Uzbekistan has long been demonstrating a calculated and strategic pragmatism dealing effectively with its foreign policy towards the Taliban-led government in Afghanistan. What might appear as mere diplomatic exchanges on the surface is, in fact, part of a broader and more sophisticated approach by Uzbekistan to secure its national interests in a volatile region. The high-level visits by Uzbek officials, including Minister of Investment, Industry, and Trade Laziz Qudratov and Prime Minister Abdulla Aripov, reflect this nuanced strategy. These visits, along with other economic engagements, are seemingly emblematic of Uzbekistan’s pragmatic foreign policy, which prioritizes economic leverage over formal diplomatic ties due to the current situation around Afghanistan.   The July 3rd business forum held in Tashkent, which brought Afghan entrepreneurs to the negotiating table, was not an isolated event but part of a series of deliberate moves by Uzbekistan to deepen economic ties with Afghanistan. This forum, followed by high-level visits, including the October 2023 visit by Uzbekistan’s Deputy Prime Minister to Kabul, underscores the importance Uzbekistan places on economic convergence with its neighbour. During the October visit, both parties agreed to increase bilateral trade to $3 billion, a significant commitment that illustrates the depth of economic engagement between the two countries.   Apparently though, these engagements might not just only be about trade; they seem to serve as a means for Uzbekistan to establish a form of an economic leverage over the Taliban government to ensure that the latter could not weaponize water issue between two countries. Given the geopolitical uncertainty in the region and the unrecognized status of the Taliban government, Uzbekistan is crafting a foreign policy that allows it to protect its interests without the need for a formal diplomatic recognition. This strategy reflects a careful balancing act, where the economic relations are used as a credible means to influence and potentially control the outcomes in bilateral relations.   In some perspective, Uzbekistan’s increasing focus on economic ties with Afghanistan is rooted in several strategic considerations. One of the most pressing issues for Uzbekistan is water security. The country’s agricultural sector, which is vital for its economy, depends heavily on Amu Darya’s water resources that in part originate in Afghanistan. With the Taliban now in control, Uzbekistan faces the risk of potential blackmail or manipulation over water rights, a scenario that could have devastating consequences for its agricultural output and, by extension, its food security.   By fostering strong economic ties, Uzbekistan, to some extent, aims to create a form of co-dependency that could deter the Taliban from using water as a bargaining chip. The promise of increased trade and economic collaboration offers Taliban certain incentives for maintaining stable and cooperative relationship with Uzbekistan. In this way, Uzbekistan is thought to be building a buffer against potential threats to its water security, ensuring that any attempt by the Taliban to leverage water resources could be met with a strong economic response, including the possibility of decoupling trade relations.   This approach is particularly pragmatic given the current geopolitical landscape. The Taliban government, though unrecognized by the international community, controls significant resources and territory. For Uzbekistan, engaging with the Taliban on economic terms allows it to navigate the complexities of the situation without compromising its own standing in the international arena. By focusing on trade rather than formal diplomatic ties, Uzbekistan could pursue its interests while maintaining flexibility in its foreign policy.   The visits by Uzbek officials to Kabul, including the recent high-profile visit by Prime Minister Abdulla Aripov, are more than just diplomatic gestures. They are part of a broader strategy that emphasizes pragmatism over ideology. Uzbekistan recognizes the reality of the Taliban’s control over Afghanistan and the need to engage with them on practical terms. This approach reflects a departure from traditional diplomacy, where recognition and formal ties are often prerequisites for engagement. Instead, Uzbekistan is prioritizing its national interests using economic tools through building a set of influences ensuring stability in its relations with Afghanistan.   This pragmatism is also evident in Uzbekistan’s broader foreign policy. The country has been careful to balance its relationships with major powers, including Russia, China, and the United States, while also fostering regional cooperation in Central Asia. In its dealings with Afghanistan, Uzbekistan is applying the same principles, seeking to avoid entanglement in ideological conflicts while focusing on tangible benefits such as trade and security. This approach allows Uzbekistan to navigate the complexities of the region while maintaining its sovereignty and independence.   Apart from hedging against some potential challenges Taliban might create, by establishing a strong economic relationship with Afghanistan, Uzbekistan could position itself as a key player in the region, capable of influencing outcomes and ensuring its own security. The potential for increased trade and economic collaboration could also bring substantial benefits to Uzbekistan’s economy, particularly in sectors such as agriculture and energy.   Conclusion Uzbekistan’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan under the Taliban is a carefully crafted strategy that prioritizes economic convergence over a formal diplomatic tie. By focusing on trade and economic collaboration, Uzbekistan is potentially building some leverages that could protect its interests in the face of possible challenges, particularly concerning water security. This pragmatic approach reflects a broader shift in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy, where national interests take precedence over ideology. As Uzbekistan continues to navigate the complexities of its relationship with Afghanistan, its strategy of economic engagement could prove to be a powerful tool in ensuring stability and security in the region.

