Dr Islomkhon Gafarov and Mr Hamza Boltaev’s brief argues that, despite its frequent portrayal as a game-changer linking Central and South Asia, the Termez–Mazar-i-Sharif–Kabul–Peshawar railway remains more myth than reality. While the 2011 opening of the Termez–Mazar-i-Sharif section highlights the theoretical promise of granting landlocked Central Asian states access to Gwadar and Karachi, Afghanistan’s fraught political and security landscape – compounded by the Taliban’s unrecognised status and the ongoing threat of terror groups such as ISKP – has repeatedly stalled progress. Border tensions with Pakistan, reflected in episodic closures and the April deportation of over 80,000 Afghans, only reinforce the fragility of any expanded corridor.   Moreover, external actors have pursued alternative routes that dilute the railway’s centrality. India’s prioritisation of the Chabahar-based North–South Corridor via Iran, coupled with Tehran’s own strategic interest in that model, diverts investment away from the Pakistan-linked project. China views the Trans-Afghan link merely as an adjunct to CPEC rather than a priority, while Russia hedges between multiple options under Western sanctions.   Within Central Asia, too, national preferences diverge: Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan favour routes that bypass Uzbekistan, whereas Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan look to Chinese-backed corridors. Uzbekistan alone has advanced materially by completing the Termez–Mazar-i-Sharif line, yet even Tashkent recognises that deeper engagement with Iran offers a more immediate pathway to seaports. In the authors’ conclusion, the corridor’s future hinges on strategic alignment among Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran — three “Islamic gateways” whose mutual distrust and competing interests threaten to render the Trans-Afghan Corridor a geopolitical mirage rather than a functioning transport artery.   Read on The Asia Today   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The policy brief by Dr Islomkhon Gafarov and Bobur Mingyasharov begins by situating China’s triangular diplomacy between Islamabad and Kabul within the framework of its Global Security Initiative (GSI), which emphasises cooperative security as a cornerstone of Beijing’s external strategy. Against a backdrop of escalating Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan activity, cross-border skirmishes, trade disruptions and the mass expulsion of Afghan migrants, Beijing has stepped forward as an interested mediator seeking to stabilise South Asia. By convening an informal trilateral meeting of foreign ministers in Beijing on 21 May 2025 — attended by China’s Wang Yi, Pakistan’s Muhammad Ishaq Dar and Afghanistan’s Amir Khan Muttaqi — China signalled its intent to translate declarative support for regional harmony into tangible diplomatic action.   The brief underscores that Beijing’s newfound activism is, in large part, a reaction to the April–May 2025 Kashmir crisis, which reminded Chinese strategists that South Asia remains prone to sudden conflagrations that could imperil the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The conflict between India and Pakistan not only threatened vital overland routes to the Indian Ocean but also prompted Beijing to shore up Pakistan’s western flank. For Islamabad, whose western border with Afghanistan has long been porous and volatile, stabilisation is essential if it is to avoid a two-front predicament when tensions flare with New Delhi.   Afghanistan’s shifting foreign policy orientation presents a further complication for Chinese objectives. Such a recalibration could erode China’s leverage over Kabul and weaken the coherence of a trilateral framework. The brief also highlights Tehran’s growing diplomatic activism — exemplified by Iranian mediation efforts during the Kashmir crisis — and Beijing’s unease at ceding influence to Iran in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. In parallel, the authors posit that Western retrenchment in post-withdrawal Afghanistan was at least partially calculated to draw Chinese focus into a volatile region, thereby diverting Beijing’s attention from Indo-Pacific affairs. In sum, China faces a complex web of competing influences and must navigate these carefully if it is to retain its strategic primacy.   In its concluding analysis, the policy brief argues that China’s GSI is now transitioning from rhetorical commitment to on-the-ground diplomacy, with the recent trilateral meeting marking a critical inflection point. The likelihood of reconciliation between Islamabad and Kabul is rising, driven by each party’s own political and economic calculus as well as Beijing’s concerted intermediation. Beyond its immediate benefits for South Asian stability, such rapprochement bears considerable significance for Central Asian states, particularly in relation to the Trans-Afghan Corridor and access to Pakistani ports. These linkages are integral to China’s broader connectivity agenda under the BRI and the future security of CPEC. Looking ahead, Beijing is expected to institutionalize its mediation — potentially through enhanced Afghan participation in the BRI or Beijing’s support for Kabul’s entry into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization — thereby embedding the resolution of Pakistan-Afghanistan tensions within multilateral frameworks.   Read on:DNA News PakistanIslamabad Post   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

