Senior Research Fellow
Hamza Muratbayevich Boltaev
Senior Fellow at the Centre for Afghanistan and South Asian Studies.
At this position, he is responsible for studying and analyzing the region as well as developing analytical reports and materials. And also participates in seminars and conferences regarding the regional issues.
Hamza Boltaev is a lawyer and systems analyst. In 2010, he graduated from the Academy of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan. In 2014, he graduated from the Higher School for Strategic Analysis and Prognosis of the Republic of Uzbekistan, and in 2021, from War Studies Department at King’s College London.
During his career, he successfully worked in different senior and managerial positions in the system of Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan in 2010-2018, including in the field of combating terrorism and extremism at the Main Department of Internal Affairs of Tashkent city. In 2018-2020, he worked as a senior analyst at the Center for Mass Communications of the Agency for Information and Mass Communications under the Administration of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, as well as a leading researcher at the Center for Scientific and Applied Research of the University of Public Safety of the Republic of Uzbekistan in 2022.
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This annual flagship report, including 13 policy briefs, offers an alternative glimpse at the events and developments in and around Afghanistan, prioritizing timely and significant thematic and regional approaches. Obviously, the Taliban’s rapid surge into power in August 2021 and the subsequent measures to solidify their position reshaped relations with Afghanistan’s neighbours.
Thematic analyses cover critical issues such as terrorism and extremism, humanitarian crises, transnational crime, as well as political and social problems stemming from Afghanistan. Additionally, sporadic efforts by the Taliban government to regulate the country’s economic situation are deeply analysed. The report also explores Afghanistan’s role as a centre for transport communications between its immediate and extended neighbours.
Policy briefs highlight emerging concerns such as transboundary water issues and border conflicts between Afghanistan and its neighbours. Furthermore, the report underscores Afghanistan’s growing importance for Central Asian Republics (CAR) as an alternative transportation corridor diversifying away from traditional partners. Several papers assess CAR’s pragmatic foreign policy towards Afghanistan amid a challenging international environment where varying approaches to establishing formal relations with the Taliban prevail.
Overall, the report presents ideas in an orthodox yet easily understandable manner, with historical events laid out chronologically to aid in understanding the contemporary developments.
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The recent, on March 12, 2024, visit of Uzbekistan’s Foreign Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov to Kabul underscores the importance of constant engagement with the Taliban regime. Ongoing negotiations with the unrecognised Taliban administration reflect Uzbekistan’s profound interest in fostering pragmatic relations with its southern neighbour. Given critical nature of issues such as trade, transport connectivity and water management, continual dialogue between the parties remains paramount.
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On February 18-19 this year, an international meeting on Afghanistan was held in Doha under the auspices of the United Nations, which was chaired by Secretary–General A. Guterres. Representatives of 25 states and regional organizations also arrived in the capital of Qatar, including with four Afghan civil society activists. However, the conference failed to achieve concrete results for several reasons.
Firstly, due to the absence of representatives of the current government of the Islamic Emirate at the conference, it is impractical to expect positive changes, since the Taliban Movement, which is not a recognized state and at the same time has great political power in Afghanistan. The reason for the refusal to participate was the rejection of his demand to be the "only official representative of Afghanistan" at the conference.
Thus, the world community does not associate Afghanistan only with the Taliban, it advocates the creation of an inclusive government, therefore it involves civil society activists and the opposition of the current government in the conference. This is confirmed by the statement of the US State Department on the non-participation of the Taliban at the meeting of special representatives in Doha, that in the future Afghanistan will not belong only to the Taliban.
Secondly, the international community is limited only to issuing ultimatums against Afghanistan on issues of respect for human rights, the creation of an inclusive government, ensuring equal freedoms for women, and preventing the country from becoming a "hotbed" of terrorism. These requirements are not supported with strategic measures for their implementation, while remaining in fact meaningless statements to the "problematic" Afghanistan, which is building public life according to Sharia law.
Thirdly, once again, the international conference does not find an effective approach to eliminate the problems of Afghanistan, postponing them for subsequent rounds of meetings. Thus, the proof of this is the statement of the UN Secretary General during the February conference in Doha - "After a series of consultations, I will be ready to convene a new meeting." Such tendency is likely to lead to the hopelessness of this negotiating platform for the Taliban, which does not take into account their interests.
The Doha meeting also sent a preemptive signal to the Tliban Movement that non-participation in this meeting would lead to their further isolation and official non-recognition of the current government. In this regard, Afghanistan should actively participate in such conferences with the international community, which is the main financial donor of humanitarian assistance critically needed in the current economic situation and humanitarian crisis in the country.
In conclusion, taking into account the fact that the Taliban is one of the main influential centers of power in Afghanistan, the world community is considering options for compromise interaction with the Taliban while maintaining a critical position regarding individual decisions of the movement on human rights and inclusiveness of public administration. At the same time, the Taliban demonstrate a restrained attitude towards the demands of international partners and to some extent use their "tough stance" on these issues as a tool to influence the acceleration of the procedure for formal recognition of their government.
This policy brief was prepared by Salomov Bakhtiyorjon him under the supervision of Hamza Boltaev.
Salomov Bakhtiyorjon
Graduate of the University of World Economy and Diplomacy
Freelance employee (intern) Institute
Institute for Advanced International Studies under UWED
Contacts: salomovbakhtiyorjon@gmail.com
The Taliban’s lightning-fast takeover of Afghanistan received rather calm and “wait and see” reactions from nearly all the Central Asian Republics (CAR), with Tajikistan being unusually outspoken about the events unfolding in its southern neighbour. Although the CARs did not welcome the Biden administration’s swift decision on the allied forces’ sudden departure from Afghanistan in the summer of 2021, they reluctantly adapted to the reality. Since then, the Central Asian countries’ respective policies towards a Taliban-led Afghanistan have shared certain similarities, with trade-driven pragmatism being their most important characteristic. This article explores the affairs of the CARs with Taliban-led Afghanistan, which are largely shaped by Western countries’ reticence in recognising the Taliban as the official government of Afghanistan.
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Contrary to the very dim and pessimistic assumptions about Afghanistan's dire economic conditions eventually getting even worse during the Taliban rule, so far appears to be a hasty and premature assessment. Nonetheless, the Taliban’s ability to stay in power so far by utilising any available tools to prevent full scale economic collapse cannot by any means be regarded as a viable transformation to solid socio economic reforms. Thus, this paper will analyse the economy of the country as well as its relationship with Uzbekistan with a greater emphasis on the security and long-term export interests of it to the Taliban-run Afghanistan.
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