Center for Afghanistan and South Asian Studies

Center for Afghanistan and South Asian Studies

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Experts

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Aziza Mukhammedova

Leading Research Fellow

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Islomkhon Gafarov

Senior research fellow

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Hamza Boltaev

Head of the Center

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Akram Umarov

Head of the Afghanistan and South Asia Research Center

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Outputs

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Media Appearances

25 September, 2024

Islomkhon Gafarov’s views on foreign policy and regional co-operation of Central Asian states

Islomkhon Gafarov expressed his views on Uzbekistan’s active foreign policy and regional cooperation on a recent edition of Mahalla TV’s MINBAR programme. Noting that Central Asian countries have significantly strengthened their co-operation in recent years, which has allowed resolving many long-standing sensitive issues, including delimitation and demarcation of state borders, as well as effective management of transboundary water resources, the expert stressed that these achievements have become possible due to joint efforts and political will of the region’s countries aimed at ensuring stability and sustainable development. In turn, the resolution of border issues has contributed to reducing potential conflicts and building trust between states, which has a positive impact on regional security.

 

However, according to Islomkhon Gafarov, despite the successes achieved, the region still faces several economic challenges. The lack of direct access to the world’s oceans forces Central Asian countries to seek alternative transport corridors for exporting and importing goods. The most promising direction in this context is South Asia, through which the nearest access to the ocean lies. Establishing close economic and infrastructural ties with the states of this region could significantly increase the trade and economic potential of Central Asia.

 

The expert added that the issue of stability and security in Afghanistan, through which the key routes linking Central Asia to southern markets pass, is of particular importance in this regard. Afghanistan’s sustainable development and security on its territory are prerequisites for the realisation of long-term transport and economic projects, which makes strengthening cooperation with the Afghan authorities an important aspect of regional policy.

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Media Appearances

13 September, 2024

“Security talks are important” says Hamza Boltaev in his recent interview with Kun.uz

Tashkent, Uzbekistan – 13 September 2024. On 4-5 September 2024, Tashkent became the focal point for two critical regional security dialogues: the 10th International Conference of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (RATS SCO) and the 2nd Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Conference on Combating Terrorism and Extremism. These high-level gatherings brought together leading experts, security officials, and policymakers from member states to address escalating security challenges in the region, with a particular focus on Afghanistan.

 

During the conferences, Chairman of the State Security Service of Uzbekistan, Abdusalom Azizov, underscored the urgent need for collaboration with Afghanistan in its ongoing struggle against the Khorasan Province, an affiliate of the Islamic State in Afghanistan notorious for its transnational extremist operations. This statement implicitly conveyed a recognition that the Taliban has yet to establish comprehensive control over the country’s security apparatus, signalling an enduring vulnerability within Afghan borders.

 

Reflecting on this during an interview broadcast by Kun.uz, Hamza Boltaev, Head of the Centre for Afghanistan and South Asian Studies at IAIS, highlighted the complexities surrounding security cooperation with Afghanistan under the current Taliban leadership. According to him, formal recognition of the Taliban’s authority remains a prerequisite for any substantial collaboration on counterterrorism measures. In the absence of official diplomatic ties, interactions between Afghanistan and its regional neighbours have been confined to dialogue, with no tangible outcomes or concerted follow-up actions. The expert further elaborated, noting that discussions on security are no longer optional but a pressing necessity driven by the evolving geopolitical landscape. In his words, “talking about security is a requirement of the time”, reinforcing the need for immediate and coordinated responses to the threats posed by extremist factions like the Khorasan Province.

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Commentary

12 September, 2024

The Evolution of US Foreign Policy in South Asia: Strategic Shifts, Key Partnerships, and Geopolitical Trends

Over the past two decades, the South Asian region has emerged as a critical region influencing global trends and international developments. Key factors include India's rapid rise on the global stage and the initiation of the international North-South transport corridor. Additionally, India and Pakistan's accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the escalating Kashmir conflict, heightened nuclear tensions between Delhi and Islamabad, Pakistan's strategic shift from being a close US ally towards closer ties with China, and the inclusion of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor in the Belt and Road Initiative are also notable developments. The US-Afghanistan war, the rise of international terrorist networks, the return of Taliban rule in Afghanistan, and subsequent dialogues with the Taliban further underscore the region’s geopolitical complexity. In analyzing US foreign policy towards South Asia, it is evident that the United States has adopted distinct approaches towards the region's two principal actors, India and Pakistan. US foreign policy has shifted over time, sometimes prioritizing India, at other times focusing more on Pakistan, and during certain periods such as the 1990s, balancing both. Currently, US relations with Pakistan and India are conducted through separate, differentiated policies. Relations with Pakistan are primarily security-oriented, while US engagement with India is framed more strategically and economically. A historical analysis of US foreign policy in South Asia reveals a dynamic evolution. The contemporary US approach to the region began after World War II, following independence of India and Pakistan. Studies by Nawaz M., Shaheen M., and Saif A. have typically divided US foreign policy into three or four distinct phases. However, our research, delineates seven distinct periods of US foreign policy development: 1947-1965, 1965-1979, 1979-1989, 1989-1998, 1998-2001, 2001-2021, and 2021 onwards. Major events that have shaped US foreign policy in South Asia include the establishment of India and Pakistan, the Vietnam War, the Soviet-Afghan War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, the events of September 11, and the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Each of these events has precipitated substantial shifts in US foreign policy in the region.

 

Our research produced a table titled "Genesis of US Foreign Policy in South Asia", which outlines these seven pivotal periods. This tool provides a valuable framework for scholars and students analyzing U.S. foreign policy in the region, offering a concise and structured overview of its evolution.

