The global coal market remains highly concentrated, with the majority of production located in Asia. According to data from the Energy Institute (Statistical Review of World Energy 2025), China accounts for 4,780 million tonnes of coal per year—more than half of global production. This makes China not only the largest producer but also the leading consumer of coal. It extracts 4.5 times more than India and nearly 10 times more than the United States. This scale is driven by China’s energy structure, which still heavily relies on coal, despite massive investments in renewables.     India ranks second with 1,085 million tonnes, driven by growing industrial and residential demand for electricity. Indonesia, with 836 million tonnes, is largely export-oriented, supplying coal to Southeast Asia, China, and South Asia.   Among Western nations, the United States (465 Mt) and Australia (463 Mt) remain major producers. Despite green transition policies, both continue to maintain stable output— the U.S. primarily for domestic use, and Australia for export. Russia follows with 427 Mt, maintaining its status as a key player despite sanctions and reduced exports to Europe. Regional suppliers such as Kazakhstan (113 Mt) and Mongolia (107 Mt) continue to strengthen their positions, especially in supplying China.   In Europe, countries like Germany (92 Mt), Poland (85 Mt), and Turkey (87 Mt) continue coal production despite decarbonization goals, largely driven by energy security concerns and the need to replace natural gas imports after the 2022–2023 energy crisis.   In summary, Asia is the undisputed center of global coal production, accounting for over 75% of output. Asian countries are now key players in the global climate agenda, and any shift in their energy policies will have a direct impact on global emissions. The future of coal largely depends on decisions made in Beijing, New Delhi, and Jakarta.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

By Mirjalol Murtozaev The meeting of the foreign ministers of Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan held in Kabul on July 17, 2025, marks an important turning point on the path of regional infrastructure development. At the meeting, a trilateral agreement was signed on the preparation of a feasibility study for the Trans-Afghan railway. This event is not merely a logistical project, but rather the beginning of a new phase in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy based on geoeconomic pragmatism and strategic reality.   Uzbekistan’s interest in the Trans-Afghan railway project has, in fact, been revived against the backdrop of recent global and regional geopolitical changes. In recent years, Uzbekistan had been actively promoting plans to access South Asia through Iran’s Chabahar port. This route was considered promising both in terms of regional diversification and for deepening direct economic ties with India. However, the geopolitical developments of recent months particularly the clashes between Iran and Israel, the worsening of Iran’s relations with Western countries, and India’s insufficient support for Iran during this process have begun to complicate the Chabahar access project. Moreover, signs of warming ties between China, Afghanistan, and Pakistan became evident during their trilateral meeting in Beijing on May 21 of this year. As a result of these factors, Pakistan’s Gwadar and Karachi ports are increasingly being seen as a more stable and reliable alternative. In particular, the opening of a short and cost-effective route to these ports via the Trans-Afghan railway may serve as a solid basis for defining a new strategic direction for Uzbekistan’s foreign trade. In addition, the Pakistani route may offer such advantages as economic efficiency, reduced transit time, and lower logistics costs. Additionally, the Pakistani route may also offer advantages such as economic efficiency, reduced transit time, and lower logistics costs.   The foundations of this railway agreement can be viewed in several stages:   First, despite existing security concerns regarding the Trans-Afghan railway, it is seen as a relatively shorter, more quickly implementable route that currently enjoys political will. The presence of stable dialogue between Tashkent and the current Afghan government is contributing to mutual interests between the two sides. Closer energy and transport ties with Pakistan could further elevate the project to a strategic level.   Second, at a time when the relevance of traditional trade routes in the north is gradually diminishing, and the route through Iran via the Caspian Sea requires large-scale infrastructure investments, the Trans-Afghan transport corridor is becoming a new geoeconomic pivot for the entire Central Asian region. This project is emerging not only as a freight transportation system but also as a key to regional integration, energy diplomacy, and export strategy. The railway also opens the opportunity to transmit electricity through Afghanistan to South Asia. In particular, the implementation of the CASA-1000 project could allow Uzbekistan and neighboring countries to increase export volumes and strengthen their presence in the energy market. Moreover, direct access to the ports of Gwadar and Karachi would enable Uzbekistan to establish stable links with strategic markets along the Indian Ocean. Additionally, this corridor would open pathways to the energy and investment projects of Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar. This would lead not only to economic cooperation but also usher in a new phase of political and diplomatic engagement. From this perspective, the agreement signed in Kabul is not merely an infrastructure deal, but a forward-looking strategic political choice that integrates multi-layered interests.   