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Over the past two decades, the South Asian region has emerged as a critical region influencing global trends and international developments. Key factors include India's rapid rise on the global stage and the initiation of the international North-South transport corridor. Additionally, India and Pakistan's accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the escalating Kashmir conflict, heightened nuclear tensions between Delhi and Islamabad, Pakistan's strategic shift from being a close US ally towards closer ties with China, and the inclusion of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor in the Belt and Road Initiative are also notable developments. The US-Afghanistan war, the rise of international terrorist networks, the return of Taliban rule in Afghanistan, and subsequent dialogues with the Taliban further underscore the region’s geopolitical complexity. In analyzing US foreign policy towards South Asia, it is evident that the United States has adopted distinct approaches towards the region's two principal actors, India and Pakistan. US foreign policy has shifted over time, sometimes prioritizing India, at other times focusing more on Pakistan, and during certain periods such as the 1990s, balancing both. Currently, US relations with Pakistan and India are conducted through separate, differentiated policies. Relations with Pakistan are primarily security-oriented, while US engagement with India is framed more strategically and economically. A historical analysis of US foreign policy in South Asia reveals a dynamic evolution. The contemporary US approach to the region began after World War II, following independence of India and Pakistan. Studies by Nawaz M., Shaheen M., and Saif A. have typically divided US foreign policy into three or four distinct phases. However, our research, delineates seven distinct periods of US foreign policy development: 1947-1965, 1965-1979, 1979-1989, 1989-1998, 1998-2001, 2001-2021, and 2021 onwards. Major events that have shaped US foreign policy in South Asia include the establishment of India and Pakistan, the Vietnam War, the Soviet-Afghan War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, the events of September 11, and the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Each of these events has precipitated substantial shifts in US foreign policy in the region.
Our research produced a table titled "Genesis of US Foreign Policy in South Asia", which outlines these seven pivotal periods. This tool provides a valuable framework for scholars and students analyzing U.S. foreign policy in the region, offering a concise and structured overview of its evolution.
*** By increasing the intensity of color, you can notice the increase or decrease in the importance of South Asia in US foreign policy
From 1947 to 1965, US foreign policy in South Asia primarily focused on “containing” the global spread of communism. During this period, the region held strategic rather than economic value for the US, with Pakistan viewed as a reliable partner in building an anti-communist buffer across the Middle East and South Asia. In contrast, US-India relations were minimal, largely due to India’s leadership in the Non-Aligned Movement, which distanced itself from Cold War power dynamics. From 1965 to 1979, US foreign policy in South Asia became more passive, as attention shifted towards the Vietnam War (1965-1973) and Southeast Asia. This resulted in a reduced US presence in South Asia and a growing distance from Pakistan. The US did not intervene in the India-Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971. The Soviet-Afghan War (1979 to 1989) marked a significant shift in US focus back to South Asia, as Pakistan became a pivotal ally in the US efforts to counter the Soviet Union’s influence in Afghanistan. This period saw Pakistan take center stage in U.S. strategic calculations. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in 1989 initiated a new phase (1989-1998), as Washington sought to consolidate its global leadership. During this time, the US expressed growing interest in India's emerging economy, while maintaining Pakistan’s strategic importance in the region. From 1998 to 2001, relations between the US and South Asia deteriorated, particularly following nuclear tests conducted by both India and Pakistan, which heightened regional tensions and triggered international concern. The events of September 11, 2001, reoriented US foreign policy towards South Asia, particularly in the context of the US-led war on terror (2001-2021). Pakistan became a key partner as a logistical and operational based for US efforts in Afghanistan, while US-India relations flourished economically, driven by a shared interest in countering China’s rising influence in the Indo-Pacific. From 2021 to the present, US foreign policy in South Asia has been influenced by the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan. Pakistan’s strategic role in US foreign policy has significantly diminished, though cooperation in counterterrorism remains. Meanwhile, India has gained prominence, with US designating it as a “Major Defense Partner”, reflecting a broader shift in US priorities toward economic and defense cooperation with India.
In conclusion, an analysis of the genesis of US foreign policy in South Asia reveals a cyclical pattern of engagement and disengagement. During the Cold War, the region was viewed through the lens of containing communism, with Pakistan serving as the main partner. In the modern era, India’s stable economy and democratic governance system have made it a favorable partner for the US, while Pakistan continues to hold importance in counterterrorism efforts.
