TASHKENT, March 2 (Xinhua) -- At present, China has become an important driver of progress on the planet. This was stated in an exclusive interview with Xinhua by the head of the laboratory of anthropology and conflictology of the Institute for Advanced International Studies of the University of World Economy and Diplomacy of Uzbekistan Azamat Seitov. According to him, China is one of the oldest civilizations in the world, which throughout the history of its development has demonstrated the inner strength to achieve its goals. Xinhua's interlocutor believes that China is now comprehensively implementing the decisions of the 20th National Congress of the CPC. In foreign policy, this means the implementation of Beijing's strategy of openness in the spirit of mutual benefit and gain in the long term. Large-scale Chinese modernization, in turn, will serve as an additional opportunity for the developing countries of the world, opening up new horizons for cooperation. A. Seitov, using the example of the countries of Central Asia, noted that over the past 30 jubilee years, the relations of the parties have reached the level of strategic partnership. The fundamental principle of interaction between the states of Central Asia and China is respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the countries, as well as support in matters relating to vital interests. The Uzbek scientist emphasized that this year marks the tenth anniversary of the Belt and Road Initiative, which in such a short period has opened a wide road for economic progress in many countries of the world. "Uzbekistan considers this initiative of Beijing as a mechanism for strengthening interstate cooperation through the development of land and sea routes, which is turning into a global economic platform before our eyes," A. Seitov said. In conclusion, the Uzbek scientist stressed that the Uzbek-Chinese cooperation is of a comprehensive strategic nature and covers a variety of areas. "It is based on trusting personal relations established between the heads of the two states. For its part, Uzbekistan attaches priority to further strengthening partnership with China, expanding multifaceted trade, economic, investment and financial cooperation between the two countries based on the principles of mutual benefit, taking into account the interests and equality," summed up A. Seitov. 

The organization of Turkic states is becoming a promising mechanism for building new regional and global landscapes to stimulate the growth of mutual prosperity, strengthening peace and stability. About the prospects for the development of the organization - in the article of Associate Professor of the University of World Economy and Diplomacy Rustam Makhmudov. On November 11, 2022, Samarkand will host the first summit of the Organization of Turkic States (OTG), whose members are Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey and Uzbekistan, while Hungary and Turkmenistan have observer status. The fact that the first summit will take place in Samarkand is not an accident. It should be noted that one of the turning points in the activities of this organization was precisely the entry of Uzbekistan in 2019 into the then Turkic Council, which later transformed into the UTC. The significance of Uzbekistan's entry for the organization was determined by a number of factors. In terms of demographics, our country with a population of more than 35 million people is the second in the UTC after Turkey with its 83.3 million inhabitants. In terms of GDP, it forms the leading economic trio of the countries of the organization, together with Turkey and Kazakhstan. Uzbekistan has a systemic influence on all key geopolitical processes in Central Eurasia. Our country also acts as a powerful cultural center of the modern world Turkic civilization due to the presence of a high educational and scientific base. The implemented policy of openness in recent years makes Uzbekistan a center of regional attraction and at the same time a generator of creative ideas that are of strategic importance not only for Central Asia, but for other adjacent spaces. It is impossible to deny the fact that the new course of Uzbekistan has led to the launch of the processes of reconsolidation of the region, in which the majority of the population are representatives of the Turkic peoples. The entry of Uzbekistan into the UTC has led to the fact that today, when assessing the development and forecasting the situation in the vast expanses of Central Asia, the South Caucasus and Asia Minor, it is no longer possible not to take into account the factor of cooperation between the Turkic countries. This, in turn, introduces additional elements into the increasingly complex geopolitical, geo-economic, value and cultural picture of the region. It is noteworthy that the strengthening of the Turkic dimension in the region occurs simultaneously with the search for new meanings and incentives for the development of other institutional and organizational dimensions, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the CIS, the Consultative Meetings of the Heads of State of Central Asia, the processes of strengthening the interconnectedness of Central and South Asia, formats " CA+” with the US, EU, Russia and China. And in this regard, of course, the question cannot but arise as to whether the strengthening Turkic dimension will enter into a targeted, organizational and functional contradiction with so many other organizations in which UTC members are represented - Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and an observer state Turkmenistan. To answer this question, it seems important to take into account two closely related aspects that relate to the nature of the development of the current geopolitical situation in the world and the conceptual understanding of the mechanisms for building multilateral relations. It is obvious that the unipolar geopolitical structure of the world and the systems of globalization institutions generated by it, which previously guaranteed stability and maximization of wealth, in the language of the new institutional economy, are gradually becoming a thing of the past. The need to form new institutional systems has been discussed for quite a long time, including in the United States itself, as the ideological, financial, economic and technological center of globalization. It is worth recalling the speech of the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2012 at the Singapore Management University, concerning the concept of the "New Silk Road". At the time, she stated, “We must follow the example of the generation that, after World War II, built the modern world order and created institutions and agreements that fostered unprecedented security and prosperity. We must follow the same path, looking even further and working even harder to forge agreements that will ensure our security and prosperity for the next 100 years.”[1]One can also recall President Donald Trump, the essence of whose foreign policy could be described as an attempt to change the previous rules of the global trade, economic and technological game. The current increase in the number of conflicts and points of tension in world politics, economics and ideology can be interpreted, in this regard, not only as an indicator of the exhaustion of the old institutions, but also as an attempt to build new global rules and balances between financial, economic and technological forces. At the same time, the problem is that in significant segments of the developing world, this process is viewed from the point of view traditional for the 19th and 20th centuries. Its essence lies in the expectation that new institutions, as before, will be exclusively formed by the leading world powers. However, this point of view does not fully correspond to the realities of the modern world. The new rules of the game that will shape the future global landscape will be shaped by more complex combinations of efforts between developed and developing countries. And they are already being formed, as indicated by the policy of Uzbekistan, as well as such an important UTC member state as Turkey, demonstrating a bright proactive position in building new multilateral formats in combination with developed and developing countries, without waiting for the largest actors to agree on new rules of the game. As for the question of the possible entry of the dimension of Turkic cooperation into conflict with other organizations and formats in which Uzbekistan and its UTC partners work, it is important to understand the ongoing changes in the models for building multilateral cooperation in modern conditions. If in the previous bipolar and unipolar models of the world, multilateral relations were built according to the “center-periphery” scheme, when the great powers were in the center, and other countries concentrated around them, then now there is a space of multiple centers and situational leaders represented by countries and organizations. All of them form branched connections, relations and formats of cooperation. This is a highly dynamic model, moving away from the statics of past eras, creating the so-called. "synergistic effect". The leading countries of the Organization of Turkic States, including Uzbekistan, largely demonstrate exactly this logic in their foreign policy, which gives grounds to talk about minimizing the likelihood of the UTC entering into conflict with other organizations and formats that the Turkic states are members of. Moreover, the UTC can increase the effectiveness of other multilateral formats with the participation of the Turkic countries, as it creates another source of economic, scientific and technological growth in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Thus, the Organization of Turkic States should become a promising mechanism for building new regional and global landscapes with their new institutions and new understanding of the nature of relations between countries in order to stimulate the growth of mutual prosperity, peace and stability. It is important that Uzbekistan, as the chairman of the UTC in the period 2022-2023, has a unique opportunity to lay a long-term strategic foundation for the development of this organization, relying on its valuable experience of recent years in the formation of productive relations of a new type, both through interstate relations and cooperation between organizations and regions.

