Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan have long maintained a dual character: formal strategic interaction coexists with persistent mutual distrust, border confrontation, and competition for influence in the cross-border space. The current stage of developments shows that the conflict between the parties is not situational but structural, with its causes lying much deeper than current political crises or the activities of individual armed groups. A key feature of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations is that both sides view each other simultaneously as a necessary partner and as a source of threats to national security. For Pakistan, Afghanistan has traditionally been perceived through the lens of strategic vulnerability on its western flank, internal ethno-political stability, and regional rivalry with India. For Afghanistan, Pakistan remains a state seeking to limit Afghan sovereignty through political, military, and ideological influence. The foundation of the long-standing conflict lies in the divergence of fundamental perceptions of security and statehood. Pakistani strategy has historically been built on the desire to ensure a controlled and loyal political space in Afghanistan, one that would preclude the formation of a government in Kabul oriented toward close cooperation with India or support for Pashtun nationalism. This explains the long-standing reliance of Pakistan’s military-intelligence apparatus on using Afghan armed and religious-political groups as instruments of regional influence. At the same time, for a significant part of Afghanistan’s political elites and society, Pakistan is perceived as the main external factor of destabilization, contributing to the persistence of armed networks, cross-border extremism, and chronic instability within the country. Consequently, a stable model of limited cooperation without strategic trust has emerged between the two sides. One central source of tension remains the border factor. The Durand Line continues to play a role not only as a disputed boundary but also as a symbol of the unresolved issue of cross-border Pashtun identity. For Islamabad, controlling the border areas is directly linked to risks of separatism and internal destabilization. For Kabul, it is tied to the question of the historical and political legitimacy of the border. In current conditions, this factor is exacerbated by the weak governance of border regions, the activity of armed groups, and the high degree of autonomy of tribal structures. An additional source of conflict is the difference in the parties’ approaches to using radical armed movements. For a long period, Pakistan viewed some Afghan Islamist structures as instruments to advance its interests in Afghanistan. However, the gradual fragmentation of the radical milieu has led to a loss of full control over these groups. As a result, many structures initially considered a foreign policy asset have transformed into an independent threat factor for Pakistan itself. Of particular importance at present is the activity of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Following the Taliban’s rise to power in Kabul, the TTP has significantly expanded its capabilities for basing, logistics, and coordination of actions on Afghan territory. According to estimates by the UN Security Council Monitoring Team, around 6,000 TTP militants are currently in Afghanistan, concentrated mainly in the eastern provinces bordering Pakistan. Islamabad increasingly openly accuses the Afghan authorities of being unable or unwilling to restrict TTP activities. The Afghan side, in turn, rejects these accusations and accuses Pakistan of attempting to pressure and interfere in its internal affairs. Against the backdrop of the latest escalation of the border conflict in October 2025, clashes resulted in dozens of fatalities on both sides (by various estimates, over 60 from each country) and numerous injuries. Meanwhile, among the Afghan civilian population, according to the UN, at least 37 deaths and over 400 injuries were recorded, giving the confrontation additional intensity and making it the largest escalation in recent years. The Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in 2021 was initially perceived by Pakistan as a strategic achievement capable of fostering a friendly regime and reducing threat levels on its western border. However, subsequent developments have shown the limits of such expectations. Despite historical ties between Pakistani security structures and the Afghan Taliban, Afghanistan’s new leadership demonstrates a significantly higher degree of autonomy than Islamabad had assumed. Moreover, the ideological and ethnic affinity between the Afghan Taliban and the TTP objectively limits Kabul’s readiness to take harsh action against Pakistani anti-government groups. As a result, Pakistan finds itself in a situation where the rise to power of an allied force has not strengthened security, but has instead contributed to the expansion of cross-border threats. Additional tensions have arisen from intensified border clashes, Pakistan’s construction of engineering barriers along the Durand Line, mass deportations of Afghan refugees, and rising anti-Pakistan sentiment within Afghanistan. These processes are creating long-term negative dynamics that complicate prospects for political resolution. External actors continue to exert significant influence on the conflict’s development. For India, Afghanistan remains an important avenue for strategically containing Pakistan and expanding political presence in the region. Islamabad traditionally views any increase in Indian influence in Kabul as a direct threat to its own security. It is largely the factor of India-Pakistan rivalry that explains