Ashwin Raghuraman’s commentary is a sharp, policy-focused critique of the recent decision by President Donald Trump to drastically downsize the U.S. National Security Council (NSC). The piece argues that this move not only reflects a dangerous centralization of power but also risks repeating the catastrophic mistakes that defined the U.S. war in Afghanistan.
Raghuraman draws extensively on the findings of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), which documented how the failure in Afghanistan was not simply due to flawed tactics but was fundamentally rooted in institutional dysfunction—particularly a lack of strategic coherence, interagency coordination, continuity, and oversight. By cutting the NSC and removing many of its seasoned analysts and aides with little notice, the Trump administration, Raghuraman warns, is dismantling one of the very safeguards meant to prevent such policy disasters.
The author contextualizes the NSC’s evolving role across administrations—from a modest staff under George H.W. Bush to post-9/11 expansion, subsequent contractions under Trump and Obama, and Biden’s later reinvestment. Now, with Trump returning to a loyalty-based, top-down leadership model that sidelines dissent and expert input, Raghuraman sees this as more than bureaucratic restructuring; it’s an erosion of deliberative policymaking that could have deadly real-world consequences.
Ultimately, Raghuraman’s message is that institutional memory and coordination — embodied in a functioning NSC — are essential to avoiding foreign policy blunders. Ignoring SIGAR’s hard-earned lessons, he argues, is not just a mistake; it’s an invitation for history to repeat itself in new and potentially more dangerous ways. The haunting of Kabul, he suggests, is not over — it’s being willfully resurrected.
* The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.