As Russian influence wanes Xi Jinping will make it a near-term priority to become the main partner of Central Asian countries. The 20th National Congress did not go according to plan for Chinese leader Xi Jinping. The unexpected public ouster of former president Hu Jintao indicated the possibility of an intra-elite struggle among the top members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Premier Li Keqiang was known to be in agreement with Xi about the state’s long-term goals, namely, to build a moderately prosperous society (Xiaokang) by 2021 and turn China into a great modern socialist country by the 100th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). However, their opinions did not coincide in the implementation of the main contours of economic policy. For example, Li disagreed with Xi regarding the “zero-COVID” policy as well as immense investments in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China’s zero-Covid policies led to an economic slowdown and stirred up discontent among the masses. From 2014 to 2019, China invested $90 billion dollars in BRI countries. But given that low-income developing countries make up a significant share of BRI participants—more than 46 percent of the total number of participating countries—many of them are in debt to China. Moreover, due to Covid-19, almost all BRI countries experienced negative gross domestic product(GDP) growth and decreased their solvency, which doubled these countries’ debts to China. Of the sixty-eight BRI participants, twenty-three are at risk of defaulting on their obligations with Djibouti, Laos, Maldives, Mongolia, Montenegro, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan at a particularly high risk of doing so. Central Asia In Focus Based on the composition of the Politburo Standing Committee, many experts noted that the new members are personally loyal to Xi, signaling his complete consolidation of power. This provides Xi with ample decision-making leeway concerning China’s future. As Alibaba founder Jack Ma said, “China is like a huge ship. In order to drastically shift its course, even if there is such a need, it takes considerable time and effort”. It is often assumed that China’s policy towards Central Asia will not change much. However, taking into account the current economic crisis and structural changes within the international order, adjustments will likely be made by strengthening the BRI. The retention of Wang Huning, the chief ideologue of the CCP, as a Politburo member is a clear signal that Xi will intensify the promotion of the BRI in his third term. Considering that Central Asia is critical to BRI’s success, the project will be a determining factor in China’s policy in the region. Additionally, because the BRI was first unveiled ten years ago in Kazakhstan, there is a symbolic meaning for China to show the project’s achievements in Central Asia. Until today, China has been careful not to push the BRI too strongly in the region. Beijing understands the difficulty of predicting Russia’s role in the region and, most importantly, the new trends in relations between the Central Asian countries and China itself. But this only testifies to Beijing’s intentions to gain a firm foothold in the region and supplants Moscow’s influence. First, given the weakening of Russia’s role in Central Asia due to its ongoing war in Ukraine, China’s position in the region is strengthening. Thus, American experts believe that for many of Russia’s neighbors, the war in Ukraine has accelerated the process of breaking out of Moscow’s orbit. Currently, many Central Asian states are rethinking and revising their relations with Russia. Sharp speeches by Kazakh president Kassym-Jomart Tokayev at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum in June and Tajik president Emomali Rakhmon at the October Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) summit addressed to Russia, as well as the evident desire of the countries of the region to resolve sensitive territorial issues bilaterally, vividly illustrates Central Asian states’ transition to independence. Russia’s growing isolation provides China with an opportunity to challenge its influence in Central Asia. Moscow’s strategic dependency on Beijing amidst the war in Ukraine excludes the possibility of Russian retaliation for encroachment into its historic sphere of influence. Second, in just this year, Xi met face-to-face three times and virtually once with other Central Asian leaders, indicating a new wave of high-intensity diplomacy. These meetings summarized thirty years of bilateral and multilateral relations while outlining prospects for future cooperation. Thus, at the Virtual Summit of the leaders of Central Asia and the President of China in January 2022, Xi made a number of important proposals including increasing trade to $70 billion by 2030, deepening cooperation in the field of advanced technologies, and providing 1,200 government-sponsored scholarships. Xi’s decision to make his first trip abroad since the outbreak of the pandemic to Central Asia is a fundamental strategic step to send an important signal to China’s competitors and partners in the region. Before the visit, the Chinese president published articles in which he outlined policy contours and guidelines for a new stage in the development of Central Asian-Chinese relations for the next decade. An analysis of Xi’s September visits to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan testify to China’s interests in the region. A number of documents signed with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan expressed China’s strong political commitment to the region, with a new focus on cooperation between Chinese media regulators and their counterparts in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Earlier, Chinese experts expressed indignation that a negative perception of China still persists in the region despite huge investment contributions for Central Asian economic development. This was primarily attributed to low awareness and the lack of positive information about China. Media