In her analysis for the Central Asia–Caucasus Institute, Nargiza Umarova warns that the growing number of trans-Afghan transport initiatives risks fragmenting Central Asia rather than integrating it. The recent India–Central Asia Dialogue reaffirmed support for Iran’s Chabahar port, which offers India and Central Asian republics an alternative trade route to the Indian Ocean while bypassing Pakistan. Uzbekistan has supported this strategy, seeing Chabahar as a way to diversify transit corridors. However, the rise of competing infrastructure projects — such as China’s Belt and Road-linked rail lines, Russia’s extension of the International North–South Transport Corridor, and the Taliban’s backing of the Herat–Kandahar route — has led to overlapping, and at times conflicting, regional agendas.
Ms. Umarova highlights that the development of new routes like the Khaf–Herat railway and the proposed Mazar–Herat–Kandahar line could undercut Uzbekistan’s preferred Trans-Afghan Railway through Kabul. The Taliban’s engagement with Russia, China, and India, coupled with Iran’s push to integrate into regional corridors, makes it difficult for Tashkent to maintain its strategic advantage without broader regional coordination. The increasing importance of Chabahar may also weaken the Chinese-backed Gwadar port, intensifying the geopolitical rivalry between Beijing and New Delhi.
The author notes that instability in Pakistan and the risk of military escalation involving Iran — especially in the context of tensions with Israel — further complicate these dynamics. If conflict disrupts access to Iranian routes, Central Asian states may have to reconsider their reliance on Chabahar, while also being vulnerable to shifting freight flows and diminished influence in regional transport planning. Ultimately, Uzbekistan’s success in navigating this complex landscape hinges on fostering consensus among Central Asian neighbors and presenting a united front in negotiations with the Afghan authorities. Without such coordination, regional competition could erode their shared strategic and economic interests.
* The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.
