Afghanistan occupies a dominant position in the water geography of South Asia. The glaciers and snowfields of the Hindu Kush feed river systems that flow eastward toward Pakistan, making Afghanistan a key actor in regional hydrology. Despite its economic vulnerability and international isolation, the Taliban government controls the headwaters of rivers that Pakistan cannot replace through alternative sources.
Since coming to power, the Taliban government has increasingly viewed control over upstream rivers not only as a tool for the country's development, but as a political lever and a means of asserting sovereignty and exerting pressure on Pakistan in the absence of traditional diplomatic or economic instruments.
Firstly, the situation is compounded by the fact that neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan has ratified the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. The two countries have also never concluded a bilateral agreement on water resource allocation, which further weakens the institutional foundation for cooperation. The situation is further complicated by the fact that any formal water-sharing agreement would effectively amount to recognition of the Durand Line as a legitimate international border - a position that contradicts Afghanistan's longstanding policy, reinforced under the Taliban.
Secondly, the Taliban's 2025 announcement of plans to construct a dam on the Kunar River - openly framed as a response to Pakistani pressure - signals that water has transformed from a latent irritant into an active element of bilateral confrontation. Although Pakistan is the downstream state on the Kabul River, it currently consumes the majority of usable water, largely due to Afghanistan's longstanding inability to develop upstream infrastructure. This balance is becoming increasingly fragile as Afghanistan advances the construction of 12 dams designed to generate 1,177 MW of electricity, which could reduce annual water inflows to Pakistan by nearly 3.7 billion cubic meters (16–17%), posing serious risks to water security, food security, and economic stability.
Afghanistan uses the waters of the Kabul River primarily for direct drinking water supply to settlements along its banks. Pakistan directs these same waters toward large-scale strategic purposes: agricultural irrigation, hydroelectric power generation at facilities such as the Warsak and Mohmand dams, and drinking water provision for approximately 20 million people dependent on the Kabul River system. Taliban representatives explicitly articulated the strategic logic behind their actions, while some experts described water as “the only non-military weapon” available in response to Pakistani interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs. Water infrastructure is thus no longer viewed solely as a means of achieving water independence, but also as an instrument of coercive diplomacy amid active bilateral confrontation.
Nevertheless, an important limitation must be noted. Afghanistan's financial resources are constrained, its technical capacity has been weakened by decades of conflict, and few foreign contractors are willing to operate under Taliban oversight. The political signal of dam construction currently far outpaces actual engineering capacity on the ground.
Thirdly, India's deepening involvement in Afghan hydropower has transformed a bilateral dispute into a triangular geopolitical confrontation. The Salma Dam - which irrigates tens of thousands of hectares and supplies water to the population of Herat Province - and the planned Shahtoot Dam on a tributary of the Kabul River will further strengthen India's infrastructural influence in Afghanistan's water sector. Beyond these projects, India has reportedly committed to investing approximately $1 billion in total, exerting a decisive influence on the direction and pace of dam construction given Kabul's limited finances. Pakistan, in turn, views this not as neutral assistance but as India's strategy to create "hydraulic compression" from two sides, targeting the agricultural base of southern Punjab, Sindh, and Balochistan. The reason is that in May 2025, India suspended the Indus Waters Treaty, threatening the water security of eastern Pakistan, while India-backed dam construction in Afghanistan applies pressure from the west.
Fourthly, the dynamics of the dispute reveal a fundamentally self-destructive character for Afghanistan. Despite rising tensions, Afghanistan remains structurally dependent on Pakistan for supplies of basic foodstuffs: nearly 80% of its key imports from Pakistan consist of wheat, flour, and rice. This interdependence creates a paradox: any attempt by Afghanistan to restrict water flows in order to weaken Pakistan's agricultural sector would likely produce immediate adverse consequences for its own economy. A decline in Pakistan's agricultural output would drive up food prices, directly affecting Afghan markets due to their dependence on imported staple goods. In this sense, both states are economic "hostages" of the same river system, and coercive strategies risk generating mutual vulnerability rather than unilateral advantage. Consequently, water cannot be effectively weaponized without significant self-destructive costs.
Fifthly, the dispute is compounded by the growing impact of climate change, which is gradually reducing the total volume of available water resources. According to the United Nations Development Programme, in 2023 Afghanistan ranked sixth among countries most vulnerable to climate change, and fourth in overall disaster risk. These climatic changes are exacerbated by the accelerated melting of Hindu Kush glaciers, which are key sources of the Kabul River system. As a result, the total volume of available water is declining even as demand continues to grow due to population growth and agricultural needs. Consequently, even minor upstream interventions carry heightened political sensitivity, as they are increasingly perceived through the lens of scarcity and existential risk.
Water relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan are increasingly shaped by structural imbalance, a weak legal framework, and growing geopolitical competition. What was once a technical matter has become a politically sensitive domain influenced by infrastructure, external involvement, and strategic paradigms. Despite rising tensions, economic interdependence and Afghanistan's domestic constraints inhibit sustained unilateral pressure.
As a result, while water disputes will likely intensify political tensions and trigger episodic crises, they are unlikely to escalate into direct armed conflict. Rather, water serves as a catalyst that amplifies existing mistrust and regional rivalry, while mutual vulnerability raises the costs of escalation - encouraging both sides, at least in the long term, toward negotiated management rather than open confrontation.
* The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.