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Uzbekistan has long been demonstrating a calculated and strategic pragmatism dealing effectively with its foreign policy towards the Taliban-led government in Afghanistan. What might appear as mere diplomatic exchanges on the surface is, in fact, part of a broader and more sophisticated approach by Uzbekistan to secure its national interests in a volatile region. The high-level visits by Uzbek officials, including Minister of Investment, Industry, and Trade Laziz Qudratov and Prime Minister Abdulla Aripov, reflect this nuanced strategy. These visits, along with other economic engagements, are seemingly emblematic of Uzbekistan’s pragmatic foreign policy, which prioritizes economic leverage over formal diplomatic ties due to the current situation around Afghanistan.
The July 3rd business forum held in Tashkent, which brought Afghan entrepreneurs to the negotiating table, was not an isolated event but part of a series of deliberate moves by Uzbekistan to deepen economic ties with Afghanistan. This forum, followed by high-level visits, including the October 2023 visit by Uzbekistan’s Deputy Prime Minister to Kabul, underscores the importance Uzbekistan places on economic convergence with its neighbour. During the October visit, both parties agreed to increase bilateral trade to $3 billion, a significant commitment that illustrates the depth of economic engagement between the two countries.
Apparently though, these engagements might not just only be about trade; they seem to serve as a means for Uzbekistan to establish a form of an economic leverage over the Taliban government to ensure that the latter could not weaponize water issue between two countries. Given the geopolitical uncertainty in the region and the unrecognized status of the Taliban government, Uzbekistan is crafting a foreign policy that allows it to protect its interests without the need for a formal diplomatic recognition. This strategy reflects a careful balancing act, where the economic relations are used as a credible means to influence and potentially control the outcomes in bilateral relations.
In some perspective, Uzbekistan’s increasing focus on economic ties with Afghanistan is rooted in several strategic considerations. One of the most pressing issues for Uzbekistan is water security. The country’s agricultural sector, which is vital for its economy, depends heavily on Amu Darya’s water resources that in part originate in Afghanistan. With the Taliban now in control, Uzbekistan faces the risk of potential blackmail or manipulation over water rights, a scenario that could have devastating consequences for its agricultural output and, by extension, its food security.
By fostering strong economic ties, Uzbekistan, to some extent, aims to create a form of co-dependency that could deter the Taliban from using water as a bargaining chip. The promise of increased trade and economic collaboration offers Taliban certain incentives for maintaining stable and cooperative relationship with Uzbekistan. In this way, Uzbekistan is thought to be building a buffer against potential threats to its water security, ensuring that any attempt by the Taliban to leverage water resources could be met with a strong economic response, including the possibility of decoupling trade relations.
This approach is particularly pragmatic given the current geopolitical landscape. The Taliban government, though unrecognized by the international community, controls significant resources and territory. For Uzbekistan, engaging with the Taliban on economic terms allows it to navigate the complexities of the situation without compromising its own standing in the international arena. By focusing on trade rather than formal diplomatic ties, Uzbekistan could pursue its interests while maintaining flexibility in its foreign policy.
The visits by Uzbek officials to Kabul, including the recent high-profile visit by Prime Minister Abdulla Aripov, are more than just diplomatic gestures. They are part of a broader strategy that emphasizes pragmatism over ideology. Uzbekistan recognizes the reality of the Taliban’s control over Afghanistan and the need to engage with them on practical terms. This approach reflects a departure from traditional diplomacy, where recognition and formal ties are often prerequisites for engagement. Instead, Uzbekistan is prioritizing its national interests using economic tools through building a set of influences ensuring stability in its relations with Afghanistan.
This pragmatism is also evident in Uzbekistan’s broader foreign policy. The country has been careful to balance its relationships with major powers, including Russia, China, and the United States, while also fostering regional cooperation in Central Asia. In its dealings with Afghanistan, Uzbekistan is applying the same principles, seeking to avoid entanglement in ideological conflicts while focusing on tangible benefits such as trade and security. This approach allows Uzbekistan to navigate the complexities of the region while maintaining its sovereignty and independence.
Apart from hedging against some potential challenges Taliban might create, by establishing a strong economic relationship with Afghanistan, Uzbekistan could position itself as a key player in the region, capable of influencing outcomes and ensuring its own security. The potential for increased trade and economic collaboration could also bring substantial benefits to Uzbekistan’s economy, particularly in sectors such as agriculture and energy.
Conclusion
Uzbekistan’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan under the Taliban is a carefully crafted strategy that prioritizes economic convergence over a formal diplomatic tie. By focusing on trade and economic collaboration, Uzbekistan is potentially building some leverages that could protect its interests in the face of possible challenges, particularly concerning water security. This pragmatic approach reflects a broader shift in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy, where national interests take precedence over ideology. As Uzbekistan continues to navigate the complexities of its relationship with Afghanistan, its strategy of economic engagement could prove to be a powerful tool in ensuring stability and security in the region.
