As Prof Azamat Seitov emphasizes, sustainable social development is impossible without the formation of mature civic consciousness in each member of society. He views civic maturity not as an abstract virtue, but as a specific social condition that directly affects the effectiveness of state institutions and the level of trust in society. In this context, characteristics such as legal responsibility, work ethic and personal involvement of citizens in social processes become key.   The author argues that double standards — others can’t, but I can — not only undermine the legitimacy of the rule of law, but also contribute to the reproduction of corruption as a social phenomenon. According to Seitov, true citizenship begins with the rejection of conspicuous consumption and a transition to conscious participation in society through work, honesty, and compliance with the law. He emphasizes that if people expect change only from the state, reforms will not have the desired effect.   Seitov refers to the classics of sociology — Marx, Weber, Durkheim, Tocqueville, Merton and others — to substantiate his position. He shows that real change is only possible through the internal motivation of citizens and their active participation in public life. His analysis of classical theories confirms the idea that no social system can be sustainable without the involvement of individuals in the common cause.   In conclusion, the author calls for a transition from criticism to action, from expectations to real contribution. He is convinced that only if every citizen realizes their role in the social mechanism and acts for the benefit of the common future will it be possible to overcome systemic crises and build a more just and developed society.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In their research, Ashwin Raghuraman and Davronbek Mamasoliev, IAIS Volunteer, explore the structural evolution and growing fragility of Iran’s proxy-based foreign policy in the Middle East. As regional tensions peaked with the unprecedented June 2025 military exchange between Iran and Israel, the authors argue that the limits of Tehran’s reliance on non-state actors such as Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Hamas have become increasingly evident. The weakening of these proxies, especially following the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, has eroded Iran’s ability to operate through its traditional asymmetric warfare strategy, pushing it toward more direct and overt confrontation, exemplified by the launch of Operation True Promise III. The study highlights that the loss of Syria as a logistical hub and the growing scrutiny of Iranian influence in Iraq are significantly constraining Tehran’s ability to sustain its regional network.   The authors trace how economic constraints, primarily driven by the reimposition of U.S. sanctions, have deepened Iran’s dependency on cost-efficient proxy groups while simultaneously undermining the very infrastructure necessary to support them. In the oil sector, Iran’s strategy of circumventing sanctions through clandestine exports to allies such as Syria is described as both adaptive and fragile, especially in light of Israel’s recent targeted strikes on oil infrastructure, which sent ripples through global energy markets. The reduction in Iranian oil flows to Syria and diversification efforts, reportedly expanding crude sales to up to 17 countries, are portrayed as key indicators of Iran’s shifting economic diplomacy under pressure.   Further, the paper delves into the sociopolitical landscapes that shape regional perceptions of power and legitimacy. While identity-driven societies in Yemen and Iraq are more likely to interpret proxy resilience through ideological and symbolic lenses, technocratic Gulf states approach Iran’s actions through pragmatic geopolitical calculations. This divergence in perception influences both local support for Iran’s partners and the regional balance of alliances. The authors also examine the instrumental use of the Houthis in the Bab al-Mandab Strait, whose attacks on maritime routes — like the Rubymar tanker incident — serve as both strategic disruption and ideological posturing in line with Iranian messaging.   The concluding section positions the collapse of Iran’s proxy strategy not only as a tactical vulnerability but as a geopolitical turning point. As proxies lose their deterrent effectiveness and domestic unrest increases within Iran, Tehran’s threshold for open conflict lowers. Raghuraman and Mamasoliev contend that Iran’s June 2025 missile strikes on Israeli territory mark a significant departure from decades of shadow warfare. In this new phase, Tehran’s foreign policy is entering an era of overt confrontation, shaped less by strategic ambiguity and more by a need to reassert its influence in a region undergoing rapid realignment. The authors argue that this transformation may permanently alter the security architecture of the Middle East, with grave implications for both regional actors and the broader international community.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Rustam Makhmudov’s article, presented at the international scientific and practical conference on The Politics of Unity in Central Asia: Uzbekistan’s Role in Ensuring Stability in the Region, offers a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of Tashkent’s course in Central Asia. The author identifies three key stages: the first (2016–2020) – the launch of large-scale reforms and active rapprochement with neighboring countries through increased trade, tourism and cultural exchanges, as well as the establishment of a format for consultative meetings between the heads of state of the region; the second (2020–2023) – overcoming the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, when Uzbekistan provided humanitarian aid and restored economic ties, while maintaining a proactive policy in Central Asia; and the third stage, which began in recent years, is characterized by deepening transport and economic cooperation, the opening of the Afghan market and the integration of resources into regional supply chains.   In the second part of the article, Makhmudov analyses the macro-factors that determine the challenges and opportunities for the new phase of regional policy. Global geopolitical transformation is leading to a transition from a bipolar to a non-polar world, where major powers are forced to build situational alliances, creating security challenges in Central Asia. Technological rivalry between the United States and China in the fields of AI and quantum technologies exacerbates the need for a common regional strategy for training personnel and developing an innovative economy. The philosophy of growthism and consumer society conflicts with the region’s climate constraints, especially in the context of water scarcity, which requires a rethinking of the green growth paradigm for sustainable development. Finally, strengthening the pan-regional identity requires a shift from a discourse of cultural and historical unity to the formation of bottom-up integration ideas capable of uniting young people and experts throughout Central Asia.   The author emphasizes that an adequate and timely response to these challenges creates the conditions for a transition from multilateral cooperation to full-fledged regional integration. Thanks to Tashkent’s proactive line and pragmatic approach based on maximizing the dividends from joint projects, Uzbekistan is capable of acting as a locomotive for sustainable cooperation, providing a safe haven in the raging global sea. This strategic vector not only strengthens political and economic stability in Central Asia, but also sets new benchmarks for integration processes that meet the realities of the 21st century.