Pakistan’s desire to retain maximum influence over Afghanistan’s internal political processes. Further exacerbation of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations followed the official visit of the Taliban government’s Foreign Minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi, to New Delhi on October 9, 2025, where he held talks with Indian leadership on political interaction, trade, and humanitarian cooperation. In Islamabad, the intensification of contacts between Kabul and Delhi was perceived as an alarming signal and further evidence of growing Indian influence in Afghanistan, deepening the existing contradictions between Pakistan and the de facto authorities in Kabul. China is primarily interested in preventing the spread of instability to regional transport and logistics projects, including CPEC, and minimizing threats to the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. In this regard, Beijing maintains working contacts with both Pakistan and Afghanistan while avoiding direct involvement in the conflict. At the same time, China is actively developing interaction with the Central Asian states, viewing the region as a key link in the Belt and Road Initiative and an important element in securing China’s western borders. Iran views the situation through the lens of the security of Shia communities, migration risks, and the struggle for influence in western Afghanistan. Tehran maintains a pragmatic approach to interaction with the Taliban, despite persistent disagreements. Simultaneously, Iran seeks to strengthen transport and economic ties with Central Asian countries, using the Afghan direction as part of a broader regional strategy, including the development of transit routes to the states of the region. Uzbekistan has acquired particular importance in regional politics. Following the Taliban’s rise to power, Tashkent has taken one of the most active and pragmatic positions among Central Asian countries. Uzbekistan consistently advocates for maintaining dialogue with Kabul, developing transport connectivity, and integrating Afghanistan into regional economic projects. For Uzbekistan, stability in Afghanistan is directly linked to the security of its southern borders, the prospects for implementing the Termez–Mazar-i-Sharif–Kabul–Khalachi railway corridor, and expanding trade and economic cooperation between Central and South Asia. Against this background, the deterioration of relations between Kabul and Islamabad, accompanied by periodic closures of key border crossings at Torkham and Chaman, negatively affects not only bilateral Afghan-Pakistani trade but also the economic interests of Central Asian states. Disruptions in goods transit, multi‑million dollar losses for foreign trade participants, rising logistics costs, and reduced predictability of transport routes undermine the region’s plans to expand access to Pakistani ports and South Asian markets. Under these circumstances, Uzbekistan seeks to maintain balanced relations with both Kabul and Islamabad, avoiding being drawn into their contradictions while advocating for the stabilization of regional transport communications. For the United States, after the withdrawal of troops, the priority remains preventing Afghanistan from becoming a global hub for transnational terrorism. At the same time, the reduced American presence has objectively diminished the possibilities for external balancing between Kabul and Islamabad. In the new conditions, the Central Asian states, primarily Uzbekistan, are increasingly emerging as independent regional mediators and platforms for diplomatic engagement on Afghan issues. Current dynamics suggest that even with the preservation of formal channels of interaction, the parties are unlikely to transition to sustainable strategic partnership in the foreseeable future. A more probable scenario is the persistence of a model of limited interaction amid periodic crises, cross-border incidents, and mutual pressure. The central contradiction of the current situation is that Pakistan, seeking to strengthen its own security by fostering a friendly political regime in Afghanistan, has instead encountered an intensification of precisely those cross-border threats it initially sought to minimize. This demonstrates the limited effectiveness of a strategy based on managed influence in the context of high fragmentation of Afghanistan’s political space and the continued activity of armed groups. As a result, regional dynamics are increasingly determined not by the controlled influence of individual external players but by a set of interconnected conflicts that go beyond the bilateral “Kabul–Islamabad” logic. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The article by Muhammad Khujanazarov, UWED undergraduate and an intern at IAIS, and Julia Davies, lecturer at UWED and a Visiting Research Fellow at IAIS, examines how the post-war liberal international order, built around the IMF, World Bank, WTO and progressively liberalised global trade, has come under pressure since the 2008 global financial crisis. The authors argue that the slowdown of globalisation, rising geopolitical rivalry, weakened multilateral institutions, and growing dissatisfaction among emerging economies have created space for regional alliances to assume stronger governance roles. Focusing on ASEAN/RCEP, BRICS+, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the article shows how these regional groupings are no longer merely supplementary platforms within the global order. Instead, they are developing independent trade rules, financial mechanisms, security practices, and normative frameworks that increasingly challenge Western-dominated multilateralism. ASEAN/RCEP is analysed through trade governance, BRICS+ through financial counter-hegemony and de-dollarisation, and the SCO through security cooperation based on sovereignty and non-interference. The central argument is that the world is moving towards a more fragmented and multipolar system of governance, where global institutions and regional organisations coexist, compete, and overlap. The authors conclude that regional alliances are unlikely to fully replace established international organisations, but they are already reshaping the rules, norms, and balance of authority in international relations. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Agricultural models developed in Spain, in particular, the intensive greenhouse systems of Almería and the regenerative landscape restoration of the Altiplano plateau, represent useful lessons for countries facing significant environmental, economic, and institutional challenges, such as Uzbekistan, characterized by an arid climate and dependence on agriculture, could significantly benefit from these proven practices. Spain has achieved great success in transforming a water-stressed environment into the “garden of Europe”, demonstrating technical innovation combined with efficient water management, resulting in enormous economic returns even with limited resources. Furthermore, the proposed two-stage approach of the Spanish model, incorporating intensive production to dominate the global market and regenerative methods to combat soil degradation and rural abandonment, is a very good example that could be implemented in Uzbekistan. Successful Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) promotes precision irrigation, integrated crop protection, greenhouse horticulture, and high-quality standards. To improve productivity, Spanish farms use electronic monitoring and drip irrigation. Almeria has 33,500 hectares of greenhouse crops used for export, and the country is a global pioneer in biological crop protection. The current Common Agricultural Policy framework (2023-2027) focuses on environmental protection and improving water efficiency . Irrigation and water management in Spain 71 % of the value of agricultural production comes from irrigated land, which accounts for 3.7 million hectares, or approximately 22 % of all agricultural land. Between 2022 and 2027 , the government will spend a record € 2.5 billion to improve 750,000 hectares. This includes installing automated flow meters, replacing open canals with pressurized pipes, and promoting smart irrigation technologies such as soil moisture sensors and automated scheduling. Spanish farms using drip/ micro-irrigation are among the most productive and consume the least water. Spain’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) strategic plan encourages competition across a wide range of climate conditions. A multi-program approach, including national recovery funds and EU rural development funds, aims to digitalize irrigation networks and reduce energy consumption. Spanish farms that use irrigation are among the most productive and consume the least water. Uzbekistan should follow Spain’s "inclusive" approach, which includes the use of digital tools, the involvement of people and communities, and significant public investment. Uzbekistan can improve the impact of agricultural reforms and modernization by combining digital technologies, community participation, and significant public investment, building on successful experiences. Agro-processing and value chains. Spain’s agri-food sector is large and complex. It comprises 30,000 companies with a combined turnover of €168 billion, accounting for approximately 23.8 % of the manufacturing industry. These include olive oil mills (1,390 companies producing approximately 1.4 million tons of olive oil annually), wineries and distilleries, fruit and vegetable canneries, and tomato paste and juice producers. Many Spanish fresh produce exporters have refrigerated warehouses and packaging facilities near their farms, as required by EU regulations. Processed olive and tomato products, canned fish, and juices are important export commodities. Uzbekistan should expand the construction of modern cold chains, juice production plants, and canning factories. To encourage agricultural processing, Spanish farmers received grants under the Common Agricultural Policy (investment assistance for rural businesses). A similar program could be implemented in Uzbekistan (through the World Bank ‘s Agriculture and Irrigation Support Program and the EBRD’s Agrifood Nexus program) using government or donor funding. For example, in Spain, the juice industry processes surplus fruits and vegetables during peak harvest periods to maintain stable prices. Spain’s processed agricultural products are often targeted at EU markets, necessitating strict quality control (HACCP, ISO standards) and compliance with food safety standards. To train local agronomists, implement pilot certification projects, and develop laboratories and digital product traceability systems, Uzbekistan should establish formal partnerships with Spanish certification bodies and experts. In Spain, cooperatives often manage enterprises processing agricultural products. Similar cooperatives could be established in Uzbekistan. This vertical coordination increases added value creation in the country. Digital Agriculture and Innovation. Spain is accelerating the digitalization of its agricultural sector to mitigate the impacts of climate change. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food supports the Observatory, which monitors the implementation of the Strategy digitalization agri-food sector. This strategy aims to address the digital divide, low technology adoption, increased labor productivity, environmental sustainability, and rural development, using digital transformation as a tool for modernizing the entire agri-food system. The government supports precision agriculture by providing farmers with funding for sensors and software. The country has more than twenty technology centers working in agro-tech and biotechnology, improving nutritional properties and enabling precision agriculture. Spanish entrepreneurs and agro-tech companies produce IoT (Internet of Things), use satellite services to measure moisture and provide crop management advice based on artificial intelligence (AI). Agricultural financing is also automated. For example, farmers can obtain loans for crop production through bank mobile apps. Digital horticulture is also being implemented in Uzbekistan. AI is currently being tested in pilot projects for water management, livestock monitoring, and greenhouse management. Uzbekistan is establishing “agricultural service zones” in each region. These zones will offer a wide range of IT services, including soil analysis, meteorological data, and training. Spain ‘s experience in introducing new agricultural technologies (precision irrigation systems, smart agriculture and digital monitoring, integrated crop protection, water recycling and desalination technologies, post-harvest processing and quality control technologies) to farmers is useful for Uzbekistan. Spanish research shows that training farmers and demonstrating the application of new technologies are essential. Uzbekistan should also invest in training farmers to use modern digital tools for resource allocation decision-making. Furthermore, it is important to establish collaboration between Spanish technology companies and universities and Uzbek technology companies to implement proven agricultural solutions, such as regional weather stations and mobile applications. Following the example of the Spanish Observatory group, data from Uzbek farms could be used in a national analytical system for agricultural policy decision-making. Based on Spain’s experience, the following practices were identified that Uzbekistan could adopt: Implement drip/micro irrigation and remote water monitoring everywhere. Modernization carried out in Spain (for example, pressure networks, flow meters) allowed for achieving water distribution efficiency of approximately 95% and reducing its consumption at the farm level by approximately 20%. It is recommended to stimulate the transition to drip irrigation (as in Spain’s plans), implement water consumption accounting on farms, and invest in automating canals and pumps. Combined with sensors on farms (soil moisture, weather), this can increase Uzbekistan’s water productivity. Implement integrated plant protection (IPP) systems using natural predators and targeted control, as is done by Spanish farmers. In Almería, the intensive use of pesticides (e.g., whiteflies, Tuta Absoluta) has given way to biological controls (parasitic wasps Encarsia, predatory beetles Nesidiocoris), as well as sticky traps and crop hygiene. This will reduce chemical costs, prevent the development of resistance, and ensure the export of products without residual substances. Uzbekistan can test RDI systems on key crops (e.g., cotton, tomatoes) and train farmers in monitoring and biological control methods. Development of greenhouse vegetable farming in hot/salted areas (e.g., Khorezm, Surkhandarya). The Spanish “plastic sea” in Almería (33500 hectares) yields 3 million tons of tomatoes, peppers, and other vegetables per year, 80% of which are exported. The model combines hydroponics, shading grids, and climate control. The Uzbek greenhouse cluster (with solar irrigation) could extend the growing season and supply high-quality products to new markets. It is necessary to develop regionally specialized clusters. For example, the Fergana Valley in Uzbekistan could focus on growing high-quality fruits (apricots, apples) and vegetables, while Bukhara/Surkhandarya could focus on growing tropical melons and pistachios (in subtropical climates). The development of clusters involves the joint use of processing capacities, joint marketing, and R&D (as in Spanish cooperatives and chambers of commerce), which will strengthen value chains. It is necessary to encourage cooperative models aimed at pooling resources and ensuring access to markets. Spanish cooperatives (e.g., Kahamar Bank, wine/olive oil cooperatives) increase the income of their members. Uzbekistan’s new law on cooperatives provides the appropriate framework for this. The government and donors can help establish cooperatives in pilot regions by training farmers in the basics of management and establishing ties between cooperatives and exporting companies. Implement digital platforms for knowledge dissemination and farm management. Spain already has pilot applications for irrigation planning, crop forecasting, and supply chain tracking. New centers of agricultural knowledge and innovation in Uzbekistan can integrate these tools. Quality standards (such as geographical indications) must be developed to gain access to premium markets. Spanish products with protected designations of origin (wine, olive oil, jamón, fruit) have high added value. Uzbekistan does not have such products, but the country could introduce organic or other origin labels (e.g., “apricots from Kokand”) and comply with global phytosanitary standards. Although Uzbekistan has already implemented numerous progressive reforms aimed at increasing the competitiveness of its agricultural sector by studying advanced foreign agricultural practices, Spanish agricultural practices can serve as a comprehensive methodology for unlocking the full potential of Uzbekistan’s agricultural sector. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