Examining the challenges faced by international organizations in addressing the denial of women’s rights in Afghanistan under Taliban rule and explores strategies to foster regional collaboration between Western countries and Afghanistan’s Central Asian neighbours, in their new research article Hamza Boltaev and Aziza Mukhammedova discuss contemporary challenges and propose a new vision of overcoming them.
Authors identified that the internal ideological splits within the Taliban also offer a glimmer of hope, as pragmatists within the movement recognize the need to address women’s rights within the framework of Sharia law. By involving the right actors and adopting a nuanced approach, there is a possibility of achieving tangible results in collaboration with the Taliban.
Read the article on the website of the Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS, Pakistan)
The commentary was prepared by the IAIS intern Jaloliddin Ibragimov under the supervision of Islomkhon Gafarov.
Narendra Modi, India’s newly re-elected Prime Minister, strategically selected Moscow as the destination for his inaugural international visit, marking a significant diplomatic gesture. This visit is his first to Moscow since 2019, occurs against a backdrop of increasing bilateral cooperation despite the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine and the numerous sanctions imposed on Russia. Over the past five years India and Russia have strengthened their ties, with trade reaching approximately $65 billion in 2023.
As the author states, the relationship between India and Russia remains a crucial element in the global geopolitical landscape, advocating for a multipolar world. The successful outcome of Modi’s visit suggests that India will continue to navigate its foreign policy with a balanced approach, maintaining strong ties with both Russia and the United States while addressing its regional challenges.
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On July 7, Islomkhon Gafarov, a senior research fellow at the Centre for Afghanistan and South Asian Studies of the Institute for Advanced International Studies, took part in the programme “Xalqaro nigoh” (“International View”) on “Uzbekistan” 24 TV channel.
During the discussion, he noted that in his speech at the Summit, Uzbekistan's President Shavkat Mirziyoyev emphasised the factor of Afghanistan in the foreign policy of Central Asia, and stressed the importance of the international community developing a common strategy regarding the state.
Watch the full programme via the link https://bit.ly/3RXVbrK.
The diplomatic maneuver of Sirajuddin Haqqani, a key figure in the Taliban, has sparked significant interest and analysis. The Taliban’s efforts to gain recognition from the international community have led to a series of developments that suggest a shift in the global community’s perception towards the Taliban. Recent events, including Kazakhstan’s removal of the Taliban from its list of terrorist organizations, Russia’s tacit acknowledgment of the Taliban’s control in Afghanistan, and the President of PRC’s official reception of the Afghan ambassador, indicate a growing acceptance of the Taliban’s de facto governance.
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Significant changes in the international logistics system are fueling the development of trans-Afghan routes, but Uzbekistan may have to deal with increased competition.
Since the beginning of the year, Uzbekistan has held several rounds of negotiations with Qatar and the United Arab Emirates on financing the construction of the $7 billion Termez-Mazar-i-Sharif-Kabul-Peshawar railway, which would link Uzbekistan to Pakistan via Afghanistan.
The project is crucial for the states of Central Asia and Afghanistan in terms of providing access to the sea, as well as strengthening their transit potential and geopolitical role, but the implementation of the Trans-Afghan Railway has long been complicated by instability in Afghanistan During the Republic period a major threat to the project was the Taliban; now the current Taliban government in Afghanistan is ready to act as a guarantor of the route’s safety. Another remaining major hurdle is the question of investment. As such, Tashkent has called on the Gulf monarchies to cooperate. Kazakhstan, Russia, and Belarus have also expressed interest.
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On May 11th of this year, new skirmishes resumed along the Durand Line. It is evident that following the parliamentary elections, the Pakistani leadership decided to concentrate on the issue of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a terrorist organization that receives support from within Afghanistan and carries out attacks on Pakistani soil. In an effort to put an end to TTP activities, Islamabad has been conducting airstrikes in Afghan border areas without notifying Kabul, which has enraged the Taliban. These border conflicts continued until May 19th, but it is likely that such incidents will persist and tensions along the Durand Line will escalate. Nonetheless, the involvement of China may potentially mitigate the conflict and the ensuing crisis. According to experts, China has its own levers to influence the TTP through the Taliban.
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Since the beginning of this year, Uzbekistan has held several rounds of negotiations with foreign partners on financing the construction of the Mazar-i-Sharif – Kabul – Peshawar railway. Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have been announced as potential investors. This circumstance brings the long-term project, which has been overgrown with a thick veil of skepticism during all this time, closer to reality. What prospects do trans-Afghan communications promise us and what is the strength of Uzbek transit we discuss below.