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In a new article by the team of the Center for Energy Diplomacy and Geopolitics, the authors define the concept of energy security and examine its technical, economic, geopolitical and environmental dimensions. The authors emphasise that modern global energy demand and the global trend towards decarbonisation require states to balance supply reliability with resilience to climate risks.   The article then analyses the strategies of leading economies – Germany, Japan, the United States and China – as well as countries with comparable levels of energy system development (Kazakhstan, Egypt and Iran). Particular attention is paid to areas such as diversification of sources, development of renewable energy and nuclear power, improving energy efficiency, and creating energy storage systems. Based on a comparative review, the report demonstrates how each country has struck its own balance between imports and domestic energy production.   The authors compare the structure of the energy balance and the degree of import dependence: Uzbekistan is close to Kazakhstan and Iran in terms of the share of fossil fuels (mainly natural gas), but lags behind countries with developed renewable energy and nuclear power (Germany, Japan, China). At the same time, it is emphasised that low external dependence does not guarantee sustainability — peak shortages and infrastructure wear and tear are becoming critical challenges even for resource-rich countries.   The concluding part of the article formulates recommendations for Uzbekistan: diversification of the energy balance through large-scale development of renewable energy and nuclear power, modernisation of infrastructure and introduction of energy-saving practices, creation of storage systems and smart grids, strengthening of regional cooperation on energy exchange, as well as institutional reforms and human resource development. The authors emphasise the adaptation of international best practices, taking into account the country’s national characteristics.   Read the article in the Journal of Interdisciplinary Science   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Dr. Abbos Bobokhonov’s article, published in the China Currents journal by the China Research Center in Atlanta (Georgia, USA), offers a detailed and nuanced analysis of how the recent Third Plenum of the Communist Party of China (CPC) may shape Beijing’s policy directions, particularly as they relate to Central Asia. Drawing parallels with the historic Third Plenum of 1978, the author positions the latest assembly as a moment of introspection and recalibration in the face of mounting economic challenges within China — including a slowing growth rate, industrial contraction, and demographic pressures. The Plenum’s adoption of the “Decision on Further Deepening Reform for Advancing Chinese Modernization” signals a continued commitment to market-oriented reforms, albeit under the cautious watch of party oversight.   Dr. Bobokhonov highlights how the outcomes of the Plenum have already catalysed intensified diplomatic exchanges and investment deals. Trade figures between China and Central Asia have risen markedly — from $70 billion in 2022 to nearly $95 billion in 2024 — complemented by massive investment pledges secured during recent presidential visits. These developments point to deepening interdependence, where Central Asia plays a dual role as both a source of raw materials and a logistical corridor linking China with Europe and the Middle East. Simultaneously, China’s support for green energy initiatives in the region — including wind and solar energy projects by companies such as Xinjiang Goldwind — reveals a growing alignment with global climate commitments and the region’s own ecological transformation goals.   Another emerging vector of cooperation identified in the article is agribusiness. With the Chinese leadership keen to ensure long-term food security, Central Asia’s agricultural capacity is seen as a valuable complement to China’s domestic needs. The Third Plenum’s call to make China’s vast market a shared global opportunity may pave the way for greater agricultural exports from the region. Finally, the article underlines that China’s strategic interest in regional stability — particularly due to its sensitivity regarding Xinjiang — will also shape its future engagement. Enhanced cooperation in security, counter-terrorism, and regional coordination through platforms like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is expected to continue alongside economic engagement.   In conclusion, Dr. Bobokhonov offers a comprehensive forecast of the multi-dimensional ties likely to evolve between China and Central Asian countries in the wake of the Third Plenum. He argues that Beijing’s renewed reform trajectory — while domestically driven — will inevitably generate structural consequences for the region, reinforcing its role as both a strategic partner and a testing ground for China’s outward-facing economic initiatives. Central Asia, in this framework, becomes both a beneficiary and a stakeholder in China’s long-term economic recalibration.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In his article Rustam Makhmudov emphasises that the modern discourse on green transition requires a deeper and non-linear understanding. The author, relying on the definitions of the European Commission, notes that the green transition involves not just technological innovation, but also fundamental changes in the very model of economic and social development. However, as Makhmudov expertly notes, current approaches often remain in the captivity of linear logic – as if we are talking about a straightforward transition from one system to another, without taking into account hidden contradictions and structural limitations.   The article pays special attention to the phenomenon of “growthism” – the ideology of quantitative increase in production, which has its roots in the era of industrial revolutions. Makhmudov argues that even proponents of the circular economy – a key element of the green transition – often remain hostage to productivist attitudes. He critically analyses the circular model, pointing out its contradiction: in reality, maintaining endless technological innovation and mass consumption leads to the increasing extraction of new resources, such as lithium and rare earth metals, which calls into question the true sustainability of the stated goals.   The author details the relationship between the ideology of mass consumption, the mechanisms of creative destruction described by Joseph Schumpeter, and the logic of modern technological progress. Makhmudov emphasises that without constant stimulation of demand and accelerated obsolescence of goods, the dynamics of the capitalist economy is impossible, which means that the green transition will not escape these patterns. In this context, he is sceptical about the possibility of building a truly closed circular economy, as resource recycling has physical, thermodynamic and economic limits.   Finally, the expert notes that green technologies, despite reducing emissions at the operational stage, are accompanied by significant environmental costs at the extraction and production stages. Makhmudov provides convincing evidence of the high level of pollution in lithium and rare earth mining and the high carbon footprint of electric vehicle production. He concludes his analysis with the need for further fundamental research that can not only diagnose the weaknesses of the current green transition model, but also suggest more realistic ways to improve it.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.