We offer evidence-based research and consultations on topics related to the analysis of the influence of anthropological factors on certain areas of state and public construction, as well as identifying the level of conflict potential of both countries and individual regions of Central Asia. The information obtained as part of the research will form a sound empirical basis for a deep, comprehensive and independent analysis to assess the risks of large projects, take into account in the conduct of effective policies by state and non-state structures, the implementation of grants, educational programs and training.
The Laboratory of Anthropology and Conflictology (hereinafter referred to as the "Laboratory") is a research unit of the Institute for Advanced International Studies at the University of World Economy and Diplomacy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan. The main goal is the preparation of relevant information-analytical, forecast documents and recommendations for the study of topical problems of anthropology and conflictology in Uzbekistan and certain regions of the world, the implementation of educational programs, the development of scientific publications and other publications.
The laboratory is staffed by a close-knit team of Uzbek scientists with rich experience in both public and private educational, research and international organizations. This allows for research on an interdisciplinary basis.
The team consists of recognized scientists in the field of anthropology, sociology, international relations and political science, which is confirmed by the relevant diplomas and certificates. The staff of the Laboratory has experience in preparing and conducting field research both in all regions of Uzbekistan and in Central Asia.
The laboratory has both its own empirical base of research and access to statistical, demographic, socio-economic and other information from various structures. All this together makes it possible, based on the goals and objectives set, to develop information and analytical materials, and on their basis to prepare strategic ideas and propose solutions to identified problems in a whole range of political and socio-demographic areas. That is, the Laboratory has the necessary scientific and expert advisory potential for scientific cooperation with stakeholders.
At the same time, the following topical issues can be considered in the context of the theory and practice of anthropology and conflictology:
- international relations in Central Asia;
- regional studies and country studies;
- anthropological specifics of a particular country of Central Asia or a region of Uzbekistan;
- ethnic and cultural diversity of the regions of Uzbekistan and the countries of Central Asia;
- interconnectedness of religious and ethnic identity in the mentality of the peoples of Uzbekistan and Central Asia;
- the influence of informal structures on the society of Uzbekistan and the countries of Central Asia;
- formation of an anthropological portrait of the national elites of the countries of Central Asia;
- the dynamics of changes in the conflict intensity of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the countries of Central Asia and Afghanistan, with an emphasis on border areas.
The main methods of the Laboratory are conducting sociological questionnaires, focus group discussions, expert surveys, in-depth interviews and other activities aimed at collecting empirical material for research.
Mr. Azamat Seitov (Uzbekistan), 46 years old, Head of the Laboratory of Anthropology and Conflictology at the Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) of the University of World Economy and Diplomacy, which studies: on an interdisciplinary basis, topical issues of international relations, regional studies and country studies in the context of the theory and practice of anthropology and conflictology; anthropological specifics of the level of conflict in the countries of Central Asia, with an emphasis on border areas; and also establishes long-term cooperation for the implementation of joint projects (programs) with leading foreign research organizations.
Rustam Makhmudov, a Leading Research Fellow at the Centre for Anthropology and Conflict Studies of the Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS), has published an article on “Central Asia facing the challenge of contemporary identity dynamics” in the Proceedings of the international conference “Identification in Central Asian countries: trajectories of development”, organised in December 2023 in Almaty by the Representative Office of the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation in Central Asia.
The article discusses in detail the issue of the entry and functioning of various identity constructs formed in other cultural and civilisational spaces in the region. Identity is described by the author as a socio-economic institution, and the latest modern scientific-theoretical methods are applied to the analysis of its phenomenon.
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Central Asia is gradually becoming part of the global process of transition to a new technological structure, which Klaus Schwab called the “Fourth Industrial Revolution” (FIR). This process is most active in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, which are the locomotives of the region’s economic growth and are investing heavily in digitalization and creating an ecosystem of startups and venture capital, gradually turning into exporters of digital services.
Meanwhile, when they talk about the digitalization of Central Asia, they most often consider its economic and technological aspects, while the value and closely related ethical aspects remain insufficiently developed at the academic level. However, as studies by Max Weber, Joseph Schumpeter and Douglas North have shown, ideological, value and institutional paradigms directly influence the nature of economic and technological development. Moreover, the technologies themselves then influence the consolidation of a new value system and the transformation of previous value systems. For Central Asia, this is more relevant than ever, given that the region today faces competition between value systems.
