This policy brief by Aziza Mukhammedova and co-author Jalal Ud Din Kakar situates the debate over the Bagram Air Base within the post-withdrawal landscape of Afghanistan. Four years after the U.S. exit, President Donald Trump’s 2025 remarks about “taking back” Bagram reflect enduring U.S. anxieties over China’s rise and the loss of a strategic foothold on the rim of Central and South Asia. The authors trace the intellectual lineage of this idea to Rep. Michael Waltz’s 2021 warnings that abandoning Bagram would forfeit unique leverage vis-à-vis China, Russia’s south, Iran, and nuclear-armed Pakistan – an argument Trump later amplified, albeit with overstated geography.

 

They underline Bagram’s dual identity: once a Soviet-built, U.S.-expanded mega-hub with dual runways and tens of thousands of personnel; now a symbol of Taliban authority and of Washington’s hurried exit. Any restoration of U.S. control collides with blunt Taliban red lines – publicly articulated by defense chief Fasihuddin Fitrat – and the group’s broader narrative of sovereignty. While Afghanistan’s economic freefall, aid dependence, and asset freezes create theoretical bargaining chips (humanitarian relief, sanctions relief, travel waivers), the authors caution that such concessions risk legitimizing an internationally isolated regime and entrenching rights abuses, especially against women.

 

A second strategic constraint is China’s expanding presence. Beijing’s early diplomatic normalization, investment signals, and interest in Afghanistan’s resource endowment reduce Western leverage and offer the Taliban alternatives to U.S. engagement. Pakistan’s role further narrows Washington’s room for maneuver: Islamabad’s ties to both Beijing and the Taliban make support for a U.S. return to Bagram strategically costly, even if it could theoretically exert pressure.

 

The brief concludes that retaking Bagram is highly implausible without far-reaching political compromises that Washington may find unacceptable. More broadly, the episode is a proxy for the U.S.–China contest across the region. Practical policy, the authors imply, lies less in resurrecting a base than in calibrated diplomacy, targeted humanitarian and economic tools, and coordination with regional actors that preserves influence without conferring de facto recognition on the Taliban.

 

Read on World Geostrategic Insights

 

Jalal Ud Din Kakar is a Research Fellow at the Center for Security Strategy and Policy Research and PhD International Relations scholar at the School of Integrated Social Sciences, University of Lahore, Pakistan.

 

* The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.