 

*** By increasing the intensity of color, you can notice the increase or decrease in the importance of South Asia in US foreign policy

 

From 1947 to 1965, US foreign policy in South Asia primarily focused on “containing” the global spread of communism. During this period, the region held strategic rather than economic value for the US, with Pakistan viewed as a reliable partner in building an anti-communist buffer across the Middle East and South Asia. In contrast, US-India relations were minimal, largely due to India’s leadership in the Non-Aligned Movement, which distanced itself from Cold War power dynamics. From 1965 to 1979, US foreign policy in South Asia became more passive, as attention shifted towards the Vietnam War (1965-1973) and Southeast Asia. This resulted in a reduced US presence in South Asia and a growing distance from Pakistan. The US did not intervene in the India-Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971. The Soviet-Afghan War (1979 to 1989) marked a significant shift in US focus back to South Asia, as Pakistan became a pivotal ally in the US efforts to counter the Soviet Union’s influence in Afghanistan. This period saw Pakistan take center stage in U.S. strategic calculations. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in 1989 initiated a new phase (1989-1998), as Washington sought to consolidate its global leadership. During this time, the US expressed growing interest in India's emerging economy, while maintaining Pakistan’s strategic importance in the region. From 1998 to 2001, relations between the US and South Asia deteriorated, particularly following nuclear tests conducted by both India and Pakistan, which heightened regional tensions and triggered international concern. The events of September 11, 2001, reoriented US foreign policy towards South Asia, particularly in the context of the US-led war on terror (2001-2021). Pakistan became a key partner as a logistical and operational based for US efforts in Afghanistan, while US-India relations flourished economically, driven by a shared interest in countering China’s rising influence in the Indo-Pacific. From 2021 to the present, US foreign policy in South Asia has been influenced by the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan. Pakistan’s strategic role in US foreign policy has significantly diminished, though cooperation in counterterrorism remains. Meanwhile, India has gained prominence, with US designating it as a “Major Defense Partner”, reflecting a broader shift in US priorities toward economic and defense cooperation with India.

 

In conclusion, an analysis of the genesis of US foreign policy in South Asia reveals a cyclical pattern of engagement and disengagement. During the Cold War, the region was viewed through the lens of containing communism, with Pakistan serving as the main partner. In the modern era, India’s stable economy and democratic governance system have made it a favorable partner for the US, while Pakistan continues to hold importance in counterterrorism efforts.

 

Download the commentary below

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Media Appearances

09 September, 2024

Islomkhon Gafarov shared his opinion on the upcoming U.S. Presidential candidates’ debates and the shift in U.S.-Uzbekistan relations

Islomkhon Gafarov, an expert at the Institute for Advanced International Studies, recently participated in the “International View” (“Xalqaro nigoh”) programme on the Uzbekistan 24 TV channel, where he provided insightful commentary on the forthcoming debates between U.S. presidential candidates. During the discussion, he highlighted the significance of these debates, which are not only a platform for candidates to present their policy proposals but also offer an opportunity to scrutinize their stance on key international issues. With the U.S. playing a pivotal role in global geopolitics, the candidates’ positions on foreign policy will be closely examined.

 

Mr. Gafarov emphasized that U.S. policy towards Central Asia, particularly Uzbekistan, is undergoing a period of transformation. Historically, the region was viewed primarily through the lenses of security, counterterrorism, and energy interests. However, recent global geopolitical shifts have prompted a recalibration of these priorities. The evolving multipolar world order, the strategic significance of China's Belt and Road Initiative, and Russia's continued presence in the region have all contributed to reshaping U.S. engagement in Central Asia.

 

In this changing landscape, U.S. policy has become more nuanced, with an increasing focus on economic development, digital infrastructure, and regional connectivity. Gafarov noted that Uzbekistan, as a key player in Central Asia, has benefitted from this shift, with U.S. diplomacy placing greater emphasis on supporting the country’s modernization efforts, fostering economic cooperation, and promoting regional stability. As the U.S. presidential candidates outline their foreign policy agendas, their approach to Central Asia will likely reflect this broader shift, moving beyond traditional concerns to embrace new forms of partnership that align with Uzbekistan’s own evolving role on the global stage.

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Commentary

22 August, 2024

Rising Pragmatism: What does Aripov’s Visit Mean?

Uzbekistan has long been demonstrating a calculated and strategic pragmatism dealing effectively with its foreign policy towards the Taliban-led government in Afghanistan. What might appear as mere diplomatic exchanges on the surface is, in fact, part of a broader and more sophisticated approach by Uzbekistan to secure its national interests in a volatile region. The high-level visits by Uzbek officials, including Minister of Investment, Industry, and Trade Laziz Qudratov and Prime Minister Abdulla Aripov, reflect this nuanced strategy. These visits, along with other economic engagements, are seemingly emblematic of Uzbekistan’s pragmatic foreign policy, which prioritizes economic leverage over formal diplomatic ties due to the current situation around Afghanistan.

 

The July 3rd business forum held in Tashkent, which brought Afghan entrepreneurs to the negotiating table, was not an isolated event but part of a series of deliberate moves by Uzbekistan to deepen economic ties with Afghanistan. This forum, followed by high-level visits, including the October 2023 visit by Uzbekistan’s Deputy Prime Minister to Kabul, underscores the importance Uzbekistan places on economic convergence with its neighbour. During the October visit, both parties agreed to increase bilateral trade to $3 billion, a significant commitment that illustrates the depth of economic engagement between the two countries.

 

Apparently though, these engagements might not just only be about trade; they seem to serve as a means for Uzbekistan to establish a form of an economic leverage over the Taliban government to ensure that the latter could not weaponize water issue between two countries. Given the geopolitical uncertainty in the region and the unrecognized status of the Taliban government, Uzbekistan is crafting a foreign policy that allows it to protect its interests without the need for a formal diplomatic recognition. This strategy reflects a careful balancing act, where the economic relations are used as a credible means to influence and potentially control the outcomes in bilateral relations.

 

In some perspective, Uzbekistan’s increasing focus on economic ties with Afghanistan is rooted in several strategic considerations. One of the most pressing issues for Uzbekistan is water security. The country’s agricultural sector, which is vital for its economy, depends heavily on Amu Darya’s water resources that in part originate in Afghanistan. With the Taliban now in control, Uzbekistan faces the risk of potential blackmail or manipulation over water rights, a scenario that could have devastating consequences for its agricultural output and, by extension, its food security.

 

By fostering strong economic ties, Uzbekistan, to some extent, aims to create a form of co-dependency that could deter the Taliban from using water as a bargaining chip. The promise of increased trade and economic collaboration offers Taliban certain incentives for maintaining stable and cooperative relationship with Uzbekistan. In this way, Uzbekistan is thought to be building a buffer against potential threats to its water security, ensuring that any attempt by the Taliban to leverage water resources could be met with a strong economic response, including the possibility of decoupling trade relations.

 

This approach is particularly pragmatic given the current geopolitical landscape. The Taliban government, though unrecognized by the international community, controls significant resources and territory. For Uzbekistan, engaging with the Taliban on economic terms allows it to navigate the complexities of the situation without compromising its own standing in the international arena. By focusing on trade rather than formal diplomatic ties, Uzbekistan could pursue its interests while maintaining flexibility in its foreign policy.

