In her recent policy brief for the Caspian Policy Center, Nargiza Umarova highlights how Azerbaijan’s transport diplomacy — particularly its drive to consolidate the East-West and North-South corridors — is transforming the South Caucasus into a key logistical hub. Azerbaijan's infrastructure push, which includes upgrades to the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway and expansion of the Baku International Sea Trade Port, aims to enhance the Middle Corridor’s competitiveness as a viable alternative to northern routes that pass-through Russia. This creates new geopolitical and geo-economic openings for landlocked Central Asian states, especially Uzbekistan, to access European and global markets more efficiently via the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR).
The Middle Corridor, also known as the Trans-Caspian route, has gained traction in recent years as an East-West trade artery connecting China and Central Asia with Europe through the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, and Türkiye. The European Union’s TRACECA program and various multilateral logistics initiatives have given further momentum to this alignment. With Azerbaijan investing heavily in upgrading port capacity, rail infrastructure, and its merchant fleet, the region is witnessing a significant reduction in logistical bottlenecks and freight delays. This benefits not only Azerbaijani ambitions but also aligns with the long-term transport strategies of Central Asian countries seeking to diversify their export and transit pathways beyond Russia and China.
For Uzbekistan, the picture is nuanced. While the TITR offers promising prospects for trade with the South Caucasus and Türkiye, its use for large-scale continental transit to Europe remains constrained. Umarova notes that although 4.5 million tons of cargo were shipped via the Middle Corridor in 2024, up 62% from the previous year, only 1 million tons originated from Uzbekistan. Moreover, the World Bank projects that even by 2030, only 40% of the total 11 million tons of cargo anticipated to transit the corridor will be truly transcontinental. Much of the benefit will accrue to Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, given their geographic proximity and infrastructural integration. For Uzbekistan, deeper engagement with southern corridors via Iran or Pakistan may offer a more direct and efficient trade route to Europe and the Middle East.
The emerging Southern Corrido, linking China, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and extending through Turkmenistan and Iran to Türkiye and the EU, could redefine Eurasian connectivity. The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, once completed, will shorten the East Asia–Europe trade route by 900 km and cut delivery times by up to eight days. Furthermore, the integration of the Trans-Afghan Railway into the broader Middle Corridor framework could create a multi-nodal logistics network stretching from India and the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea and Europe. Uzbekistan’s strategic location at the heart of these intersecting routes underscores its potential as a key player in Eurasian transit — provided it can continue to align its infrastructure development with evolving regional corridors.
Ultimately, Ms. Umarova argues that the expansion of trans-Caspian transport links is about more than just moving goods. It represents a shift in Central Asia’s geopolitical posture from isolation to integration, from dependency to diversification. As new railways and ports come online, the region has the chance to assert itself as a nexus of Eurasian connectivity. Yet the benefits will not be evenly distributed; strategic planning and interregional coordination will be crucial for Uzbekistan and its neighbors to fully capitalize on these opportunities.
* The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.
