The events of recent weeks demonstrate Central Asian states’ determination to promote their own infrastructure projects in Afghanistan. Some of these initiatives are being implemented despite continuing tensions on the Afghan-Pakistani border and the conflictual nature of relations between New Delhi and Islamabad.
At the end of January, Kazakhstan’s ambassador to Pakistan announced that Astana was ready to finance the construction of the Torghundi-Herat-Kandahar-Spin Boldak railway, also known as the Western Trans-Afghan Railway, at a cost of around $7 billion. This decision is obviously motivated by the country’s desire to strengthen its position in north-south transit transport, encompassing existing routes through Iran and new transport corridors crossing Afghanistan.
Meanwhile, Astana has expressed its support for the launch of the Kabul Corridor along the Termez-Naibabad-Maidanshahr-Logar-Kharlachi route proposed by Uzbekistan in 2018. In July 2025, the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (UAP) railway project entered a new stage of development when a trilateral intergovernmental framework agreement on the joint development of the project's feasibility study was signed. On 4 February 2026, Uzbekistan ratified the agreement and agreed with Pakistan to begin field studies on the transport corridor.
The UAP project is paving the way for a new north-south trade route through Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. This route will provide the fastest land connection between Europe, Russia and South Asia, eliminating the need for sea crossings. Against this backdrop, Tashkent has proposed the creation of a multimodal corridor connecting Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, which is three times shorter than sea delivery routes. Astana’s participation in the project was discussed during bilateral talks held during Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s state visit to Pakistan on 4 February 2026. The parties also discussed the prospects for the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) Railway Corridor.
Kazakhstan joined the initiative to construction a railway from Torghundi to Spin Boldak in Kandahar Province in 2024 at the invitation of the Turkmen side. In July 2025, Astana and Kabul signed a memorandum to implement the project. Kazakhstan pledged to allocate $500 million towards the construction of a railway line to Herat and the necessary accompanying infrastructure, including a logistics hub in northern Afghanistan. The stake has now been raised to cover the entire budget for the Western Trans-Afghan Route.
Astana’s active interest in the TAP project may be linked to the current dynamics of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas transport corridor's development. Work began on laying the Afghan section of the 1,840-kilometre pipeline in December 2024. It is expected to reach Herat Province by the end of 2026.
Russia is paying close attention to TAPI, viewing it as an opportunity to diversify and stabilize its energy exports following the loss of the premium European market. In this context, Kazakhstan can expect to earn transit profits, providing additional hope for the profitability of the railway from Torghundi to Spin Boldak, as the two transport routes will clearly be synchronized.
On 1 February 2026, a meeting was held in Herat between Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, Afghanistan’s Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs, and Rashid Meredov, Turkmenistan’s Foreign Minister. They discussed the progress of construction of the TAPI gas pipeline, the power line between Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, and the Torghundi-Herat railway.
Both Ashgabat and Kabul are seeking to accelerate the TAPI project. At a recent meeting between Turkmenistan’s Ambassador, Khoja Ovezov, and Afghanistan’s Minister of Mines and Petroleum, Hedayatullah Badri, they noted the rapid pace of work on the Afghan section of the gas pipeline. According to the available data, part of the route has already been prepared for pipe installation.
The dynamic development of relations with Afghanistan raises the question for Central Asian states to strengthen mutual coordination to ensure their infrastructure initiatives have complementary political and economic effects.
* The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.