 

The visits by Uzbek officials to Kabul, including the recent high-profile visit by Prime Minister Abdulla Aripov, are more than just diplomatic gestures. They are part of a broader strategy that emphasizes pragmatism over ideology. Uzbekistan recognizes the reality of the Taliban’s control over Afghanistan and the need to engage with them on practical terms. This approach reflects a departure from traditional diplomacy, where recognition and formal ties are often prerequisites for engagement. Instead, Uzbekistan is prioritizing its national interests using economic tools through building a set of influences ensuring stability in its relations with Afghanistan.

 

This pragmatism is also evident in Uzbekistan’s broader foreign policy. The country has been careful to balance its relationships with major powers, including Russia, China, and the United States, while also fostering regional cooperation in Central Asia. In its dealings with Afghanistan, Uzbekistan is applying the same principles, seeking to avoid entanglement in ideological conflicts while focusing on tangible benefits such as trade and security. This approach allows Uzbekistan to navigate the complexities of the region while maintaining its sovereignty and independence.

 

Apart from hedging against some potential challenges Taliban might create, by establishing a strong economic relationship with Afghanistan, Uzbekistan could position itself as a key player in the region, capable of influencing outcomes and ensuring its own security. The potential for increased trade and economic collaboration could also bring substantial benefits to Uzbekistan’s economy, particularly in sectors such as agriculture and energy.

 

Conclusion

Uzbekistan’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan under the Taliban is a carefully crafted strategy that prioritizes economic convergence over a formal diplomatic tie. By focusing on trade and economic collaboration, Uzbekistan is potentially building some leverages that could protect its interests in the face of possible challenges, particularly concerning water security. This pragmatic approach reflects a broader shift in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy, where national interests take precedence over ideology. As Uzbekistan continues to navigate the complexities of its relationship with Afghanistan, its strategy of economic engagement could prove to be a powerful tool in ensuring stability and security in the region.

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Commentary

04 July, 2024

Doha Meeting: Is the International Community on the Verge of Recognizing the Taliban?

The UN and other international organisations find themselves in a difficult situation where the need for dialogue with the authorities of Afghanistan conflicts with the rejection of their policies regarding human rights. Despite this, since May of last year, we have witnessed a series of attempts to establish a dialogue with the government of Afghanistan.

On May 1-2, 2023, a meeting on Afghanistan was convened in Qatar by Antonio Guterres. Special envoys for Afghanistan from various countries, including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, participated. Although the agenda was dedicated to Afghan issues, the invitation did not extend to the representatives of the Taliban due to the international community's non-recognition of the Taliban government as legitimate and the clear requirements they must meet.

However, in February 2024, the Second Doha Meeting on Afghanistan took place, where representatives of both the Taliban and the official opposition to their government were invited. Despite the Taliban government's refusal to participate in the meeting, this dynamic clearly shows changes in the approaches of the international community, particularly the UN, towards the Taliban and a readiness to bring them to the negotiating table. This is also confirmed by the UN's DiCarlo, who stated that the main goal of the third Doha meeting on Afghanistan is the "normalization" of relations between the Taliban and the international community.

This position was confirmed in the latest meeting on Afghanistan in Doha, which started on June 30th this year. This time, we not only observed the invitation and participation of the Taliban in the negotiations but also the fulfillment of their conditions to exclude Afghan women and activists from participating in the meetings. This appears paradoxical since the UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Rosemary DiCarlo, who oversees this event, stated the goal is to create an Afghanistan that "is at peace with itself and its neighbors, fully integrated into the international community, and fulfilling its obligations, including in the area of human rights, especially those of women and girls."

The events around organising “Doha meeting” this particular time possibly indicate that the international community’s approach towards Taliban seems to be undergoing shifts as official interaction with the Taliban has reached to a new legitimate level. Moreover, meetings of the Taliban with countries discussing issues of cooperation and strengthening interaction indicate that countries have already established strong ties in areas such as trade relations, infrastructure projects, and plans to expand the mining sector.

This also applies to the countries of Central Asia. Perhaps, these countries have to develop a common legal framework for cooperation with Taliban government. As practice shows, the Taliban's integration into the region is growing, and there might soon be a need for legal regulation of certain issues. Today, we see the Taliban actively engaging in regional processes, driven by the need to improve and stabilize Afghanistan's internal situation. As a result, it is safe to assume that this process could necessitate a revision of Central Asian countries’ policies regarding Afghanistan.

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Research Articles

03 June, 2024

Uzbekistan and the New Realities of Trans-Afghan Trade

Significant changes in the international logistics system are fueling the development of trans-Afghan routes, but Uzbekistan may have to deal with increased competition.

Since the beginning of the year, Uzbekistan has held several rounds of negotiations with Qatar and the United Arab Emirates on financing the construction of the $7 billion Termez-Mazar-i-Sharif-Kabul-Peshawar railway, which would link Uzbekistan to Pakistan via Afghanistan.

The project is crucial for the states of Central Asia and Afghanistan in terms of providing access to the sea, as well as strengthening their transit potential and geopolitical role, but the implementation of the Trans-Afghan Railway has long been complicated by instability in Afghanistan During the Republic period a major threat to the project was the Taliban; now the current Taliban government in Afghanistan is ready to act as a guarantor of the route’s safety. Another remaining major hurdle is the question of investment. As such, Tashkent has called on the Gulf monarchies to cooperate. Kazakhstan, Russia, and Belarus have also expressed interest.

Read the article 

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Research Articles

01 April, 2024

The genesis of US foreign policy in the South Asian region (1947-2022)

US foreign policy in the South Asian region is characterized by changeability and dynamism. The main purpose of this article is to reveal the constructivist aspects of US foreign policy in this region. The article used historical, comparative political, inductive and deductive scientific methods. The paper concludes that the US foreign policy in South Asia from the Cold War to the present day has consisted of ups and downs, the foreign policy vector has been directed either towards Pakistan or towards India, and today relations are mainly directed towards India .

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Reports

29 March, 2024

Afghanistan: Contemporary developments & alternative perspectives

This annual flagship report, including 13 policy briefs, offers an alternative glimpse at the events and developments in and around Afghanistan, prioritizing timely and significant thematic and regional approaches. Obviously, the Taliban’s rapid surge into power in August 2021 and the subsequent measures to solidify their position reshaped relations with Afghanistan’s neighbours.