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The article shows the exceptional role of the Republic of Uzbekistan in ensuring transport connectivity of the Turkic states. Tashkent’s initiatives to expand the logistics capabilities of member countries of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), the progress and results of their practical imple- mentation are analyzed.
The potential of Uzbekistan is being revealed in the con- text of the effective use of the Trans-Caspian multimodal transport route. Examples of successful partnerships in the field of transport communications with Azerbaijan are consi-dered
Special attention is paid to the problematic aspects of mul- tilateral cooperation between OTS countries on transport and transit issues. Solutions to eliminate bottlenecks are presented.
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Currently, there is an alarming trend in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan associated with the intensification of radical propaganda on social networks. This negative trend raises serious concerns and requires closer attention from society and the authorities. Radical propaganda based on ideological and religious extremism is becoming more widespread in these regions. It is aimed at manipulating the masses, forming negative stereotypes and inciting ethnic hatred. Such attempts at manipulation and division only increase social tensions and threaten the peaceful coexistence of various ethnic groups. Despite the fact that the percentage of the population affected by such influence in Uzbekistan is small, the increasing number of radical channels seems to be a cause for concern.
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Kyrgyzstan is a country in Central Asia that during its recent 32 years of history has seen three of its president’s overthrown, two instances of mass ethnic violence and 32 prime ministers. After gaining independence in 1991, Kyrgyzstan encountered a range of socio-economic problems associated with the collapse of the USSR, the establishment of a new state, the rupture of traditional economic and trade relations with other Soviet republics, and the suspension of centralized financial subsidies from Moscow. The new government had to seek other sources of funding for its sustainability and development. The international community treated Kyrgyzstan as a “more advanced democracy” (Garcés de los Fayos and Mendonça 2018) than other regional states, as an “island of democracy” (Anderson 1999) surrounded by Russia, other authoritarian Central Asian countries, and China. This recognition led to increasingly international, mainly Western, support, which included development aid and assistance with democratiz‐ ation and governance reforms. There was an expectation that Kyrgyzstan would become a more liberal and prosperous state as a result.
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On April 1, 2024, Israeli airstrike on Iranian targets in Damascus allegedly killed General Mohammad Reza Zahedi, commanding the elite IRGC Quds forces in Syria and Lebanon. At Iirst glance, the Israel’s move resembles mere retaliation against Iran's incessant support for Hamas whereas, the complexity of events suggests otherwise. Hence, another general’s assassination possibly triggers even greater conIlicts in Middle East.
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US foreign policy in the South Asian region is characterized by changeability and dynamism. The main purpose of this article is to reveal the constructivist aspects of US foreign policy in this region. The article used historical, comparative political, inductive and deductive scientific methods. The paper concludes that the US foreign policy in South Asia from the Cold War to the present day has consisted of ups and downs, the foreign policy vector has been directed either towards Pakistan or towards India, and today relations are mainly directed towards India .
The article includes the main seven periods of US foreign policy in the South Asian region. In particular, in 1947-1965, the attention of the United States in the region was focused on Pakistan, and in 1965-1979, due to the Vietnam War, it moved away from the region. The war of the USSR in Afghanistan, which took place in 1979-1989, again strengthens the importance of Pakistan in the foreign policy of the United States. In 1989-1998, the United States began to pursue a separate foreign policy with both India and Pakistan due to its pursuit of global hegemony. In 1998-2001, India and Pakistan are subject to US sanctions due to their nuclear weapons tests. Consequently, the War on Terror, which began in Afghanistan in 2001, increases the priority of Pakistan in the foreign policy of the United States. This continued until 2021, when the United States withdrew its forces from Afghanistan. Since the time of President Barack Obama, the role of India in the foreign policy of the United States has increased dramatically. During the period of D.Trump, this country was officially given the status of “Major Defense Partner”.
The article differs in that it is revealed from the standpoint of the theory of international relations of constructivism and can be useful in the work of specialists in this field.
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This annual flagship report, including 13 policy briefs, offers an alternative glimpse at the events and developments in and around Afghanistan, prioritizing timely and significant thematic and regional approaches. Obviously, the Taliban’s rapid surge into power in August 2021 and the subsequent measures to solidify their position reshaped relations with Afghanistan’s neighbours.
Thematic analyses cover critical issues such as terrorism and extremism, humanitarian crises, transnational crime, as well as political and social problems stemming from Afghanistan. Additionally, sporadic efforts by the Taliban government to regulate the country’s economic situation are deeply analysed. The report also explores Afghanistan’s role as a centre for transport communications between its immediate and extended neighbours.
