Nargiza Umarova outlines the strategic rationale behind Uzbekistan’s efforts to establish a West-South transport axis as part of its broader ambition to emerge as a key logistics hub in Eurasia. She argues that Uzbekistan’s current participation in Europe-bound freight flows remains disproportionately low, just 2.3 percent of Central Asia’s total, despite the country’s advantageous geographic location. This marginal role, she notes, represents both a structural limitation and a latent opportunity. As European interest in Central Asian connectivity intensifies, particularly through the diversification of transport routes away from Russian infrastructure, Uzbekistan is positioning itself to fill a growing demand for new, geopolitically neutral corridors.   Umarova situates this development within the evolving geopolitical and economic relationship between Central Asia and the European Union. The EU, now Uzbekistan’s third-largest trading partner after China and Russia, has already seen a rise in bilateral trade turnover, particularly under the GSP+ trade preference scheme. Uzbekistan’s exports to Europe — dominated by chemicals and uranium — reflect both the scale and the narrow base of current exchanges. Thus, she argues, the expansion of transport connectivity is not just about logistics but about fundamentally restructuring Uzbekistan’s economic integration with global markets, enabling more diversified, higher-value exports over time.   To that end, Umarova highlights two transformative infrastructure initiatives. The first is the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway, which will shorten trade routes between East Asia and Europe by nearly 900 kilometers. This railway is designed to turn the Southern Corridor, previously marginalized by sanctions on Iran and logistical difficulties, into a competitive monomodal artery for transcontinental trade. Although she acknowledges that the mountainous terrain in Kyrgyzstan may limit its scalability compared to Kazakhstan’s flatter routes, Umarova argues that the southern path offers new geoeconomic options, particularly through potential linkages to the Middle East and Africa via Iran and Türkiye.   The second initiative she examines is the Termez–Mazar-i-Sharif–Kabul–Peshawar railway, which aims to create a direct land connection from Central Asia to South Asia and the Indian Ocean. In Umarova’s assessment, this so-called Kabul Corridor has the potential to redefine regional transit flows by offering an alternative to traditional northward routes through Russia. If successfully linked to the Northern and Middle Corridors, the Afghan route could connect Northern Europe, Russia, Belarus, the Caucasus, and parts of Southern Europe to India and the Gulf, with Uzbekistan serving as the pivotal junction. This would not only enhance the country’s logistical profile but also elevate its geostrategic relevance in a fragmenting global order.   Umarova concludes that while Uzbekistan cannot fully compete with Kazakhstan’s dominance in regional freight due to its lack of Caspian Sea access and more limited rail infrastructure, these new corridors offer pathways to mitigate existing imbalances. The key, she asserts, is not to replicate Kazakhstan’s model, but to develop complementary routes that serve new geographies and actors. If Uzbekistan succeeds in establishing itself as an indispensable link between Europe, South Asia, and the Middle East, it could profoundly shift the regional transport matrix and secure a stronger role in the international economic system.   Read on The Diplomat   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In his policy brief, Eugenio Ciarlandini examines whether China’s economic outreach through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Uzbekistan has translated into genuine cultural influence or merely reinforced existing economic dependencies. Since President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s accession in 2016, Tashkent has pursued a multi-vector strategy, welcoming infrastructure investment to modernize transport links and diversify its external partnerships. His analysis begins by charting the brass-tacks achievements of the BRI — most notably the Angren–Pop railway, completed in 2016 to bypass Tajikistan, and the 2024 agreement on the Kashgar–Andijan–Jalal-Abad link — which have undeniably cemented Uzbekistan’s role in East–West trade flows and channelled nearly $90 billion in commerce between Central Asia and Xinjiang.   Eugenio argues that the material benefits are clear: between 2022 and 2023, Uzbekistan’s foreign direct investment almost doubled to $7.2 billion, with Chinese capital nearly twice that of Russia’s, and GDP growth comfortably exceeding 6 percent through 2024. These figures attest to the BRI’s success in stimulating the transport, energy and construction sectors, creating local jobs and unlocking trans-Eurasian supply-chain efficiencies. Yet this economic momentum has not been matched by a corresponding upsurge in Chinese cultural presence: there remains a conspicuous absence of Confucius Institutes, Mandarin curriculum expansion or Chinese media penetration in Uzbek public life.   