According to the World Food Programme, more than 340 million people in the world today suffer from severe food insecurity. Behind each of these figures are, in fact, specific people. Moreover, almost two million of them are on the verge of starvation, and their condition is qualified as catastrophic. That is, people are currently dying not from disease or old age, but from lack of the most basic things, namely, food.   At the same time, according to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the world wastes about 1 billion tonnes of food per year, or one fifth of all food available to consumers. Food waste not only adds to the problem of hunger, but also causes serious environmental damage. They are responsible for about 10 per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions. Reducing food waste is therefore a key step towards food security, climate protection and resource efficiency.   We highlight that the bulk of food waste (about 60%) is generated by households, with the rest distributed between catering (28%) and retail (12%). In addition, about 13% of food is lost before it reaches the shelves, namely at the stages of harvesting, storage and transport.   Countries around the world, such as Uzbekistan, are increasingly introducing various technological solutions to reduce food waste. Against this background, an important direction, in our opinion, is the strengthening of anthropological factors, such as an ingrained tradition of careful and respectful attitude to food that has existed since ancient times. This has direct relevance to Uzbekistan, where it is not just a cultural peculiarity, but also a part of folk ethics. And today, despite the growth of consumption and urbanisation, it is important to continue to support this attitude in families in our country.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The 14th government of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), led by incumbent President Massoud Pezeshkian, is noticeably strengthening its pragmatic Central Asian policy. The main focus of regional interaction is aimed at developing trade and transportation and logistics links. This goal is in harmony with Iran's “Look East” strategy, designed to mitigate Tehran’s economic isolation.   International sanctions remain the main constraint on Iran’s integration with Central Asia. Despite geographic proximity and huge resource potential, the total volume of mutual trade remains unsatisfactory at just over $1.5 billion, although it has increased slightly in recent years. The goal is to quadruple trade with Uzbekistan to $2 billion, with Kazakhstan and Tajikistan to $1 billion, and with Turkmenistan by 30%.   The expanding export opportunities of Central Asian states stimulate the search for new consumer markets and efficient ways of communication with major economies of the world. Iran combines both qualities, making it a valuable partner for the regional P5. In addition, the country has solid scientific and technical expertise in engineering, energy, agriculture, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, as well as an investment base for joint ventures.   The extensive road and railroad network, coupled with the presence of major ports in the Indian Ocean, gives IRI an important advantage in cooperation with the landlocked Central Asian republics. Tehran plays a key role in the formation of the Eurasian land bridge to connect China and Europe by railroads. Several transit routes from East to West cross Iranian territory by land, which also involve Central Asian countries. The China-Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey-EU railroad corridor has been actively developed, and the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey-EU multimodal route operates in parallel.   In light of the actualization of the southern direction of transit for the Central Asian republics, the Iranian deep-water port of Chabahar, which is being modernized by India and thanks to it is not burdened by sanctions, is gaining popularity. In 2023, Tehran approved Tashkent's request to join the Chabahar agreement. The Uzbek side plans to build warehouses and a terminal at the sea harbor. Kazakhstan and Tajikistan are considering a similar issue. Discussions are also underway to launch transportation corridors from Central Asia to India using Iran’s road and port infrastructure. Such development will spur intensification of trade with one of the world’s largest economies, which fully meets the geo-economic interests of the Central Asian states.   In August 2024, container transportation from the Indian ports of Mundra, Nhava Sheva and Chennai to Uzbekistan via Iran (Bandar Abbas port) and Turkmenistan started. In March 2025, cargo deliveries to Kazakhstan were organized along the same route. At the same time, Astana intends to build a specialized terminal and logistics center on the shore of Shahid Rajai port in southern Iran. All these episodes indicate the determination of the Central Asian states to get closer to Tehran.   