Nargiza Umarova, a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS), analyses the implications of the renewed “maximum pressure” campaign by the United States on Iran, particularly its potential impact on the Chabahar port and broader regional transport dynamics. She explains that the decision by President Donald Trump to reinstate stringent sanctions on Iran threatens India's long-term investment in Chabahar, which serves as a critical gateway for India’s access to Central Asia and Afghanistan. By targeting Iranian port operations, the US may indirectly weaken India’s geoeconomic position while reinforcing the strategic advantage of Pakistan’s Gwadar port, which is being developed under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This could further intensify the competition between India and China over regional connectivity and trade routes.
Ms. Umarova highlights that India has been modernizing Chabahar for years, securing an exemption from US sanctions in 2018 to operate the Shahid Beheshti terminal. However, with the renewed sanctions, India's plans to invest $370 million in upgrading the port may be jeopardized. The Chabahar port is central to several international transport initiatives, including the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and the Ashgabat Agreement, facilitating trade between Central Asia and the Persian Gulf. Countries such as Uzbekistan, which relies on external ports for its maritime trade, have shown great interest in leveraging Chabahar’s transit potential. The planned establishment of a logistics center at the port could have significantly boosted Uzbekistan’s trade, especially with India, which saw bilateral trade figures nearing $1 billion in 2024. Additionally, Afghanistan, facing tensions with Pakistan, has increasingly turned to Chabahar as an alternative route for its maritime trade, with the completion of the Khaf-Herat railway expected to enhance connectivity further.
Should Chabahar’s operations be restricted due to renewed US sanctions, Umarova argues that this would leave Central Asian states and Afghanistan with no alternative but to rely on Pakistan for maritime access. This, in turn, would strengthen Islamabad’s strategic importance in the regional transport network while amplifying the geopolitical influence of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). China’s investment in Gwadar port would benefit from Chabahar’s decline, reinforcing Beijing’s regional influence while undermining India’s land connectivity with Central Asia. Furthermore, the shift in regional transport dynamics could inadvertently benefit Uzbekistan by making its Trans-Afghan Railway Corridor (Termez-Mazar-i-Sharif-Kabul-Peshawar) more attractive to investors, potentially accelerating its implementation. Umarova concludes that the US sanctions regime, while aimed at curbing Iran’s economic capabilities, will have far-reaching consequences for regional connectivity, reshaping the geopolitical and trade landscape of South and Central Asia.
* The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.
