On 17 April 2025, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar visited Dhaka, Bangladesh, and held talks with her counterpart, Bangladesh’s Foreign Secretary Jashim Uddin. This was the first high-level diplomatic contact between the two countries since 2010.
Throughout Bangladesh’s creation as an independent state till the 2010s, relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh have been somewhat cordial. Pakistan officially recognized Bangladesh in February 1974, under Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. This came after the 1972 Simla Agreement and the release of Pakistani prisoners of war by Bangladesh. That same year, Bhutto visited Dhaka, where he expressed regret for the events of 1971 and talked about working together economically, although he didn’t give a formal apology.
Relations started to improve in the late 1970s and 1980s. In 1978, Pakistan gave Bangladesh four Shenyang F-6 fighter jets, showing signs of military cooperation. The two countries kept talking during President Muhammad Ershad’s time (1982–1990). He visited Pakistan in 1986, and during the visit, both sides discussed trade and regional cooperation. These discussions took place under the framework of SAARC, which had been founded in 1985. SAARC created opportunities for regional leaders like Ershad and Zia-ul-Haq to meet and engage. However, progress in Bangladesh–Pakistan relations was slow. One reason was that many in Bangladesh (especially the Awami League) remained focused on seeking justice for the events of 1971. They also preferred maintaining closer ties with India. A key moment came in July 2002, when Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf visited Dhaka; it was the first visit by a Pakistani head of state since 1974. At the Martyrs’ Monument, he expressed regret for the “excesses” of 1971. The BNP welcomed this, but the Awami League said it wasn’t enough. Furthermore, when Sheikh Hasina returned to power in 2009, relations got colder. Her government prioritized ties with India and started trials against people accused of helping the Pakistani military in 1971. Pakistan criticized the trials, calling them politically motivated. Even though trade reached $400-450 million, by 2010, high-level talks had mostly stopped.
New Elite. Bangladesh’s government changed in August 2024 when protests led by students forced out Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. At the moment, Muhammad Yunus, a Nobel Prize laureate, leads an interim government. Yunus wants Bangladesh to have good ties with multiple countries, not just India. His interim government severed its ties with New Delhi when he criticized India for sheltering the overthrown Hasina and demanded her extradition. As a result, it opened up a space (chance) for Pakistan to get closer to Bangladesh. This change is not merely reactive; it shows a deliberate attempt to redefine Bangladesh’s national identity and foreign policy, moving away from India-centric dependence toward broader regional engagement.
Although an apology was asked for the 1971 war damages from Pakistan and the request was not met. However, it should not be seen as a condition from the Bangladeshi part to Pakistan in resetting their ties, because regardless two states seem desperate in reconnection. It can even be noticed in their discussion on reviving SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) – an ASEAN-like organization for the region.
Economic cooperation is a major reason for the renewed talks between Bangladesh and Pakistan. Their bilateral trade already exceeds $1 billion. Bangladesh exports garments, and Pakistan supplies cotton, rice, and wheat. Due to the new interim ruler, M. Yunus, in February 2025, they restarted direct trade with a large rice shipment, signaling stronger economic ties. Plans for direct flights, lessening visa procedures, are also in progress to boost connectivity.
China Factor. China’s influence quietly shapes this development. Pakistan remains a close ally of Beijing. Bangladesh depends on Chinese investment for infrastructure such as roads and ports. Pakistan and Bangladesh may align with China’s South Asian ambitions. Stronger ties between them could support China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Such alignment raises India’s concerns about a shifting regional balance. Meanwhile, India closely monitors these talks because its economic ties with Bangladesh have weakened: India recently canceled a transshipment deal. This disrupted Bangladesh’s $39 billion garment export industry.
Impact on CA. Pakistan’s role as a transit hub for Bangladeshi goods from Afghanistan could boost economic ties with Central Asian nations like Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Afghanistan serves as a gateway to Central Asia. Both nations already focus on this region. Enhanced cooperation might spark joint energy or infrastructure projects. Additionally, China’s Belt and Road Initiative could link Bangladesh and Pakistan to Central Asian markets. Thus, new trade routes may emerge.
By Firdavs Azimkulov
* The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.
