The 14th government of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), led by incumbent President Massoud Pezeshkian, is noticeably strengthening its pragmatic Central Asian policy. The main focus of regional interaction is aimed at developing trade and transportation and logistics links. This goal is in harmony with Iran's “Look East” strategy, designed to mitigate Tehran’s economic isolation.
International sanctions remain the main constraint on Iran’s integration with Central Asia. Despite geographic proximity and huge resource potential, the total volume of mutual trade remains unsatisfactory at just over $1.5 billion, although it has increased slightly in recent years. The goal is to quadruple trade with Uzbekistan to $2 billion, with Kazakhstan and Tajikistan to $1 billion, and with Turkmenistan by 30%.
The expanding export opportunities of Central Asian states stimulate the search for new consumer markets and efficient ways of communication with major economies of the world. Iran combines both qualities, making it a valuable partner for the regional P5. In addition, the country has solid scientific and technical expertise in engineering, energy, agriculture, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, as well as an investment base for joint ventures.
The extensive road and railroad network, coupled with the presence of major ports in the Indian Ocean, gives IRI an important advantage in cooperation with the landlocked Central Asian republics. Tehran plays a key role in the formation of the Eurasian land bridge to connect China and Europe by railroads. Several transit routes from East to West cross Iranian territory by land, which also involve Central Asian countries. The China-Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey-EU railroad corridor has been actively developed, and the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey-EU multimodal route operates in parallel.
In light of the actualization of the southern direction of transit for the Central Asian republics, the Iranian deep-water port of Chabahar, which is being modernized by India and thanks to it is not burdened by sanctions, is gaining popularity. In 2023, Tehran approved Tashkent's request to join the Chabahar agreement. The Uzbek side plans to build warehouses and a terminal at the sea harbor. Kazakhstan and Tajikistan are considering a similar issue. Discussions are also underway to launch transportation corridors from Central Asia to India using Iran’s road and port infrastructure. Such development will spur intensification of trade with one of the world’s largest economies, which fully meets the geo-economic interests of the Central Asian states.
In August 2024, container transportation from the Indian ports of Mundra, Nhava Sheva and Chennai to Uzbekistan via Iran (Bandar Abbas port) and Turkmenistan started. In March 2025, cargo deliveries to Kazakhstan were organized along the same route. At the same time, Astana intends to build a specialized terminal and logistics center on the shore of Shahid Rajai port in southern Iran. All these episodes indicate the determination of the Central Asian states to get closer to Tehran.
Central Asian transit is also very important for the IRI, given the reorientation of its foreign trade to the East. On May 15, 2025, a full-fledged free trade agreement between the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Iran came into force, which provides for a sharp reduction in customs duties on almost all commodity nomenclature. Russia, which is the leader in the EAEU and has an impressive trade turnover with Iran ($4.8 billion by the end of 2024), will benefit the most from this. However, China has been and remains Tehran's largest trade partner in the East, and therefore, the development of transportation corridors through our region is a fundamental issue on the agenda of Iran-China relations.
* The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.