The author further contends that Russia’s cultural legacy retains its primacy in Uzbekistan. Russian remains the lingua franca of business, government and higher education, while a growing cohort of Uzbek students opts for Western universities and professional opportunities in North America and Europe. This persistence of Russian soft power, alongside emerging Western cultural influences, suggests that Uzbek society has not realigned its cultural orientations in step with its economic pivot toward Beijing.   In assessing China’s strategy, he maintains that its heavy emphasis on hard infrastructure — while effective in forging tangible connectivity — has overlooked the necessity of people-to-people engagement. The BRI’s evolving model, which now favours targeted, sector-specific investments, presents an opening for expanded cultural diplomacy. He proposes that Beijing supplement its infrastructure portfolio with robust academic exchanges, language programmes and joint media initiatives to cultivate deeper mutual understanding and sustained influence.   Finally, Eugenio recommends that Uzbekistan leverage its position not only to host Chinese-financed projects but also to assert greater cultural agency. Tashkent should negotiate BRI partnerships that bundle infrastructure financing with cultural cooperation clauses — such as scholarship quotas, cultural festivals and collaborative research centres. By doing so, Uzbekistan can ensure that its Silk Road resurgence fosters not only the flow of goods and capital, but also a reciprocally enriching exchange of ideas and values.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The conflict between Israel and Iran, despite its regional nature, has the potential to cause global turmoil in the oil market. Escalating tensions in the strategically important Middle East region threaten the stability of oil supplies and, in extreme scenarios, could cause price shocks comparable to the oil crises of the 1970s.     Short-term conflict – minimal impact If the military confrontation develops along the lines of the previous exchange of blows – that is, short-term, without significant infrastructure losses and the involvement of third countries – the oil market's reaction will be restrained. An example of this is the episode in the spring of 2024, when, after exchanges of blows on targets in Syria, Iraq and Iran, oil prices temporarily rose by $3-5 per barrel, but returned to their previous levels within a week.   In such situations, the market factors a ‘geopolitical premium’ into the price, but quickly adjusts when it becomes clear that there is no threat to actual supplies. This is especially true given that Iran supplies about 1–1.5 million barrels per day to the external market, which is a significant but not critical volume, especially since it goes mainly to China, which has its own strategic reserves.   Escalation and strikes on infrastructure – prices rise to $100–150 A scenario in which the conflict drags on and Iran's oil refineries, export terminals and pipelines are hit poses a much greater threat. In this case, the market will face a real reduction in supply, which could trigger a jump in prices to $100–150 per barrel.   There have been precedents of this kind: the drone attack on Saudi Aramco facilities in September 2019 led to the loss of almost 5% of global supplies and caused a one-off 19% increase in Brent crude oil prices (the sharpest jump since 1991). Although the situation was quickly resolved, it highlighted the vulnerability of infrastructure even in highly protected countries.   Given the limited ability to increase production in the short term, even for OPEC+ countries, and the possible tightening of sanctions against Iran, it will be difficult for the market to quickly make up for the loss of even 1–1.5 million barrels per day.   Threat to the Strait of Hormuz – energy shock scenario The most critical scenario involves the closure or military blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, a strategic ‘oil bottleneck.’ Between 20 and 21 million barrels of oil pass through this narrow section between Oman and Iran every day, which is about one-fifth of total global consumption.   Iran has repeatedly threatened to block the strait in the event of military aggression. If such a threat becomes a reality, even for a few days, oil prices could rise sharply to $200-300 per barrel. In the event of a large-scale naval blockade, insurance companies refusing to operate in the region and tanker traffic coming to a halt, even more extreme figures are theoretically possible — $500-1000 per barrel — although these seem hypothetical in the short term.   This would create a domino effect: global supply chains will face a sharp increase in logistics costs, prices for petrol, aviation fuel, food and fertilisers will rise, inflationary pressure will increase in importing countries, central banks will tighten monetary policy, global GDP may contract by 1–2%.   