By Jasurbek Khamrakulov, 3rd year student at UWED
The war between Russia and Ukraine has profoundly reshaped the European security system, exposing its weaknesses in military readiness and the defence-industrial capacity of European states. Territorial defence has once again become a priority, defence spending has accelerated, and NATO’s eastern flank has been gradually reinforced, including through the accession of Finland (2023) and Sweden (2024).
At the same time, shifts in U.S. strategic priorities under the administration of Donald Trump, along with renewed debates over transatlantic burden-sharing, have intensified European concerns about dependence on American security guarantees. This has prompted a reassessment of strategic autonomy and deeper military cooperation in several key states, including Germany, France, and the United Kingdom.
One of the first steps toward strengthening European defence autonomy was the strategic initiative “Readiness 2030,” presented at the European Council meeting on 6 March, 2025. The plan proposes up to EUR 800 bn to reinforce Europe’s defence infrastructure amid heightened security concerns, particularly following the suspension of U.S. military aid to Ukraine and the Oval Office dispute between Trump and Zelenskyy on 28 February 2025. In May 2025, the European Commission launched the “SAFE” financial instrument, a EUR 150 bn fund offering low-cost loans to EU member states for defence projects.
At the intergovernmental level, the “E5” format was established in November 2024 as an informal mechanism bringing together the defence ministers of five major European defence spenders – France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and the United Kingdom, to strengthen the European dimension of security amid the ongoing war in Ukraine and the structural transformation of EU and NATO defence policy.
This format reflects a growing tendency toward a “core of the willing” within Europe, whereby the largest military and economic powers seek to accelerate decision-making beyond the complex EU consensus procedures, thereby shaping a more flexible and pragmatic model of cooperation.
On the bilateral level, following Friedrich Merz’s accession to power in Germany, his first official state visit on 7 May 2025 was to France, aimed at revitalizing cooperation between the EU’s two largest powers, an effort many analysts argue had stalled under his predecessor, Olaf Scholz.
A key outcome was the intention to establish a Franco-German Defence and Security Council that would meet regularly to formulate operational responses to shared strategic challenges. According to President Macron, France and Germany intend to accelerate joint programmes and develop new capabilities in addition to tanks, long-range missiles, and combat aircraft.
Subsequently, at the 37th UK–France Summit held on 8–10 July 2025 and attended by President Macron and Prime Minister Starmer, further steps were taken to enhance not only bilateral defence ties but also broader European security. In particular, the two sides launched “Lancaster House 2.0” to modernize defence cooperation and establish “Combined Joint Forces” capable of large-scale combat operations and fully compatible with NATO.
In addition, the Northwood Declaration reaffirmed the two countries’ “longstanding and resolute commitment to nuclear cooperation.” As a result of deepening UK–France nuclear coordination, it has become increasingly evident that “any serious threat to Europe would now trigger a joint response”.
A week later, on 17 July 2025 in London, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz signed a historic Treaty on Friendship and Bilateral Cooperation. Central to the agreement are its defence provisions, which establish a mutual assistance clause obliging both countries to provide support in the event of an armed attack. These commitments build upon the 2024 “Trinity House Agreement” on defence cooperation concluded under Olaf Scholz.
The treaty also provides for the joint development of a new high-precision strike capability to strengthen conventional deterrence in Europe. Notably, German anti-submarine warfare aircraft were granted access to operate from British bases, while German crews will receive training on the UK’s P-8A maritime patrol aircraft. For Prime Minister Starmer, the defence pact with Germany represents a calculated strategic step aimed at restoring close engagement with key European powers in the post-Brexit context.
At the same time, the “Weimar Triangle”, bringing together Germany, France, and Poland, has regained strategic relevance. In September 2025, the three countries called for significantly deeper integration of Ukraine into the European security and defence framework, emphasizing the need to move toward a more structured role for Kyiv within European defence mechanisms.
Regarding recent initiatives, on 28 January German Finance Minister Lars Klingbeil and his French counterpart Roland Lescure held an online meeting with the finance ministers of Poland, Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands as part of the newly proposed “E6” format, designed to strengthen closer defence coordination among major European economic actors.