interactions between each side to fill this gap will become the main tool for Chinese soft power projection in the region. Third, Xi explicitly identified the BRI as an important mechanism to realize Chinese interests in Central Asia. At the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Uzbekistan, Xi called for continuing efforts to complement BRI projects with national development strategies and regional cooperation initiatives, as well as to expand sub-multilateral and sub-regional cooperation. The need for regional transportation and communications links is increasing in Central Asia. Beginning next year, Beijing will become actively involved in constructing critical transport infrastructure in the region. To this end, after more than twenty years, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and China will revive the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway construction project. On the eve of the SCO summit, the relevant authorities of the three countries signed an agreement to implement this project with Chinese financing, no doubt placing it under “the framework of BRI.” This connectivity project aims to ensure Chinese access to Central Asian markets which is especially relevant when the war in Ukraine has impeded important routes leading to Europe. China’s interest in the speedy implementation of the BRI is becoming a decisive factor in the implementation of the CKU railway. According to experts, the CKU railway will not only create the southern corridor of the Second Continental Transport Bridge but will also open up new markets for manufactured products from the three countries. This route will become one of the shortest for transporting Chinese goods to Europe and will also increase Beijing’s regional economic influence. Finally, as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic, China will make more targeted investments rather than large-scale commitments. Xi’s visit to the region signals that China will invest more funds in the region but from now on, they will not be unconditional. China is determined to protect its economic interests in the region by linking them to certain political benchmarks. It is likely that initially, these conditions will be delicate but firmer demands for change will eventually be issued. Conclusion Due to the negative economic ramifications of the pandemic and the Russo-Ukrainian War, Central Asia has a general interest in accelerating the implementation of the BRI and other Chinese-financed projects. Still, while counting on large Chinese investments, participating countries should not hope for “generous conditions.” Countries can pay a high price for Chinese funding, including the “Sinicization” of their economies and cultures. For Xi, the BRI will remain a top priority for regional engagement as China continues to be the main donor for developing countries. Some BRI countries, however, will learn from the experiences of Pakistan and Sri Lanka and become more cautious about accepting Chinese investments with political conditions. Thus, the BRI is gradually transforming from a regional infrastructure development plan into a security strategy for Central Asia. Abbos Bobokhonov is a PhD student at the University of World Economy and Diplomacy, and Research Fellow at the Institute for Advanced International Studies. Previously, he was a Research Fellow at the Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies under the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, where his main areas of expertise were China’s foreign policy and SCO. His research interests include contemporary Chinese foreign policy in Central Asia, China’s Soft Power policy, BRI and AIIB.

There are no major alternatives to natural gas to ensure the stable and steady development of Uzbekistan’s economy and society. The idea of a new “gas union” was floated at a very consequential time, amid an unusually harsh winter in the region. Since the second half of November, several Central Asian countries have experienced unprecedented energy deficits and natural gas shortages. This coincided with a snap presidential election in Kazakhstan. So, it was during Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s first foreign visit — to Russia — after beginning his second term that the idea of a “trilateral gas union” was aired in late November. As press secretary for the Kazakh leader Ruslan Zheldibay commented: “…the talks between the presidents of Kazakhstan and Russia in the Kremlin focused on the creation of a ‘trilateral gas union’ between Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan with the purpose of coordinating their actions in order to transport Russian gas through the territories of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.” Over the next few days, the proposal was elaborated upon by Kremlin spokesman Dmitri Peskov, who talked about the creation of a joint company that would manage energy infrastructure. “The proposal implies the creation of a certain legal entity for cooperation between these three countries, and for infrastructure development, then for foreign markets,” said Peskov. This statement suggested Russia’s desire to expand its natural gas export routes in the direction of Central Asia and perhaps partially substitute for the losses of the European export market

In recent years, the EU has shifted how it views Central Asia. That effort culminated recently with the first EU- Central Asia leaders summit. At the end of October 2022, President of the European Council Charles Michel paid his first official visit to Astana and held a summit with the leaders of all five Central Asian states — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Download article

