In her analytical piece, Nargiza Umarova examines how Iran has emerged as a central actor in the ongoing reconfiguration of Eurasian transport routes. Against the backdrop of geopolitical instability, sanctions pressure on Tehran, and disruptions along the Northern Corridor, the article shows how Iran is intensifying transport diplomacy with Central Asian states to position itself as a key land bridge linking East Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. The Southern Corridor is presented not as an abstract alternative, but as a practical response to shifting trade geographies and mounting risks in traditional routes. A central argument of the article is that the Southern Corridor aligns the strategic interests of several actors at once. For China, constrained by maritime insecurity and the war in Ukraine, trans-Iranian routes offer a technically efficient, container-friendly overland option for high-value exports to the EU. For Iran, large-scale investments in rail infrastructure—including new transit corridors and cross-border links—are designed to consolidate its role as the shortest East–West land route. For Central Asia, participation in these projects enhances transit competitiveness, diversifies export pathways, and reduces over-dependence on any single corridor or partner. In her conclusions, the author stresses that the strategic value of the Southern Corridor goes beyond logistics. Access to Iran’s ports on the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean opens new north–south dimensions for Central Asian trade, reinforcing the region’s global connectivity. At the same time, she argues that sustained progress will require harmonized transport policies, unified documentation standards, and a collective approach to managing geopolitical risks related to Iran, making transport diplomacy a key instrument of Central Asia’s long-term strategic autonomy. Read on CACI Analyst * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In his article, Timur Dadabaev analyzes the evolution of Japan’s policy toward Central Asia, noting that in 2025 Tokyo placed particular emphasis on cooperation in the field of artificial intelligence within the Central Asia + Japan format. Unlike infrastructure- and technology-driven models, Japan promotes AI primarily as a tool for institutional development, governance, and human capital formation. The author emphasizes that Japan’s approach differs markedly from the strategies of other Asian actors. While China and the Republic of Korea focus on digital infrastructure and corporate-led technological projects, Japan prioritizes the integration of AI into existing administrative processes—particularly in public administration, customs, and logistics. In this context, artificial intelligence is not treated as an autonomous technology, but rather as a means of enhancing the efficiency of state institutions. According to Prof. Dadabaev, this model helps reduce the political and administrative risks associated with AI adoption. At the same time, it may contribute to the entrenchment of external governance standards. Since algorithms and analytical frameworks are often developed outside the region, Central Asian states risk reproducing external conceptions of efficiency, risk, and good governance without sufficient local adaptation. Special attention is given to the application of AI in transport and logistics connectivity, including along the Trans-Caspian route. While the digitalization of procedures can reduce costs and improve the predictability of trade, the author stresses the importance of developing domestic analytical capacities in order to avoid dependence on external data and regulatory standards. In conclusion, Prof. Dadabaev argues that participation in AI diplomacy requires Central Asian states not only to adapt technologically, but also to build institutional readiness to shape and govern their own AI systems. Without this, the benefits of cooperation may remain asymmetric and could ultimately constrain the region’s strategic autonomy. Read on East Asia Forum * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

by Uskanboev Giyosbek & Khidirov Mardonbek This policy brief examines the “Zangezur Paradox” by asking whether a new transit route linking mainland Azerbaijan with the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic through Armenia’s Syunik region can function as a genuine peace-support instrument in the South Caucasus. It frames the corridor as more than a logistics upgrade within the broader Middle Corridor connecting China, Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Europe: it is treated as a political test-case for post-conflict stabilisation between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The central argument is deliberately conditional: the corridor can contribute to sustainable peace only if it is embedded in political normalisation, mutual recognition of sovereignty and territorial integrity, credible security guarantees, and enforceable legal arrangements that reduce uncertainty and prevent coercive reinterpretations. The analysis is anchored in neorealism and the security dilemma, emphasising how infrastructure projects in contested spaces are rarely neutral: the very measures one side considers “connectivity” can be perceived by the other as strategic encroachment. From this angle, the corridor’s peace-building promise lies in transforming rivalry into interdependence raising the economic costs of renewed confrontation and creating shared incentives for stability. Yet the brief stresses that interdependence does not emerge automatically; without transparent governance and robust confidence-building mechanisms, the corridor risks becoming a pressure point