The authors, Hamza Boltaev and Dr. Islomkhon Gafarov, argue that Uzbekistan’s evolving strategy towards Northern Afghanistan is driven by pragmatic economic and geopolitical considerations. They state that Tashkent has moved beyond a traditional security-first approach to one that prioritizes economic engagement and infrastructural development. This shift is exemplified by Uzbekistan’s commitment to increasing bilateral trade with Afghanistan, with a stated goal of reaching a turnover of $3 billion, alongside key projects such as the expansion of trade centers and the Trans-Afghan transport corridor.   They highlight the deep historical ties between Uzbekistan and Northern Afghanistan, particularly in provinces such as Balkh, Jowzjan, and Faryab, where significant Uzbek communities reside. They state that these connections, dating back to the Emirate of Bukhara, provide a strong foundation for Uzbekistan’s policy. They further argue that while the Qosh-Tepa Canal presents potential water-related tensions, Tashkent’s strategy focuses on fostering economic development in Northern Afghanistan as a means of ensuring stability. The authors suggest that Uzbekistan’s approach balances caution with engagement, aiming to position itself as a key economic partner while avoiding direct political entanglements.   The policy brief also underscores Uzbekistan’s use of soft power through educational initiatives, such as funding the construction of the “Khair al-Mudaris Imam Bukhari” madrasah in Mazar-i-Sharif. The authors contend that by supporting religious and intellectual development, Uzbekistan seeks to counter radical ideologies and solidify its influence among Afghanistan’s religious and political elites. However, they caution that challenges remain, including shifting ethnic dynamics in Northern Afghanistan, growing Chinese economic interests, and potential energy market realignments that could diminish Uzbekistan’s role.   Ultimately, Mr. Boltaev and Dr. Gafarov conclude that Uzbekistan’s policy reflects an effort to integrate Afghanistan more closely into the broader Central Asian region. They state that Tashkent’s focus on economic cooperation, regional stability, and infrastructural development demonstrates a long-term commitment to fostering bilateral relations beyond immediate security concerns. While challenges persist, the authors suggest that Uzbekistan’s nuanced approach positions it as a critical player in shaping Afghanistan’s future, particularly in its northern provinces.   Read on The Diplomat   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Dr. Islomkhon Gafarov, Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Afghanistan and South Asian Studies, and Junior Research Fellow Bobur Mingyasharov state that Russia’s growing influence in Afghanistan is a strategic shift shaped by both geopolitical necessity and economic interests. Following the U.S. withdrawal, Moscow has sought to expand its engagement with the Taliban government, leveraging Afghanistan’s transit potential and market of 41 million people. The authors argue that Russia’s pragmatic approach — maintaining diplomatic presence in Kabul and considering the removal of the Taliban from its terrorist list — demonstrates a long-term commitment to strengthening ties. This shift, they note, aligns with Russia’s broader strategy of consolidating influence in Eurasia amid its ongoing confrontation with the West.   The authors further state that Russia’s engagement with Afghanistan encompasses three primary areas: trade, resource extraction, and security cooperation. They highlight that trade turnover between the two countries has exceeded $1 billion, with projections to reach $10 billion by 2030. Russia’s interest in Afghanistan’s lithium and rare earth minerals, they note, positions it in direct competition with China and India for resource access. Additionally, the authors emphasize Russia’s humanitarian aid efforts as part of its “soft power” strategy to improve relations with the Afghan authorities and overcome lingering historical grievances from the Soviet-Afghan war.   They also highlight that Russia’s strategy is shaped by competition with China, particularly in the economic sphere. While Beijing has firmly established itself as a key investor in Afghanistan through the Belt and Road Initiative, Russia seeks to secure its own economic foothold, particularly by supporting large-scale infrastructure projects such as the Trans-Afghan Railway. This project, they argue, would enhance Russia’s access to Indian and Pakistani markets while reinforcing Central Asia’s role as a transit corridor. However, they caution that the evolving geopolitical landscape in Afghanistan — where Russia, China, India, and Pakistan all vie for influence — could create tensions that may spill over into Central Asia.   Furthermore, it is underlined that security concerns remain a central factor in Russia’s Afghanistan policy. They note that Moscow views the Taliban as a critical partner in countering ISIS-Khorasan, particularly following the Crocus City Hall terrorist attack in Moscow. While Russia has refrained from expanding its military presence in Central Asia, the authors argue that its diplomatic engagement with the Taliban could reshape regional security dynamics. Finally, they conclude that Russia’s growing involvement in Afghanistan presents both opportunities and challenges for Central Asia, particularly in the realms of economic cooperation, counterterrorism, and water resource management.   Read the policy brief on Kun.uz   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

As Nargiza Umarova explains, Uzbekistan is actively developing its transport connectivity with the South Caucasus, recognising the region’s key role in facilitating trade between Central Asia and Europe. Given the growing importance of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) amid shifting geopolitical dynamics, Tashkent has intensified its cooperation with Azerbaijan and Georgia. Since the war in Ukraine and the subsequent decline of Russia’s role in the Europe-China transit chain, Uzbekistan has sought to capitalise on new transport corridors, particularly through the CASCA+ multimodal route. This corridor, linking Central Asia with the South Caucasus and Anatolia, has already proven its effectiveness with the successful shipment of goods to Europe, reducing both transit time and costs.   The author highlights Uzbekistan’s commitment to enhancing maritime transport infrastructure, with significant investments in the Baku International Sea Trade Port and the Black Sea ports of Poti and Batumi. The country also supports the opening of the Zangezur Corridor, which could shorten the route from Azerbaijan to Türkiye, further strengthening East-West trade links. However, she notes that the success of these transport initiatives depends on overcoming administrative and legal barriers, including tariff unification and the digitalisation of transit processes. According to Ms. Umarova, Uzbekistan’s deepening cooperation with Azerbaijan, particularly in railway and port infrastructure, aligns with its broader ambition to increase transit capacity to 22 million tons annually by 2030.   