Policy briefs highlight emerging concerns such as transboundary water issues and border conflicts between Afghanistan and its neighbours. Furthermore, the report underscores Afghanistan’s growing importance for Central Asian Republics (CAR) as an alternative transportation corridor diversifying away from traditional partners. Several papers assess CAR’s pragmatic foreign policy towards Afghanistan amid a challenging international environment where varying approaches to establishing formal relations with the Taliban prevail.
Overall, the report presents ideas in an orthodox yet easily understandable manner, with historical events laid out chronologically to aid in understanding the contemporary developments.
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The recent, on March 12, 2024, visit of Uzbekistan’s Foreign Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov to Kabul underscores the importance of constant engagement with the Taliban regime. Ongoing negotiations with the unrecognised Taliban administration reflect Uzbekistan’s profound interest in fostering pragmatic relations with its southern neighbour. Given critical nature of issues such as trade, transport connectivity and water management, continual dialogue between the parties remains paramount.
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The March 16 terrorist attack in Waziristan, has deteriorated the rather thin relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Soon after, On March 18, 2024, both sides of Durand Line exchanged with a military strikes on the targets of each other’s territory. Shahboz Sharif’s government blamed the Taliban government for allegedly cosying up with Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and carrying out recent attack in Pakistan’s soil. Such a bold move could be interpreted as flexing military muscle since newly elected prime minister of Pakistan has finally got over rather difficult elections. Pakistan’s such a decisive move appears to be an acme of worsening relations between the neighbours therefore, this incident seems to be a tip of the iceberg the beneath of which could potentially transcend current events and go deeper where Islamabad’s political disappointment of Taliban lies.
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On February 18-19 this year, an international meeting on Afghanistan was held in Doha under the auspices of the United Nations, which was chaired by Secretary–General A. Guterres. Representatives of 25 states and regional organizations also arrived in the capital of Qatar, including with four Afghan civil society activists. However, the conference failed to achieve concrete results for several reasons.
Firstly, due to the absence of representatives of the current government of the Islamic Emirate at the conference, it is impractical to expect positive changes, since the Taliban Movement, which is not a recognized state and at the same time has great political power in Afghanistan. The reason for the refusal to participate was the rejection of his demand to be the "only official representative of Afghanistan" at the conference.
Thus, the world community does not associate Afghanistan only with the Taliban, it advocates the creation of an inclusive government, therefore it involves civil society activists and the opposition of the current government in the conference. This is confirmed by the statement of the US State Department on the non-participation of the Taliban at the meeting of special representatives in Doha, that in the future Afghanistan will not belong only to the Taliban.
Secondly, the international community is limited only to issuing ultimatums against Afghanistan on issues of respect for human rights, the creation of an inclusive government, ensuring equal freedoms for women, and preventing the country from becoming a "hotbed" of terrorism. These requirements are not supported with strategic measures for their implementation, while remaining in fact meaningless statements to the "problematic" Afghanistan, which is building public life according to Sharia law.
Thirdly, once again, the international conference does not find an effective approach to eliminate the problems of Afghanistan, postponing them for subsequent rounds of meetings. Thus, the proof of this is the statement of the UN Secretary General during the February conference in Doha - "After a series of consultations, I will be ready to convene a new meeting." Such tendency is likely to lead to the hopelessness of this negotiating platform for the Taliban, which does not take into account their interests.
The Doha meeting also sent a preemptive signal to the Tliban Movement that non-participation in this meeting would lead to their further isolation and official non-recognition of the current government. In this regard, Afghanistan should actively participate in such conferences with the international community, which is the main financial donor of humanitarian assistance critically needed in the current economic situation and humanitarian crisis in the country.
In conclusion, taking into account the fact that the Taliban is one of the main influential centers of power in Afghanistan, the world community is considering options for compromise interaction with the Taliban while maintaining a critical position regarding individual decisions of the movement on human rights and inclusiveness of public administration. At the same time, the Taliban demonstrate a restrained attitude towards the demands of international partners and to some extent use their "tough stance" on these issues as a tool to influence the acceleration of the procedure for formal recognition of their government.
This policy brief was prepared by Salomov Bakhtiyorjon him under the supervision of Hamza Boltaev.
Salomov Bakhtiyorjon
Graduate of the University of World Economy and Diplomacy
Freelance employee (intern) Institute
Institute for Advanced International Studies under UWED
Contacts: salomovbakhtiyorjon@gmail.com
The Taliban’s lightning-fast takeover of Afghanistan received rather calm and “wait and see” reactions from nearly all the Central Asian Republics (CAR), with Tajikistan being unusually outspoken about the events unfolding in its southern neighbour. Although the CARs did not welcome the Biden administration’s swift decision on the allied forces’ sudden departure from Afghanistan in the summer of 2021, they reluctantly adapted to the reality. Since then, the Central Asian countries’ respective policies towards a Taliban-led Afghanistan have shared certain similarities, with trade-driven pragmatism being their most important characteristic. This article explores the affairs of the CARs with Taliban-led Afghanistan, which are largely shaped by Western countries’ reticence in recognising the Taliban as the official government of Afghanistan.