that deepens mistrust rather than a platform for cooperation. A major contribution of the brief is its actor-centred mapping of interests and anxieties. Azerbaijan is presented as prioritising uninterrupted, secure passage and national reintegration of Nakhchivan; Armenia is depicted as insisting on full jurisdiction rejecting any “extraterritorial” logic and reframing the concept through its “Crossroads of Peace” approach. Georgia is assessed as supportive of peace in principle but wary of losing transit primacy, while Iran is portrayed as viewing the corridor through a hard security lens, including fears of strategic isolation and a shift in regional power geometry. The United States is cast as a catalytic external sponsor seeking to institutionalise the route through international guarantees and investment, while Russia and Turkey are portrayed as balancing, respectively, concerns over influence and security architecture against pragmatic economic and strategic benefits. The brief concludes that the Zangezur Corridor is neither a guaranteed peace dividend nor an inevitable trigger of escalation; it is a strategic instrument whose effects depend on design and sequencing. If managed through inclusive, rules-based governance clarifying customs and border modalities, establishing credible monitoring and dispute-resolution mechanisms, and keeping external competition from dominating the agenda, the corridor could consolidate a “peace through connectivity” logic. If, however, it is securitised, used as leverage, or perceived as undermining sovereignty, it may intensify geopolitical contestation and revive conflict dynamics. In short, the corridor’s value as a peace-support measure rests on whether it is operationalised as a shared economic public good rather than a zero-sum geopolitical trophy. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

UWED PhD Candidate Nigina Saidova’s policy brief frames nationwide AI literacy not only as a domestic development priority, but as a new instrument of Uzbekistan’s soft power in the digital age. Drawing on Joseph Nye’s concept of soft power and the expanding logic of cyber power and digital diplomacy, the brief argues that a population equipped with AI skills becomes part of a country’s international attractiveness, signalling openness, innovation, and a future-oriented national identity. In this reading, human capital in AI is no longer simply an education agenda; it becomes a reputational asset that strengthens “digital nation branding” and enhances foreign-policy communication. At the centre of the analysis is Uzbekistan’s Five Million AI Leaders initiative, presented as an extension of the Digital Uzbekistan–2030 strategy and the AI development framework through 2030. The brief highlights how the initiative is underpinned by policy architecture and measurable targets, expanding AI products and services, improving governmental readiness for AI deployment, establishing research laboratories, and building a critical mass of specialists. It situates this agenda within broader progress in IT education and youth skills development, portraying Uzbekistan as deliberately building the foundations of a competitive AI ecosystem and positioning itself to function as a regional digital hub in Central Asia. The brief then explains how the initiative is designed to transmit clear external signals: investment in youth, openness to global tech partnerships, and regional leadership in convening AI dialogue. Cooperation with major technology actors, international internships, and platforms such as the Silk Road AI Forum are presented as channels of “digital diplomacy” that integrate Uzbekistan into global innovation networks while projecting a cooperative, modernising image, distinct from more closed models of digital sovereignty. Concluding, the author recommends institutionalising this soft-power potential through diplomatic promotion at major multilateral venues, consistent English-language reporting and success stories, alignment with SDGs (especially education and decent work), and stronger emphasis on AI ethics, data protection, and rights-based governance to reinforce Uzbekistan’s credibility in international AI discussions. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The development of digital technologies in the 21st century is accompanied not only by an increase in data volumes, but also by a qualitative complication of data processing processes. Artificial intelligence (AI), big data analysis, and the development of autonomous systems and digital platforms are creating a steady and ever-growing demand for computing power. At the heart of this transformation are data centers, which are becoming critically important infrastructure for the functioning of the modern economy, public administration, and security systems. At the same time, the ground-based infrastructure of data centers faces systemic constraints. These include overloaded power grids, rising electricity costs, water shortages for cooling, and social and environmental resistance at the local community level. In a number of countries, primarily the United States, there have already been cases of new data center construction being blocked due to concerns about the environment and the load on regional power grids. Against this backdrop, experts, corporations, and governments are increasingly discussing the idea of placing computing infrastructure outside Earth—in outer space. Orbital data centers are seen as a potential response to the structural limitations of the terrestrial model of digital development and as an element in the formation of a new technological paradigm. Project initiators and international dynamics. Leading technological powers and major corporations