Constructive U.S.-China talks in Geneva have led to a decision that the U.S. will reduce tariffs on Chinese imports, which were imposed from January 2025 on both sides, from 145% to 30%, and China’s retaliatory tariffs on U.S. goods will be reduced from 125% to 10%. Thus, the agreement reached to reduce tariffs by 115% of each side within the next 90 days – to some extent calmed the international economic community.   Against this backdrop, CNN experts note that “global investors are welcoming a thaw in a trade war that has rattled financial markets, disrupted supply chains and heightened fears of recession”. At a news conference in Geneva, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said: “Both delegations agreed that neither side wants a breakdown in relations. We do want trade. We want to achieve a greater balance in trade”. A spokesperson for China’s Ministry of Commerce called the joint statement “an important step by both sides to resolve differences through equitable dialog and consultation, laying the groundwork and creating conditions for further closing gaps and deepening cooperation”.   Following President Trump’s statement to reporters that “the weekend's talks have led to a ”complete reset of the terms of trade between the U.S. and China”, stock markets jumped, according to BBC News reporters, with investors cheering the de-escalation, with the S&P 500 Index jumping more than 3.2%, the Dow Jones Index rising 2.8%, and the Nasdaq up 4.3%. On Wall Street, shares of Target, Home Depot and Nike rose sharply in value, while technology stocks including Nvidia, Amazon, Apple and Facebook Meta also rose sharply. European stock indexes rose, with Hong Kong’s Hang Seng Index ending the day up 3%. The deal sent shares of shipping companies soaring, with Denmark’s Maersk up more than 12% and Germany’s Hapag-Lloyd up 14%. Maersk said the US-China agreement was “a step in the right direction” and that they now hope for a “permanent deal that can provide long-term predictability”. The International Chamber of Commerce said the deal sent a clear signal that the U.S. and China both want to avoid a “hard breakdown in relations”.   J.P.Morgan Research estimates such tariff cuts will continue through the end of 2025 and will have a significant impact on economic growth forecasts, including China’s annual growth forecast to 4.8 percent from a low of 4.1 percent. According to Haibin Zhu, head of research at J.P.Morgan Research, “the magnitude of the temporary tariff cuts is larger than expected and is a surprisingly positive development”. They also predicted that the US Federal Reserve will keep interest rates unchanged in the medium term until December 2025, the probability of recession in the US and globally has also dropped to below 50%.   To summarize, it should be emphasized that the agreement on trade tariffs has helped to ease the confrontation between the two countries and laid the foundation for overcoming uncertainty in trade policy.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

At a joint business forum in Kazan (Republic of Tatarstan, Russian Federation), Russia and Afghanistan considered the prospects for developing the Russia-Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan and Russia-Caspian Sea-Turkmenistan-Afghanistan multimodal transit corridors.   This development brings clarity to the understanding of Moscow’s long-term vision for shaping Afghanistan’s transportation architecture. It is noteworthy that along with the overland route through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the Russian side has begun to openly discuss the possibility of connecting to Afghanistan via the Caspian Sea using Turkmenistan’s port and railroad infrastructure. This approach signals Russia’s desire to diversify its supply routes to South Asia in order to pre-empt the risk of excessive dependence on one or another transit country.   The idea to establish multimodal transportation along the North-South axis through Afghanistan was initiated by Uzbekistan. In 2022, Tashkent proposed to launch an interregional route Belarus-Russia-Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan with a length of 5532 kilometers. A year later, the parties signed a memorandum on its implementation. Since then, Russia has been noticeably active on the trans-Afghan track and has already announced its participation in the preparation of a feasibility study of the Trans-Afghan railroad project.   As is known, Uzbekistan is promoting the concept of the Kabul corridor, which involves laying railroad tracks from Mazar-e-Sharif (Afghanistan) to Peshawar (Pakistan). The work was planned to start in the fall of 2021. However, due to an unexpected change of power in Afghanistan, the process was suspended and then resumed again. Meanwhile, in 2024, Turkmenistan in partnership with Kazakhstan presented an alternative version of the Trans-Afghan railroad along the Torghundi-Herat-Kandahar-Spin-Buldak route with access to Pakistani ports in the Indian Ocean. Russia appears to be interested in the operation of both the Kabul and Kandahar corridors.   In September 2024, Turkmenistan started laying the first section of the Torghundi-Herat railroad (115 km), which is planned to be extended to the Pakistani border via Kandahar. Part of the project’s $500 million cost will be borne by Kazakhstan.   