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Uzbekistan has gained the status of a beneficiary of GSP+ which allows it to export goods without duties. However, lack of market information, certification and quality control issues are still hindering exports. The country has potential in various sectors, including agriculture and tourism, but infrastructure needs to be improved. Uzbekistan needs to promote and develop its high export potential sectors to fully utilize its potential in the global market. The country has met criteria for the GSP+ scheme but needs to implement them fully. Read the full research article it to learn more about why Uzbekistan has not used the GSP+ preferences on a full scale yet
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On November 11, 2022, Samarkand will host the first summit of the Organization of Turkic States (OTG), whose members are Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey and Uzbekistan, while Hungary and Turkmenistan have observer status.
The fact that the first summit will take place in Samarkand is not an accident. It should be noted that one of the turning points in the activities of this organization was precisely the entry of Uzbekistan in 2019 into the then Turkic Council, which later transformed into the UTC.
The significance of Uzbekistan's entry for the organization was determined by a number of factors. In terms of demographics, our country with a population of more than 35 million people is the second in the UTC after Turkey with its 83.3 million inhabitants. In terms of GDP, it forms the leading economic trio of the countries of the organization, together with Turkey and Kazakhstan. Uzbekistan has a systemic influence on all key geopolitical processes in Central Eurasia.
Our country also acts as a powerful cultural center of the modern world Turkic civilization due to the presence of a high educational and scientific base. The implemented policy of openness in recent years makes Uzbekistan a center of regional attraction and at the same time a generator of creative ideas that are of strategic importance not only for Central Asia, but for other adjacent spaces. It is impossible to deny the fact that the new course of Uzbekistan has led to the launch of the processes of reconsolidation of the region, in which the majority of the population are representatives of the Turkic peoples.
The entry of Uzbekistan into the UTC has led to the fact that today, when assessing the development and forecasting the situation in the vast expanses of Central Asia, the South Caucasus and Asia Minor, it is no longer possible not to take into account the factor of cooperation between the Turkic countries. This, in turn, introduces additional elements into the increasingly complex geopolitical, geo-economic, value and cultural picture of the region.
It is noteworthy that the strengthening of the Turkic dimension in the region occurs simultaneously with the search for new meanings and incentives for the development of other institutional and organizational dimensions, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the CIS, the Consultative Meetings of the Heads of State of Central Asia, the processes of strengthening the interconnectedness of Central and South Asia, formats " CA+” with the US, EU, Russia and China.
And in this regard, of course, the question cannot but arise as to whether the strengthening Turkic dimension will enter into a targeted, organizational and functional contradiction with so many other organizations in which UTC members are represented - Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and an observer state Turkmenistan.
To answer this question, it seems important to take into account two closely related aspects that relate to the nature of the development of the current geopolitical situation in the world and the conceptual understanding of the mechanisms for building multilateral relations.
It is obvious that the unipolar geopolitical structure of the world and the systems of globalization institutions generated by it, which previously guaranteed stability and maximization of wealth, in the language of the new institutional economy, are gradually becoming a thing of the past. The need to form new institutional systems has been discussed for quite a long time, including in the United States itself, as the ideological, financial, economic and technological center of globalization.
It is worth recalling the speech of the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2012 at the Singapore Management University, concerning the concept of the "New Silk Road". At the time, she stated, “We must follow the example of the generation that, after World War II, built the modern world order and created institutions and agreements that fostered unprecedented security and prosperity. We must follow the same path, looking even further and working even harder to forge agreements that will ensure our security and prosperity for the next 100 years.”[1]One can also recall President Donald Trump, the essence of whose foreign policy could be described as an attempt to change the previous rules of the global trade, economic and technological game.
The current increase in the number of conflicts and points of tension in world politics, economics and ideology can be interpreted, in this regard, not only as an indicator of the exhaustion of the old institutions, but also as an attempt to build new global rules and balances between financial, economic and technological forces.
At the same time, the problem is that in significant segments of the developing world, this process is viewed from the point of view traditional for the 19th and 20th centuries. Its essence lies in the expectation that new institutions, as before, will be exclusively formed by the leading world powers. However, this point of view does not fully correspond to the realities of the modern world.
The new rules of the game that will shape the future global landscape will be shaped by more complex combinations of efforts between developed and developing countries. And they are already being formed, as indicated by the policy of Uzbekistan, as well as such an important UTC member state as Turkey, demonstrating a bright proactive position in building new multilateral formats in combination with developed and developing countries, without waiting for the largest actors to agree on new rules of the game.