The security dynamics between China and the Central Asian nations of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan evolved predominantly through formal diplomatic channels, bilateral agreements, and the institutional framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.   China has collaborated with regional governments in areas such as counterterrorism, military trainings, and intelligence sharing.   Driven primarily by market demand, specifics of the local law system, and adaptation to the security challenges that Chinese enterprises face in the region, this phenomenon may also harbor the potential for the Chinese state to project power in the region should it wish to.   Read the commentary on Carnegie Endowments’ website

The commentary was prepared by the IAIS intern Jaloliddin Ibragimov under the supervision of Islomkhon Gafarov.Narendra Modi, India’s newly re-elected Prime Minister, strategically selected Moscow as the destination for his inaugural international visit, marking a significant diplomatic gesture. This visit is his first to Moscow since 2019, occurs against a backdrop of increasing bilateral cooperation despite the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine and the numerous sanctions imposed on Russia. Over the past five years India and Russia have strengthened their ties, with trade reaching approximately $65 billion in 2023. As the author states, the relationship between India and Russia remains a crucial element in the global geopolitical landscape, advocating for a multipolar world. The successful outcome of Modi’s visit suggests that India will continue to navigate its foreign policy with a balanced approach, maintaining strong ties with both Russia and the United States while addressing its regional challenges.Read the commentary

Increasing geopolitical tensions in the world threaten the security of traditional sea routes, on the one hand, and spur the development of land transport corridors, on the other. Such changes contribute to the effective implementation of the transit potential of Central Asia, located in the core of the Eurasian continent.    Realizing their high importance in establishing proper communications between global economic centers, the states of the region are actively diversifying trade relations and routes.    Read the Commentary

In early July, Uzbekistan intensified its diplomatic engagement on the Afghan issue, highlighted by key international interactions. Following the Third Doha Conference, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev held pivotal discussions with UN Secretary-General António Guterres, addressing humanitarian aid and a unified international strategy towards Afghanistan. At the SCO summit, President Mirziyoyev emphasized the integration of Afghanistan into Central Asia and called for the resumption of the "SCO-Afghanistan" dialogue. At the Turkic States Organization summit, he advocated for unfreezing Afghanistan's financial assets to enhance humanitarian support. Through these diplomatic efforts, Uzbekistan positions itself as a significant player in addressing Afghanistan's challenges, promoting a unified global strategy to foster stability and development.   Read the Commentary