Thematic analyses cover critical issues such as terrorism and extremism, humanitarian crises, transnational crime, as well as political and social problems stemming from Afghanistan. Additionally, sporadic efforts by the Taliban government to regulate the country’s economic situation are deeply analysed. The report also explores Afghanistan’s role as a centre for transport communications between its immediate and extended neighbours.

Policy briefs highlight emerging concerns such as transboundary water issues and border conflicts between Afghanistan and its neighbours. Furthermore, the report underscores Afghanistan’s growing importance for Central Asian Republics (CAR) as an alternative transportation corridor diversifying away from traditional partners. Several papers assess CAR’s pragmatic foreign policy towards Afghanistan amid a challenging international environment where varying approaches to establishing formal relations with the Taliban prevail.

Overall, the report presents ideas in an orthodox yet easily understandable manner, with historical events laid out chronologically to aid in understanding the contemporary developments.

Download the report

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Media Appearances

13 March, 2024

Another inconclusive meeting?

On February 18-19 this year, an international meeting on Afghanistan was held in Doha under the auspices of the United Nations, which was chaired by Secretary–General A. Guterres. Representatives of 25 states and regional organizations also arrived in the capital of Qatar, including with four Afghan civil society activists. However, the conference failed to achieve concrete results for several reasons.

Firstly, due to the absence of representatives of the current government of the Islamic Emirate at the conference, it is impractical to expect positive changes, since the Taliban Movement, which is not a recognized state and at the same time has great political power in Afghanistan. The reason for the refusal to participate was the rejection of his demand to be the "only official representative of Afghanistan" at the conference.

Thus, the world community does not associate Afghanistan only with the Taliban, it advocates the creation of an inclusive government, therefore it involves civil society activists and the opposition of the current government in the conference. This is confirmed by the statement of the US State Department on the non-participation of the Taliban at the meeting of special representatives in Doha, that in the future Afghanistan will not belong only to the Taliban.

Secondly, the international community is limited only to issuing ultimatums against Afghanistan on issues of respect for human rights, the creation of an inclusive government, ensuring equal freedoms for women, and preventing the country from becoming a "hotbed" of terrorism. These requirements are not supported with strategic measures for their implementation, while remaining in fact meaningless statements to the "problematic" Afghanistan, which is building public life according to Sharia law.

Thirdly, once again, the international conference does not find an effective approach to eliminate the problems of Afghanistan, postponing them for subsequent rounds of meetings. Thus, the proof of this is the statement of the UN Secretary General during the February conference in Doha - "After a series of consultations, I will be ready to convene a new meeting." Such tendency is likely to lead to the hopelessness of this negotiating platform for the Taliban, which does not take into account their interests.

The Doha meeting also sent a preemptive signal to the Tliban Movement that non-participation in this meeting would lead to their further isolation and official non-recognition of the current government. In this regard, Afghanistan should actively participate in such conferences with the international community, which is the main financial donor of humanitarian assistance critically needed in the current economic situation and humanitarian crisis in the country.

In conclusion, taking into account the fact that the Taliban is one of the main influential centers of power in Afghanistan, the world community is considering options for compromise interaction with the Taliban while maintaining a critical position regarding individual decisions of the movement on human rights and inclusiveness of public administration. At the same time, the Taliban demonstrate a restrained attitude towards the demands of international partners and to some extent use their "tough stance" on these issues as a tool to influence the acceleration of the procedure for formal recognition of their government.

This policy brief was prepared by Salomov Bakhtiyorjon him under the supervision of Hamza Boltaev.

Salomov Bakhtiyorjon

Graduate of the University of World Economy and Diplomacy 

Freelance employee (intern) Institute 

Institute for Advanced International Studies under UWED

Contacts: salomovbakhtiyorjon@gmail.com

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Policy Briefs

04 February, 2024

China – Taliban: diplomatic rapprochement

China’s recent unprecedented move on ceremonially accepting the Taliban’s ambassador to PRC in Beijing raised mixed signals around the world. According to the Taliban’s chief spokesperson Zabiullah Mujahid, “China is the only country to officially approve Islamic Emirate’s ambassador”. It is a rather reciprocal move by China as the country’s ambassador to Afghanistan, Zhao Sheng, also received an official acceptance in September, last year. 

 

These “diplomatic romans” go further back to the initial official contact between sides when Wang Yi of China met with the representative of the Taliban, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, acting Deputy Prime Minister of the Taliban government, in Doha on October 2021. Even earlier, on July 2021, the Taliban delegation and China’s former Foreign Minister Wang Yi met in Tianjin.

 

China’s seemingly proactive foreign policy towards Afghanistan can well be a trigger for various interpretations the first of which could be characterized as the Chinese strive to develop its own narratives and approaches in relation to the Taliban acknowledgement issue. Second, China as a forerunner of a green development, will definitely need an enormous natural resource for its green development endeavour, thereby, Afghanistan could probably be an important destination for satisfying China’s appetite in this field. Third, acknowledging the Taliban’s capacity in providing relatively secure environment for the Chinese interests in Afghanistan such as fighting terrorism and creating transportation corridors, China seems to be winning time as a first-runner. 

 

Moreover, China probably believes that diplomatic recognition of the Taliban government will come naturally providing an active engagement mixed with the capacity-building prevails.

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Policy Briefs

23 March, 2023

Afghan vector of modern foreign policy of Uzbekistan

Until 2016, the factor of Afghanistan in the framework of the foreign policy of Uzbekistan was considered mainly through the prism of ensuring national and regional security. However, after the launch of reforms by President Shavkat Mirziyoyev in the second half of 2016, the southern neighbor began to be increasingly perceived not as a source of challenges and threats, but as a sum of opportunities within the framework of the general trend towards economization of the country's foreign policy.

This, of course, did not mean that security issues faded into the background. They were simply called upon to create favorable conditions for the development of trade, economic and investment relations. It is noteworthy that the withdrawal of American and NATO contingents, which caused a wide resonance in the world and the region, accompanied by the rapid advance of the Taliban (the Taliban movement, an organization banned in Russia) and the collapse of the government of Ashraf Ghani in August 2021, did not, on the whole, introduce fundamental changes in the new approach. Uzbekistan.