Central Asian transit is also very important for the IRI, given the reorientation of its foreign trade to the East. On May 15, 2025, a full-fledged free trade agreement between the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Iran came into force, which provides for a sharp reduction in customs duties on almost all commodity nomenclature. Russia, which is the leader in the EAEU and has an impressive trade turnover with Iran ($4.8 billion by the end of 2024), will benefit the most from this. However, China has been and remains Tehran's largest trade partner in the East, and therefore, the development of transportation corridors through our region is a fundamental issue on the agenda of Iran-China relations.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Commenting on Donald Trump’s tour of key countries in the Middle East, where geopolitical competition is intensifying, it is important to recognize Trump’s efforts to restore U.S. influence in the region through a combination of economic, diplomatic and strategic initiatives. Trump's major agreements totaling more than $2 trillion in commercial and defense contracts with the UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia signal a new commitment to economic diplomacy that could change the dynamics of regional influence and set new precedents for American engagement. The strategic alignment between U.S. technology exports and defense partnerships comes from the following: Saudi Arabia has committed $600 billion in investments, including $142 billion in military procurement and $20 billion in artificial intelligence and energy infrastructure projects; Agreements with Qatar exceeded $243 billion, including a $96 billion purchase of a Boeing jet, a $42 billion arms purchase from the U.S. and $3 billion in advanced defense technology; investment is set to increase to $1.2 trillion; UAE has deals worth more than $200 billion, including a $14.5 billion Boeing order and a major artificial intelligence data center in Abu Dhabi.   ALJAZEERA comments on Donald Trump’s trip to the Middle East as a “geopolitical shift in the United States’ approach to the region”, noting that “President Trump is accelerating investment in America and securing fair trade deals around the world, paving the way for a new golden age of lasting prosperity for future generations”.   At a speech in Saudi Arabia, Trump said, “A new generation of leaders is overcoming the ancient conflicts and tiresome divisions of the past and building a future in which the Middle East will be defined by trade, not chaos.” He called for “technology, where people of different nations, religions and creeds build cities together rather than destroying each other with bombings.”   Thus, President Donald Trump’s diplomatic mission to the Middle East has yielded significant economic benefits and marked a marked shift in U.S. foreign economic policy and economic diplomacy toward the region. The main goal of the economic aspect of the visit – attracting significant investment in the U.S. economy to develop advanced technologies in artificial intelligence, energy and defense – has been achieved.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In 2015, the United Nations launched the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, establishing 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 specific targets to address global challenges such as poverty reduction, environmental protection, and the enhancement of quality of life. Uzbekistan has demonstrated its commitment to this global initiative by integrating the SDGs into its national strategies and policy frameworks.   With the consensus of 193 member states, the SDGs are structured around three core pillars: the economy, society, and the environment. Achieving these targets requires rigorous monitoring and evaluation by each nation to identify areas of weakness, prioritize policy interventions, and allocate resources efficiently.   Uzbekistan has undertaken significant reforms in recent years to stimulate economic growth, enhance health and education systems, safeguard natural resources, and strengthen public institutions. Despite these efforts, the pursuit of the SDGs remains a complex and long-term endeavor, requiring increased coordinated action across various sectors of society and government.   This commentary serves as a precursor to an upcoming paper, offering a concise overview of Uzbekistan’s advancements in meeting the SDGs to date. It draws on key data and government initiatives to highlight both accomplishments and ongoing challenges. The aim is to offer insights into how Uzbekistan can further align its development trajectory with global sustainability objectives.   Uzbekistan has demonstrated moderate advancement in achieving the SDGs, currently ranking 81st out of 167 countries with a score of 70.6 – marginally surpassing the Eastern Europe and Central Asia regional average of 69.2. Despite this relative progress, the country’s performance remains inconsistent across individual SDGs.   