Explore a detailed analysis on Caspian Policy Center   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Prepared under the supervision of Hamza Boltaev and Islomkhon Gafarov, this policy brief by Samandar Soliev, IAIS junior research fellow, explores the broader implications of Abdukodir Khusanov’s transfer to Manchester City, positioning it as a strategic instrument of the United Kingdom’s soft power in Uzbekistan. The author states that while this transfer may seem like a routine football transaction, it aligns with a subtle yet significant shift in the UK’s approach to public diplomacy in Central Asia. The UK has traditionally engaged with the region through cultural initiatives and language promotion, yet the incorporation of football into its soft power strategy reflects an evolving framework that capitalises on the immense popularity of the English Premier League. The extensive media engagement surrounding Khusanov’s transfer, notably the club’s targeted outreach to the Uzbek audience, illustrates the growing intersection of digital diplomacy, sports marketing, and international influence.   The author further examines how the UK employs institutional mechanisms such as the British Council, diplomatic missions, and business networks to shape perceptions and bolster its global standing. He highlights the British Council’s role in expanding access to UK education and increasing English proficiency among Uzbek youth, citing a significant rise in IELTS success rates. The policy brief also underscores the expanding UK-Uzbekistan economic relations, evidenced by increased trade turnover and British investments in various sectors. Football, as an unparalleled vehicle for engagement, serves as an extension of these diplomatic efforts, with Manchester City’s engagement in Uzbekistan reflecting a strategic move to strengthen cultural ties. The author concludes that, despite the absence of a unified UK strategy for Central Asia, soft power remains a vital mechanism for maintaining British influence in the region, with Khusanov’s transfer marking a potential milestone in this evolving approach.   Read in Kun.uz   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Nargiza Umarova, a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS), analyses the implications of the renewed “maximum pressure” campaign by the United States on Iran, particularly its potential impact on the Chabahar port and broader regional transport dynamics. She explains that the decision by President Donald Trump to reinstate stringent sanctions on Iran threatens India's long-term investment in Chabahar, which serves as a critical gateway for India’s access to Central Asia and Afghanistan. By targeting Iranian port operations, the US may indirectly weaken India’s geoeconomic position while reinforcing the strategic advantage of Pakistan’s Gwadar port, which is being developed under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This could further intensify the competition between India and China over regional connectivity and trade routes.   Ms. Umarova highlights that India has been modernizing Chabahar for years, securing an exemption from US sanctions in 2018 to operate the Shahid Beheshti terminal. However, with the renewed sanctions, India's plans to invest $370 million in upgrading the port may be jeopardized. The Chabahar port is central to several international transport initiatives, including the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and the Ashgabat Agreement, facilitating trade between Central Asia and the Persian Gulf. Countries such as Uzbekistan, which relies on external ports for its maritime trade, have shown great interest in leveraging Chabahar’s transit potential. The planned establishment of a logistics center at the port could have significantly boosted Uzbekistan’s trade, especially with India, which saw bilateral trade figures nearing $1 billion in 2024. Additionally, Afghanistan, facing tensions with Pakistan, has increasingly turned to Chabahar as an alternative route for its maritime trade, with the completion of the Khaf-Herat railway expected to enhance connectivity further.   Should Chabahar’s operations be restricted due to renewed US sanctions, Umarova argues that this would leave Central Asian states and Afghanistan with no alternative but to rely on Pakistan for maritime access. This, in turn, would strengthen Islamabad’s strategic importance in the regional transport network while amplifying the geopolitical influence of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). China’s investment in Gwadar port would benefit from Chabahar’s decline, reinforcing Beijing’s regional influence while undermining India’s land connectivity with Central Asia. Furthermore, the shift in regional transport dynamics could inadvertently benefit Uzbekistan by making its Trans-Afghan Railway Corridor (Termez-Mazar-i-Sharif-Kabul-Peshawar) more attractive to investors, potentially accelerating its implementation. Umarova concludes that the US sanctions regime, while aimed at curbing Iran’s economic capabilities, will have far-reaching consequences for regional connectivity, reshaping the geopolitical and trade landscape of South and Central Asia.   Read on The Diplomat   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In a recent analysis in Kun.uz, Hamza Boltaev, Head of the Centre for Afghanistan and South Asian Studies, and Senior Research Fellow Islomkhon Gafarov argue that the recent Munich Security Conference signified a major shift in the global order, challenging the traditional transatlantic alliance between Europe and the United States. They state that the emerging divergence in U.S. and EU foreign policies — exemplified by Washington’s direct negotiations with Russia on Ukraine, bypassing European involvement — raises critical questions about the future trajectory of European diplomacy. In light of this, the authors explore how the European Union may redefine its engagement with key actors and regions such as China, Central Asia, the Middle East, and South Asia, as it seeks to assert greater strategic autonomy.   They suggest that Europe may reassess its stance towards China, Iran, and Afghanistan, given that past policies were largely shaped by U.S. influence. They highlight the potential for the EU to deepen economic ties with China through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative, while also reconsidering its approach to Iran as an energy partner, independent of Washington’s policies. The authors also point out that Afghanistan, previously viewed through the lens of NATO intervention, could now be engaged in a more pragmatic manner by the EU. Furthermore, they examine the evolving dynamics in relations with India and Türkiye, emphasizing that Brussels may prioritize strategic transport corridors and trade expansion. Ultimately, they conclude that while Europe faces significant geopolitical challenges, these changes also create opportunities for strengthened cooperation with emerging regional powers.   Read in Kun.uz   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.