On 3 June 2026, the UN General Assembly elected Kyrgyzstan as a non-permanent member of the Security Council for the 2027–2028 term. In the vote for the Asia-Pacific Group seat, Bishkek defeated Manila in the fourth round of secret balloting by a margin of 142 votes to 49. This is Kyrgyzstan’s first membership in the Security Council since the country joined the United Nations in 1992, and for Central Asia it marks the return of representation to the highest platform of global security for the first time since Kazakhstan’s 2017–2018 term. Non-permanent members of the Security Council are elected by a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly (127 of 193). If no candidate secures the required majority in the first round, additional rounds are held between the two frontrunners. In the case of Kyrgyzstan and the Philippines, four rounds were needed: in the first round Bishkek received 105 votes against Manila’s 85 short of victory, yet enough to give it the advantage in the subsequent rounds. The final score of 142:49 reflected consolidation around the principle of rotation and historical justice. Alongside Kyrgyzstan, Austria and Portugal (from the Western European and Others Group), Trinidad and Tobago (Latin America and the Caribbean) and Zimbabwe (Africa) were also elected. Notably, Germany failed to win a Security Council seat for the first time, ceding both Western European seats to Austria and Portugal. Bishkek’s campaign was built on several mutually reinforcing arguments that set it apart from standard diplomatic canvassing. Central among them was the argument of historical justice: Kyrgyzstan had never served on the Security Council, whereas the Philippines had already held the seat four times, and by 2027 another 59 UN member states will never have held it. President Sadyr Japarov appealed directly to this inequity, framing Kyrgyzstan’s election as restoring the inclusiveness of the UN’s key organ. The next argument was the country’s exportable experience in preventive diplomacy. The completion of years-long border negotiations with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan — processes that had previously escalated into armed clashes more than once — was presented as proof of the country’s capacity to facilitate peaceful settlement. Kyrgyzstan also highlighted its role in establishing the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and its signing of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 2025. The coalition foundation of the victory was laid institutionally as early as November 2025, when all Central Asian heads of state formally appealed to UN member states to support the Kyrgyz candidacy. Türkiye’s backing and the consolidated bloc of Muslim states played a decisive role in the final vote. On 31 May 2026, three days before the ballot, Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs hosted a state reception in New York for the final push of the candidacy. The opportunities of the status and the priority agenda. As a non-permanent member, from January 2027 Kyrgyzstan will gain a vote on all Security Council matters, participation in closed consultations, membership in all of the Council’s sanctions committees and working groups, a monthly presidency by alphabetical rotation and — most importantly — a seat in negotiations over the wording of resolutions. It is precisely at the level of wording, at the stage of agreeing on drafts, that non-permanent members effectively shape the legal language later cited as precedent. The practical weight of a non-permanent member is determined not so much by its vote as by its ability to work in coalitions. Small and medium-sized states systematically secure influence through building durable issue-based blocs — on climate security or the Afghan dossier, for example. Foreign Minister Zheenbek Kulubaev put it plainly: “No state can cope with today’s threats alone, which is why multilateral diplomacy is critically important.” Kyrgyzstan’s official programme for its term is structured around four substantive blocks. The first block – Afghanistan and preventive diplomacy. Sadyr Japarov has stated outright that Afghanistan’s security is inseparable from that of Central Asia: the transit of instability across the Afghan border exposes the region’s countries to risks ranging from cross-border terrorism to migration pressure. The return of a Central Asian voice to the Council reinforces the institutional link with UNRCCA in Ashgabat, the UN centre for preventive diplomacy established at the initiative of all five states of the region. The second block – the water, climate and glacier agenda. The melting of the Tian Shan and Pamir glaciers directly threatens the water supply of the entire region. Kyrgyzstan intends to press for recognition of the nexus between climate risks and security on the Council’s platform: this is an area where small mountainous states hold a moral and factual high ground that is hard to contest even amid obstruction by permanent members. The third block – a growing focus on transport connectivity. The China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway, the CAREC corridors and the Kambarata-1 hydropower plant as a joint project of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan — all of these initiatives require political accompaniment at the international level. The Security Council is not a development bank, but its platform can be used to legitimise regional projects in the eyes of international donors and partners. The fourth block – reform of multilateral cooperation. Speaking at the Security Council’s open debate on the eve of the vote, Zheenbek Kulubaev raised a question of principle: the Council must not be perceived as a “closed club”, and its decisions must take into account the interests of the majority of UN member states. This argument