The election of Shavkat Mirziyoyev as President of Uzbekistan symbolized a change in the basic paradigm in the development of the country. There has been a rethinking of its basic constants in foreign policy – ​​the focus has shifted from the priority on maximizing security, which prevailed in the 1990s and the first decade of the 2000s, towards ensuring socio-economic reforms in accordance with modern realities and the backbone trends of the global economy. The new foreign policy course was called "economization" in the expert community.

As part of the new policy, key attention has been paid to using the potential of cooperation with regional countries, which are considered as natural markets for Uzbek products. It should be noted that until 2016 this potential was not used to its full potential due to disagreements with a number of Central Asian countries on water and border issues.

The new course of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev showed that often the sharpness and depth of the previously existing contradictions were seriously exaggerated. Evidence of this was the rapid normalization of relations with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, accompanied by the explosive growth of bilateral trade and the expansion of humanitarian contacts. Trade with Kazakhstan also began to develop rapidly. Despite the decline in trade with some Central Asian countries during the coronavirus pandemic, after it ended, it quickly recovered and returned to a growth trajectory.

In the new “economized” foreign policy course, much attention was also paid to Afghanistan, which, during the presence of the United States in this country and large-scale injections of donor funds into the Afghan economy, has become a significant export destination for Uzbek producers. At the same time, Uzbekistan traditionally had a steady surplus in trade with Kabul. If in 2019 it amounted to 431.2 million dollars (exports 433.3 million, imports - almost 2.1), then in the record-breaking coronavirus 2020 for bilateral trade. - 774.4 million dollars (export - 776.7 million, import - 2.3 million).

The Afghan market, which accounts for 5% of all Uzbek exports, has become the engine of economic activity in a number of sectors of the Uzbek economy, as evidenced by the commodity nomenclature. In 2020, 662 trade items were exported to Afghanistan. Of these, the lion's share of exports fell on the supply of wheat flour (28.1%), electricity (17.2%), freight rail services (25.3%). Exports of cement grew rapidly (by 21% compared to 2019) and ferrous metallurgy products (26.6%).

As of 2021, Afghanistan was Uzbekistan's largest trade and economic partner of all South Asian countries. It accounted for 48.9% of the total trade turnover, India - 35.6%, Pakistan - 13.2% and Bangladesh - 2.1%.

Meanwhile, the potential of economic relations with Afghanistan at that time was considered as far from its full implementation, which set the task for the government and the Foreign Ministry of Uzbekistan to bring bilateral cooperation to a qualitatively and quantitatively new level. As an analysis of Tashkent's foreign policy activity in relation to Afghanistan in the period 2016-2021 shows, its steps in the Afghan direction have become proactive and focused on three areas.

The first direction is to stimulate the efforts of the international community to find a model for a peaceful settlement of the Afghan conflict. It must be said that the period 2016-2021. characterized by growing military and political instability in Afghanistan. Thus, according to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the UN Human Rights Office, in 2018, 3,804 civilians were killed and 7,189 injured, including 927 children. The cause of 63% of the victims was the actions of anti-government forces (AGF) - the Taliban * (37%), ISIS-Khorasan ** (20%) and 6% - unidentified ATF. Pro-government forces were responsible for 24% of the casualties.

Obviously, this trend inspired growing fears for the future development of the situation in the Afghan domestic political field. In this regard, Uzbekistan came up with the initiative to hold an international conference on Afghanistan "Peace process, security cooperation and regional interaction." The event was held in Tashkent in March 2018 and during it, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev voiced the Uzbek vision for the settlement of the Afghan conflict, which consisted in advancing a comprehensive peace process at the following three interrelated and interdependent levels:

- at the intra-Afghan level, where it was necessary to ensure the launch of a direct dialogue without preconditions between the central government and the main forces of the armed opposition, primarily the Taliban *;

- at the regional level, in order to ensure the achievement of a strong consensus with the support of Pakistan, India, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and the countries of Central Asia;

- at the global level, at which it was necessary to provide fundamental political support for the peace process and financial assistance to the socio-economic reconstruction of Afghanistan from the leading world powers and donor organizations.

Later, already in 2020, Uzbekistan positively perceived the transformation of the capital of Qatar, Doha, into a negotiating platform for the Afghan settlement. As President Shavkat Mirziyoyev stated in his speech at the 75th session of the UN General Assembly, “We fully support the peace talks between the political forces of Afghanistan that began in September this year in the city of Doha. We express the hope that these negotiations will contribute to the establishment of peace and stability in the long-suffering Afghan land.”

Second directionwhere the proactive nature of Uzbek policy was manifested was the promotion of an initiative to create a solid foundation for cooperation between Central and South Asia with the participation of Afghanistan. The impetus for this strategic line was given by the international conference “Central and South Asia: Regional Connectivity” held on July 15-16, 2021 in Tashkent. The expansion of cooperation between the two regions was supposed to have a positive impact on the overall security system in Eurasia, contribute to the expansion of trade, economic and investment relations, and the development of cultural and humanitarian ties. Afghanistan in this regard was considered as one of the key beneficiaries, since the lion's share of cargo transportation would have to be carried out directly through its territory.

As the third direction of the Afghan vector of Uzbekistan's policy in the period 2016-2021. one can note the search for and creation of additional incentives and platforms for building up economic cooperation with Afghanistan. In 2017, a roadmap was signed to increase bilateral trade turnover to $1.5 billion, including more than 40 contracts worth more than $500 million to supply Uzbek products to the Afghan market.

An agreement was also signed on the construction of a power line at Surkhan - Puli Khumri for a stable energy supply to Kabul. The contract for the design, construction and operation of power lines in Afghanistan was signed between the National Electric Grids of Uzbekistan and Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat in December 2020, after which its implementation began, which was suspended in July 2021 amid a sharp increase in hostilities in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan managed at that time to complete the construction of a part of the power line on its territory.

Among the significant steps to increase trade and economic cooperation, one can single out the agreement reached by the parties in May 2021 in Termez to accelerate the approval of a draft agreement on preferential trade to bring trade to the level of $2 billion per year. In order to stimulate transit cargo transportation to / from Afghanistan, in 2016, the Termez Cargo Center was opened in the Surkhandarya region in close proximity to the Afghan border.

Meanwhile, the policy of Uzbekistan during the period of President Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani was not limited to economic interests. Tashkent, considering this country as "an integral part of Central Asia" and has repeatedly provided humanitarian assistance to it.