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The policy of Turkmenistan after the Taliban took control of Kabul and the entire territory of Afghanistan in August 2021 can be described as proactive, aimed at establishing constructive, working and mutually beneficial relations with the new authorities of the country. Meanwhile, Ashgabat sought to achieve three strategic goals - by establishing diplomatic contacts to secure its borders, to maintain access to the Afghan consumer market and to try to give new impetus to transport and energy projects, tied to Afghanistan.
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Afghanistan’s market and its position as a trade route that can connect Central Asia to South Asian ports are critically important to Kazakhstan.
As the global community experiences a turbulent and unpredictable period, Kazakhstan, alongside other countries, faces a range of challenges and risks. A timely reorientation and adjustment of both its external and internal policies may enable the country to effectively cope with these challenges and even extract benefits from them.
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Contrary to the very dim and pessimistic assumptions about Afghanistan's dire economic conditions eventually getting even worse during the Taliban rule, so far appears to be a hasty and premature assessment. Nonetheless, the Taliban’s ability to stay in power so far by utilising any available tools to prevent full scale economic collapse cannot by any means be regarded as a viable transformation to solid socio economic reforms. Thus, this paper will analyse the economy of the country as well as its relationship with Uzbekistan with a greater emphasis on the security and long-term export interests of it to the Taliban-run Afghanistan.
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China’s recent unprecedented move on ceremonially accepting the Taliban’s ambassador to PRC in Beijing raised mixed signals around the world. According to the Taliban’s chief spokesperson Zabiullah Mujahid, “China is the only country to officially approve Islamic Emirate’s ambassador”. It is a rather reciprocal move by China as the country’s ambassador to Afghanistan, Zhao Sheng, also received an official acceptance in September, last year.
These “diplomatic romans” go further back to the initial official contact between sides when Wang Yi of China met with the representative of the Taliban, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, acting Deputy Prime Minister of the Taliban government, in Doha on October 2021. Even earlier, on July 2021, the Taliban delegation and China’s former Foreign Minister Wang Yi met in Tianjin.
China’s seemingly proactive foreign policy towards Afghanistan can well be a trigger for various interpretations the first of which could be characterized as the Chinese strive to develop its own narratives and approaches in relation to the Taliban acknowledgement issue. Second, China as a forerunner of a green development, will definitely need an enormous natural resource for its green development endeavour, thereby, Afghanistan could probably be an important destination for satisfying China’s appetite in this field. Third, acknowledging the Taliban’s capacity in providing relatively secure environment for the Chinese interests in Afghanistan such as fighting terrorism and creating transportation corridors, China seems to be winning time as a first-runner.
Moreover, China probably believes that diplomatic recognition of the Taliban government will come naturally providing an active engagement mixed with the capacity-building prevails.
The radical change in the situation in Afghanistan, brought about by the return to power of the Taliban in August 2021, raised the question of the further development of the jihadist terrorist movements in the region, as well as the participation of citizens of Central Asian countries. Experts’ assessments, made immediately after the fall of Kabul, that Central Asia would be the target of direct coercive pressure from international groups, which would receive Taliban protection and funding, have not yet come true.
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Editor’s note: In August, The National Interest organized a symposium on Afghanistan one year after the U.S. withdrawal and the Taliban takeover of Kabul. We asked a variety of experts the following question: “How should the Biden administration approach Afghanistan and the Taliban government?” The following article is one of their responses:
One year after the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, the international community is still facing enormous challenges in dealing with the new reality in Central Asia. The withdrawal of international military forces, and the evacuation of only a small number of the Afghans who previously collaborated with them, considerably damaged the reputation of the United States and its Western allies. The chaos of the evacuation shocked millions of people around the world and Taliban rule has not brought long-expected peace, sustainable development, and prosperity.
The Taliban cannot be blamed for all the current problems facing Afghanistan given that they inherited an underdeveloped state with high rates of poverty, an over-dependence on foreign aid, and an inefficient governing apparatus. The Taliban could improve the internal security situation but it is encountering substantial problems in governing effectively. The lack of an inclusive government and respect for the rights of women are the largest disagreements between the Taliban and the majority of the international community, which so far has not officially recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan.