Third, the Trans-Afghan railway is not only a transport project, but a geoeconomic route that ensures Uzbekistan’s access to the markets of South Asia, India, and the Persian Gulf. Through this route, cargo delivery time will be reduced from 35 days to 5-7 days, and container costs will decrease from $900 to $286. Under such conditions, Uzbekistan can make its export-import operations more competitive and stable. Financial and political support for the project is also crucial. China’s “Belt and Road” initiative, Russia’s transit diplomacy, and Pakistan’s port policy could be directly integrated into this project. This aligns with Uzbekistan’s “multi-vector” foreign policy principle.   Fourth, at the Kabul meeting, the Uzbek Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bakhtiyor Saidov, held talks with Afghanistan’s Prime Minister Mullah Hasan Akhund, Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi, and Interior Minister Khalifa Sirajuddin Haqqani - which is evidence of Tashkent’s increasingly active foreign policy. These meetings can be seen as efforts to deepen consistent political dialogue with the Afghan government, strengthen economic trust, and build security guarantees. It also reflects the desire to view Afghanistan as an integral part of regional integration. Through this, Uzbekistan is implementing the concept of becoming a transit hub between Central and South Asia and serving as a “bridge” in regional diplomacy. Conclusion. The Trans-Afghan railway project represents a real geoeconomic transformation in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy. This initiative envisions not only transport infrastructure but also the creation of political trust, trade security, and regional balance. Under the leadership of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, Uzbekistan’s foreign policy consistently relies on geopolitical pragmatism and the priority of regional stability. Uzbekistan is shaping itself as a normative initiator and a country that defines strategic direction.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

By Shokhruzbek Gulmetov   The Iran-Israel confrontation has evolved beyond a regional dispute, drawing close attention from the wider international community. In response to recent developments, major global players have taken clear positions, reflecting their respective strategic interests. India, long viewed as a key partner of the Islamic Republic of Iran and consistently recognizing Tehran’s regional significance, has taken a cautious and calibrated approach. Unlike several other members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), New Delhi refrained from issuing any direct condemnation of Israel, instead calling for de-escalation and maintaining a position of formal neutrality, albeit with subtle indications of diplomatic alignment with Tel Aviv.   Converging Political Outlooks To understand India’s motives for abstaining from condemning Israel’s actions, it is essential to examine the nature of India-Israel relations, particularly in the political and strategic domains. New Delhi’s decision not to align with the joint SCO position reveals a pragmatic approach to foreign policy. When both parties to a conflict represent important partners, states often opt for neutrality, guided by national interests and long-term strategic calculations.   In India’s case, cooperation with Israel has been steadily expanding across sectors such as defense, technology, and intelligence. Following the October 2023 attacks by Hamas on Israeli territory, India expressed solidarity with Tel Aviv. In turn, during India’s “Sindhur” operation on Pakistani territory, Israel offered diplomatic support to India, a move that drew concern from the international community due to reports of civilian casualties.   In April 2025, Israeli President Isaac Herzog, during a meeting with India’s new ambassador, emphasized the importance of deepening bilateral ties, especially in the field of geostrategic cooperation. He also noted Israel’s generally favorable perception of India. On the morning of June 13, 2025, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for a ceasefire in Gaza. India abstained from the vote, despite traditional Israeli allies such as France, the United Kingdom, and Germany having supported the resolution.   India’s behavior reflects its effort to maintain a delicate balance in its relationships with key partners, particularly Israel. However, its abstention on a humanitarian resolution raises questions, especially given the alignment of Indian and Israeli approaches to various developments in the Muslim world. This position may be interpreted as a lack of sufficient sensitivity to the humanitarian aspects of the conflict.   New Delhi’s Economic Priorities India-Israel relations are rooted not only in political alignment but also in expanding economic cooperation, which New Delhi considers more promising than its projects with Iran, such as the Chabahar Port or the North-South Transport Corridor. In February 2025, the India-Israel Business Forum brought together over 100 leading companies. At the forum, Israel’s Minister of Economy emphasized the geopolitical importance of strengthening partnerships with India and the United States, reflecting Tel Aviv’s strategic pivot toward Asia.   