The unexpected for many analysts, the rapid fall of Kabul on August 15, 2021 and the establishment by the Taliban * of control over the entire territory of Afghanistan, including the seemingly impregnable Panjshir Gorge immediately after the withdrawal of American troops, put all the countries of Central Asia in front of the need to adjust their foreign policy based on new realities. According to a statement by Uzbek officials, the return of the Taliban * to power was not a surprise for them, since two years earlier such a development of events was predicted and clear security guarantees were received from the head of the political office of the Taliban in Doha (Qatar), Mullah Abdul Ghani Barodar.

Understanding that the emerging new reality in Afghanistan provides an opportunity to end the forty-year conflict, it was important for Uzbekistan to prevent the degradation of the humanitarian situation in this country, especially since against the backdrop of the cessation of international funding and the freezing of the country's funds in Western banks, the Afghan economy and the banking system were immediately on the brink of collapse. To prevent this, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, at the SCO summit in Dushanbe on September 17, 2021, called for the unfreezing of $9.5 billion of Afghan funds and assistance to Afghanistan in solving social problems.

A few days later, at the 76th session of the UN General Assembly, the President of Uzbekistan also called for the creation of a permanent committee on Afghanistan under the UN. His goal was to prevent the isolation of this state, in which it would be alone with its problems.

Based on the logic of preventing a humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan constructively and pragmatically accepted the formation of the Transitional Administration of the "Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan" (interim government) immediately after the capture of Kabul by the Taliban. Already on October 7, 2021, the head of the Uzbek Foreign Ministry Abdulaziz Kamilov visited Kabul. During the visit, he met with Acting Foreign Minister of Afghanistan Amir Khan Muttaki, with whom issues of bilateral economic cooperation in the field of cargo transit, energy, trade and reconstruction of the airport in Mazar-i-Sharif were discussed.

In general, the position of Uzbekistan at the end of 2021 regarding Afghanistan and the political changes that have taken place in it can be reduced to several points voiced by A. Kamilov at the second ministerial meeting in the Italy-Central Asia format on December 8, 2021. Among them:

- the need for a constructive dialogue with the new authorities of Afghanistan in order to avoid the re-turning of this country into a so-called. “a rogue state;

- providing a humanitarian corridor to Afghanistan in order to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe;

- taking measures to lift sanctions, unfreeze Afghanistan's international assets and assist it in restoring the banking system;

- the importance of launching the development of a post-conflict strategy with regard to Afghanistan and highlighting as a priority its more active involvement in regional economic integration processes and the implementation of socio-economic projects in this country;

- the fulfillment by the new Afghan authorities of the international obligations assumed: the creation of an inclusive government, the fight against terrorism and drug trafficking, the prevention of the deployment of terrorist groups in the country, the termination of contacts with them, the support of good neighborly relations with the countries of the region, the observance of fundamental human rights and freedoms, including number of women and national minorities.

Additional aspects to the designated political line of Uzbekistan towards Afghanistan were introduced in Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s address to the participants of the international conference “Afghanistan: security and economic development” held on July 26, 2022 in Tashkent. He, in particular, stressed that the Uzbek and Afghan peoples are united by common cultural, spiritual and historical values, as well as a single religion and heritage of their ancestors. In addition, the indivisibility of the security of Central Asia and Afghanistan was noted, since without stability south of the Amu Darya it would be impossible to achieve the security and sustainable development of Uzbekistan and all of Central Asia.

As the positions of the new Afghan authorities strengthened, showing their ability to keep the situation under control and revive certain economic activity in the country, despite limited financial opportunities, the policy of Uzbekistan again returned to giving priority to economic cooperation, promotion of mutually beneficial infrastructure and transport projects. Moreover, the Taliban themselves showed a clear interest. This is evidenced by the conference held on December 6-7, 2021. Uzbek-Afghan-Pakistani meeting in Tashkent to discuss the project for the construction of the Termez-Mazar-i-Sharif-Kabul-Peshawar railway. Also at the end of December 2021, during negotiations in Tashkent, the parties announced their intention to continue the construction of the Surkhan-Puli-Khumri power line.

If we analyze the situation in bilateral relations in 2022, we can note a number of positive events and trends for Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. Among them is the growth of bilateral trade to $759.9 million, which was only slightly lower than in 2020, when President Ashraf Ghani was in power ($779.1 million). Uzbek exports in 2022 accounted for $750.6 million ($776.7 million in 2020). At the same time, imports of Afghan goods and services increased - from $2.3 million in 2020. and $6.2 million in 2021 to 9.3 million in 2022.

Significant events include the completion by Tashkent of a technical assistance project for the restoration of the Mazar-i-Sharif airport, which included the repair of aeronautical and meteorological equipment, the reconstruction of the runway and the restoration of power supply.

During the first half of 2022 there was a rapid increase in transit traffic through Uzbekistan and Afghanistan in a southerly direction, which can serve as an indicator of the ability of the Taliban * to ensure the security of transport communications. The volume of cargo transportation increased by 2.6 times compared to the same period in 2021. up to 330 thousand tons.

Thanks to a certain stabilization of Afghanistan, an opportunity has opened up for Tashkent to establish direct cargo transportation with Islamabad. Already in November 2021, the first transit cargo from Uzbekistan was delivered to Pakistan, and in March 2022, the first batch of Pakistani meat was delivered to the Uzbek market through Afghan territory. India also tested this route by sending a transit cargo through Pakistan and Afghanistan to Uzbekistan.

The development of joint plans to increase the volume of bilateral trade and investment can be considered an indicator of the positive mood that has appeared in this regard in Uzbek-Pakistani relations. The parties reached an agreement on preferential trade, according to which duties on several dozen goods will be reduced from 20 to 100% [24]. Thanks to this, the volume of bilateral trade is expected to increase from $181 million in 2021 to $1 billion in the coming years.

Meanwhile, speaking about the future contours of Uzbekistan's policy towards Afghanistan under the rule of the Taliban*, one cannot ignore the potential risks that may affect its progressive nature. Although the Taliban * controls the situation in the country as a whole, however, this control still remains insufficiently strong in its basic basis. First of all, we are talking about the economy and the humanitarian situation. Currently, 6 million Afghans are on the verge of starvation, which is an extremely dangerous challenge for the Taliban authorities. The further aggravation of the situation with hunger still allows to deter foreign aid. More than a quarter of the population of 40 million receive food packages from the World Food Program.