To learn from its past experience of military and political involvement in Afghanistan, Western countries should focus on the following lessons:
First, nation-building should be an internal process largely unaffected by foreign intervention. Afghanistan has continually proven that there is no “blueprint approach” that works and externally orchestrated reforms are fragile. There are no ready solutions for conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction. Some general principles and approaches for supporting countries after the end of conflicts still apply but each case requires attention to the importance of local communities taking the lead.
Second, building a highly centralized government under the leadership of strongmen did not work. Afghanistan has a historic tradition of decentralized administration and cannot admit the establishment of personalist regimes. Oddly, the United States and its allies decided to neglect their own principles and commitment to democratic procedures. From 2001-2021, Afghanistan’s presidents were legitimized under the direct coordination and interference of external actors. Despite Kabul’s efforts to consolidate power, the central government was predominantly perceived as being manipulated by the West and lacking the necessary internal support to implement post-conflict reconciliation and development policies. This experiment in Afghanistan clearly demonstrated that an over-centralized presidential model does not guarantee security and stability.
Third, the West was ignorant of how regional countries could elaborate strategies on post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan. The future of Afghanistan cannot be considered and assembled without significant support from its neighbors. For various reasons, the United States avoided or minimized its cooperation with several regional countries on Afghanistan issues. Countries such as Pakistan were mainly used as transit routes and to host U.S. and Western military infrastructure essential for operations in Afghanistan. All major international gatherings discussing Afghanistan happened in Europe, the United States, and Japan. All are very far from the region and have a limited understanding of local traditions, context, and history. The concerns and proposals of states next to Afghanistan were barely considered as policy options by the United States and its allies.
The Biden administration is willing to engage with Afghanistan in a limited manner. However, questions remain on how to deal with the Taliban’s tough ideological approach to many policy issues. There is now an ongoing debate on whether the Taliban should be recognized by the international community. The Taliban have faced difficulties in establishing their credibility to merit cooperation with other states. What can the Biden administration do to improve the security situation in Afghanistan?
First, there is a strong lack of trust between the Taliban and the United States. Conducting any substantive negotiations under such circumstances will not be effective. Especially after the U.S. drone strike against Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, there are many open questions about the credibility and honesty of the Taliban. However, collaboration on a limited number of issues important to the United States and its regional partners is critical. Drug and illicit arms trafficking, transborder threats, and border security are pressing problems that cannot be solved without cooperating with the Taliban.
Second, it is essential for the United States and the West to keep supporting and cooperating closely with Afghanistan’s neighbors. Despite regular exchanges between regional countries and the West, there are still many gaps in mutual understanding. Promoting development and prosperity in the region requires improving connectivity. Western countries have already found ways to regularly send humanitarian support to Afghanistan while not violating sanctions against the Taliban. Therefore, funding connectivity projects in Central Asia would invest in its security, independence, and resilience.
The main attention of the United States and allies in the international coalition should be given to the problem of socio-economic reconstruction and infrastructure development within Afghanistan. Improving the living standards of the Afghan people would help support U.S. policy, reduce the Taliban’s influence, and decrease interethnic struggles. Close cooperation with regional countries would ease the burden of interacting with the Taliban. No one wants to see a new civil war in Afghanistan and the United States has an interest in working to make sure that doesn’t happen.
Akram Umarov is Director of the Center for Afghanistan Studies, University of World Economy and Diplomacy. His research covers security studies, conflict management, public diplomacy and development issues in Central Asia, Afghanistan and CIS countries. Twitter: @umarov_akram
he ease with which the Taliban was able to remove the government of Ashraf Ghani from power created an illusion about the group’s power, consolidation, and readiness to take full control of the country. The international community expected the Taliban to stabilize Afghanistan and put the entire country under reliable control in order to establish sole power and eliminate security challenges such as terrorism and drug trafficking. However, the U.S. strike on Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri raises questions about the credibility and honesty of the movement. In the eleven months since the Taliban came to power, the group has faced a number of serious internal problems, including increased factional clashes over engagement with foreign partners, the rise of Pashtun nationalism and the exit of ethnic minorities from the movement, and its inability to stabilize the state administration system.
First, almost since the moment the Taliban seized power, there have been systematic clashes within the group over its leadership, pitting the future of the movement's agenda and cooperation with the international community between various factions. In the process of distributing leading state positions, the Taliban is facing serious confrontation between various factions. Despite Mullah Baradar's past success leading the Taliban, he has been demoted to holding a subordinate post as deputy prime minister for economic affairs. At the same time, Deputy Prime Minister for Political Affairs Abdul Kabeer has wide authority and the confidence of the country's supreme leadership.