reflects a broader coalition of states that have never sat on the Council and are concerned about the structural inequality of international institutions. The most systemic constraint is the structural paralysis of the Security Council itself. The deep divisions among the permanent members over Ukraine, Gaza and the Taiwan question have repeatedly blocked substantive decisions. In such an environment a non-permanent member cannot guarantee the adoption of desired resolutions, but it can influence coalitions, textual formulations and the framing of issues in closed consultations. This is real yet inherently limited leverage, which must be communicated accurately at home and across the region to avoid inflated expectations. At the same time, international attention to Kyrgyzstan will inevitably extend from its foreign policy positions to its domestic practices. NGOs, Western governments and international media will step up their monitoring of the rule of law, judicial independence and media freedom. This creates a dual dynamic: external pressure for domestic reform may intensify precisely when Bishkek needs to consolidate its diplomatic capital. Moreover, there is a risk of a gap between the collective expectations of neighbours and legal reality: it is Kyrgyzstan as a sovereign state, not a “representative of Central Asia”, that sits on the Council. Kyrgyzstan votes independently, including when the positions of the region’s states diverge — on the Afghan agenda, for instance, or towards initiatives of the permanent members. The risk of interstate friction arises precisely where expectations of coordination fail to match the position actually taken. Implications for the countries of Central Asia. For Kazakhstan, the effect is most pronounced in the “security + development” dimension: Astana consistently supported Kyrgyzstan’s candidacy, has its own experience of serving on the Council (2017–2018) and is promoting the UN Sustainable Development Goals Centre for Central Asia and Afghanistan in Almaty. Synchronising the Kyrgyz agenda in the Council with Kazakhstan’s SDG initiatives creates potential for mutual reinforcement. For Uzbekistan, two intersections of priorities matter most: the Afghan dossier (Tashkent is a key partner in stabilising Afghanistan) and the transport block, as the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway gains additional political accompaniment. For Tajikistan and Turkmenistan the effect is primarily institutional. For Tajikistan heightened attention to the Afghan border vector and to water-energy cooperation. For Turkmenistan further strengthening of the mandate of the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia in Ashgabat: the republic’s neutral status and its cooperation with the UN blend organically with the Kyrgyz emphasis on preventive dialogue and inclusiveness, without requiring Ashgabat to depart from neutrality. Overall, Kyrgyzstan’s election to the Security Council is a functional instrument whose effectiveness will depend on three factors. First – institutional readiness: the capacity of Kyrgyz diplomacy to formulate positions promptly across a wide range of issues, including topics far removed from direct regional experience. It is here that support from international partners in preparing the delegation will prove most practically valuable. Second – the quality of C5 coordination: a light but regular model of aligning positions on a limited set of package themes — Afghanistan, water and climate, transport — will deliver far more than attempts to build a cumbersome regional mechanism. Third – expectation management: public communication must consistently distinguish between what a non-permanent member actually does (wording, coalitions, framing of issues) and what it cannot do under a blocking veto. For the region, the window of opportunity has coincided with a phase of institutional consolidation in Central Asia: the “Central Asia – 2040” concept, the 2025–2027 Roadmap and the precedent of the Kyrgyz-Tajik border settlement form a real basis for substantive rather than declarative coordination. If Bishkek manages to confine itself to the four designated thematic packages and refrains from “regionalising” the Council’s entire docket, the membership will become a long-term contribution to Central Asia’s agency on global platforms. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

This policy brief examines the contemporary evolution of Iran–Afghanistan relations in the context of shifting regional security dynamics, economic interdependence, and geopolitical realignment following the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021. It argues that the relationship between Tehran and Kabul is neither purely adversarial nor genuinely strategic, but rather defined by a complex mixture of pragmatic cooperation, mutual suspicion, and competing security imperatives. While Iran views Afghanistan as a crucial buffer on its eastern frontier, it also perceives the country as a potential source of instability, terrorism, sectarian tension, migration pressure, and foreign military penetration. The brief traces the historical foundations of Iran’s Afghanistan policy, beginning with Tehran’s engagement with Afghan political and armed factions after the 1979 Islamic Revolution and continuing through its later tactical contacts with elements of the Taliban. It highlights the fact that Iran’s relations with the Taliban have remained fundamentally pragmatic rather than ideological, shaped above all by Tehran’s desire to limit American influence, prevent Afghanistan from becoming a platform for operations against Iran, and preserve influence among Afghan Shiite communities, particularly the Hazaras. At the same time, the Taliban’s insistence on strategic autonomy