The recent article coauthored by Prof. Timur Dadabaev and his colleagues for Central Asian Affairs (Brill, 2025) offers a fresh and critical examination of an emerging migratory trend that upends longstanding regional patterns. The authors analyze the unexpected yet significant influx of Russian migrants into Central Asia following the military conflict Ukraine, positing that this movement represents a reversal of the traditional post-Soviet migratory flow, which for decades had seen Central Asians moving northward to Russia in search of economic opportunities.   Drawing on empirical data and theoretical insights, the authors argue that existing migration theories fall short of explaining this complex phenomenon. Central Asia, they assert, is no longer merely a space of departure or transit, but is transforming into a viable destination in its own right. This shift is underpinned not only by the region’s relative economic accessibility but also by its political neutrality — a factor that has become increasingly attractive to Russian citizens seeking to leave their country due to disillusionment with the war, political repression, and deteriorating economic conditions.   One of the article’s key conceptual contributions is its engagement with the notion of “exit as voice”. The authors suggest that for many Russians, particularly the educated urban middle class, migration to Central Asia serves as a form of political expression — a way to withdraw from and silently protest against the direction of the Russian state. In this sense, mobility becomes a medium of dissent, a phenomenon not adequately captured by traditional economic or conflict-driven migration models.   Furthermore, the article underscores the evolution of migration infrastructure within Central Asian states. Governments and institutions in the region are increasingly adapting to accommodate incoming populations, reshaping not only labor markets but also education, housing, and social services. This infrastructural transformation signals a broader regional recalibration in response to shifting geopolitical and demographic realities. As the authors persuasively argue, understanding these new dynamics is crucial for rethinking regional integration, mobility regimes, and the future of post-Soviet space.   Access the article: https://doi.org/10.30965/22142290-bja10066   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

By Dr. Mahfuz Parvez Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at the University of Chittagong and the Executive Director of the Chittagong Center for Regional Studies, Bangladesh (CCRSBD)   Since reclaiming power in 2021, the Taliban have defied predictions of total diplomatic isolation by gradually embedding themselves within the fabric of regional geopolitics. Dr. Mahfuz Parvez, in his examination of Afghanistan’s evolving foreign relations, demonstrates how the Taliban have shifted from pariah status to pragmatic interlocutors. Countries across South, Central, and West Asia are increasingly engaging with the Taliban not out of ideological alignment, but to serve pressing strategic and security interests. The result is an emergent pattern of selective, transactional diplomacy focused on border control, trade connectivity, and counterterrorism.   At the core of this recalibration is a growing recognition that Afghanistan, rich in minerals and geographically pivotal, cannot be sidelined if the region is to achieve long-term stability. Dr. Parvez highlights how regional actors such as Uzbekistan, Iran, and India have adopted differentiated strategies: Tashkent sees Kabul as a vital partner for economic corridors, while Tehran cautiously balances ideological differences with practical cooperation to contain border threats. India, for its part, has moved from a position of staunch opposition to cautious engagement, driven by the desire to counterbalance Pakistan’s influence and protect long-term infrastructure investments.   What emerges is a landscape where geopolitical necessity often overrides normative discomfort. Central Asian states, facing the ripple effects of war in Ukraine and regional insecurity, have embraced Afghanistan’s reintegration as a stabilizing force. Similarly, in South Asia, the Taliban’s engagement with both Islamabad and New Delhi underscores Kabul’s position as a buffer and potential pivot in one of the world’s most volatile dyads. Dr. Parvez also draws attention to the Taliban’s attempts at multilateral diplomacy, such as participating in SCO discussions and engaging in trilateral talks with China and Pakistan, a clear indicator of their intent to formalize their regional status.   Yet challenges remain acute. Afghanistan still grapples with economic collapse, internal repression, and the absence of international recognition. As Dr. Parvez argues, engagement must not legitimize authoritarianism. The international and regional community must pursue a dual strategy — balancing functional cooperation with principled diplomacy. Multilateral frameworks such as the SCO, SAARC, and the UN system can facilitate this balance by embedding the Taliban’s regional integration within norms of inclusive governance, humanitarian concern, and long-term development.   In conclusion, Dr. Mahfuz Parvez’s research underscores that Afghanistan’s trajectory is no longer solely determined within its borders. Its future hinges on the convergence of regional strategies — whether shaped by competition, cooperation, or ambivalence. As Kabul seeks a place within the evolving order of South and West Asia, the burden is shared: both the Taliban and their neighbors must decide whether the country remains a source of instability or becomes a cornerstone of regional resilience.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The article published in the journal Economic Diplomacy examines the evolution of foreign policy strategies among the five Central Asian states in the context of shifting global power dynamics. The authors argue that the traditional Multi-Vector Foreign Policy (MVFP) framework, which centers on balancing relations with Russia, China, and the West, is no longer sufficient to explain Central Asia’s contemporary foreign engagements. In light of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, war in Ukraine, and China’s deepening economic footprint through the Belt and Road Initiative, the region has begun seeking new partnerships. The paper introduces the concept of a “fourth vector”, composed of emerging regional powers such as Türkiye, Iran, Azerbaijan, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, India, and Pakistan. These states, the authors contend, are becoming significant players in Central Asia by offering economic cooperation, particularly in energy and transport, without imposing great power politics.   