Following their February visit to Tashkent, the Taliban said they had reached an agreement with the Uzbek side on the construction of the Mazar-e-Sharif-Herat railroad, although Uzbekistan’s specialized agency did not confirm this information. Here we should also emphasize that one of the two routes, which, judging by the reports of the Russian Ministry of Transport, was agreed upon for the preparation of the feasibility study of the Trans-Afghan railroad, starts from the city of Mazar-e-Sharif, connecting Afghanistan’s Herat, Dilaram, Kandahar with the border town of Chaman in Pakistan. It follows that the Taliban government intends to turn Herat into the country’s main transit hub, which would give major shippers such as Russia the opportunity to connect to different branches of the Trans-Afghan Railway – west via Kandahar or east via Kabul. Connecting the routes would probably allow Afghanistan to attract more transit cargo, which, in addition to economic benefits, would bring the local government considerable geopolitical dividends. However, this plan may cause a conflict of interests for Central Asian states involved in trans-Afghan communications.   A trade route across the Caspian Sea to Afghanistan is sure to irritate Tashkent, which is making great efforts to build the Termez-Mazar-e-Sharif-Kabul-Peshawar railroad, which is supposed to complete the process of creating a direct rail link between East Asia, Eurasia and the Indian peninsula. The efficiency of any transportation corridor depends on the freight base. If the Russia-Caspian Sea-Turkmenistan-Afghanistan multimodal route is launched, a significant volume of supplies from north to south may be reoriented to the sea route due to its low cost and the enormous cargo capacity of sea vessels. Regardless of which transport and through which Central Asian country transit flows to Afghanistan will be directed, the Kabul corridor will have to compete for their transportation, which will be a serious challenge for the region.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In Uzbekistan, I noticed a striking trend: nearly every political science researcher I met interpreted U.S. foreign policy through the framework of classical International Relations (IR) theory. They spoke in terms of realism, liberalism, and constructivism, assuming that the United States behaved according to strategic interest, institutional norms, or ideological values. But when I read about the Trump administration, none of those models seemed to fit. How could IR theory explain slashing embassies and diplomatic missions, or cozying up to adversaries while tariffing allies? The discrepancy between theoretical models and political reality wasn’t just confusing — it revealed something deeper: that the traditional IR playbook is no longer equipped to explain a second Trump administration.   Then, the burning question emerges: if International Relations cannot explain Trump, what can? This commentary calls for a psychopolitical approach, specifically blending Trump’s desire for ego, performance, and chaos.   Firstly, Trump is guided by ego. Unlike leaders driven by national interests or institutional norms, his foreign policy decisions consistently reflect a desire for personal validation and dominance. When Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky – who is more popular than President Trump in the US – visited Washington, Trump couldn’t stand being overshadowed. He publicly undermined Zelensky in front of the cameras, trying to reassert his own authority. Similarly, after Pope Francis passed away earlier this year, Trump responded not with statesmanship, but with spectacle: he circulated an AI-generated image of himself as Pope, seemingly to redirect public attention from a strong critic who had once labeled his immigration stance “not Christian”. Countries like South Africa, Canada, and the UK have found themselves forced to navigate Trump’s ego with extreme caution, offering delicate praise while hoping to avoid public ambushes – though such efforts often fell short. Traditional IR theories would assume that these actions serve a broader national purpose and advance U.S. interests in some way. Yet, Trump’s ego-driven decisions have failed to deliver meaningful gains for American foreign policy. These incidents are not isolated; rather, they reveal a consistent pattern where Trump’s foreign policy prioritizes his ego above all else, subordinating diplomacy to personal image and emotional gratification.   