By Fayoziddin Bakhriddinov
It is becoming increasingly clear that Tashkent is taking a more pragmatic approach in its relations with war-torn, Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, which remains unrecognized by much of the international community. This pragmatism is most evident in the growing economic and social ties between the border regions. Uzbekistan sees Afghanistan not only as a key player in regional security but also as a potential strategic transit corridor that could provide access to South Asian markets in the future. Furthermore, Afghanistan may serve as a promising market for Uzbekistan’s products and goods. For this reason, Tashkent is attempting to prioritize economic interests even against the backdrop of ongoing challenges from Afghanistan.
Uzbekistan, which has openly embraced the stance that “Afghanistan is an integral part of Central Asia”, seeks to gain significant benefits through broader cooperation in areas such as transboundary water resources, counterterrorism, transportation connectivity, and trade integration. Additionally, in his April 1, 2024 interview, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev emphasized that stabilizing Afghanistan is in the shared interest of both Central Asia and the European Union. The Taliban administration received this message warmly, expressing its intention to pursue a policy based on “sincere neighborhood and mutual interests” with Uzbekistan - a clear example of the current diplomatic momentum.
Therefore, Tashkent’s pragmatism appears to be rooted in the idea that, if ideological considerations can temporarily be set aside, broad economic cooperation with Taliban-led Afghanistan could lead to deep integration between the two neighbors. A practical step in realizing this vision was the opening of the Termez International Trade Center in Surkhandarya in 2022, which has significantly boosted freight traffic between the two countries. It’s worth noting that in 2024, the total volume of trade between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan reached $1.1 billion, of whichover $1 billion consisted of Uzbek exports to Afghanistan. In March, both nations agreed to increase this trade volume to $3 billion, indicating that the majority of bilateral trade is driven by Uzbekistan’s exports.
However, in June 2025, local media and other sources reported that the Taliban's so-called “morality police” banned Afghan women under the age of 40 from working in the Termez Free Economic Zone. The ban, reportedly lacking clear legal basis, especially targeted women working without a male guardian (“mahram”). As a result, the purchasing power within the zone might in future see substantial decline, should not only women entrepreneurs but also female consumers became scarce. Naturally, such measures pose a serious risk to bilateral trade relations and Tashkent’s strategy of fostering regional stability through economic engagement.
While Uzbekistan’s pragmatic approach to Afghanistan is driven by economic interests and the ambition to strengthen its regional transit role, maintaining this approach will depend heavily on how the Taliban’s ideological stance evolves in future. If the ideology continues gaining dominance in the country, it could not only weaken Uzbekistan-Afghanistan relations but also undermine broader regional integration efforts that Tashkent is pursuing today.
* The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.
