of transit corridors.
At the same time, these projects require substantial investment, international financing, and long-term security guarantees. In the short term, they therefore remain instruments of strategic positioning rather than full-fledged alternatives to existing routes.
Uzbekistan’s geographical advantage limits the autonomy of Kazakhstan’s Afghanistan policy. Unlike Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan shares a border with Afghanistan and possesses the Termez–Hairatan bridge, functioning railway infrastructure, and stable channels for electricity supplies. In 2025, Uzbek–Afghan trade reached USD 1.68 billion, substantially exceeding Kazakhstan’s figures.
For Astana, this creates a dual situation. On the one hand, Uzbekistan’s growing role intensifies competition for the Afghan market and influence over future transport corridors. On the other hand, Kazakhstan cannot secure direct access to Afghanistan without using Uzbek or Turkmen infrastructure. Consequently, its strategy will inevitably combine competitive ambitions with transit cooperation. Kazakhstan may claim the role of a major supplier and investor, but not full control over the logistical architecture of the Central Asia–South Asia corridor.
Mining cooperation is shaping a potential model of “Afghan raw materials–Kazakh processing.” Afghanistan possesses substantial reserves of copper, zinc, chromium, lithium, rare-earth metals, and natural stone; however, weak infrastructure and prolonged instability have constrained their industrial development. Kazakhstan, with its mining companies, engineering expertise, and processing capacity, seeks to occupy the niche between initial exploration and advanced processing.
A visit by specialists from Tau-Ken Samruk to the Pami-Kakrak deposit in Bamyan Province, followed by sample analysis by Kazzinc enterprises, demonstrated the possibility of processing Afghan ore in Kazakhstan. The potential participation of ERG, Kazakhmys Barlau, and other companies in geological exploration and deposit development is also under discussion. Such an arrangement reduces the need to construct costly processing facilities in Afghanistan while providing Kazakh industry with an additional raw-material base. Its implementation, however, will depend on security guarantees, transparent licensing, and investment protection.
Educational and technological projects are being used as instruments of long-term presence.Kazakhstan provides scholarships to Afghan students in medicine, agriculture, and engineering. The establishment of a joint centre for water-resource management, irrigation, and sustainable farming expands cooperation in an area of critical importance to Afghanistan’s food security.
An additional area is the promotion of Kazakh technological solutions, including the HES-7 mobile diagnostic platform. Such initiatives enable Astana to build durable professional ties with Afghan institutions and consolidate its position in sectors where the geographical advantage of neighbouring countries is less significant. The location in Kazakhstan of the UN Regional Centre for the Sustainable Development Goals for Central Asia and Afghanistan also strengthens its claim to a regional coordinating role.
Security cooperation remains a necessary precondition for economic rapprochement. Contacts with the leadership of Afghanistan’s Ministry of Interior focus on countering drug trafficking, extremism, and transnational crime. The training of Afghan canine specialists in Kazakhstan and the establishment of direct links between the relevant agencies reflect a shift towards limited practical cooperation. At the same time, Astana avoids formats that could be interpreted as a full-fledged security partnership or as political legitimation of the Taliban government.
Conclusion. Kazakhstan is moving from cautious political engagement with Afghanistan towards institutionally structured economic expansion without formally recognizing the Taliban government. Astana simultaneously seeks access to the Afghan market and resources, the development of southern transport corridors, and the consolidation of long-term influence through education and technology. The implementation of this strategy, however, is constrained by geographical dependence on neighboring states, the Afghan market’s limited purchasing power, sanctions-related risks, and Uzbekistan’s advantages.
* The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.