Secondly, Trump’s approach to international relations is performative. His decisions are shaped by how they play to a domestic audience, specifically how they reinforce his image as a successful dealmaker. Humanitarian aid was cut because its benefits weren’t easily visible to voters – regardless of consequences such as 91,000 dead adults and 190,000 dead children, or the destabilizing effects on already fragile regions like the Middle East. Domestically, as a result of Trump’s proposed Medicaid cuts, an adult will die every 18 minutes according to work by Boston University. Even when judged by the economic criteria Trump claimed to prioritize, his policies are counterproductive: his trade wars and tariffs are projected to shrink long-term U.S. GDP by 6% and reduce real wages by 5%. These contradictions reveal a deeper truth: Trump’s foreign policy isn’t about economic outcomes (like some IR theories propose), but about appearances. When countries hit by tariffs respond, they cannot take the analytical route like Japan and attempt to negotiate tariffs. Rather, they must appear specifically to Trump’s desire to create a performative atmosphere, engaging in public appeasement – such as what India has pursued. The language of money and “deals” was never a coherent strategy, but a performance designed to reinforce his brand as a tough, no-nonsense leader who puts “America First”.   Thirdly, Trump thrives on creating chaos. He requires constant attention, staying one step ahead of the media. By creating scandal after scandal every week, outrage fatigue sets in, and legitimate criticism can be brushed off as part of a never-ending “witch hunt.” He frequently discusses annexing Canada, invading Greenland, or building a luxury resort in Gaza. He accepted multi-million-dollar jets from monarchies, and renamed the Gulf of Mexico. These actions are highly strategic, not to advance the goals of the US, but to make Trump appear stronger. IR as a field rests on an assumption of stability and analysis, where decisions are nuanced and temporally-appropriate. For Trump, chaos becomes a political tool, and confusion creates conditions for him to take control.   Through ego, performance, and chaos, a psychopolitical model emerges through which countries can interpret the actions of President Trump – not as a foreign leader in a traditional sense, but as a spectacle. Classic International Relations theory fails to account for a leader who puts attention over alliances, optics over outcomes, and personal gain over national strategy. For countries like Uzbekistan, using IR as a frame means that it is impossible to understand the actions and motivations of President Trump. His behaviour isn’t simply an anomaly within IR, but something entirely outside of it. To make sense of Trump’s actions, we must go beyond IR and reckon with a broader truth: the traditional playbook is no longer just outdated – it’s irrelevant in a Trump-led world.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

According to the World Food Programme, more than 340 million people in the world today suffer from severe food insecurity. Behind each of these figures are, in fact, specific people. Moreover, almost two million of them are on the verge of starvation, and their condition is qualified as catastrophic. That is, people are currently dying not from disease or old age, but from lack of the most basic things, namely, food.   At the same time, according to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the world wastes about 1 billion tonnes of food per year, or one fifth of all food available to consumers. Food waste not only adds to the problem of hunger, but also causes serious environmental damage. They are responsible for about 10 per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions. Reducing food waste is therefore a key step towards food security, climate protection and resource efficiency.   We highlight that the bulk of food waste (about 60%) is generated by households, with the rest distributed between catering (28%) and retail (12%). In addition, about 13% of food is lost before it reaches the shelves, namely at the stages of harvesting, storage and transport.   Countries around the world, such as Uzbekistan, are increasingly introducing various technological solutions to reduce food waste. Against this background, an important direction, in our opinion, is the strengthening of anthropological factors, such as an ingrained tradition of careful and respectful attitude to food that has existed since ancient times. This has direct relevance to Uzbekistan, where it is not just a cultural peculiarity, but also a part of folk ethics. And today, despite the growth of consumption and urbanisation, it is important to continue to support this attitude in families in our country.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The 14th government of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), led by incumbent President Massoud Pezeshkian, is noticeably strengthening its pragmatic Central Asian policy. The main focus of regional interaction is aimed at developing trade and transportation and logistics links. This goal is in harmony with Iran's “Look East” strategy, designed to mitigate Tehran’s economic isolation.   International sanctions remain the main constraint on Iran’s integration with Central Asia. Despite geographic proximity and huge resource potential, the total volume of mutual trade remains unsatisfactory at just over $1.5 billion, although it has increased slightly in recent years. The goal is to quadruple trade with Uzbekistan to $2 billion, with Kazakhstan and Tajikistan to $1 billion, and with Turkmenistan by 30%.   The expanding export opportunities of Central Asian states stimulate the search for new consumer markets and efficient ways of communication with major economies of the world. Iran combines both qualities, making it a valuable partner for the regional P5. In addition, the country has solid scientific and technical expertise in engineering, energy, agriculture, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, as well as an investment base for joint ventures.   