Constraining factors Despite the dramatic potential for developments, a number of factors may constrain explosive price growth: Strategic oil reserves in OECD countries and China are capable of temporarily compensating for the drop in supply. The flexibility of OPEC+, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, allows for rapid increases in production in emergencies. US shale oil could increase production by 500-700 thousand barrels per day within 3-6 months. Diplomatic pressure on Iran from China and Russia, which are interested in stability in the region.   At the moment, the oil market is living on expectations. If the conflict between Israel and Iran remains limited, the price increase will be short-term and moderate. However, its prolongation or the involvement of third countries (e.g., the US, Saudi Arabia, the UAE) could radically change the picture.   The key risk is the Strait of Hormuz. Its closure, even for a few days, would trigger an energy shock and global inflation. Therefore, despite all the scenarios, the world's leading countries are making efforts to prevent the situation from escalating to that level.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In their compelling policy brief, Darius Riazi and Alexander Schrier dissect the growing strategic divergence between the European Union and the United States in their engagement with Central Asia. Once unified under a broadly complementary transatlantic strategy that aimed to promote regional stability, connectivity, and liberal-democratic norms while hedging against Russian and Chinese influence, the two powers have since charted markedly different courses. The shift, catalyzed by Donald Trump’s return to the White House in 2025, signals the erosion of a once-coordinated Western approach. The authors argue convincingly that this rift is not merely symbolic but has tangible consequences for the foreign policy calculus of the Central Asian Five (C5), whose long-standing commitment to a multi-vector foreign policy is now tested by increasingly divergent external pressures.   The European Union, as Riazi and Schrier note, has embraced a strategy of continuity and institutional maturity. Through high-profile initiatives such as the 2025 Samarkand Summit and major investments under the Global Gateway framework, the EU has positioned itself as a long-term partner committed to inclusive development, multilateralism, and green transition cooperation. With projects in critical mineral development, renewable energy, and digital connectivity, the EU is not only filling strategic voids left by retreating American programs but offering a normative alternative rooted in sustainable governance and regional integration. The EU’s explicit rejection of “spheres of influence” in favor of a “third way” of cooperation stands in stark contrast to Washington’s more transactional diplomacy under Trump.   Indeed, the return of Trump has introduced a hard pivot in U.S. engagement with the region. As the authors demonstrate, Trump’s emphasis on bilateral deals, high tariffs, and a retreat from liberal-democratic aid mechanisms such as USAID has fragmented the once-unified C5+1 framework. American diplomacy is now characterized by an assertive form of bilateral transnationalism: ad hoc deals tailored to national elites, often with a security or migration lens. While this may yield short-term concessions from individual Central Asian governments — such as Uzbekistan’s deportation initiative or Kazakhstan’s mineral negotiations — it risks undercutting the multilateral platforms and long-term development goals that previously underpinned U.S.–C5 relations. Moreover, the vacuum created by the withdrawal of U.S. support for civil society and governance projects is already being filled by China, reinforcing Beijing’s growing normative influence in the region.   The policy brief ends on a note of strategic caution and pragmatic foresight. Riazi and Schrier recommend that C5 states resist the temptation to view the EU and U.S. as a cohesive bloc and instead pursue differentiated diplomatic strategies tailored to the shifting priorities of each actor. This approach, they argue, will allow Central Asia to preserve its multi-vector foreign policy and avoid entanglement in zero-sum geopolitical rivalries. Their conclusion also gestures toward a broader global trend: the unravelling of the transatlantic consensus not only in Central Asia but across the Global South. In a world increasingly marked by multipolarity and great power competition, the authors call for a recalibration of regional strategies — not only by external actors but also by smaller states intent on preserving agency amid fragmentation.