In his latest policy brief, Dr Islomkhon Gafarov provides a detailed assessment of how the Taliban are recalibrating Afghanistan’s mineral wealth as a strategic diplomatic instrument. Faced with the collapse of international aid, asset freezes, and the dismantling of the opium economy, the Taliban leadership has turned its attention to the country’s vast untapped reserves of copper, lithium, iron ore, and uranium. Yet, rather than launching immediate large-scale exploitation, Dr Gafarov argues, the Taliban have adopted a cautious approach — employing natural resources as a form of political capital in their efforts to achieve international recognition.   Afghanistan’s subsoil potential is immense: over 1,400 deposits are identified across the country, with copper at Mes Aynak valued at over $50 billion, and lithium reserves seen as critical to the global green energy transition. While the sector has already attracted approximately $7 billion in foreign investment and officially employs 150,000 people, the Taliban appear to be treating these resources not primarily as economic assets, but as geopolitical leverage. The brief underlines how the regime is linking bilateral extraction agreements with broader negotiations over legal frameworks, with the implicit understanding that access to Afghanistan’s critical minerals could pave the way for limited international engagement or even recognition.   Dr Gafarov outlines the role of key external actors — most prominently China, whose state companies have secured long-term contracts in oil and copper, and which is now negotiating for lithium concessions. China’s interest is both economic and strategic, tied to the Belt and Road Initiative and to securing technological supply chains. India, facing rising tensions with Pakistan and aiming to scale its nuclear sector, is eyeing Afghan uranium. Russia, Iran, and Pakistan, while active, are approaching resource cooperation through broader strategic lenses, including transit infrastructure and regional power dynamics. Uzbekistan, for its part, is well positioned to assist through mineral processing facilities, cross-border logistics, and technical capacity-building.   The policy brief concludes that Afghanistan’s extractive sector, though underdeveloped, has become a central pillar of the Taliban’s shadow diplomacy. By avoiding exclusive partnerships and maintaining a multi-vector engagement strategy, the Taliban are using natural resources to generate interest without making full concessions. According to Dr Gafarov, this strategy reflects an attempt to move beyond financial survival and toward the careful construction of political legitimacy through resource diplomacy — seeking not merely contracts, but recognition.   Read on Geopolitical Monitor   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In recent years, mutual interest between Uzbekistan-and the Central Asian region more broadly-and EU member states has markedly intensified, reflecting growing engagement not only at the governmental and expert levels but also among the wider public.   From a political standpoint, the key driver of Uzbekistan-EU relations is the presence of political dialogue. Uzbekistan has established strategic partnerships with three EU member states, reflecting growing alignment and shared interests. The first such partnership was forged during President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s first term, when Hungary and Uzbekistan signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement in March 2021 in Tashkent. This relationship was later elevated to the level of Expanded Strategic Partnership during President Mirziyoyev’s reciprocal visit to Budapest in May 2025. The second strategic partnership was established during President Mirziyoyev’s second term, marked by the signing of a Joint Declaration with Italy during his official visit to Rome in June 2023. The third partnership was concluded in his third term, when France and Uzbekistan adopted a Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership in March 2025 in Paris, further solidifying Uzbekistan’s growing ties with key EU actors.   From the viewpoint of public interest, it is important to highlight the growing number of tourists visiting Uzbekistan from European Union member states. Comparing pre-pandemic figures with data from 2024, the number of EU tourists increased from approximately 70,000 to over 230,000, representing more than threefold rise. Italy, in particular, has consistently ranked among the top three EU countries in terms of tourist arrivals. In 2024, with around 40,000 Italian visitors, it became the leading EU source of tourism for Uzbekistan. These figures reflect not only a robust post-pandemic recovery but also a structural intensification of travel flows between the two countries. They signal a deepening Italian interest in Uzbekistan’s cultural and historical heritage. Additionally, there are currently four direct flights per week between Italy and Uzbekistan, further facilitating bilateral mobility. More broadly, historic cities such as Samarkand-Uzbekistan’s cultural jewel and a peer to Rome with over 2,700 years of history-as well as Bukhara and Khiva, are attracting an increasing number of visitors not only from Italy but from across the European Union. Cultural exchange serves as a vital foundation for strengthening bilateral relations. The deeper the mutual understanding, the more effective and constructive the cooperation.   