Editor’s note: In August, The National Interest organized a symposium on Afghanistan one year after the U.S. withdrawal and the Taliban takeover of Kabul. We asked a variety of experts the following question: “How should the Biden administration approach Afghanistan and the Taliban government?” The following article is one of their responses: One year after the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, the international community is still facing enormous challenges in dealing with the new reality in Central Asia. The withdrawal of international military forces, and the evacuation of only a small number of the Afghans who previously collaborated with them, considerably damaged the reputation of the United States and its Western allies. The chaos of the evacuation shocked millions of people around the world and Taliban rule has not brought long-expected peace, sustainable development, and prosperity. The Taliban cannot be blamed for all the current problems facing Afghanistan given that they inherited an underdeveloped state with high rates of poverty, an over-dependence on foreign aid, and an inefficient governing apparatus. The Taliban could improve the internal security situation but it is encountering substantial problems in governing effectively. The lack of an inclusive government and respect for the rights of women are the largest disagreements between the Taliban and the majority of the international community, which so far has not officially recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. To learn from its past experience of military and political involvement in Afghanistan, Western countries should focus on the following lessons: First, nation-building should be an internal process largely unaffected by foreign intervention. Afghanistan has continually proven that there is no “blueprint approach” that works and externally orchestrated reforms are fragile. There are no ready solutions for conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction. Some general principles and approaches for supporting countries after the end of conflicts still apply but each case requires attention to the importance of local communities taking the lead.  Second, building a highly centralized government under the leadership of strongmen did not work. Afghanistan has a historic tradition of decentralized administration and cannot admit the establishment of personalist regimes. Oddly, the United States and its allies decided to neglect their own principles and commitment to democratic procedures. From 2001-2021, Afghanistan’s presidents were legitimized under the direct coordination and interference of external actors. Despite Kabul’s efforts to consolidate power, the central government was predominantly perceived as being manipulated by the West and lacking the necessary internal support to implement post-conflict reconciliation and development policies. This experiment in Afghanistan clearly demonstrated that an over-centralized presidential model does not guarantee security and stability. Third, the West was ignorant of how regional countries could elaborate strategies on post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan. The future of Afghanistan cannot be considered and assembled without significant support from its neighbors. For various reasons, the United States avoided or minimized its cooperation with several regional countries on Afghanistan issues. Countries such as Pakistan were mainly used as transit routes and to host U.S. and Western military infrastructure essential for operations in Afghanistan. All major international gatherings discussing Afghanistan happened in Europe, the United States, and Japan. All are very far from the region and have a limited understanding of local traditions, context, and history. The concerns and proposals of states next to Afghanistan were barely considered as policy options by the United States and its allies. The Biden administration is willing to engage with Afghanistan in a limited manner. However, questions remain on how to deal with the Taliban’s tough ideological approach to many policy issues. There is now an ongoing debate on whether the Taliban should be recognized by the international community. The Taliban have faced difficulties in establishing their credibility to merit cooperation with other states. What can the Biden administration do to improve the security situation in Afghanistan?  First, there is a strong lack of trust between the Taliban and the United States. Conducting any substantive negotiations under such circumstances will not be effective. Especially after the U.S. drone strike against Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, there are many open questions about the credibility and honesty of the Taliban. However, collaboration on a limited number of issues important to the United States and its regional partners is critical. Drug and illicit arms trafficking, transborder threats, and border security are pressing problems that cannot be solved without cooperating with the Taliban. Second, it is essential for the United States and the West to keep supporting and cooperating closely with Afghanistan’s neighbors. Despite regular exchanges between regional countries and the West, there are still many gaps in mutual understanding. Promoting development and prosperity in the region requires improving connectivity. Western countries have already found ways to regularly send humanitarian support to Afghanistan while not violating sanctions against the Taliban. Therefore, funding connectivity projects in Central Asia would invest in its security, independence, and resilience. The main attention of the United States and allies in the international coalition should be given to the problem of socio-economic reconstruction and infrastructure development within Afghanistan. Improving the living standards of the Afghan people would help support U.S. policy, reduce the Taliban’s influence, and decrease interethnic struggles. Close cooperation with regional countries would ease the burden of interacting with the Taliban. No one wants to see a new civil war in Afghanistan and the United States has an interest in working to make sure that doesn’t happen. Akram Umarov is Director of the Center for Afghanistan Studies, University of World Economy and Diplomacy. His research covers security studies, conflict management, public diplomacy and development issues in Central Asia, Afghanistan and CIS countries. Twitter: @umarov_akram