are showing interest in orbital data centers. In the United States, this direction is being actively promoted both by the private sector and within the framework of government strategic discussions. Through Project SunCatcher, Google has announced the possibility of creating satellite computing platforms that use solar energy and autonomous life support systems for equipment. Entrepreneur Elon Musk links the prospects for orbital computing with the development of reusable rockets and the global Starlink satellite network. In his approach, space infrastructure should become an extension of the Earth's internet and cloud services, but with fundamentally different energy and spatial potential. The startup Starcloud, in partnership with NVIDIA, is developing specialized satellites with computing modules for AI tasks, focused on processing data directly in orbit. The European Union is taking a more cautious stance for now, focusing on research programs such as the ASCEND project, which aims to assess the technical feasibility and economic implications of orbital data centers. At the same time, China is demonstrating a more decisive approach. The launch of satellites as part of the Three-Body Computing Constellation (Xing Shidai / 星时代) program demonstrates Beijing's desire to take a leading position in the emerging field of space computing technologies. Technological features and limitations. From a technical point of view, orbital data centers have a number of fundamental advantages. The main one is access to solar energy outside the Earth's atmosphere. The intensity of solar radiation in space is higher than on the planet's surface, and the absence of weather factors allows for more stable energy generation. Placement in certain types of orbits minimizes periods of shading, which makes it possible for equipment to operate almost continuously. However, the space environment also imposes serious limitations. One of the key problems remains the cooling of servers. In a vacuum, there is no convective heat exchange, and heat can only be removed by radiation. This requires the use of massive radiators and complicates the architecture of orbital platforms. In addition, such designs increase the mass of the devices and, accordingly, the cost of their launch. Another critical factor is cosmic radiation. The impact of high-energy particles can lead to microchip malfunctions and reduced computing reliability. Special materials, shielding, and software error correction methods are used to protect equipment, but all these measures increase the cost and complexity of the systems. Economic logic and investment models. The economic efficiency of orbital data centers is directly linked to the cost of launching equipment into orbit. Despite advancements in reusable launch vehicles, the launch process remains an expensive component of the entire chain. In the short term, this renders orbital data centers less competitive compared to their terrestrial counterparts. Communication between orbital data centers and Earth is a separate challenge. High-speed channels, including laser communication systems, are required to transmit large amounts of data. Ensuring the stability of such channels, their redundancy, and protection against failures are critical tasks in the design of orbital computing systems. Nevertheless, significant economic benefits are possible in the long term. The main source of potential savings is energy. In ground-based data centers, a significant portion of operating costs is accounted for by electricity and cooling. In space, once the infrastructure is deployed, solar energy becomes virtually free, which can radically reduce the cost of computing. In addition, orbital data centers can offer unique services, such as processing Earth remote sensing data directly in orbit or providing computing resources for space missions. These niches have no direct analogues in ground-based infrastructure and may justify higher initial costs. Environmental aspects. From an environmental point of view, the idea of moving data centers into space is ambiguous. On the one hand, it reduces the burden on terrestrial ecosystems, decreases water consumption, and reduces the need to build new power plants. This is especially relevant for regions with scarce resources. The relevance of this argument is confirmed by the situation in the United States, where the rapid expansion of AI infrastructure is already having a noticeable impact on aquatic ecosystems. AI data centers in the US threaten to dry up the Great Lakes. One large center consumes as much water as hundreds of thousands of people. This has already led to falling water levels in the Great Lakes, water supply problems, and threats to agriculture. Companies that operate data centers often conceal the real data on resource consumption. On the other hand, rocket launches are accompanied by significant emissions of greenhouse gases and other substances that affect the atmosphere. The mass deployment of orbital infrastructure could lead to an increase in the carbon footprint if more environmentally friendly launch technologies are not introduced. An additional systemic risk is the increase in space debris. The increase in the number of satellites increases the risk of collisions and threatens the sustainability of near-Earth space as an environment for human activity. Geopolitical and legal implications. Orbital data centers have a pronounced geopolitical dimension. Control over computing infrastructure in space can provide states with significant advantages in data processing, intelligence activities, and complex systems management. At the same time, the line between civilian and military use of such technologies remains blurred. The existing