The modern architecture of European security, which for decades has been based on American guarantees and the concept of the “end of history”, is today undergoing significant transformation. Recent years’ events have demonstrated that the era of minimal defense spending under the protection of transatlantic partnership is passing through a period of substantial change.
The transformation of the global order, characterized by shifts in the balance of power among great powers, poses important strategic questions for the European Union. The situation is complicated by the fact that the United States, in its 2025 National Security Strategy, called to “resist Europe’s current course”, while the introduction of trade tariffs on partners has shown the need to revise existing agreements.
Even while maintaining formal commitments under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, US strategic priorities are shifting toward managing competition with China.
To ensure its security and protect citizens’ interests, Europe should transition to a more active role in defense matters, developing its own integrated military potential. The historically established European dependence on the US in defense matters has created a dangerous illusion of security, which has led to the degradation of national armed forces and deep fragmentation of the military-industrial complex. The role of the United States in the European security system has traditionally been highly significant, including not only the provision of security guarantees but also the provision of critically important capabilities without which European armed forces have limited capacity to conduct prolonged high-intensity operations. This refers to strategic intelligence, satellite communications, aerial refueling, and heavy transport aviation.
The conflict in Ukraine revealed that European militaries, structured for expeditionary missions and crisis response, must strengthen their capacity for high-intensity warfare, where scale of production, logistics, and resilient procurement matter as much as technology. Even if the conflict stabilizes, Europe still needs a robust security system: Russia continues to expand its military potential, which requires constant readiness along NATO‘s eastern flank.
As long as European security relies on American guarantees, projects aimed at European defense autonomy face limits. Against this backdrop, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz announced talks with French President Emmanuel Macron and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer on extending French and British nuclear deterrence guarantees to the European level. This move shifts what was once a theoretical debate about the “Europeanization” of nuclear forces into practical policy.
Analysis of the current state of EU countries’ capabilities in conventional weapons reveals a fundamental paradox: with total military spending exceeding 290 billion euros, Europe’s actual combat readiness remains low. Despite NATO countries agreeing to increase spending to 3.5% of GDP by 2035, the financial component alone cannot solve the structural problem.
The significant US defense budget, approaching 1 trillion dollars, allows Washington to invest in research and development (R&D) amounts comparable to the combined military budgets of the largest European countries. This creates a situation of technological gap, where the acquisition of American weapons often becomes a preferable solution for Europe in terms of cost-effectiveness.
The main opportunity for improving the efficiency of European approaches is connected with strengthening coordination and eliminating duplication of functions at the national level. The main constraint remains the institutional architecture of the EU: defense decisions still require consensus, and differences in strategic cultures (from Polish mobilization logic to Southern European priorities in the Mediterranean) create certain complexities for unified planning.
Each state seeks to preserve its own industrial base, which leads to small production runs and weak economies of scale. National defense ministries often resist deeper integration to protect existing structures and domestic contracts. Experts estimate that the lack of integration costs Europe €25–30 billion annually, while joint procurement could reduce rearmament costs by half. For comparison: if the US operates one main type of battle tank, the M1 Abrams, European countries’ armies have seventeen different types. A similar situation is observed regarding infantry fighting vehicles, artillery systems, and aviation.
Such diversity of armaments creates logistical challenges, complicating joint operations without additional coordination and support, which requires attention given the US shift in focus toward the Indo-Pacific region. The fifth-generation F-35 fighter program is an illustrative example. Large-scale purchases of this aircraft by Germany, Poland, and the Netherlands mean technological dependence on American partners. By acquiring the F-35, European countries gain access to an advanced digital ecosystem, which provides a high level of technological capabilities while maintaining a certain interdependence.
Meanwhile, approximately 78% of all defense procurement by European countries over the past two years has been directed to external suppliers, predominantly American companies through the Foreign Military Sales mechanism. This reflects the competitiveness of the American defense industry, but also points to the need to develop the European technological base to ensure greater balance. The conflict in Ukraine has shown the importance of diversifying supply sources: European production faced difficulties in making up the deficit of 155mm caliber shells, while high-tech systems such as HIMARS, Patriot missiles, and real-time intelligence came predominantly from American partners. This underscores the importance of developing indigenous production capabilities to enhance the resilience of the European security system.
Fragmented procurement reduces economic efficiency and burdens national budgets. Today, defense also functions as industrial policy: production of munitions, drones, cyber defense systems, and space-based intelligence can sustain Europe’s broader technological competitiveness.
The current geopolitical environment forces Europe to rethink the foundations of transatlantic relations, as the concept of burden-sharing gains practical meaning. Budget constraints in the United States may reshape American military presence across regions. The European Union faces a choice: deepen defense integration and strengthen its role as an autonomous security actor, or maintain the current model of dependence on external support.
By building more integrated defense structures, the EU can create effective coordination mechanisms. A first step could involve forming Rapid Deployment Forces numbering 50,000–100,000 personnel, with major contributions from countries such as Spain and Italy. These forces would operate under unified command and coordinate with Eastern European militaries. Financial integration would support this process, including potential European defense bonds to fund long-term innovation.
For genuine autonomy, Europe should integrate procurement and intelligence cooperation by establishing a unified EU intelligence coordination service and a European Security Council that includes the United Kingdom. A symbolic step could involve appointing a European general as Supreme Commander of joint forces in Europe, reflecting Europe’s growing responsibility for its own defense.
Such measures find public support: according to polls, only 19% of Europeans fully trust their national armies, while 60% positively evaluate the idea of pan-European defense structures. Political will for such changes is gradually forming: leading politicians are actively discussing the possibility of transferring part of procurement coordination powers to the supranational level.
The path to strategic autonomy will require European leaders to balance national interests and collective security goals. A more independent Europe can become a more effective and predictable partner for the US, capable of independently solving stabilization tasks in neighboring regions, thereby allowing American partners to concentrate resources on global priorities. The development of European military potential is viewed not as a weakening of transatlantic partnership but as a way to strengthen it through more balanced distribution of responsibility. On the path to this goal, there are differences in approaches between countries due to historical features and different strategic cultures, however, joint projects for developing a new generation fighter and tank platforms create the foundation for a new model of cooperation.
Thus, a more integrated and effective European defense system will allow the continent to play a more active role in determining the contours of the future world order and will strengthen transatlantic partnership on a more equal basis. Strategic autonomy is viewed not as an alternative to existing alliances but as an important condition for ensuring European security in a changing international environment.
* The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.