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In her contribution to Working Paper of the European Institute of Romania, Nargiza Umarova offers a comprehensive appraisal of Uzbekistan’s burgeoning role as a pivotal transit hub between Central Asia and the European Union. Drawing upon recent geopolitical shifts — most notably the aftermath of the war in Ukraine and the inaugural EU–Central Asia Summit in Samarkand on 4 April 2025 — she underscores Uzbekistan’s strategic imperative to diversify its export routes and strengthen economic ties with Romania through the Trans-Caspian and Black Sea corridors. By tripling its exports to the EU under the GSP+ regime to US $1.15 billion since 2021, Uzbekistan has demonstrated both the viability of preferential trade frameworks and the urgent need for reliable, multimodal transport links to sustain that momentum.   Umarova delineates three “trigger points” for accelerating interregional connectivity: enhanced trade cooperation, energy export diversification, and critical-minerals logistics. She highlights Tashkent’s proactive engagement in TRACECA and the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, as well as its 2019 launch of the CASCA+ corridor — an Asia-Pacific to Europe multimodal axis traversing Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Romania and Bulgaria. Her analysis stresses that harmonising these parallel initiatives could substantially expand cargo throughput along the China–Central Asia–Europe axis, notably once the December 2024-opened China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway reaches Turkmenbashi and links to the port of Constanța.   Beyond freight logistics, Umarova envisages a “green energy corridor” threading Caspian and Black Sea seabeds to transmit up to 15 billion kWh of Uzbek solar and wind power to European markets by 2030. She argues that this initiative not only aligns with Romania’s ambition to become a regional energy-distribution hub but also cements a symbiotic Uzbek–Romanian partnership in advancing the EU’s decarbonisation and energy-security objectives. In so doing, her contribution charts a forward-looking agenda whereby transport infrastructure and clean-energy interconnectivity jointly underpin Uzbekistan’s integration into Europe’s economic and environmental architecture.   Nargiza Umarova underpins her recommendations with detailed trade statistics, corridor-development milestones and policy roadmaps, thereby furnishing policymakers with a rigorous blueprint for deepening EU–Central Asia cooperation through the prism of Uzbekistan–Romania linkages.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In his latest policy brief, Dr Islomkhon Gafarov provides a detailed assessment of how the Taliban are recalibrating Afghanistan’s mineral wealth as a strategic diplomatic instrument. Faced with the collapse of international aid, asset freezes, and the dismantling of the opium economy, the Taliban leadership has turned its attention to the country’s vast untapped reserves of copper, lithium, iron ore, and uranium. Yet, rather than launching immediate large-scale exploitation, Dr Gafarov argues, the Taliban have adopted a cautious approach — employing natural resources as a form of political capital in their efforts to achieve international recognition.   Afghanistan’s subsoil potential is immense: over 1,400 deposits are identified across the country, with copper at Mes Aynak valued at over $50 billion, and lithium reserves seen as critical to the global green energy transition. While the sector has already attracted approximately $7 billion in foreign investment and officially employs 150,000 people, the Taliban appear to be treating these resources not primarily as economic assets, but as geopolitical leverage. The brief underlines how the regime is linking bilateral extraction agreements with broader negotiations over legal frameworks, with the implicit understanding that access to Afghanistan’s critical minerals could pave the way for limited international engagement or even recognition.   Dr Gafarov outlines the role of key external actors — most prominently China, whose state companies have secured long-term contracts in oil and copper, and which is now negotiating for lithium concessions. China’s interest is both economic and strategic, tied to the Belt and Road Initiative and to securing technological supply chains. India, facing rising tensions with Pakistan and aiming to scale its nuclear sector, is eyeing Afghan uranium. Russia, Iran, and Pakistan, while active, are approaching resource cooperation through broader strategic lenses, including transit infrastructure and regional power dynamics. Uzbekistan, for its part, is well positioned to assist through mineral processing facilities, cross-border logistics, and technical capacity-building.   The policy brief concludes that Afghanistan’s extractive sector, though underdeveloped, has become a central pillar of the Taliban’s shadow diplomacy. By avoiding exclusive partnerships and maintaining a multi-vector engagement strategy, the Taliban are using natural resources to generate interest without making full concessions. According to Dr Gafarov, this strategy reflects an attempt to move beyond financial survival and toward the careful construction of political legitimacy through resource diplomacy — seeking not merely contracts, but recognition.   Read on Geopolitical Monitor   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.