At a joint business forum in Kazan (Republic of Tatarstan, Russian Federation), Russia and Afghanistan considered the prospects for developing the Russia-Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan and Russia-Caspian Sea-Turkmenistan-Afghanistan multimodal transit corridors.

 

This development brings clarity to the understanding of Moscow’s long-term vision for shaping Afghanistan’s transportation architecture. It is noteworthy that along with the overland route through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the Russian side has begun to openly discuss the possibility of connecting to Afghanistan via the Caspian Sea using Turkmenistan’s port and railroad infrastructure. This approach signals Russia’s desire to diversify its supply routes to South Asia in order to pre-empt the risk of excessive dependence on one or another transit country.

 

The idea to establish multimodal transportation along the North-South axis through Afghanistan was initiated by Uzbekistan. In 2022, Tashkent proposed to launch an interregional route Belarus-Russia-Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan with a length of 5532 kilometers. A year later, the parties signed a memorandum on its implementation. Since then, Russia has been noticeably active on the trans-Afghan track and has already announced its participation in the preparation of a feasibility study of the Trans-Afghan railroad project.

 

As is known, Uzbekistan is promoting the concept of the Kabul corridor, which involves laying railroad tracks from Mazar-e-Sharif (Afghanistan) to Peshawar (Pakistan). The work was planned to start in the fall of 2021. However, due to an unexpected change of power in Afghanistan, the process was suspended and then resumed again. Meanwhile, in 2024, Turkmenistan in partnership with Kazakhstan presented an alternative version of the Trans-Afghan railroad along the Torghundi-Herat-Kandahar-Spin-Buldak route with access to Pakistani ports in the Indian Ocean. Russia appears to be interested in the operation of both the Kabul and Kandahar corridors.

 

In September 2024, Turkmenistan started laying the first section of the Torghundi-Herat railroad (115 km), which is planned to be extended to the Pakistani border via Kandahar. Part of the project’s $500 million cost will be borne by Kazakhstan.

 

Following their February visit to Tashkent, the Taliban said they had reached an agreement with the Uzbek side on the construction of the Mazar-e-Sharif-Herat railroad, although Uzbekistan’s specialized agency did not confirm this information. Here we should also emphasize that one of the two routes, which, judging by the reports of the Russian Ministry of Transport, was agreed upon for the preparation of the feasibility study of the Trans-Afghan railroad, starts from the city of Mazar-e-Sharif, connecting Afghanistan’s Herat, Dilaram, Kandahar with the border town of Chaman in Pakistan. It follows that the Taliban government intends to turn Herat into the country’s main transit hub, which would give major shippers such as Russia the opportunity to connect to different branches of the Trans-Afghan Railway – west via Kandahar or east via Kabul. Connecting the routes would probably allow Afghanistan to attract more transit cargo, which, in addition to economic benefits, would bring the local government considerable geopolitical dividends. However, this plan may cause a conflict of interests for Central Asian states involved in trans-Afghan communications.

 

A trade route across the Caspian Sea to Afghanistan is sure to irritate Tashkent, which is making great efforts to build the Termez-Mazar-e-Sharif-Kabul-Peshawar railroad, which is supposed to complete the process of creating a direct rail link between East Asia, Eurasia and the Indian peninsula. The efficiency of any transportation corridor depends on the freight base. If the Russia-Caspian Sea-Turkmenistan-Afghanistan multimodal route is launched, a significant volume of supplies from north to south may be reoriented to the sea route due to its low cost and the enormous cargo capacity of sea vessels. Regardless of which transport and through which Central Asian country transit flows to Afghanistan will be directed, the Kabul corridor will have to compete for their transportation, which will be a serious challenge for the region.

 

* The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.