The extensive road and railroad network, coupled with the presence of major ports in the Indian Ocean, gives IRI an important advantage in cooperation with the landlocked Central Asian republics. Tehran plays a key role in the formation of the Eurasian land bridge to connect China and Europe by railroads. Several transit routes from East to West cross Iranian territory by land, which also involve Central Asian countries. The China-Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey-EU railroad corridor has been actively developed, and the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey-EU multimodal route operates in parallel.   In light of the actualization of the southern direction of transit for the Central Asian republics, the Iranian deep-water port of Chabahar, which is being modernized by India and thanks to it is not burdened by sanctions, is gaining popularity. In 2023, Tehran approved Tashkent's request to join the Chabahar agreement. The Uzbek side plans to build warehouses and a terminal at the sea harbor. Kazakhstan and Tajikistan are considering a similar issue. Discussions are also underway to launch transportation corridors from Central Asia to India using Iran’s road and port infrastructure. Such development will spur intensification of trade with one of the world’s largest economies, which fully meets the geo-economic interests of the Central Asian states.   In August 2024, container transportation from the Indian ports of Mundra, Nhava Sheva and Chennai to Uzbekistan via Iran (Bandar Abbas port) and Turkmenistan started. In March 2025, cargo deliveries to Kazakhstan were organized along the same route. At the same time, Astana intends to build a specialized terminal and logistics center on the shore of Shahid Rajai port in southern Iran. All these episodes indicate the determination of the Central Asian states to get closer to Tehran.   Central Asian transit is also very important for the IRI, given the reorientation of its foreign trade to the East. On May 15, 2025, a full-fledged free trade agreement between the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Iran came into force, which provides for a sharp reduction in customs duties on almost all commodity nomenclature. Russia, which is the leader in the EAEU and has an impressive trade turnover with Iran ($4.8 billion by the end of 2024), will benefit the most from this. However, China has been and remains Tehran's largest trade partner in the East, and therefore, the development of transportation corridors through our region is a fundamental issue on the agenda of Iran-China relations.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Commenting on Donald Trump’s tour of key countries in the Middle East, where geopolitical competition is intensifying, it is important to recognize Trump’s efforts to restore U.S. influence in the region through a combination of economic, diplomatic and strategic initiatives. Trump's major agreements totaling more than $2 trillion in commercial and defense contracts with the UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia signal a new commitment to economic diplomacy that could change the dynamics of regional influence and set new precedents for American engagement. The strategic alignment between U.S. technology exports and defense partnerships comes from the following: Saudi Arabia has committed $600 billion in investments, including $142 billion in military procurement and $20 billion in artificial intelligence and energy infrastructure projects; Agreements with Qatar exceeded $243 billion, including a $96 billion purchase of a Boeing jet, a $42 billion arms purchase from the U.S. and $3 billion in advanced defense technology; investment is set to increase to $1.2 trillion; UAE has deals worth more than $200 billion, including a $14.5 billion Boeing order and a major artificial intelligence data center in Abu Dhabi.   ALJAZEERA comments on Donald Trump’s trip to the Middle East as a “geopolitical shift in the United States’ approach to the region”, noting that “President Trump is accelerating investment in America and securing fair trade deals around the world, paving the way for a new golden age of lasting prosperity for future generations”.   At a speech in Saudi Arabia, Trump said, “A new generation of leaders is overcoming the ancient conflicts and tiresome divisions of the past and building a future in which the Middle East will be defined by trade, not chaos.” He called for “technology, where people of different nations, religions and creeds build cities together rather than destroying each other with bombings.”   Thus, President Donald Trump’s diplomatic mission to the Middle East has yielded significant economic benefits and marked a marked shift in U.S. foreign economic policy and economic diplomacy toward the region. The main goal of the economic aspect of the visit – attracting significant investment in the U.S. economy to develop advanced technologies in artificial intelligence, energy and defense – has been achieved.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.