The proposal has been described as a “two-speed” approach intended to circumvent slower consensus-based decision-making among all 27 EU member states, particularly on defence-related measures. One of the four key pillars of the initiative, according to Klingbeil, is increased defence spending.
Complementing these initiatives, Germany’s 2026 federal budget allocates EUR 82.69 bn to the Bundeswehr, alongside an additional EUR 25.5 bn from the special defence fund. Chancellor Merz has publicly declared his ambition for Germany to become “the strongest army in Europe,” reaffirming at the World Economic Forum in Davos plans to raise defence expenditure to 5% of GDP.
In a broader context, the firm stance taken by European leaders, that only Greenland and Denmark have the right to decide Greenland’s future, following renewed public pressure from the U.S. president regarding the Danish territory, has further prompted Europe to reflect on the need for new institutional reforms in the field of security.
With the of the Munich Security Conference taking place, UK Defence Secretary John Healey announced that spending on long-range hypersonic weapons would exceed £400 million this year. The government also underscored the importance of joint missile development with France, Germany, and Italy, marking a broader push for coordinated European capability development.
During the conference, Prime Minister Keir Starmer stressed the “urgent need” to deepen defence cooperation between the United Kingdom and Europe. He noted that, ten years after Brexit, the UK is seeking a new phase in its relationship with the continent, shaped by the long-term threat posed by Russia and the need for Europe to assume greater responsibility for its own security.
Starmer supported reopening discussions on potential UK participation in the “SAFE” programme and is considering the creation of an intergovernmental European defence mechanism open to all European democracies. At the same time, he emphasized that strengthening European defence autonomy does not imply weakening ties with the United States or moving away from NATO, describing the Alliance as “the most effective defence alliance in history.” The prevailing European rhetoric toward NATO suggests that trust in the alliance as the cornerstone of collective security remains intact, even amid tensions surrounding Greenland.
Despite the ambitions and measured steps taken by European leaders, significant divergences in interests and priorities persist. One of the most prominent recent defence initiatives, the Future Combat Air System (FCAS)programme, aimed at developing a sixth-generation European fighter jet through cooperation between Airbus, Dassault Aviation, and Spain has entered a serious crisis due to deep disagreements among industrial and governmental stakeholders over governance, technical specifications, and strategic requirements, particularly between Paris and Berlin.
France insists on developing a single aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons and operating from aircraft carriers, a requirement Germany does not consider necessary, which has substantially slowed progress and pushed the programme to the brink of collapse. In response, Airbus executives have proposed a compromise involving two distinct fighter platforms linked by a shared digital system in order to preserve cooperation. However, this solution has yet to resolve the underlying strategic and industrial tensions.
In this term, alternative scenarios are increasingly being discussed. Germany may expand its procurement of U.S.-made F-35 aircraft, while France, according to some analysts, could pursue the independent development of a national fighter platform, should a common European solution prove unattainable. This situation underlines the structural difficulties inherent in building fully integrated European defence projects.
Taken together, the initiatives outlined above suggest not merely an expansion of cooperation, but the gradual emergence of a “functional core” of European defence, centred on Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Poland. These states command the largest military budgets in Europe, possess advanced defence-industrial bases, and, in the case of Paris and London, maintain nuclear capabilities.
However, this emerging core remains hybrid and only partially institutionalized. The United Kingdom operates outside the EU framework, promoting intergovernmental mechanisms open to all European democracies, while France traditionally prioritizes strengthening the European dimension within the EU. Germany occupies an intermediate position. Although it supports deeper European integration, Berlin continues to rely heavily on transatlantic solutions, as reflected in its reliance on American weapons systems.
Crises, such as the FCAS programme illustrate how divergences in strategic requirements, capability preferences, and industrial burden-sharing can hinder integration efforts.
Thus, a new core of European defence is indeed taking shape, but it is unlikely to evolve into a centralized structure in the near term. Cooperation will more likely rest on overlapping bilateral and multilateral arrangements united by a shared objective to increase Europe’s responsibility for its own security. A central priority will be maintaining a balance between EU strategic autonomy and the transatlantic alliance, ensuring that the strengthening of European defence capabilities reinforces the European pillar within NATO. In this scenario, the actions of the emerging core inside NATO would aim to reduce excessive dependence on the United States without undermining the structure of collective defence.
* The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.