As for the question of the possible entry of the dimension of Turkic cooperation into conflict with other organizations and formats in which Uzbekistan and its UTC partners work, it is important to understand the ongoing changes in the models for building multilateral cooperation in modern conditions.
If in the previous bipolar and unipolar models of the world, multilateral relations were built according to the “center-periphery” scheme, when the great powers were in the center, and other countries concentrated around them, then now there is a space of multiple centers and situational leaders represented by countries and organizations. All of them form branched connections, relations and formats of cooperation. This is a highly dynamic model, moving away from the statics of past eras, creating the so-called. "synergistic effect".
The leading countries of the Organization of Turkic States, including Uzbekistan, largely demonstrate exactly this logic in their foreign policy, which gives grounds to talk about minimizing the likelihood of the UTC entering into conflict with other organizations and formats that the Turkic states are members of. Moreover, the UTC can increase the effectiveness of other multilateral formats with the participation of the Turkic countries, as it creates another source of economic, scientific and technological growth in Central Asia and the South Caucasus.
Thus, the Organization of Turkic States should become a promising mechanism for building new regional and global landscapes with their new institutions and new understanding of the nature of relations between countries in order to stimulate the growth of mutual prosperity, peace and stability. It is important that Uzbekistan, as the chairman of the UTC in the period 2022-2023, has a unique opportunity to lay a long-term strategic foundation for the development of this organization, relying on its valuable experience of recent years in the formation of productive relations of a new type, both through interstate relations and cooperation between organizations and regions.
As Russian influence wanes Xi Jinping will make it a near-term priority to become the main partner of Central Asian countries.
The 20th National Congress did not go according to plan for Chinese leader Xi Jinping. The unexpected public ouster of former president Hu Jintao indicated the possibility of an intra-elite struggle among the top members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
Premier Li Keqiang was known to be in agreement with Xi about the state’s long-term goals, namely, to build a moderately prosperous society (Xiaokang) by 2021 and turn China into a great modern socialist country by the 100th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). However, their opinions did not coincide in the implementation of the main contours of economic policy. For example, Li disagreed with Xi regarding the “zero-COVID” policy as well as immense investments in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
China’s zero-Covid policies led to an economic slowdown and stirred up discontent among the masses. From 2014 to 2019, China invested $90 billion dollars in BRI countries. But given that low-income developing countries make up a significant share of BRI participants—more than 46 percent of the total number of participating countries—many of them are in debt to China. Moreover, due to Covid-19, almost all BRI countries experienced negative gross domestic product(GDP) growth and decreased their solvency, which doubled these countries’ debts to China. Of the sixty-eight BRI participants, twenty-three are at risk of defaulting on their obligations with Djibouti, Laos, Maldives, Mongolia, Montenegro, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan at a particularly high risk of doing so.
Central Asia In Focus
Based on the composition of the Politburo Standing Committee, many experts noted that the new members are personally loyal to Xi, signaling his complete consolidation of power. This provides Xi with ample decision-making leeway concerning China’s future. As Alibaba founder Jack Ma said, “China is like a huge ship. In order to drastically shift its course, even if there is such a need, it takes considerable time and effort”.
It is often assumed that China’s policy towards Central Asia will not change much. However, taking into account the current economic crisis and structural changes within the international order, adjustments will likely be made by strengthening the BRI. The retention of Wang Huning, the chief ideologue of the CCP, as a Politburo member is a clear signal that Xi will intensify the promotion of the BRI in his third term. Considering that Central Asia is critical to BRI’s success, the project will be a determining factor in China’s policy in the region. Additionally, because the BRI was first unveiled ten years ago in Kazakhstan, there is a symbolic meaning for China to show the project’s achievements in Central Asia.
Until today, China has been careful not to push the BRI too strongly in the region. Beijing understands the difficulty of predicting Russia’s role in the region and, most importantly, the new trends in relations between the Central Asian countries and China itself. But this only testifies to Beijing’s intentions to gain a firm foothold in the region and supplants Moscow’s influence.