The article provides a detailed comparative analysis of the four foreign policy vectors. The Western vector, although diminished in influence, remains symbolically relevant. Russia retains deep security, cultural, and migration links with the region, while China has solidified its position as the leading economic force, primarily through infrastructure investment and trade. The newly emerging fourth vector is described as a “marriage of convenience” for Central Asian states seeking to diversify their external ties without antagonizing the dominant great powers. Through forums like the Organization of Turkic States and bilateral deals in renewable energy and logistics, these emerging actors are being integrated into the region’s strategic calculus.   Crucially, the authors suggest that this fourth vector might serve Western interests indirectly by helping Central Asian states resist overreliance on Russia or China. They raise the possibility — cautiously and based on insider interviews — that the U.S. could be quietly facilitating these partnerships to circumvent the geopolitical sensitivities that hinder direct American engagement. The article concludes by calling for further research on the sustainability and geopolitical consequences of these new alignments, especially in a world moving towards multipolarity. It is a timely and nuanced contribution to debates on Central Asia’s evolving place in global affairs.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In their latest article, published in Oxford University Press’s International Affairs  Journal, Dr. Akram Umarov and Prof. Timur Dadabaev examine the underlying logic and features of the newly emerging central Asian regional security complex (RSC). They explore how the Chinese-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) relates to shifting security dynamics in central Asia. Their study identifies a gap in existing conceptual debates, which often overlook how regional engagements and initiatives reshape regional security beyond the post-Soviet context.   Using a constructivist framework, this research reconceptualizes the relationship between the BRI and the formation of an independent central Asian RSC, focusing on the notion of mutual constitution to explain the interplay between regional structures and state behaviours. Methodologically, the article combines constructivist analysis with consideration of the influences of BRI-related projects, emphasizing their impact on regional security norms and practices.   The authors’ key findings suggest that the BRI influences norm formation and fosters new security linkages in shaping the emerging central Asian RSC. Shaped by these linkages, it represents an alternative to Russian security guarantees and stands in contrast to the ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) strategy. This study highlights the need to view the BRI’s influence as central to understanding contemporary regional security in central Asia.   Read the article in International Affairs   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

As Nargiza Umarova notes, cooperation between Central Asian countries in the field of transport and transit has become one of the key areas of regional integration since 2018, when the mechanism of Consultative Meetings of the Leaders of the Region was launched. Despite political will and common goals, in practice there is a lack of coordination: Central Asian states are focused primarily on developing international routes rather than strengthening intra-regional connectivity. This leads to competition between countries and hinders the formation of a single transport space.   The author emphasises that, despite some progress in modernising infrastructure and launching new routes — such as the TITR, CKU and Trans-Afghan railway corridor — the countries of the region act more as rivals than allies. In particular, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are developing parallel alternative routes to the west, which could lead to duplication of efforts. Umarova emphasises the need to coordinate and harmonise transport policy in order to avoid fragmentation of the regional space and achieve mutual benefits.   As the researcher points out, serious obstacles to effective integration remain, including varying levels of infrastructure development, low institutional coordination, lack of investment, and the existence of tariff and non-tariff barriers. These factors require a systematic approach and the formation of a common coordinating body with legal entity status, capable of developing a coordinated strategy and ensuring the stable implementation of transport initiatives.   Umarova concludes that only through the synchronised development of intra-regional and international transport connectivity will Central Asia be able to realise its transit potential. She insists on the need to intensify joint efforts to harmonise the regulatory framework, digitise logistics and institutionalise integration processes. Without this, the author warns, the region may miss a unique opportunity to establish itself in the global transport architecture.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In her analysis for the Central Asia–Caucasus Institute, Nargiza Umarova warns that the growing number of trans-Afghan transport initiatives risks fragmenting Central Asia rather than integrating it. The recent India–Central Asia Dialogue reaffirmed support for Iran’s Chabahar port, which offers India and Central Asian republics an alternative trade route to the Indian Ocean while bypassing Pakistan. Uzbekistan has supported this strategy, seeing Chabahar as a way to diversify transit corridors. However, the rise of competing infrastructure projects — such as China’s Belt and Road-linked rail lines, Russia’s extension of the International North–South Transport Corridor, and the Taliban’s backing of the Herat–Kandahar route — has led to overlapping, and at times conflicting, regional agendas.   Ms. Umarova highlights that the development of new routes like the Khaf–Herat railway and the proposed Mazari Sharif–Herat–Kandahar line could undercut Uzbekistan’s preferred Trans-Afghan Railway through Kabul. The Taliban’s engagement with Russia, China, and India, coupled with Iran’s push to integrate into regional corridors, makes it difficult for Tashkent to maintain its strategic advantage without broader regional coordination. The increasing importance of Chabahar may also weaken the Chinese-backed Gwadar port, intensifying the geopolitical rivalry between Beijing and New Delhi.   The author notes that instability in Pakistan and the risk of military escalation involving Iran — especially in the context of tensions with Israel — further complicate these dynamics. If conflict disrupts access to Iranian routes, Central Asian states may have to reconsider their reliance on Chabahar, while also being vulnerable to shifting freight flows and diminished influence in regional transport planning. Ultimately, Uzbekistan’s success in navigating this complex landscape hinges on fostering consensus among Central Asian neighbors and presenting a united front in negotiations with the Afghan authorities. Without such coordination, regional competition could erode their shared strategic and economic interests.   Read on CACI Analyst   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.