As a result of the growing influence and presence in power structures of radical and ideological factions with regard to women's rights, access to education, and freedoms for the population, the new government of Afghanistan has not compromised with the international community. The group of conservatives among the Taliban is personally occupied by the leader of the movement, Sheikh Hebatullah Akhundzad; other prominent representatives include Prime Minister Mullah Hassan Akhund, Chief Justice of the Islamic Central Court Abdul Hakim Haqqani, and Mayor of Kabul Mullah Neda Mohammad Nadeem. On the other hand, more moderate leaders include Deputy Prime Minister Mullah Baradar, Mining and Oil Minister Sheikh Shahabuddin Delawar, and Deputy Foreign Minister Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai. At the same time, several influential Taliban figures, such as Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani and Defense Minister Mullah Yaqoob, are trying to maneuver between these opposing camps without joining either.
Second, in recent months, there has been a clear trend within the Taliban toward strengthening and significantly expanding the role of the Pashtun nationality. While the Taliban has previously been able to recruit Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Hazaras in the north and elsewhere to further its goals, the movement’s leadership is still dominated by the same radical Pashtun heads who ruled Afghanistan in the 1990s and oppose compromising on ideology and the balance of power. If the Taliban can find a formula to unite these factions, it will be able to strengthen the regime. Otherwise, this trend will weaken the group's hold on the country and may encourage some non-Pashtun groups to openly oppose the Taliban.
One of the most important factors in the success of the Taliban in the summer of 2021 was the fact that Uzbek and Tajik groups joined the movement in northern Afghanistan and were able to effectively neutralize any resistance from local warlords and the armed forces of Kabul. However, in recent months, Makhdoom Alam, a Taliban commander of Uzbek origin, has been persecuted. In March, Haji Mali-Khan, the uncle of Sirajuddin Haqqani, was made deputy chief of staff of the Taliban’s armed forces to keep an eye on Kari Salahuddin Ayubi, the Tajik head of the armed forces. There has also been an increase in tensions between the movement and the Hazara ethnic minority in Afghanistan. In addition to a series of terrorist attacks directed against this ethnic group, some Hazaras collaborating with the Taliban have recently been subjected to unjustified persecution. If the movement’s leadership cannot find a way to solve ethnic problems internally, a substantial number of the non-Pashtun Taliban armed forces could join the ranks of the resistance groups or terrorist organizations based in Afghanistan.
Third, despite being in power for a year, the Taliban has failed to demonstrate the ability to effectively govern the country. The Taliban, being a movement with a predominantly horizontal hierarchy, has always had a decentralized system of rule. Taliban forces on the ground acted within the framework of a single strategy approved by the leadership. However, at the same time, they had considerable autonomy in terms of choosing tactics to achieve their goals and independently determined their own operational tasks. Such an approach to management attracted a wide range of militants opposed to the government of Ashraf Ghani and helped the Taliban achieve its goals at the time.
Since seizing power in August 2021, the Taliban has been trying to build a highly centralized system of government by directly appointing local chiefs from Kabul, predominantly of Pashtun origin, and creating a rigid vertical hierarchy. However, such decisions have broken the existing balance of power between local commanders and the country's top leadership. By redistributing sources of income as a result of these changes, transferring removed commanders to remote parts of the country, and filling vacant posts with Pashtuns, the Taliban has radically changed the balance of power within the movement and significantly weakened its ability to control events in the provinces.
Generally speaking, in the last months, there has been a major split in various directions within the Taliban. The growing confrontation between different factions on issues related to strategy, ideology, cooperation with the outside world, and the inclusion of non-Pashtun ethnic groups in leadership positions is weakening the Taliban’s power, making a split in the movement’s ranks increasingly likely. The Taliban government faces systemic challenges under these conditions and is unlikely to overcome them in the near future.
It can be expected that this discord will intensify the power struggle between the various factions of the movement. If influential external actors become disappointed with the Taliban’s inability to resolve the challenges facing the country, support for opposition forces may increase significantly. Accordingly, this may lead to a new round of a full-scale civil war based on interethnic confrontation. The Taliban, whose radical ideology and uncompromising position has been gradually moving it toward international isolation, cannot be excluded from this trajectory. However, by engaging in credible and open dialogue with the outside world, offering security guarantees to neighboring countries, cooperating in good faith on counter-terrorism, and enhancing trade relations with other states, the Taliban may be able to overcome its challenges and become a full-fledged member of the international community.
Akram Umarov is Director of the Center for Afghanistan Studies, University of World Economy and Diplomacy. His research covers security studies, conflict management, public diplomacy and development issues in Central Asia, Afghanistan and CIS countries. Follow Akram on Twitter @umarov_akram.