Economic data highlights New Delhi’s pragmatic choice: in 2024, trade between India and Iran totaled USD 4.13 billion, whereas trade with Israel reached USD 6.53 billion, despite a decline from 2023, when it had exceeded USD 10 billion. Indian Minister of Commerce and Industry Piyush Goyal stated that trade volumes between India and Israel should be increased tenfold, underscoring the prioritization of economic dialogue with Israel.   Beyond bilateral projects, multilateral economic initiatives also play a crucial role in bringing India and Israel closer together. Notable among them are the I2U2 coalition (India, Israel, the U.S., and the UAE) and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). I2U2 focuses on key areas, including food security, sustainable energy, and the private sector. It envisions up to USD 2 billion in investments for agro-industrial parks in India, along with projects to reach 500 GW of clean energy capacity by 2030.   Initiated with U.S. support, IMEC offers India direct and stable access to Middle Eastern and European markets, circumventing unstable transit routes. Amid sanctions on Iran and Russia, New Delhi views IMEC as a more reliable and advantageous alternative to the North-South Corridor. For the U.S., IMEC represents not only an infrastructure initiative but also a strategic counterweight to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, as well as a vehicle for deepening ties with India in the context of regional balancing.   India’s participation in these multilateral formats strengthens its economic ties with Israel and the U.S., while also helping explain New Delhi’s cautious foreign policy stance in the Iran-Israel context.   Military-Technical Cooperation Israel has proven to be a reliable strategic partner for India, particularly in enhancing its defense capabilities during periods of heightened tensions with Pakistan. During Operation Sindhur, Israel provided substantial support, including medium-range air defense systems such as the Barak 8, as well as precision strike drones like the HAROP. The latter, classified as loitering munitions, proved effective in targeted strikes against strategic enemy assets.   The effectiveness of Israeli drones was also observed during the conflict in Karabakh, where they were deployed by Azerbaijan. India-Israel military-technical cooperation goes beyond arms deliveries. It encompasses joint exercises, cybersecurity collaboration, joint development of advanced defense technologies, and training of personnel. This comprehensive approach enhances not only operational interoperability but also the strategic resilience of the partnership.   Support in the Sphere of Digital Diplomacy Beyond conventional military cooperation, Israel’s support for India extends into the digital realm. Digital diplomacy has emerged as a vital instrument for strengthening bilateral relations, particularly in the absence of a shared border. On various online platforms, there is a noticeable level of mutual understanding and friendly interaction between the governmental institutions of the two countries and their civil societies. Through digital channels, New Delhi and Tel Aviv successfully carry out joint cultural, educational, and scientific initiatives, significantly contributing to the development of a positive bilateral image and mutual trust between the peoples.   Conclusion An analysis of India-Israel relations highlights New Delhi’s pragmatic and adaptive foreign policy, which aims to balance interests amid shifting global dynamics. In the context of rising tensions, including the Iran-Israel conflict, India avoids unilateral positions while maintaining ties with key actors.   Cooperation with Israel in technology, security, and trade is important but not exclusive. India preserves strategic flexibility and remains open to recalibrating partnerships based on regional shifts and national priorities, avoiding rigid commitments in favor of diplomatic maneuverability.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The issue of water resources in Central Asia is becoming increasingly relevant. A number of experts, especially on social media, are making alarming predictions about a possible acute shortage of fresh water in the region by 2050. These estimates are based on climate change, population growth, and the dominance of the agricultural sector in water consumption.   It should be noted that over 90% of all water used in Central Asia is consumed by agriculture. In Uzbekistan, this figure is about 92%, with a significant portion of water resources going to irrigate rice and cotton. For comparison, in developed countries, agriculture accounts for 30 to 40% of available water. Meanwhile, less than 8% of water in the region is used for domestic and drinking water supply. This means that the water shortage for the population is not critical – the main challenge is to optimize water use in the agricultural sector.   Uzbekistan is taking steps to overcome this imbalance. Recognizing the scale of water risks, the country has begun implementing a set of water policy reforms in recent years. Among the priorities are the modernization of irrigation infrastructure, the introduction of water-saving technologies, the expansion of drip and sprinkler irrigation methods, and the digitization of water use accounting processes. The state is investing in hydraulic structures and improving water resource management models, with a focus on international cooperation, especially in transboundary river basins.   