At the regional level, mutual interest between Central Asian states and Italy has intensified notably since 2023. This growing engagement is reflected in a series of high-level visits to Italy by regional leaders: President Shavkat Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan in June 2023, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev of Kazakhstan in January 2024, and President Emomali Rahmon of Tajikistan in April 2024. On the Italian side, President Sergio Mattarella paid official visits to Uzbekistan in November 2023 and to Kazakhstan in March 2025, underscoring Italy’s strategic commitment to deepening ties with Central Asia. From a market profile perspective, Italy ranks as Central Asia’s third-largest economic partner, following China and Russia. Among the countries of the region, Kazakhstan maintains the highest volume of trade with Italy. In 2024, bilateral trade turnover between Kazakhstan and Italy increased by 25%, reaching nearly $20 billion. Of this total, approximately $18 billion - or 90% - consisted of Kazakh crude petroleum exports to Italy. Yet, Italy’s trade turnover with other Central Asian states remained more modest: $438 million with Uzbekistan, approximately $250 million with Turkmenistan, around $240 million with Kyrgyzstan, and close to $100 million with Tajikistan. These figures highlight untapped economic potential, which opens doors for all Central Asian countries to broaden their economic horizons, and for Kazakhstan in particular, prospects for diversifying its trade landscape.   At the invitation of the President of Uzbekistan, Prime Minister of the Italian Republic Giorgia Meloni arrived in Samarkand on an official visit on May 28. As outcomes, about ten agreements, worth over 3 billion euros were signed in Samarkand. Of all, three documents aim to shape a durable and forward-looking partnership.   First and foremost, the agreements in the field of education hold particular strategic importance because true and lasting partnerships can only be forged through a profound understanding of one another – ideologically, culturally, and historically. This, in turn, is best cultivated through joint degree programs, institutional partnerships, research collaboration, and cultural exchanges. These mechanisms not only foster trust and familiarity but also build the societal infrastructure necessary for strategic, long-term alignment between nations. This vision was concretely advanced during the Samarkand meeting, where the opening of a branch of the University of Tuscia in Uzbekistan and the launch of double degree programs with the Universities of Pisa, Trento, Roma Tre, and Ca’ Foscari were announced. In parallel, to strengthen technical education, the leading Italian company Danieli and the ITS Academy of Udine signed a strategic memorandum of understanding with the Tashkent branch of the Polytechnic University of Turin.    Another fundamental document is on cooperation in sustainable development and environmental protection. Since 2015, all UN member states have committed to the ambitious “2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”. The partial successes and shortcomings of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the predecessor framework of the 2030 SDGs, revealed that achieving such comprehensive objectives requires more than just collective action; it demands sustained commitment, coordinated policy alignment, and adaptive strategies tailored to diverse regional contexts. Particularly pressing within this framework is the challenge of climate change. According to the Asian Development Bank’s assessment, under a high-end emissions scenario, climate change could reduce regional GDP by 17% by 2070, with losses potentially reaching 41% by the end of the century. Meanwhile, the International Monetary Fund projects that by 2060, the region’s economic output may decline by nearly 7%. Compounding these risks is the forthcoming implementation of the European Commission’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) in 2026, which will impose carbon taxes on imports to the EU based on their carbon footprint. This measure aims to align international trade with global climate objectives. Without adequate preparatory measures, Uzbek exporters risk considerable fiscal losses in certain product categories. Given these significant global and regional dynamics, the signing of this cooperation agreement is both timely and critical. It represents a proactive step toward addressing shared environmental challenges and safeguarding the sustainable economic future of the region.   