Countries with a diversified energy mix – comprising oil, gas, renewable energy sources (RES) and nuclear power – face unique challenges in managing the transition to sustainable energy. Nations such as the US, China, France, UK, India and Spain are striving to balance energy security, decarbonization and economic efficiency.   The key challenges for countries with an integrated energy mix are as follows: 1. Balancing between stability and flexibility of the energy system Nuclear and gas-fired generation provide a stable base load, while RES such as solar and wind power are subject to fluctuations. Integrating these sources requires significant investment in energy storage infrastructure and grid modernization. For example, in Spain, where 57 per cent of electricity comes from renewables and 20 per cent from nuclear plants, a recent large-scale blackout has sparked debate about the reliability of the grid and the role of nuclear power in ensuring stability.   2. Cost-efficiency and investment risks Maintaining a diverse energy portfolio requires significant investment. In the UK, despite efforts to meet Net Zero targets, the North Sea oil and gas sector continues to play an important role in the economy, generating £20bn annually and supporting over 200,000 jobs. However, high taxes and policy uncertainty could discourage investors and slow the sector's development.   3. Geopolitical risks and energy security Dependence on energy imports makes countries vulnerable to external shocks. China, to reduce its dependence on oil and coal imports, is investing in the development of renewable energy sources and electrification of its economy, which has already enabled it to meet 30 per cent of its energy consumption from electricity.   4. Technological challenges and infrastructure modernization The integration of different energy sources requires grid modernization and the introduction of new technologies. The US and China are planning to add nearly 890 GW of gas capacity by 2040, which will require significant investment and infrastructure modernization.   Countries with a complex energy mix: The US has extensive oil, gas, renewable energy resources and a developed nuclear power industry. However, policy changes could affect RES development. For example, reduced incentives for electric vehicles could slow the transition to clean energy.   China is actively investing in renewables and electrification to reduce its dependence on imported fossil resources. These efforts have already led to significant success in reducing its carbon footprint and improving energy security.   Spain plans to increase the share of renewables to 81 per cent by 2030 and decommission nuclear plants by 2035. However, recent power outages have raised questions about the reliability of the grid and the need to revise plans to move away from nuclear power.   Countries with a diverse energy mix face unique challenges in the transition to sustainable energy. The development of different energy sources needs to be carefully balanced, considering economic, technological and geopolitical aspects. Investments in infrastructure modernization, development of energy storage technologies and flexible energy policies are key to a successful transition to sustainable energy.   Several key lessons for Uzbekistan, which itself is endeavoring to balance the development of all these areas, can be identified from this analysis:   1. The energy balance requires strategic management Lesson: There is a need to avoid bias towards a single energy source - even if it is renewable energy. Context: As the example of Spain shows, a rapid increase in the share of RES without supporting baseload generation (gas, nuclear) can lead to instability of the energy system. For Uzbekistan: Given the ambitious targets to increase the share of solar and wind power to 25% by 2030, it is critical not to weaken the development of gas and nuclear generation, and to modernize the electricity grid to cope with fluctuations in RES generation.   2. Nuclear power as a pillar in the energy transition Lesson: Nuclear power plays an ‘anchor’ role for grid stability in countries with a high share of RES. Context: France, the US and China are using nuclear as a stable low-carbon source against the backdrop of growing RES. For Uzbekistan: The construction of a small nuclear power plant (SNPP) in Jizzakh region, and possibly a large plant in the future, can ensure energy security in the long term. But it is important to ensure: localization of components, training of personnel, transparency of financing, international safety standards.   