has repeatedly limited Iran’s ability to transform tactical cooperation into durable political control. Particular attention is given to the security, migration, and humanitarian dimensions of the bilateral relationship. Iran remains deeply concerned about the activities of ISKP, anti-Shiite militant networks, cross-border criminal groups, narcotics trafficking, and the possible return of American military infrastructure to Afghanistan. These concerns have been intensified by refugee flows and Iran’s growing deportation campaign against undocumented Afghans, which has placed additional pressure on Afghanistan’s already fragile economy and social infrastructure. The brief shows that migration has become not only a humanitarian issue, but also a major security and political factor shaping Tehran’s approach towards Kabul. Despite these tensions, economic interdependence continues to function as an important stabilising element in Iran–Afghanistan relations. Afghanistan remains heavily dependent on Iranian fuel, food products, construction materials, and transit infrastructure, while Iran views Afghanistan as a valuable export market amid continued Western sanctions. The policy brief therefore concludes that the future of the Iran–Afghanistan relationship will be determined by the balance between security mistrust and practical cooperation. As regional actors such as China, Russia, Pakistan, and Central Asian states increase their engagement with Afghanistan, Tehran and Kabul will likely remain bound by necessity, even as distrust, border insecurity, migration pressures, and wider Middle Eastern instability continue to constrain deeper rapprochement. Read on Topchubashov Center’s web-site * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

By Fatima Dalieva, an independent researcher specializing “International Relations, Political Problems of Global and Regional Issues” at the University of World Economy and Diplomacy and works as Chief Specialist at the Postgraduate Education Office.   By the third decade of the twenty-first century, transport-logistics systems and trade corridors have emerged as one of the central arenas of global geopolitical competition. Whereas geopolitical superiority in the twentieth century was largely determined by military power, territorial control, or energy resources, contemporary global influence is increasingly defined by the ability to control logistics networks, transit infrastructure, maritime routes, ports, digital transport systems, and supply chains. China’s transformation into the world’s principal manufacturing platform has elevated transport and logistics systems into a strategic component of global geopolitics. Within the contemporary international system, the interests of the United States, Russia, and China are increasingly colliding over the control of logistics corridors, energy routes, and trade networks. In this context, Eurasia is becoming not merely a geographical space but a strategic arena in which a new architecture of the global economy is taking shape. In recent years, Russia–China economic cooperation has expanded significantly. In particular, Western sanctions imposed after the Russia–Ukraine war accelerated Russia’s economic dependence on China. Bilateral trade reached a record level exceeding 244 billion USD in 2024. Although a temporary decline was observed in 2025, trade growth resumed in early 2026. Chinese exports to Russia increased by more than 23 percent, while Russian exports to China grew by 17 percent, demonstrating the growing interdependence of the two economies. However, this rapprochement does not represent an equal partnership; rather, it reflects an asymmetric model of economic dependence. Russia primarily exports oil, natural gas, coal, and raw materials, while China supplies Russia with automobiles, electronics, industrial equipment, and high-technology products. This structure increasingly binds the Russian economy to raw-material exports while simultaneously strengthening Beijing’s technological and industrial dominance. Transport and logistics systems are becoming the central element of this emerging economic model. Russia’s Far East has evolved into a major transit hub for trade with China, while cargo transportation through border crossings and newly constructed bridges has expanded rapidly. Consequently, transport-logistics cooperation has evolved beyond a purely technical sphere and has become a mechanism of strategic integration between Moscow and Beijing. At the same time, it is precisely within the logistics sector that the sharpest contradiction between U.S. and Chinese interests is emerging. The core of the contemporary global economy lies in Chinese manufacturing and the logistics systems that distribute Chinese products worldwide. More than 80 percent of Chinese exports are transported by sea, and a substantial part of this system is controlled by Western companies. Major corporations such as Mediterranean Shipping Company, A.P. Moller - Maersk, Hapag-Lloyd, Ocean Network Express, and Evergreen Marine play decisive roles in the global logistics of Chinese exports. This creates a major geopolitical paradox. On the one hand, the United States and its Western allies seek to limit China’s geopolitical influence. On the other hand, Western logistics corporations derive enormous profits from China’s export economy. This demonstrates the extraordinarily high degree of interdependence within the global economic system. In particular, Maersk and MSC have established deeply integrated logistics systems connected with Chinese ports. These corporations manage not only maritime shipping but also warehouses, terminals, container networks, and multimodal logistics infrastructure. As a result, the contemporary global trade system