Third strategically consequential agreement pertains to the promotion and mutual protection of investments-an essential legal and institutional framework for fostering long-term economic integration. First, it reinforces the growing Italian economic footprint in Uzbekistan, where nearly 60 enterprises already operate with partial Italian capital, including 24 with full Italian capital. This reflects not only commercial interest but also investor confidence in Uzbekistan’s evolving business environment. Second, the agreement is aligned with a broader geopolitical and economic reconfiguration in the region. At the first C5+EU Summit in April, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced a €12 billion investment package for the region, positioning the EU - and by extension its member states - as long-term stakeholders in Central Asia’s development trajectory. Additionally, Italy complements this vision by directing 41.6% of its ADB projects to Central and West Asia, underscoring its strategic political interest and development commitment to this region. Third, the C5+EU Summit yielded an agreement to open a European Investment Bank regional office in Uzbekistan - an initiative that further advances the EU’s long-term development agenda in Central Asia. Within this evolving architecture, the Italy-Uzbekistan investment protection agreement plays a critical role in de-risking capital flows, securing investor rights, and institutionalizing bilateral economic cooperation. As such, it represents not merely a legal instrument, but a forward-anchored mechanism designed to operationalize Italy’s long-term strategic and economic presence in the region.   Clearly, the Italy-Central Asia Summit held on 30th May 2025 in Astana reaffirmed the unity of our nations on the international stage. Following a few weeks from the C5+EU Summit, held in Samarkand, this event reflects the growing geopolitical importance of Central Asia. However, unlike the C5+EU format, which emphasized region-to-region model, this summit is a country-to-region engagement, signaling Italy’s intent to carve a distinct strategic and economic relationship with Central Asia - one that supplements the common EU stance while advancing Italy’s national interests. Most importantly, as expressed by Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni in Astana during recent meeting with President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev on May 30th, “Italy was the first EU nation to have decided to invest in relations with Central Asia and its individual member states, setting up a stable format for the sharing of ideas…”. This is also exemplified by Italy being the first European country to initiate ministerial-level dialogue with Central Asia back in 2019, with subsequent meetings held in 2021 and 2024. Thus, this May’s summit marks the first gathering at the level of heads of state, serving as a logical continuation of earlier engagements. Since then, Berlin has also intensified its country-to-region engagement, demonstrated by the inaugural “Germany-Central Asia” summit held in Berlin on September 29, 2023, followed by the second summit in Astana on September 17, 2024.   In summary, the intensification of Uzbekistan-EU relations, particularly through the dynamic and multifaceted partnership with Italy, reflects a broader strategic recalibration in both regional and international engagement. Italy’s pioneering role – manifested in sustained political dialogue, expanding economic cooperation, cultural diplomacy, and shared commitments to sustainability - underscores a shift toward deeper, country-specific partnerships. The agreements signed during recent high-level visits signal not only the maturation of bilateral and multilateral ties but also the institutionalization of long-term collaboration. As the geopolitical and economic landscape evolves, such partnerships will be instrumental in advancing mutual interests.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Dr Islomkhon Gafarov and Mr Hamza Boltaev’s brief argues that, despite its frequent portrayal as a game-changer linking Central and South Asia, the Termez–Mazar-i-Sharif–Kabul–Peshawar railway remains more myth than reality. While the 2011 opening of the Termez–Mazar-i-Sharif section highlights the theoretical promise of granting landlocked Central Asian states access to Gwadar and Karachi, Afghanistan’s fraught political and security landscape – compounded by the Taliban’s unrecognised status and the ongoing threat of terror groups such as ISKP – has repeatedly stalled progress. Border tensions with Pakistan, reflected in episodic closures and the April deportation of over 80,000 Afghans, only reinforce the fragility of any expanded corridor.   