In recent years, the government of Afghanistan has expanded its technological capabilities for monitoring the population. Improvements in the technical infrastructure have enabled the authorities to introduce new forms of control that go beyond traditional methods. In the context of the policies pursued by the Taliban, this trend can be viewed not only as a process of modernization, but also as part of a broader strategy aimed at strengthening state governance.
The digitalisation of control mechanisms creates a model resembling the concept of the “panopticon” - an ideal model of prison introduced into the social sciences by french philosopher Michel Foucault. Within this framework, the key factor is not actual surveillance, but the perception of its constant possibility. The model assumes that individuals adjust their behavior under the perception of continuous observation, which fosters self-discipline. Thus, this mechanism enables the state to shift from practicing reactive policies to the functioning of a disciplinary form of power.
From the perspective of the Afghan government, a key driver of this policy is the intention of the Taliban to mitigate social and political fragmentation, which is perceived as a major threat to regime stability. The integration of advanced surveillance technologies and the control of the information space create conditions for a transition from reactive repression to more preventive forms of social regulation. The absence of mechanisms aligned with international legal standards creates a favorable environment for the institutionalization of this model of control. This is manifested in the following ways:
Firstly, in recent years, the Taliban government has demonstrated an increased interest in the systematic collection of information about the population. Since 2023, the Taliban authorities have consistently employed technological resources to strengthen and expand state control. The existence of sufficient digital infrastructure creates conditions for the authorities to establish monitoring mechanisms and broadens their capacity to carry out political persecution.
According to a 2025 investigative report by the BBC, at the time the Taliban came to power, approximately 850 surveillance cameras were installed in the Afghan capital. However, since 2023, their number has increased sharply: around 90,000 cameras of manufactured in China have been installed in Kabul alone. The software allows the cameras to recognize individuals, display their images and classify each person by age, gender, and features such as the presence of a beard or a mask.
This rapid expansion of surveillance systems has raised concerns within the international community. The human rights organization Human Rights Watch has warned that Afghanistan lacks data protection laws regulating the storage and use of collected footage. However, according to government statements, the data is stored for only three months, after which it is deleted and not shared with other agencies. Representatives of the Afghan Ministry of Interior claim that the cameras significantly contribute to improved security and a reduction in crime rates.
Despite these claims, surveillance cameras may also be used to intensify control over civilians, particularly women in public spaces. Although local authorities assert that crime rates have significantly declined following the installation of surveillance systems, these claims cannot be independently verified. Given the opacity of Afghan legislation, it is also difficult to confirm the actual purposes for which the collected data is used. Furthermore, numerous documented cases of abuse and persecution of civilians cast doubt on official statements regarding the use of such data.
Secondly, the policy of the Taliban is aimed at managing potential sources of internal instability. From the perspective of the Taliban leadership, fragmentation of the country represents a key risk that could weaken central authority. The implementation of such policies is accompanied by restrictions on the rights of ethnic and religious minorities. The institutionalization of these measures reinforces structural inequalities and creates conditions for the escalation of interethnic and interreligious tensions.
Beyond the capital, surveillance cameras have also been installed in other regions of Afghanistan. These provinces, which border Kabul, possess both strategic geographical importance and a significant share of non-Pashtun populations, increasing their relevance in terms of maintaining control and political stability. The deployment of cameras in areas characterized by ethnic and religious diversity suggests that these technologies may be used not only for security purposes, as officially stated, but also as tools for monitoring groups perceived as insufficiently aligned with the regime.
Between 2021 and 2025, international organizations have documented numerous cases of extrajudicial killings, torture, and raids against ethnic minorities carried out by representatives of the Taliban. Reports by international human rights organisations indicate that marginalized religious and ethnic groups were deliberately deprived of humanitarian assistance, as well as access to essential services and public sector employment.
Thirdly, in addition to access to advanced surveillance technologies, the Taliban possesses a substantial database of biometric and personal data left behind by Western countries in August 2021. One such database is the electronic identity system (e-Tazkira), launched in 2018 under the administration of Ashraf Ghani and still in operation today. It contains personal and biometric data of Afghan citizens, including iris scans, fingerprints, photographs, occupation, native language, home addresses, and family members’ names.
According to a statement by the National Statistics and Information Agency, by the end of 2025 up to 17 million electronic identity cards had been issued, six million of which were distributed after the Taliban came to power. Moreover, the Taliban government has gone beyond the traditional use of biometric data and is collecting information on categories of the population that were previously outside the scope of state attention. According to the International Organization for Migration, the Afghan government is collecting biometric data on homeless people, beggars and criminals. The scale of coverage and the pace of ID issuance demonstrate the Taliban’s level of interest in biometric data collection and the integration of the Tazkira system into administrative governance.
Reports also suggest that the Taliban has access to portable biometric identification devices previously used by the United States military. These devices enable the rapid collection of iris and fingerprint data. The data stored on devices left behind by the United States and other Western donors was reportedly not protected by basic security measures. International human rights organizations have repeatedly warned about the risk that such biometric data could be used by the Taliban to target perceived opponents, former military personnel and political activists.
In addition, according to local media, the cost of obtaining identification documents is prohibitively high for much of the population: the official fee is 500 Afghanis (around 7 US dollars) for adults and 200 Afghanis for minors. However, the shortage of document issuance centers forces many citizens to incur additional transportation costs, and in remote areas where in-person visits are not possible, processing fees can reach up to 200 US dollars. Such financial barriers have concrete practical consequences: as the absence of an identity document deprives citizens of the ability to obtain a visa and, consequently, to leave the country. It also restricts access to basic services such as education, healthcare, and humanitarian aid, for which identification is often a mandatory requirement. Discontent is also fueled by the system’s ethnic classification, which divides major ethnic groups into smaller subcategories, statistically diluting the representation of ethnic minorities.
Thus, based on the actions undertaken by the Taliban leadership, it can be concluded that territorial and social fragmentation are viewed as key internal risks capable of undermining regime stability. The integration of biometric databases and surveillance technologies is forming a new infrastructure of power with characteristics of a disciplinary mechanism. Moreover, the new Criminal Procedure Code adopted in January 2026 institutionalizes this approach at the legal level and represents a logical continuation of the domestic political strategy. Its adoption signals the effective consolidation of power by the political elite in Afghanistan. Under such conditions, the vulnerability of regional, ethnic, and religious minorities increases, creating a high risk of escalating internal conflicts and deepening social inequalities.
* The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.