3. Gas as a transition fuel, not a dead end Lesson: Gas-fired generation is not an obstacle to decarbonization, but a support for it. Context: In the US and China, gas is being used as a support to move away from coal dependence and to integrate renewables. For Uzbekistan: Uzbekistan’s own gas resources allow the country to utilize the flexible generation mechanism, while increasing export opportunities and creating added value (CCGT, gas chemistry). But it is important to eliminate subsidies that inhibit efficiency and to develop Digital Load Management.   4. Transparent investment policies and integration into global chains Lesson: In the context of energy transition, international investments go where: clear regulatory environment, long-term stability, ESG-oriented projects. For Uzbekistan: The state should strengthen transparency of conditions for private and international investors, including auction models for RES, open access to grids, guarantees of return on investment. Example: PPA model for ACWA Power or Masdar shows efficiency but needs to be scaled and institutionalized.   5: Energy diplomacy as a strategic asset Lesson: Geopolitics directly affects the success of an energy transition: access to critical resources, technologies, and markets. For Uzbekistan: It is important to develop energy diplomacy through participation in European initiatives (EU Global Gateway, Central Asia-EU Green Energy Dialogue), partnerships with China and South Korea on hydrogen and storage technologies, strengthening communication with the international community (particularly Russia) on nuclear and gas.   For Uzbekistan, energy transformation is not a choice between RES and FEC, but a search for a reasonable balance.   Key priorities: Synchronization of all sources in a single energy system model. Investments in infrastructure and grid flexibility. Supporting domestic industry in the construction of new capacity. Active participation in regional and international co-operation.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The policy brief by Islomkhon Gafarov, Hamza Boltaev, and Bobur Mingyasharov, published on The Diplomat, provides an incisive analysis of Uzbekistan’s evolving policy towards Afghanistan under Taliban rule, characterized by pragmatic engagement despite the absence of formal diplomatic recognition. The authors argue that Uzbekistan’s recent bilateral agreement on the joint management of the Amu Darya River with Afghan provincial authorities signifies a deepening of institutional ties, driven by a strategic imperative to secure transboundary water resources. This development reflects a calculated shift in Tashkent’s foreign policy — from cautious observation to selective, interest-based cooperation, underscoring the need to address pressing regional challenges through direct dialogue and functional arrangements.   The brief underscores that Uzbekistan's stance on the Taliban government embodies a form of de facto recognition, exemplified not only by the acceptance of a Taliban-appointed ambassador but also by sustained intergovernmental cooperation. While such steps raise questions under international law, the Uzbek government’s priority remains practical problem-solving over ideological posturing. In this context, the authors stress the centrality of water diplomacy, especially as Afghanistan’s controversial Qosh-Tepa Canal project threatens to divert significant volumes from the Amu Darya, jeopardizing downstream water availability in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Given the canal’s potential environmental and geopolitical consequences, Uzbekistan’s strategy signals a proactive commitment to defending vital interests, regardless of the international community’s indecisiveness regarding Taliban legitimacy.   Security concerns remain a critical factor in Tashkent’s calculus. The persistent threat from extremist groups operating in Afghanistan compels Uzbekistan to extend its security and developmental engagement across the border. This includes soft-power tools like funding religious educational institutions in Afghan provinces, designed to foster stability and counteract radical influences. At the same time, the authors point to the absence of a collective regional approach toward managing water disputes with Afghanistan. While Iran and Afghanistan have recently made progress over the Helmand River, countries like Pakistan remain locked in unresolved negotiations, further highlighting Uzbekistan’s preference for bilateralism over multilateral dependency.   Importantly, the brief reveals that Uzbekistan is developing a nuanced model of “limited recognition” anchored in economic interdependence, cross-border trade, and municipal cooperation. The authors cite examples such as the establishment of Afghan trade infrastructure in Termez and plans for Uzbek commercial representation in Mazar-i-Sharif. These moves suggest that official recognition is not the only pathway to effective engagement, especially when national interests demand urgent and adaptive diplomacy. Uzbekistan’s approach offers a blueprint for other regional actors seeking stability without conferring political legitimacy on a controversial regime.   In conclusion, the authors argue that Uzbekistan’s Afghanistan policy is less a break from tradition than a continuation of a strategic doctrine that balances principle with pragmatism. As the international community stalls, Uzbekistan’s actions may eventually catalyze a broader regional realignment, prompting others to pursue similar policies of conditional engagement. Thus, Tashkent’s carefully managed cooperation with the Taliban may well redefine the contours of Central Asian diplomacy, illustrating how mid-sized powers can take initiative in shaping regional security and development agendas.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