One of the key areas is the diversification of agriculture and the transition to crops with lower water requirements. In this context, an important step was the decision taken in 2025 to review approaches to rice cultivation, one of the most water-intensive crops. As an alternative, farmers are being offered a transition to crops that are more resistant to climate change and less dependent on intensive irrigation.   At the same time, resource-saving technologies will be introduced in rice cultivation and new varieties adapted to extreme temperatures and droughts will be used. From 2026, a pilot project on rice cultivation using drip irrigation will be expanded. Currently, rice is mainly grown on flooded fields. It is important that international experts, including specialists from the KOPIA center (South Korea), will be actively involved in this process.   Thus, Uzbekistan is demonstrating a strategic approach to water management issues and a readiness to take practical action in the face of growing water shortages. A set of preventive measures aimed at rationalizing water use and revising agricultural policy can serve as a benchmark for other countries in the region and contribute to the formation of sustainable water security in Central Asia.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

By Mirjalol Murtozaev   On July 3, 2025, within the framework of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) Summit held in the city of Khankendi, Azerbaijan, a historic high-level meeting took place between the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, and the acting deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs of Afghanistan’s Interim Government, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar. This marked the first official high-level engagement between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. The meeting, held on the sidelines of the ECO Summit, reflects the growing dynamism of Uzbekistan’s diplomatic engagement with Afghanistan. While Uzbekistan has gradually intensified its diplomatic outreach toward Afghanistan since 2021, this encounter signals the opening of a new chapter-one characterized by direct dialogue at the highest levels of leadership. This development demonstrates not only Uzbekistan’s sustained interest in Afghanistan but also its broader strategic objective of strengthening and activating its regional diplomacy. Uzbekistan’s proactive approach indicates a deliberate effort to expand its role as a stabilizing actor and constructive partner in regional affairs, particularly concerning the Afghan direction.   This suggests that Uzbekistan is not only engaging in direct dialogue with Afghanistan but is also beginning to utilize its diplomacy through international platforms. It is likely that Uzbekistan will continue to demonstrate activity in such multilateral formats. In particular, Afghanistan’s participation may be expected at the upcoming Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit scheduled to take place in China on August 31 and September 1, 2025. Uzbekistan has long advocated for the revival of the “SCO–Afghanistan Contact Group” within the framework of the organization. Developments in this direction appear increasingly likely. Moreover, opportunities are emerging for Afghanistan to be involved in processes within the framework of the Organization of Turkic States and other regional bodies, with Uzbekistan potentially playing a facilitating role. Uzbekistan promotes a cooperative and balanced political approach to the Afghan issue, grounded in international consensus. This evolving strategy is elevating Uzbekistan’s relations with Afghanistan to a new level while simultaneously enhancing the scope and sophistication of Uzbek diplomacy itself. The consistency in this approach indicates that Uzbekistan is committed to supporting Afghanistan’s integration into the international community through constructive and inclusive engagement.   It is unlikely that Afghanistan will be able to fully reintegrate into the international community in a short period of time. In this regard, Uzbekistan is contributing to the process by supporting a gradual, step-by-step approach. High-level meetings of this nature may serve as a model for other countries, encouraging greater international attention toward Afghanistan and potentially leading to an increase in humanitarian assistance - particularly in support of the Afghan people.   Furthermore, Uzbekistan has expressed its intention to advance an initiative titled “Communicating the Real Situation in Afghanistan within the United Nations Framework.” This proposal aims to foster a more informed and pragmatic international dialogue about developments in the country.   During the bilateral meeting, the two sides focused on several key areas of cooperation:   First, in the field of transport connectivity, the importance of the Trans-Afghan Railway Project was once again emphasized. Both sides agreed on the need to accelerate the project and intensify practical steps toward its realization. The railway corridor is expected to link Uzbekistan with Pakistan’s Peshawar and, ultimately, the ports of the Indian Ocean via Afghanistan. The project’s major advantages include significantly reducing transportation costs and shortening delivery times, making it a strategic asset for regional trade.   Additionally, concrete initiatives such as the development of the Termez International Trade Center were discussed. This platform would allow Afghanistan - particularly its agricultural sector - to utilize Uzbekistan’s transit infrastructure for exporting goods to Central Asia and Russia.   