Key challenges still remain in critical domains such as zero hunger, good health and well-being, clean water and sanitation, affordable energy, sustainable cities, land preservation, and the establishment of robust institutions. Addressing these areas necessitates urgent, targeted policy interventions.   Furthermore, Uzbekistan faces considerable obstacles in enhancing educational quality, advancing gender equality, expanding employment opportunities, fostering industrial innovation, and strengthening international partnerships. These factors are essential for promoting inclusive and sustainable development. Although measurable progress has been made in reducing poverty and inequalities and in encouraging responsible consumption and climate action, these gains remain fragile. Sustained, coordinated efforts are required to ensure long-term sustainability and equitable growth nationwide[1].     The progress table highlights not only Uzbekistan’s performance across SDGs but also the underlying trends in progress, which offer important insights into the country’s development trajectory. Of particular concern is SDG 11 (sustainable cities and communities), which is marked in red to indicate a declining trend. This means a deterioration in performance within this area, underscoring an urgent signal for targeted policy interventions.   The majority of SDGs fall under the dark yellow category, indicating a stagnating trend. This category includes SDGs 2 (zero hunger), SDG 7 (clean energy), SDG 8 (decent work), SDG 9 (industry and innovation), SDG 12 (responsible consumption), SDG 15 (life on land), and SDG 16 (peace and institutions). Stagnation in such a wide range of goals suggests that progress is either too slow or not occurring at all, which could be attributed to systemic challenges, including weak implementation, lack of financing, or institutional inefficiencies.   In contrast, several SDGs show moderate improvement, including SDG 1 (no poverty), SDG 3 (good health), SDG 4 (quality education), SDG 5 (gender equality), SDG 6 (clean water), SDG 9 (industry and innovation), and SDG 17 (partnerships), as indicated by light yellow. These trends suggest incremental advancements, especially in poverty reduction and the expansion of basic services. Meanwhile, SDG 10 (reduced inequalities) is marked in gray, indicating no available information, which may reflect challenges in data collection or monitoring capabilities.   Uzbekistan has achieved notable progress in several domains, including poverty reduction, access to basic healthcare, education enrollment, and expanded access to electricity and clean water. Despite these achievements, significant challenges remain, as multiple SDG targets continue to exhibit either stagnation or insufficient progress. Key areas requiring urgent policy attention include nutrition quality, non-communicable diseases, gender equality, water management, clean energy transition, labor rights, innovation, inequality, environmental degradation, governance, and statistical capacity.   While Uzbekistan’s SDG achievements provide a strong foundation toward SDGs, accelerated, multi-sectoral reforms and increased investments are essential to stimulate progress in lagging areas. Policymakers should prioritize inclusive and green approaches backed by effective governance, data-driven monitoring, and international cooperation to meet the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals.   [1] Sachs, J.D., Lafortune, G., Fuller, G. (2024). The SDGs and the UN Summit of the Future. Sustainable Development Report 2024. Paris: SDSN, Dublin: Dublin University Press. doi:10.25546/108572. Available online: https://dashboards.sdgindex.org/static/profiles/pdfs/SDR-2024-uzbekistan.pdf

With a visit to the Gulf States from May 13-16, Donald Trump made his first trip outside Europe since returning to the White House (with the exception of a trip to Rome for the funeral of Pope Francis). The itinerary covered Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE, but notable was the exclusion of Israel and a surprise meeting with Syria’s new leader. These moves are perceived as a signal of the U.S. administration’s desire to reorient Middle East strategy and shift focus to the Arab monarchies.   The economic agenda of the meeting was unprecedentedly large: in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia promised to invest about $600 billion in the U.S. economy. It was about the development of data centers for AI, large defense purchases (over $140 billion) and investments in technology projects with the participation of Google, Oracle and Uber.   The Qatar stage showed similar results: the parties’ commitments exceeded $1.2 trillion. Among the most notable is the order of Qatar Airways for more than 200 Boeing planes worth almost $100 billion. In addition, it included agreements on the supply of drones and financing of American military facilities, in particular, the modernization of the Al-Udeid airbase.   