The only way to mitigate the acuteness of the humanitarian situation is through the accelerated development of the national economy through the attraction of large-scale foreign investments, technologies and competencies, but for this the new authorities will need to receive international recognition, which will not be available in the foreseeable future until an inclusive political system is created and protected. the rights of women and girls to education and work. Whether the Taliban will be ready to change and go for a significant liberalization of their political and value approaches, as well as along the path of assimilation of the cultural foundations of Modern, is still difficult to say.

Nevertheless, time does not endure, just as the Afghan society will not wait for a natural change of generations in the ranks of the Taliban *. As the whole history of this country shows, the discontent of the population is always a time bomb, which sooner or later will make itself felt. In this regard, of interest is the opinion expressed by the Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation for Afghanistan, Director of the Second Department of Asia of the Russian Foreign Ministry Zamir Kabulov in an interview with the Indian magazine The Week in February 2023.

In his opinion, the Taliban have not learned how to govern the state, although they have repeatedly stated that they have learned their lessons and will not repeat past mistakes. “The Taliban* sometimes cannot understand very simple things, especially when there are no challenges to their power. I mean serious contenders who can force him out. This does not mean that there will be no such challenges. It won't be someone from the outside. But this will be a normal reaction of the Afghan people, because in the current circumstances it will be very difficult for them to survive,” the Russian diplomat said. According to Zamir Kabulov, "The Taliban must take institutional steps to improve the situation, or at least open the way for such an improvement, which we do not see at the moment."

***

So, summing up, it can be noted that the policy of Uzbekistan, based on an approach that combines issues of bilateral economic cooperation with Kabul, promoting initiatives at the international level to strengthen peace and provide assistance to Afghanistan in order to prevent its next slide into the abyss of instability and humanitarian crisis, and the implementation of measures to integrate this country into the system of trade, economic and transport relations between Central and South Asia that is being created today, is one of the most conceptually formalized lines among states that have their own interests in the Afghan field. As shown by the results of 2021-2022. this line is already paying dividends for the foreign policy and economy of Uzbekistan, including allowing it to smoothly go through the period of change of power in Afghanistan in August 2021.

At the same time, the further progress of Uzbekistan's policy in the Afghan direction will be largely associated with the steps of the new Afghan authorities themselves in domestic and foreign policy, with their ability not only to control the domestic political situation, but also to implement measures of economic and social modernization, without which it will be virtually impossible launch sustainable economic growth, raise the income level of the population, gain international recognition and improve the country's image on the world stage.

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Policy Briefs

05 February, 2023

Dr. Akram Umarov's article on the importance of Central Asian countries when it comes to dealing with the Taliban

Editor’s note: In August, The National Interest organized a symposium on Afghanistan one year after the U.S. withdrawal and the Taliban takeover of Kabul. We asked a variety of experts the following question: “How should the Biden administration approach Afghanistan and the Taliban government?” The following article is one of their responses:

One year after the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, the international community is still facing enormous challenges in dealing with the new reality in Central Asia. The withdrawal of international military forces, and the evacuation of only a small number of the Afghans who previously collaborated with them, considerably damaged the reputation of the United States and its Western allies. The chaos of the evacuation shocked millions of people around the world and Taliban rule has not brought long-expected peace, sustainable development, and prosperity.

The Taliban cannot be blamed for all the current problems facing Afghanistan given that they inherited an underdeveloped state with high rates of poverty, an over-dependence on foreign aid, and an inefficient governing apparatus. The Taliban could improve the internal security situation but it is encountering substantial problems in governing effectively. The lack of an inclusive government and respect for the rights of women are the largest disagreements between the Taliban and the majority of the international community, which so far has not officially recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan.

To learn from its past experience of military and political involvement in Afghanistan, Western countries should focus on the following lessons:

First, nation-building should be an internal process largely unaffected by foreign intervention. Afghanistan has continually proven that there is no “blueprint approach” that works and externally orchestrated reforms are fragile. There are no ready solutions for conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction. Some general principles and approaches for supporting countries after the end of conflicts still apply but each case requires attention to the importance of local communities taking the lead. 

Second, building a highly centralized government under the leadership of strongmen did not work. Afghanistan has a historic tradition of decentralized administration and cannot admit the establishment of personalist regimes. Oddly, the United States and its allies decided to neglect their own principles and commitment to democratic procedures. From 2001-2021, Afghanistan’s presidents were legitimized under the direct coordination and interference of external actors. Despite Kabul’s efforts to consolidate power, the central government was predominantly perceived as being manipulated by the West and lacking the necessary internal support to implement post-conflict reconciliation and development policies. This experiment in Afghanistan clearly demonstrated that an over-centralized presidential model does not guarantee security and stability.

Third, the West was ignorant of how regional countries could elaborate strategies on post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan. The future of Afghanistan cannot be considered and assembled without significant support from its neighbors. For various reasons, the United States avoided or minimized its cooperation with several regional countries on Afghanistan issues. Countries such as Pakistan were mainly used as transit routes and to host U.S. and Western military infrastructure essential for operations in Afghanistan. All major international gatherings discussing Afghanistan happened in Europe, the United States, and Japan. All are very far from the region and have a limited understanding of local traditions, context, and history. The concerns and proposals of states next to Afghanistan were barely considered as policy options by the United States and its allies.

The Biden administration is willing to engage with Afghanistan in a limited manner. However, questions remain on how to deal with the Taliban’s tough ideological approach to many policy issues. There is now an ongoing debate on whether the Taliban should be recognized by the international community. The Taliban have faced difficulties in establishing their credibility to merit cooperation with other states. What can the Biden administration do to improve the security situation in Afghanistan? 

First, there is a strong lack of trust between the Taliban and the United States. Conducting any substantive negotiations under such circumstances will not be effective. Especially after the U.S. drone strike against Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, there are many open questions about the credibility and honesty of the Taliban. However, collaboration on a limited number of issues important to the United States and its regional partners is critical. Drug and illicit arms trafficking, transborder threats, and border security are pressing problems that cannot be solved without cooperating with the Taliban.

Second, it is essential for the United States and the West to keep supporting and cooperating closely with Afghanistan’s neighbors. Despite regular exchanges between regional countries and the West, there are still many gaps in mutual understanding. Promoting development and prosperity in the region requires improving connectivity. Western countries have already found ways to regularly send humanitarian support to Afghanistan while not violating sanctions against the Taliban. Therefore, funding connectivity projects in Central Asia would invest in its security, independence, and resilience.

