The policy brief by Dr Islomkhon Gafarov and Bobur Mingyasharov begins by situating China’s triangular diplomacy between Islamabad and Kabul within the framework of its Global Security Initiative (GSI), which emphasises cooperative security as a cornerstone of Beijing’s external strategy. Against a backdrop of escalating Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan activity, cross-border skirmishes, trade disruptions and the mass expulsion of Afghan migrants, Beijing has stepped forward as an interested mediator seeking to stabilise South Asia. By convening an informal trilateral meeting of foreign ministers in Beijing on 21 May 2025 — attended by China’s Wang Yi, Pakistan’s Muhammad Ishaq Dar and Afghanistan’s Amir Khan Muttaqi — China signalled its intent to translate declarative support for regional harmony into tangible diplomatic action.
The brief underscores that Beijing’s newfound activism is, in large part, a reaction to the April–May 2025 Kashmir crisis, which reminded Chinese strategists that South Asia remains prone to sudden conflagrations that could imperil the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The conflict between India and Pakistan not only threatened vital overland routes to the Indian Ocean but also prompted Beijing to shore up Pakistan’s western flank. For Islamabad, whose western border with Afghanistan has long been porous and volatile, stabilisation is essential if it is to avoid a two-front predicament when tensions flare with New Delhi.
Afghanistan’s shifting foreign policy orientation presents a further complication for Chinese objectives. Such a recalibration could erode China’s leverage over Kabul and weaken the coherence of a trilateral framework. The brief also highlights Tehran’s growing diplomatic activism — exemplified by Iranian mediation efforts during the Kashmir crisis — and Beijing’s unease at ceding influence to Iran in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. In parallel, the authors posit that Western retrenchment in post-withdrawal Afghanistan was at least partially calculated to draw Chinese focus into a volatile region, thereby diverting Beijing’s attention from Indo-Pacific affairs. In sum, China faces a complex web of competing influences and must navigate these carefully if it is to retain its strategic primacy.
In its concluding analysis, the policy brief argues that China’s GSI is now transitioning from rhetorical commitment to on-the-ground diplomacy, with the recent trilateral meeting marking a critical inflection point. The likelihood of reconciliation between Islamabad and Kabul is rising, driven by each party’s own political and economic calculus as well as Beijing’s concerted intermediation. Beyond its immediate benefits for South Asian stability, such rapprochement bears considerable significance for Central Asian states, particularly in relation to the Trans-Afghan Corridor and access to Pakistani ports. These linkages are integral to China’s broader connectivity agenda under the BRI and the future security of CPEC. Looking ahead, Beijing is expected to institutionalize its mediation — potentially through enhanced Afghan participation in the BRI or Beijing’s support for Kabul’s entry into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization — thereby embedding the resolution of Pakistan-Afghanistan tensions within multilateral frameworks.
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DNA News Pakistan
Islamabad Post
* The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.