increasingly represents a symbiosis between Chinese manufacturing power and Western logistics capital. This creates a major strategic dilemma for Washington. While the United States attempts to constrain China technologically and economically, global capital and logistics networks remain deeply dependent on Chinese production. Consequently, U.S. tariff policies and technological sanctions have not isolated China; instead, they have accelerated the restructuring of global supply chains. The concept of “China Shock 2.0” reflects this transformation. China is no longer exporting only low-cost consumer goods; it is now dominating sectors such as electric vehicles, batteries, solar panels, robotics, and semiconductors. This development poses new challenges for both the United States and Europe because the state that controls logistics routes is gradually acquiring dominance in high-technology industries as well. Competition surrounding semiconductors and electric transportation is transforming global logistics into a strategic instrument of power. For the United States, the Taiwan issue is no longer solely political or military in nature. Since Taiwan is the center of global semiconductor production, it has also become a crucial element of logistics and technological security. In this context, Xi Jinping’s reference to the “Thucydides Trap” carries particular significance. Beijing seeks to manage competition with the United States without allowing it to escalate into open military conflict. Both China and the United States clearly understand the depth of their mutual economic dependence. China remains heavily export-oriented, while the United States continues to dominate global capital flows and the dollar-centered financial system. Nevertheless, this model of “managed competition” is becoming increasingly complex. American technological restrictions have compelled China to rely more heavily on domestic resources. As a result, Beijing has accelerated its strategy of technological self-sufficiency while simultaneously diversifying logistics corridors. The Belt and Road Initiative represents the central component of this strategy. In this regard, the role of Central Asia and Russia is growing substantially. Eurasian land corridors are increasingly viewed by China as strategic alternatives to maritime trade routes. In particular, the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway project significantly strengthens Beijing’s geoeconomic influence in Central Asia. Kyrgyzstan’s acquisition of 305 million USD in Chinese financial support for this railway project demonstrates the deepening of Beijing’s influence through transport-logistics diplomacy. However, an important geopolitical risk also emerges here. Since the overall project cost exceeds 5 billion USD, Kyrgyzstan will require additional external financing in the future, potentially increasing its dependence on Chinese capital. Indeed, contemporary Chinese strategy is fundamentally centered on logistics and infrastructure diplomacy. Through loans, transport corridors, port construction, and industrial projects, Beijing is creating long-term economic dependencies. This model is frequently described as “infrastructural geopolitics.” Russia, however, occupies a more complicated position within this process. On the one hand, Moscow benefits from economic rapprochement with China because Western sanctions have sharply restricted Russia’s access to European markets and technologies. On the other hand, China’s expanding economic influence in Central Asia and Eurasia weakens Russia’s traditional geopolitical position. In Central Asia, Russian and Chinese interests increasingly intersect. While Moscow continues to perceive the region as part of its historical sphere of influence, Beijing primarily views it as a logistics and transit space. As a result, transport corridors are becoming the principal arena of geopolitical competition. The United States is also actively involved in this process. Washington views Central Asia not merely as a security zone but as a strategic space capable of balancing Chinese and Russian influence. Consequently, the United States is showing growing interest in transport, energy, and digital infrastructure projects throughout the region. In the contemporary global system, logistics is no longer simply an economic issue. It has become an instrument of geopolitical dominance, strategic security, and technological control. Those who control transport corridors, ports, logistics corporations, and information flows are able to exert substantial influence over the global economy itself. Therefore, the current rivalry among the United States, Russia, and China is fundamentally a struggle for the “new geopolitics of logistics.” In this competition, transport corridors, maritime routes, railways, ports, and digital infrastructure increasingly play a more decisive role than traditional military force. This rivalry is likely to intensify further in the future. The development of artificial intelligence, electric transportation, semiconductors, and green energy technologies will continue to increase the strategic importance of logistics systems. As a result, Eurasia is expected to remain one of the principal centers of global competition in the twenty-first century. Ultimately, in the current era of geopolitical transformation, transport-logistics systems are becoming the central element of international relations. Competition among the United States, Russia, and China is increasingly unfolding precisely within this infrastructural and logistical sphere. This process will shape not only the future architecture of Eurasia but also the broader structure of the global economic and political order. * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.