Moreover, external actors have pursued alternative routes that dilute the railway’s centrality. India’s prioritisation of the Chabahar-based North–South Corridor via Iran, coupled with Tehran’s own strategic interest in that model, diverts investment away from the Pakistan-linked project. China views the Trans-Afghan link merely as an adjunct to CPEC rather than a priority, while Russia hedges between multiple options under Western sanctions.   Within Central Asia, too, national preferences diverge: Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan favour routes that bypass Uzbekistan, whereas Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan look to Chinese-backed corridors. Uzbekistan alone has advanced materially by completing the Termez–Mazar-i-Sharif line, yet even Tashkent recognises that deeper engagement with Iran offers a more immediate pathway to seaports. In the authors’ conclusion, the corridor’s future hinges on strategic alignment among Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran — three “Islamic gateways” whose mutual distrust and competing interests threaten to render the Trans-Afghan Corridor a geopolitical mirage rather than a functioning transport artery.   Read on The Asia Today   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The policy brief by Dr Islomkhon Gafarov and Bobur Mingyasharov begins by situating China’s triangular diplomacy between Islamabad and Kabul within the framework of its Global Security Initiative (GSI), which emphasises cooperative security as a cornerstone of Beijing’s external strategy. Against a backdrop of escalating Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan activity, cross-border skirmishes, trade disruptions and the mass expulsion of Afghan migrants, Beijing has stepped forward as an interested mediator seeking to stabilise South Asia. By convening an informal trilateral meeting of foreign ministers in Beijing on 21 May 2025 — attended by China’s Wang Yi, Pakistan’s Muhammad Ishaq Dar and Afghanistan’s Amir Khan Muttaqi — China signalled its intent to translate declarative support for regional harmony into tangible diplomatic action.   The brief underscores that Beijing’s newfound activism is, in large part, a reaction to the April–May 2025 Kashmir crisis, which reminded Chinese strategists that South Asia remains prone to sudden conflagrations that could imperil the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The conflict between India and Pakistan not only threatened vital overland routes to the Indian Ocean but also prompted Beijing to shore up Pakistan’s western flank. For Islamabad, whose western border with Afghanistan has long been porous and volatile, stabilisation is essential if it is to avoid a two-front predicament when tensions flare with New Delhi.   Afghanistan’s shifting foreign policy orientation presents a further complication for Chinese objectives. Such a recalibration could erode China’s leverage over Kabul and weaken the coherence of a trilateral framework. The brief also highlights Tehran’s growing diplomatic activism — exemplified by Iranian mediation efforts during the Kashmir crisis — and Beijing’s unease at ceding influence to Iran in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. In parallel, the authors posit that Western retrenchment in post-withdrawal Afghanistan was at least partially calculated to draw Chinese focus into a volatile region, thereby diverting Beijing’s attention from Indo-Pacific affairs. In sum, China faces a complex web of competing influences and must navigate these carefully if it is to retain its strategic primacy.   In its concluding analysis, the policy brief argues that China’s GSI is now transitioning from rhetorical commitment to on-the-ground diplomacy, with the recent trilateral meeting marking a critical inflection point. The likelihood of reconciliation between Islamabad and Kabul is rising, driven by each party’s own political and economic calculus as well as Beijing’s concerted intermediation. Beyond its immediate benefits for South Asian stability, such rapprochement bears considerable significance for Central Asian states, particularly in relation to the Trans-Afghan Corridor and access to Pakistani ports. These linkages are integral to China’s broader connectivity agenda under the BRI and the future security of CPEC. Looking ahead, Beijing is expected to institutionalize its mediation — potentially through enhanced Afghan participation in the BRI or Beijing’s support for Kabul’s entry into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization — thereby embedding the resolution of Pakistan-Afghanistan tensions within multilateral frameworks.   Read on:DNA News PakistanIslamabad Post   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Countries with a diversified energy mix – comprising oil, gas, renewable energy sources (RES) and nuclear power – face unique challenges in managing the transition to sustainable energy. Nations such as the US, China, France, UK, India and Spain are striving to balance energy security, decarbonization and economic efficiency.   