The article by Professor Ibragim Mavlanov published in the electronic scientific and practical journal “Human Capital and Labor Protection” focuses on the fact that the country’s share in world exports is the most important macroeconomic indicator directly affecting its status in the world economy. He stresses that the growth of Uzbekistan’s export potential is a key condition for realizing the tasks set by the President, including the strategic goal of joining the ranks of developed countries. Analyzing statistics, Professor Mavlanov demonstrates the positive dynamics of Uzbekistan's export growth in recent years, but points to its inconsistency with the scale achieved by countries with similar or smaller populations.   An important place in the article is given to economic diplomacy as a strategic tool for promoting export policy. The author stresses that strengthening foreign economic interaction and supporting exports of services and intellectual property are becoming key areas of export strategy modernization.   The author concludes with several practical recommendations, ranging from interagency coordination to radical expansion of services exports. He argues that to achieve the target indicators of the Uzbekistan-2030 Strategy the volume of exports should be increased by 2.5-3 times. Thus, the article is a substantial and well-founded contribution to the scientific and applied discussion on the place of Uzbekistan in the global economy.   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.

In his new policy brief, Dr. Islomkhon Gafarov explores the shifting contours of American foreign policy toward Afghanistan. He presents a nuanced periodization of U.S. engagement, tracing four evolving phases that reflect Washington’s strategic ambiguity, internal contradictions, and the absence of a long-term vision in its dealings with the Taliban regime. Beginning with the continuation of counterterrorism efforts beyond the military withdrawal — epitomized by the 2022 killing of al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri — Dr. Gafarov highlights how terrorism remained the dominant lens through which U.S. policymakers initially viewed Afghanistan.   The subsequent phase, characterized by political disengagement, saw Washington adopt a posture of strategic patience and indirect diplomacy, largely withdrawing from political and infrastructural involvement while maintaining limited humanitarian assistance. Dr. Gafarov then focuses on the Trump administration’s more assertive yet bifurcated approach. On one hand, President Trump’s MAGA-driven rhetoric called for punitive measures against the Taliban, such as suspending aid and demanding the return of military equipment. On the other, pragmatic calculations led to direct contact with Taliban representatives—underscoring a willingness to adjust tactics when electoral messaging proved inadequate for realpolitik imperatives.   In analyzing the most recent phase of direct engagement, Dr. Gafarov argues that the United States has begun to reassess its methods, engaging Taliban officials in dialogue despite earlier antagonism. This shift is attributed, in part, to growing Chinese influence in Afghanistan, which has challenged U.S. strategic interests in the region. The resumption of U.S.-Taliban contact — symbolized by high-level meetings and hostage releases — signals Washington’s renewed recognition of Afghanistan’s geopolitical centrality, particularly considering China’s Belt and Road ambitions.   Dr. Gafarov also explores the potential for Uzbekistan to serve as a diplomatic bridge between the United States and the Taliban. He underscores Tashkent’s historical and logistical relevance, its alignment with U.S. perspectives on regional development and stability, and its unique standing as one of Afghanistan’s most engaged neighbors. In this context, Uzbekistan’s mediation role is portrayed as a promising avenue for cautious re-engagement that would allow Washington to advance its interests while maintaining a degree of political distance.   Ultimately, Dr. Gafarov concludes that the U.S. strategy toward Afghanistan remains fragmented and reactive. Internal divisions within the Taliban, the persistence of terrorist threats, and the unresolved issue of human rights all contribute to Washington’s uncertainty and strategic hesitation. While pragmatic engagement may increase, he suggests, it is likely to remain constrained by ideological, geopolitical, and humanitarian considerations.   Read on The Asia Today   * The Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS) does not take institutional positions on any issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IAIS.