international legal framework does not fully take into account the specific nature of orbital computing platforms. Questions arise regarding jurisdiction, access to data, and liability for possible damage. This makes it necessary to develop new international mechanisms for regulation and cooperation. In a broader geopolitical context, orbital data centers are becoming an element in the struggle for technological and regulatory leadership in the emerging digital order. Control over computing power in space means not only access to advanced data processing technologies, but also the ability to shape the standards, rules, and architecture of the global digital infrastructure. This factor is particularly significant in the context of intensifying rivalry between the world's leading powers, primarily the United States and China. China's active steps to create satellite computing clusters demonstrate Beijing's desire not only to solve applied data processing tasks, but also to establish itself as one of the architects of the future global digital infrastructure. For the United States, orbital data centers are seen as part of its technology leadership strategy. The growing needs of the AI industry and the limited capabilities of the power grid are driving the search for alternative solutions. Interest in space computing is being shown by both civilian agencies and national security organizations. In a broader strategic context, the development of orbital data centers reflects the United States' desire to ensure the long-term sustainability of critical digital infrastructure. Moving some computing power outside the country is seen as a way to reduce vulnerability to domestic energy crises, natural disasters, and potential attacks on ground-based infrastructure. Close cooperation between the state and the private sector plays an important role in the American approach. Technology corporations and specialized startups working on orbital computing platforms effectively complement government priorities in the field of innovation and security. This is particularly important in the context of increasing competition with China. The placement of data centers in orbit represents a complex and multidimensional project that combines technological innovations, economic calculations, and geopolitical interests. Potential advantages - access to energy, scalability, and reduced load on Earth's infrastructure - make this concept attractive. At the same time, significant risks associated with high costs, technical challenges, and environmental consequences remain. In the long term, orbital data centers may become an important element of global digital architecture; however, their successful implementation will require coordinated efforts from states, businesses, and international organizations. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Julia Davies’ policy brief examines the White House’s 2025 NSS as a deliberate break from the expansive, interventionist logic that has often characterised U.S. grand strategy. At the centre of her reading is the document’s attempt to cure what Washington commentators call the “Christmas tree problem”, a tendency for national security strategies to become all-encompassing wish lists. Davies argues that, instead, the NSS tries to narrow the definition of U.S. national interest to a stark, realist baseline: the survival and safety of the United States, supported by domestic resilience (borders, industrial capacity, energy, technology) and renewed instruments of state power. A major portion of the brief highlights the NSS’s hierarchy of priorities and the way it links foreign policy to a domestic political agenda. Davies notes the strategy’s five core interests – Western Hemisphere migration pressures, Indo-Pacific trade practices, bolstering Europe, Middle Eastern energy access, and winning the AI/technology race – presented as the organising logic for statecraft and resource allocation. She underscores how the strategy frames internal measures – reindustrialisation, energy reshoring, deregulation, and cultural-political programmes as the enabling foundation for achieving these external goals, making the document as much a statement of political worldview as a conventional strategic blueprint. Davies then interrogates the NSS’s regional ordering and its most controversial language. She emphasises the elevation of the Western Hemisphere to the top priority, paired with a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, alongside a more transactional, de-ideologised posture in Asia, where the strategy envisages managing U.S.–China relations through balanced trade rather than democracy-versus-autocracy framing. In contrast, she identifies the Europe section as the sharpest fault line: allies react strongly to what she presents as scolding rhetoric and a perceived double standard – non-interference is preached globally, yet Europe’s domestic trajectory is treated as a U.S. national security concern. In conclusion, the brief frames the NSS as unorthodox but internally purposeful, attracting optimism from realist and restraint-oriented audiences who welcome a higher threshold for military adventurism. At the same time, Davies flags an unresolved tension: the strategy’s non-interventionist, selective-prioritisation posture can clash with broader claims about U.S. peace-brokering and with coercive signals, particularly in the Americas. Her overall assessment is that the 2025 NSS is best understood as a strategy of tightened national interest definition, but one whose credibility will depend on whether implementation remains disciplined and consistent with the limits the document itself tries to impose. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.