The main attention of the United States and allies in the international coalition should be given to the problem of socio-economic reconstruction and infrastructure development within Afghanistan. Improving the living standards of the Afghan people would help support U.S. policy, reduce the Taliban’s influence, and decrease interethnic struggles. Close cooperation with regional countries would ease the burden of interacting with the Taliban. No one wants to see a new civil war in Afghanistan and the United States has an interest in working to make sure that doesn’t happen.

Akram Umarov is Director of the Center for Afghanistan Studies, University of World Economy and Diplomacy. His research covers security studies, conflict management, public diplomacy and development issues in Central Asia, Afghanistan and CIS countries. Twitter: @umarov_akram

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Policy Briefs

05 February, 2023

Dr. Akram Umarov discusses whether the Taliban's Coming Split Lead to Civil War in Afghanistan

he ease with which the Taliban was able to remove the government of Ashraf Ghani from power created an illusion about the group’s power, consolidation, and readiness to take full control of the country. The international community expected the Taliban to stabilize Afghanistan and put the entire country under reliable control in order to establish sole power and eliminate security challenges such as terrorism and drug trafficking. However, the U.S. strike on Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri raises questions about the credibility and honesty of the movement. In the eleven months since the Taliban came to power, the group has faced a number of serious internal problems, including increased factional clashes over engagement with foreign partners, the rise of Pashtun nationalism and the exit of ethnic minorities from the movement, and its inability to stabilize the state administration system.

First, almost since the moment the Taliban seized power, there have been systematic clashes within the group over its leadership, pitting the future of the movement's agenda and cooperation with the international community between various factions. In the process of distributing leading state positions, the Taliban is facing serious confrontation between various factions. Despite Mullah Baradar's past success leading the Taliban, he has been demoted to holding a subordinate post as deputy prime minister for economic affairs. At the same time, Deputy Prime Minister for Political Affairs Abdul Kabeer has wide authority and the confidence of the country's supreme leadership.

As a result of the growing influence and presence in power structures of radical and ideological factions with regard to women's rights, access to education, and freedoms for the population, the new government of Afghanistan has not compromised with the international community. The group of conservatives among the Taliban is personally occupied by the leader of the movement, Sheikh Hebatullah Akhundzad; other prominent representatives include Prime Minister Mullah Hassan Akhund, Chief Justice of the Islamic Central Court Abdul Hakim Haqqani, and Mayor of Kabul Mullah Neda Mohammad Nadeem. On the other hand, more moderate leaders include Deputy Prime Minister Mullah Baradar, Mining and Oil Minister Sheikh Shahabuddin Delawar, and Deputy Foreign Minister Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai. At the same time, several influential Taliban figures, such as Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani and Defense Minister Mullah Yaqoob, are trying to maneuver between these opposing camps without joining either.

Second, in recent months, there has been a clear trend within the Taliban toward strengthening and significantly expanding the role of the Pashtun nationality. While the Taliban has previously been able to recruit Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Hazaras in the north and elsewhere to further its goals, the movement’s leadership is still dominated by the same radical Pashtun heads who ruled Afghanistan in the 1990s and oppose compromising on ideology and the balance of power. If the Taliban can find a formula to unite these factions, it will be able to strengthen the regime. Otherwise, this trend will weaken the group's hold on the country and may encourage some non-Pashtun groups to openly oppose the Taliban.

One of the most important factors in the success of the Taliban in the summer of 2021 was the fact that Uzbek and Tajik groups joined the movement in northern Afghanistan and were able to effectively neutralize any resistance from local warlords and the armed forces of Kabul. However, in recent months, Makhdoom Alam, a Taliban commander of Uzbek origin, has been persecuted. In March, Haji Mali-Khan, the uncle of Sirajuddin Haqqani, was made deputy chief of staff of the Taliban’s armed forces to keep an eye on Kari Salahuddin Ayubi, the Tajik head of the armed forces. There has also been an increase in tensions between the movement and the Hazara ethnic minority in Afghanistan. In addition to a series of terrorist attacks directed against this ethnic group, some Hazaras collaborating with the Taliban have recently been subjected to unjustified persecution. If the movement’s leadership cannot find a way to solve ethnic problems internally, a substantial number of the non-Pashtun Taliban armed forces could join the ranks of the resistance groups or terrorist organizations based in Afghanistan.

Third, despite being in power for a year, the Taliban has failed to demonstrate the ability to effectively govern the country. The Taliban, being a movement with a predominantly horizontal hierarchy, has always had a decentralized system of rule. Taliban forces on the ground acted within the framework of a single strategy approved by the leadership. However, at the same time, they had considerable autonomy in terms of choosing tactics to achieve their goals and independently determined their own operational tasks. Such an approach to management attracted a wide range of militants opposed to the government of Ashraf Ghani and helped the Taliban achieve its goals at the time.

Since seizing power in August 2021, the Taliban has been trying to build a highly centralized system of government by directly appointing local chiefs from Kabul, predominantly of Pashtun origin, and creating a rigid vertical hierarchy. However, such decisions have broken the existing balance of power between local commanders and the country's top leadership. By redistributing sources of income as a result of these changes, transferring removed commanders to remote parts of the country, and filling vacant posts with Pashtuns, the Taliban has radically changed the balance of power within the movement and significantly weakened its ability to control events in the provinces.

Generally speaking, in the last months, there has been a major split in various directions within the Taliban. The growing confrontation between different factions on issues related to strategy, ideology, cooperation with the outside world, and the inclusion of non-Pashtun ethnic groups in leadership positions is weakening the Taliban’s power, making a split in the movement’s ranks increasingly likely. The Taliban government faces systemic challenges under these conditions and is unlikely to overcome them in the near future.

It can be expected that this discord will intensify the power struggle between the various factions of the movement. If influential external actors become disappointed with the Taliban’s inability to resolve the challenges facing the country, support for opposition forces may increase significantly. Accordingly, this may lead to a new round of a full-scale civil war based on interethnic confrontation. The Taliban, whose radical ideology and uncompromising position has been gradually moving it toward international isolation, cannot be excluded from this trajectory. However, by engaging in credible and open dialogue with the outside world, offering security guarantees to neighboring countries, cooperating in good faith on counter-terrorism, and enhancing trade relations with other states, the Taliban may be able to overcome its challenges and become a full-fledged member of the international community.

Akram Umarov is Director of the Center for Afghanistan Studies, University of World Economy and Diplomacy. His research covers security studies, conflict management, public diplomacy and development issues in Central Asia, Afghanistan and CIS countries. Follow Akram on Twitter @umarov_akram.