The key challenges for countries with an integrated energy mix are as follows: 1. Balancing between stability and flexibility of the energy system Nuclear and gas-fired generation provide a stable base load, while RES such as solar and wind power are subject to fluctuations. Integrating these sources requires significant investment in energy storage infrastructure and grid modernization. For example, in Spain, where 57 per cent of electricity comes from renewables and 20 per cent from nuclear plants, a recent large-scale blackout has sparked debate about the reliability of the grid and the role of nuclear power in ensuring stability.   2. Cost-efficiency and investment risks Maintaining a diverse energy portfolio requires significant investment. In the UK, despite efforts to meet Net Zero targets, the North Sea oil and gas sector continues to play an important role in the economy, generating £20bn annually and supporting over 200,000 jobs. However, high taxes and policy uncertainty could discourage investors and slow the sector's development.   3. Geopolitical risks and energy security Dependence on energy imports makes countries vulnerable to external shocks. China, to reduce its dependence on oil and coal imports, is investing in the development of renewable energy sources and electrification of its economy, which has already enabled it to meet 30 per cent of its energy consumption from electricity.   4. Technological challenges and infrastructure modernization The integration of different energy sources requires grid modernization and the introduction of new technologies. The US and China are planning to add nearly 890 GW of gas capacity by 2040, which will require significant investment and infrastructure modernization.   Countries with a complex energy mix: The US has extensive oil, gas, renewable energy resources and a developed nuclear power industry. However, policy changes could affect RES development. For example, reduced incentives for electric vehicles could slow the transition to clean energy.   China is actively investing in renewables and electrification to reduce its dependence on imported fossil resources. These efforts have already led to significant success in reducing its carbon footprint and improving energy security.   Spain plans to increase the share of renewables to 81 per cent by 2030 and decommission nuclear plants by 2035. However, recent power outages have raised questions about the reliability of the grid and the need to revise plans to move away from nuclear power.   Countries with a diverse energy mix face unique challenges in the transition to sustainable energy. The development of different energy sources needs to be carefully balanced, considering economic, technological and geopolitical aspects. Investments in infrastructure modernization, development of energy storage technologies and flexible energy policies are key to a successful transition to sustainable energy.   Several key lessons for Uzbekistan, which itself is endeavoring to balance the development of all these areas, can be identified from this analysis:   1. The energy balance requires strategic management Lesson: There is a need to avoid bias towards a single energy source - even if it is renewable energy. Context: As the example of Spain shows, a rapid increase in the share of RES without supporting baseload generation (gas, nuclear) can lead to instability of the energy system. For Uzbekistan: Given the ambitious targets to increase the share of solar and wind power to 25% by 2030, it is critical not to weaken the development of gas and nuclear generation, and to modernize the electricity grid to cope with fluctuations in RES generation.   2. Nuclear power as a pillar in the energy transition Lesson: Nuclear power plays an ‘anchor’ role for grid stability in countries with a high share of RES. Context: France, the US and China are using nuclear as a stable low-carbon source against the backdrop of growing RES. For Uzbekistan: The construction of a small nuclear power plant (SNPP) in Jizzakh region, and possibly a large plant in the future, can ensure energy security in the long term. But it is important to ensure: localization of components, training of personnel, transparency of financing, international safety standards.   3. Gas as a transition fuel, not a dead end Lesson: Gas-fired generation is not an obstacle to decarbonization, but a support for it. Context: In the US and China, gas is being used as a support to move away from coal dependence and to integrate renewables. For Uzbekistan: Uzbekistan’s own gas resources allow the country to utilize the flexible generation mechanism, while increasing export opportunities and creating added value (CCGT, gas chemistry). But it is important to eliminate subsidies that inhibit efficiency and to develop Digital Load Management.   4. Transparent investment policies and integration into global chains Lesson: In the context of energy transition, international investments go where: clear regulatory environment, long-term stability, ESG-oriented projects. For Uzbekistan: The state should strengthen transparency of conditions for private and international investors, including auction models for RES, open access to grids, guarantees of return on investment. Example: PPA model for ACWA Power or Masdar shows efficiency but needs to be scaled and institutionalized.   