First, given the weakening of Russia’s role in Central Asia due to its ongoing war in Ukraine, China’s position in the region is strengthening. Thus, American experts believe that for many of Russia’s neighbors, the war in Ukraine has accelerated the process of breaking out of Moscow’s orbit. Currently, many Central Asian states are rethinking and revising their relations with Russia. Sharp speeches by Kazakh president Kassym-Jomart Tokayev at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum in June and Tajik president Emomali Rakhmon at the October Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) summit addressed to Russia, as well as the evident desire of the countries of the region to resolve sensitive territorial issues bilaterally, vividly illustrates Central Asian states’ transition to independence.
Russia’s growing isolation provides China with an opportunity to challenge its influence in Central Asia. Moscow’s strategic dependency on Beijing amidst the war in Ukraine excludes the possibility of Russian retaliation for encroachment into its historic sphere of influence.
Second, in just this year, Xi met face-to-face three times and virtually once with other Central Asian leaders, indicating a new wave of high-intensity diplomacy. These meetings summarized thirty years of bilateral and multilateral relations while outlining prospects for future cooperation.
Thus, at the Virtual Summit of the leaders of Central Asia and the President of China in January 2022, Xi made a number of important proposals including increasing trade to $70 billion by 2030, deepening cooperation in the field of advanced technologies, and providing 1,200 government-sponsored scholarships.
Xi’s decision to make his first trip abroad since the outbreak of the pandemic to Central Asia is a fundamental strategic step to send an important signal to China’s competitors and partners in the region. Before the visit, the Chinese president published articles in which he outlined policy contours and guidelines for a new stage in the development of Central Asian-Chinese relations for the next decade.
An analysis of Xi’s September visits to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan testify to China’s interests in the region. A number of documents signed with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan expressed China’s strong political commitment to the region, with a new focus on cooperation between Chinese media regulators and their counterparts in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Earlier, Chinese experts expressed indignation that a negative perception of China still persists in the region despite huge investment contributions for Central Asian economic development. This was primarily attributed to low awareness and the lack of positive information about China. Media interactions between each side to fill this gap will become the main tool for Chinese soft power projection in the region.
Third, Xi explicitly identified the BRI as an important mechanism to realize Chinese interests in Central Asia. At the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Uzbekistan, Xi called for continuing efforts to complement BRI projects with national development strategies and regional cooperation initiatives, as well as to expand sub-multilateral and sub-regional cooperation.
The need for regional transportation and communications links is increasing in Central Asia. Beginning next year, Beijing will become actively involved in constructing critical transport infrastructure in the region. To this end, after more than twenty years, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and China will revive the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway construction project. On the eve of the SCO summit, the relevant authorities of the three countries signed an agreement to implement this project with Chinese financing, no doubt placing it under “the framework of BRI.” This connectivity project aims to ensure Chinese access to Central Asian markets which is especially relevant when the war in Ukraine has impeded important routes leading to Europe.
China’s interest in the speedy implementation of the BRI is becoming a decisive factor in the implementation of the CKU railway. According to experts, the CKU railway will not only create the southern corridor of the Second Continental Transport Bridge but will also open up new markets for manufactured products from the three countries. This route will become one of the shortest for transporting Chinese goods to Europe and will also increase Beijing’s regional economic influence.
Finally, as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic, China will make more targeted investments rather than large-scale commitments. Xi’s visit to the region signals that China will invest more funds in the region but from now on, they will not be unconditional. China is determined to protect its economic interests in the region by linking them to certain political benchmarks. It is likely that initially, these conditions will be delicate but firmer demands for change will eventually be issued.
Conclusion
Due to the negative economic ramifications of the pandemic and the Russo-Ukrainian War, Central Asia has a general interest in accelerating the implementation of the BRI and other Chinese-financed projects. Still, while counting on large Chinese investments, participating countries should not hope for “generous conditions.” Countries can pay a high price for Chinese funding, including the “Sinicization” of their economies and cultures.
For Xi, the BRI will remain a top priority for regional engagement as China continues to be the main donor for developing countries. Some BRI countries, however, will learn from the experiences of Pakistan and Sri Lanka and become more cautious about accepting Chinese investments with political conditions. Thus, the BRI is gradually transforming from a regional infrastructure development plan into a security strategy for Central Asia.
Abbos Bobokhonov is a PhD student at the University of World Economy and Diplomacy, and Research Fellow at the Institute for Advanced International Studies. Previously, he was a Research Fellow at the Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies under the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, where his main areas of expertise were China’s foreign policy and SCO. His research interests include contemporary Chinese foreign policy in Central Asia, China’s Soft Power policy, BRI and AIIB.
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