The commentary was prepared by IAIS research intern Malika Khakimova under the supervision of Fazliddin Djamalov.   From June 23 to 26,2024 the President of Mongolia, Ukhnaagiin Khurelsukh, paid a state visit to Uzbekistan. The main agenda of the negotiations between the leaders of Mongolia and Uzbekistan focused on prospects for expanding multifaceted cooperation between the countries and intensifying political dialogue. During the visit, the two countries signed 14 intergovernmental documents, including agreements on trade and economic cooperation, air and road transportation, tourism, agriculture, science, and culture. Consequently, the following key trends aimed at intensifying relations between Uzbekistan and Mongolia can be highlighted: Strengthening Regional Cooperation. This visit underscores Mongolia's ambition to strengthen its position in Central Asia. Mongolia aims to move beyond its status as a "buffer zone" between China and Russia and position itself as part of Central Asia. Following its "third neighbor" policy, Mongolia is developing close political ties with other influential states to secure their support on the international stage. In this context, the European Union (EU) is an ideal "third neighbor"[1] for Mongolia, as it does not provoke strategic concerns in Beijing or Moscow. Experts note that Mongolia's desire to associate itself with Central Asia is linked to the EU's active cooperation with the region. The European Union shows significant interest in Central Asia due to its strategic geographic location, vast energy resources, considerable market potential, and role in ensuring regional security. From 2014 to 2020, the total amount of EU assistance to Central Asian countries was €1.1 billion, and for the period 2021-2024, it is expected to be at least €390 million[2]. At the same time, EU investments in Mongolia for the period 2021-2024 amounted to €31 million[3]. Therefore, through regional integration into Central Asia, Mongolia hopes to strengthen its ties with the European Union. Diversification of Foreign Economic Relations. Both countries are diversifying their foreign economic relations to reduce dependence on traditional trading partners. Mongolia, situated between China and Russia, is seeking new opportunities for economic growth through cooperation with Uzbekistan. Mongolia specializes in the production and export of cashmere, wool, meat, meat products, and leather goods. Uzbekistan, in turn, offers vegetables and fruits, fertilizers, medicines, household appliances, plastic and rubber products, building materials, ready-made textiles, and footwear in exchange. In 2022, the trade turnover of food and agricultural products between the two countries amounted to about $5.5 million, with the majority of this sum coming from Uzbekistan's exports to Mongolia, which totaled $4.4 million[4]. In the coming years, mutual trade is expected to increase 5-10 times by expanding the range and volume of demanded products. Intensifying Diplomatic Contacts. The opening of the Mongolian embassy in Tashkent and Uzbekistan's plans to open its embassy in Ulaanbaatar demonstrate the countries' readiness for closer political interaction. To attract Mongolian youth to Uzbekistan, the government of the latter has expressed its willingness to allocate grant funds for the education of Mongolian students. In 2022, Mongolian and Uzbek agricultural universities already negotiated regarding student exchange programs[5]. During the visit, it was noted that it is also necessary to develop partnerships between research institutes, especially in the field of animal husbandry. Bolstering International Status. Mongolia was one of the first countries to support Uzbekistan's inclusion to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Uzbekistan's accession to the WTO could create favorable conditions for the development of bilateral trade between Mongolia and Uzbekistan. During recent negotiations, Uzbekistan and Mongolia have prepared an agreement on preferential trade and proposals for simplifying mutual market access[6]. This agreement will allow both countries to benefit from preferential tariffs and conditions, thereby enhancing the competitiveness of their products in international markets. For Mongolia, this will also open up new opportunities for exporting its goods and attracting investments. Developing Transport Infrastructure. The presidents signed agreements on air and road transport aimed at improving transportation infrastructure and logistics. This is particularly crucial for landlocked countries. Prior to the visit of the Mongolian president, the construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway was announced, with the parliament ratifying a six-year implementation agreement for the project[7]. Mongolia might be interested in joining this project, which would enable shorter and more economically viable transportation routes for its goods, as well as integration into a wider network of transportation corridors. Moreover, the project has the potential to connect to the Trans-Afghan corridor, offering Mongolia opportunities to export its agricultural and meat products to Afghanistan and South Asia. Participation in such a significant infrastructure project would also contribute to the formation of a unified Central Asian identity in Mongolia.   [1] EUCAM. (2012, July 4). Mongolia’s quest for third neighbors.. Why the European Union? Retrieved from https://eucentralasia.eu/mongolias-quest-for-third-neighbours-why-the-european-union-ru/ [2] European External Action Service. (2022, November 14). Josep Borrell: We are actively working on building a stronger, broader, and modern partnership with five Central Asian countries. [3]  European Commission. (n.d.). Mongolia. Retrieved from https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/countries/mongolia_en   [4] Panfilova, V. (2024, June 23). Mongolia seeks access to the sea through Uzbekistan. Nezavisimaya Gazeta. Retrieved from https://www.ng.ru/cis/2024-06-23/8_9033_sea.html [5] Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of Uzbekistan. (2022, August 27). Student exchange was established between agricultural universities of Mongolia and Uzbekistan. Retrieved from https://www.agro.uz/ru/11-0395/   [6] Kun.uz. (2024, June 24). Uzbekistan and Mongolia to prepare an agreement on preferential trade. Retrieved from https://kun.uz/ru/news/2024/06/24/uzbekistan-i-mongoliya-podgotovyat-soglasheniye-o-preferensialnoy-torgovle [7] Hwan, E. (2024, June 20). Kyrgyzstan: Railway from China to reduce dependency on Russia. Deutsche Welle. Retrieved from https://www.dw.com/ru/kyrgyzstan-zeleznaa-doroga-iz-kitaa-snizit-zavisimost-ot-rossii/a-69430517