5: Energy diplomacy as a strategic asset Lesson: Geopolitics directly affects the success of an energy transition: access to critical resources, technologies, and markets. For Uzbekistan: It is important to develop energy diplomacy through participation in European initiatives (EU Global Gateway, Central Asia-EU Green Energy Dialogue), partnerships with China and South Korea on hydrogen and storage technologies, strengthening communication with the international community (particularly Russia) on nuclear and gas.   For Uzbekistan, energy transformation is not a choice between RES and FEC, but a search for a reasonable balance.   Key priorities: Synchronization of all sources in a single energy system model. Investments in infrastructure and grid flexibility. Supporting domestic industry in the construction of new capacity. Active participation in regional and international co-operation.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The policy brief by Islomkhon Gafarov, Hamza Boltaev, and Bobur Mingyasharov, published on The Diplomat, provides an incisive analysis of Uzbekistan’s evolving policy towards Afghanistan under Taliban rule, characterized by pragmatic engagement despite the absence of formal diplomatic recognition. The authors argue that Uzbekistan’s recent bilateral agreement on the joint management of the Amu Darya River with Afghan provincial authorities signifies a deepening of institutional ties, driven by a strategic imperative to secure transboundary water resources. This development reflects a calculated shift in Tashkent’s foreign policy — from cautious observation to selective, interest-based cooperation, underscoring the need to address pressing regional challenges through direct dialogue and functional arrangements.   The brief underscores that Uzbekistan's stance on the Taliban government embodies a form of de facto recognition, exemplified not only by the acceptance of a Taliban-appointed ambassador but also by sustained intergovernmental cooperation. While such steps raise questions under international law, the Uzbek government’s priority remains practical problem-solving over ideological posturing. In this context, the authors stress the centrality of water diplomacy, especially as Afghanistan’s controversial Qosh-Tepa Canal project threatens to divert significant volumes from the Amu Darya, jeopardizing downstream water availability in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Given the canal’s potential environmental and geopolitical consequences, Uzbekistan’s strategy signals a proactive commitment to defending vital interests, regardless of the international community’s indecisiveness regarding Taliban legitimacy.   Security concerns remain a critical factor in Tashkent’s calculus. The persistent threat from extremist groups operating in Afghanistan compels Uzbekistan to extend its security and developmental engagement across the border. This includes soft-power tools like funding religious educational institutions in Afghan provinces, designed to foster stability and counteract radical influences. At the same time, the authors point to the absence of a collective regional approach toward managing water disputes with Afghanistan. While Iran and Afghanistan have recently made progress over the Helmand River, countries like Pakistan remain locked in unresolved negotiations, further highlighting Uzbekistan’s preference for bilateralism over multilateral dependency.   Importantly, the brief reveals that Uzbekistan is developing a nuanced model of “limited recognition” anchored in economic interdependence, cross-border trade, and municipal cooperation. The authors cite examples such as the establishment of Afghan trade infrastructure in Termez and plans for Uzbek commercial representation in Mazar-i-Sharif. These moves suggest that official recognition is not the only pathway to effective engagement, especially when national interests demand urgent and adaptive diplomacy. Uzbekistan’s approach offers a blueprint for other regional actors seeking stability without conferring political legitimacy on a controversial regime.   In conclusion, the authors argue that Uzbekistan’s Afghanistan policy is less a break from tradition than a continuation of a strategic doctrine that balances principle with pragmatism. As the international community stalls, Uzbekistan’s actions may eventually catalyze a broader regional realignment, prompting others to pursue similar policies of conditional engagement. Thus, Tashkent’s carefully managed cooperation with the Taliban may well redefine the contours of Central Asian diplomacy, illustrating how mid-sized powers can take initiative in shaping regional security and development agendas.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.