Second, Uzbekistan expressed interest in investing in several key sectors of the Afghan economy. Among the priority areas mentioned were the construction of the Balkh-Herat–Kandahar railway, cement and textile production, electronic governance systems, salt processing, and the establishment of oil refining facilities. These investments would not only stimulate Afghanistan’s economic revitalization but could also position Uzbekistan as one of the country’s leading foreign investors.   Third, Mullah Baradar emphasized that bilateral trade turnover between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan has already surpassed $1 billion and expressed his desire to increase it to $2 billion in the near future. This projection appears realistic, considering that by the end of 2024, the total volume of trade between the two countries exceeded $1.13 billion - a 30.7% increase compared to 2023. Of that total, $1.09 billion accounted for Uzbekistan’s exports of goods and services to Afghanistan. During the first five months of 2025, bilateral trade grew to $622 million, marking a 62.8% increase compared to the same period the previous year. In this context, the opening of Uzbekistan’s trade houses in Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif, along with the signing of the Preferential Trade Agreement in June 2025, serves as concrete evidence of an increasingly proactive and structured trade diplomacy between the two countries.   Fourth, the dialogue concluded with an agreement to establish a joint working group that will convene quarterly to coordinate the implementation of previously agreed commitments. This development is expected to bring strategic coherence and institutional continuity to bilateral cooperation efforts.   In conclusion, this inaugural high-level meeting between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan could serve as a foundation for future steps aimed at gradually integrating Afghanistan into regional cooperation frameworks. By connecting Afghanistan to trade and transit corridors and attracting investment flows, such efforts may contribute to the country’s internal stabilization. In this context, Uzbekistan’s foreign policy toward Afghanistan can be seen as a clear example of pragmatic diplomacy focused on tangible and constructive outcomes.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

By Sanjarbek Tilavoldiev   On June 30 and July 1 of this year, another meeting on the Afghan issue took place in the Qatari capital, Doha, under the auspices of the United Nations. It is worth noting that the Taliban government officially participated in the Doha-format meetings for the second time. This indicates the Taliban’s intention to expand its diplomatic capabilities and defend its interests on the international stage. Whereas in the past, representatives of the movement were wary of criticism at such platforms, they are now approaching it constructively, seeking solutions and engaging in international dialogue.   The main focus of the meetings held in the Doha format was the issue of drug cultivation in Afghanistan, particularly opium. For many years, opium cultivation had been one of the country’s primary sources of income. However, following the Taliban’s rise to power, this figure began to decline significantly. According to statistics, after the Taliban assumed control, the area of land used for opium poppy cultivation decreased from 232,000 hectares to 7,382 hectares by 2024. In order to further reduce these figures, the authorities have resorted to the use of force when necessary. For example, in 2025, several clashes occurred between Taliban representatives and local residents in the Badakhshan province. This demonstrates that the Taliban seeks to avoid being associated on the international stage with a state involved in opium production, as such a reputation hinders its international recognition and limits the inflow of humanitarian aid and foreign investment into Afghanistan. For this reason, the movement is making efforts to combat this issue and aims to present itself as an open government ready for constructive dialogue.   In addition, within the framework of the UN-led process, the United States has maintained silence regarding the Taliban, while a number of Western countries continue to express criticism toward the movement. This, in turn, is prompting the Taliban to strengthen its relations with Eastern countries. On June 30, 2025, alongside its participation in the Doha meetings, Taliban representatives held talks with Pakistan, China, and Russia, during which important regional political issues were discussed. Such diplomatic engagement contributes to the enhancement of the Taliban’s foreign policy capacity. Notably, on July 3, 2025, shortly after the Doha talks, Russia officially recognized the Taliban government for the first time. This may lead to a further shift in Afghanistan’s orientation toward Eastern countries, should the West continue its policy of non-recognition.   Overall, the Taliban government took part in these meetings with the aim of strengthening its authority on the international stage. In this context, it sought to present itself not as a state associated with drug trafficking, but as an actor ready for meaningful diplomatic engagement. This, in turn, may accelerate the process of international recognition of the Taliban government by a larger number of states and contribute to the consolidation of its position in regional politics.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.