The UAE also confirmed its willingness to invest more than $1.4 trillion over the next ten years, focusing on technology, artificial intelligence and energy. The deals in excess of $200 billion were joined by oil companies ExxonMobil and Occidental Petroleum's industry agreements with Abu Dhabi worth about $60 billion.   Washington has relaxed the rules of the Committee on Foreign Investment in advance to accelerate capital inflows, underscoring the administration’s willingness to go along with Gulf allies even in sensitive sectors of the economy.   The political component of the visit was no less significant. The exclusion of Israel from the itinerary and the tough rhetoric of Special Envoy Steve Whitkoff indicate growing irritation with the decisions of the Israeli leadership on the Gas conflict and normalization of relations with Palestine.   U.S. contacts with the Syrian leadership and the announced lifting of sanctions was the first step since the 2000s to reintegrate Damascus into the regional dialog. This reflects the influence of Saudi Arabia and Turkey on American policy and opens new opportunities for stabilization in Syria.   On the Iranian track, Washington actively supported the talks, promising “maximum pressure” or an agreement depending on Tehran's willingness to give up its nuclear ambitions. In turn, Iran was ready to dismantle its stockpiles of highly enriched uranium in exchange for the lifting of sanctions, which creates prerequisites for de-escalation of the regional confrontation.   The Palestinian-Israeli issue remained without breakthroughs at the end of the tour: Trump only stated the need for a better life for the inhabitants of Gaza, without proposing specific mechanisms for settlement. Against this background, the firmness of Netanyahu’s position only emphasizes the difficulty of reaching agreements.   In general, Donald Trump’s Middle East tour in May was a demonstration of a new model of interaction – from declarations to large-scale economic and military agreements. The cumulative volume of contracts exceeding $4 trillion strengthens the U.S. presence in the region and contributes to the reorientation of foreign policy toward strong strategic alliances with the Arab monarchies.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In recent years, the People’s Republic of China has demonstrated consistent intensification of cooperation with the countries of Central Asia, which is manifested in the platform of multilateral dialogue at the level of heads of state in the China-Central Asia format initiated by President Xi Jinping. One of the concrete results of the deepening bilateral interaction between Uzbekistan and China was the signing of an agreement on visa-free regime on 1 December 2024.   According to the agreements reached, from 1 June 2025, citizens of both countries will be able to make mutual trips for up to 30 days without the need to issue visas. The entry into force of the agreement on the designated date is likely due to the need to finalize internal legal and administrative procedures, to agree on mechanisms of interdepartmental interaction, as well as technical preparation of infrastructure and border crossing system. In addition, the choice of the date of 1 June may be due to the seasonal factor – the summer months traditionally see an increase in tourist and business traffic, which makes the application of the agreement particularly relevant.   It should be noted that the signing and implementation of the agreement is not only legal and practical, but also of a significant political nature. It is a symbol of a high level of mutual trust and aspiration for further institutionalization of strategic partnership between the two states. The simplification of the entry regime creates additional opportunities for intensifying contacts at the level of civil societies, educational institutions, cultural and scientific exchanges, i.e., for the development of people-to-people diplomacy, which complements interstate relations with informal but stable horizontal ties.   In the economic dimension, the cancellation of the visa regime may become an additional incentive to expand cooperation in trade, investment, transport, and logistics. China is already a leader among foreign investors in Uzbekistan, actively participating in the implementation of key infrastructure projects, including within the framework of the ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative. Simplification of border crossing procedures creates favorable conditions for intensification of business contacts, exchange of delegations and participation of business circles of both countries in joint projects.   Thus, the visa-free regime between Uzbekistan and China is not only a pragmatic step in the field of visa liberalization, but also an instrument aimed at strengthening political dialogue, economic cooperation, and humanitarian ties. Its implementation opens up new horizons for the comprehensive development of bilateral cooperation in line with the spirit of good neighborliness, strategic interaction and mutual benefit.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.