As Russian influence wanes Xi Jinping will make it a near-term priority to become the main partner of Central Asian countries. The 20th National Congress did not go according to plan for Chinese leader Xi Jinping. The unexpected public ouster of former president Hu Jintao indicated the possibility of an intra-elite struggle among the top members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Premier Li Keqiang was known to be in agreement with Xi about the state’s long-term goals, namely, to build a moderately prosperous society (Xiaokang) by 2021 and turn China into a great modern socialist country by the 100th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). However, their opinions did not coincide in the implementation of the main contours of economic policy. For example, Li disagreed with Xi regarding the “zero-COVID” policy as well as immense investments in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China’s zero-Covid policies led to an economic slowdown and stirred up discontent among the masses. From 2014 to 2019, China invested $90 billion dollars in BRI countries. But given that low-income developing countries make up a significant share of BRI participants—more than 46 percent of the total number of participating countries—many of them are in debt to China. Moreover, due to Covid-19, almost all BRI countries experienced negative gross domestic product(GDP) growth and decreased their solvency, which doubled these countries’ debts to China. Of the sixty-eight BRI participants, twenty-three are at risk of defaulting on their obligations with Djibouti, Laos, Maldives, Mongolia, Montenegro, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan at a particularly high risk of doing so. Central Asia In Focus Based on the composition of the Politburo Standing Committee, many experts noted that the new members are personally loyal to Xi, signaling his complete consolidation of power. This provides Xi with ample decision-making leeway concerning China’s future. As Alibaba founder Jack Ma said, “China is like a huge ship. In order to drastically shift its course, even if there is such a need, it takes considerable time and effort”. It is often assumed that China’s policy towards Central Asia will not change much. However, taking into account the current economic crisis and structural changes within the international order, adjustments will likely be made by strengthening the BRI. The retention of Wang Huning, the chief ideologue of the CCP, as a Politburo member is a clear signal that Xi will intensify the promotion of the BRI in his third term. Considering that Central Asia is critical to BRI’s success, the project will be a determining factor in China’s policy in the region. Additionally, because the BRI was first unveiled ten years ago in Kazakhstan, there is a symbolic meaning for China to show the project’s achievements in Central Asia. Until today, China has been careful not to push the BRI too strongly in the region. Beijing understands the difficulty of predicting Russia’s role in the region and, most importantly, the new trends in relations between the Central Asian countries and China itself. But this only testifies to Beijing’s intentions to gain a firm foothold in the region and supplants Moscow’s influence. First, given the weakening of Russia’s role in Central Asia due to its ongoing war in Ukraine, China’s position in the region is strengthening. Thus, American experts believe that for many of Russia’s neighbors, the war in Ukraine has accelerated the process of breaking out of Moscow’s orbit. Currently, many Central Asian states are rethinking and revising their relations with Russia. Sharp speeches by Kazakh president Kassym-Jomart Tokayev at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum in June and Tajik president Emomali Rakhmon at the October Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) summit addressed to Russia, as well as the evident desire of the countries of the region to resolve sensitive territorial issues bilaterally, vividly illustrates Central Asian states’ transition to independence. Russia’s growing isolation provides China with an opportunity to challenge its influence in Central Asia. Moscow’s strategic dependency on Beijing amidst the war in Ukraine excludes the possibility of Russian retaliation for encroachment into its historic sphere of influence. Second, in just this year, Xi met face-to-face three times and virtually once with other Central Asian leaders, indicating a new wave of high-intensity diplomacy. These meetings summarized thirty years of bilateral and multilateral relations while outlining prospects for future cooperation. Thus, at the Virtual Summit of the leaders of Central Asia and the President of China in January 2022, Xi made a number of important proposals including increasing trade to $70 billion by 2030, deepening cooperation in the field of advanced technologies, and providing 1,200 government-sponsored scholarships. Xi’s decision to make his first trip abroad since the outbreak of the pandemic to Central Asia is a fundamental strategic step to send an important signal to China’s competitors and partners in the region. Before the visit, the Chinese president published articles in which he outlined policy contours and guidelines for a new stage in the development of Central Asian-Chinese relations for the next decade. An analysis of Xi’s September visits to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan testify to China’s interests in the region. A number of documents signed with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan expressed China’s strong political commitment to the region, with a new focus on cooperation between Chinese media regulators and their counterparts in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Earlier, Chinese experts expressed indignation that a negative perception of China still persists in the region despite huge investment contributions for Central Asian economic development. This was primarily attributed to low awareness and the lack of positive information about China. Media interactions between each side to fill this gap will become the main tool for Chinese soft power projection in the region. Third, Xi explicitly identified the BRI as an important mechanism to realize Chinese interests in Central Asia. At the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Uzbekistan, Xi called for continuing efforts to complement BRI projects with national development strategies and regional cooperation initiatives, as well as to expand sub-multilateral and sub-regional cooperation. The need for regional transportation and communications links is increasing in Central Asia. Beginning next year, Beijing will become actively involved in constructing critical transport infrastructure in the region. To this end, after more than twenty years, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and China will revive the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway construction project. On the eve of the SCO summit, the relevant authorities of the three countries signed an agreement to implement this project with Chinese financing, no doubt placing it under “the framework of BRI.” This connectivity project aims to ensure Chinese access to Central Asian markets which is especially relevant when the war in Ukraine has impeded important routes leading to Europe. China’s interest in the speedy implementation of the BRI is becoming a decisive factor in the implementation of the CKU railway. According to experts, the CKU railway will not only create the southern corridor of the Second Continental Transport Bridge but will also open up new markets for manufactured products from the three countries. This route will become one of the shortest for transporting Chinese goods to Europe and will also increase Beijing’s regional economic influence. Finally, as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic, China will make more targeted investments rather than large-scale commitments. Xi’s visit to the region signals that China will invest more funds in the region but from now on, they will not be unconditional. China is determined to protect its economic interests in the region by linking them to certain political benchmarks. It is likely that initially, these conditions will be delicate but firmer demands for change will eventually be issued. Conclusion Due to the negative economic ramifications of the pandemic and the Russo-Ukrainian War, Central Asia has a general interest in accelerating the implementation of the BRI and other Chinese-financed projects. Still, while counting on large Chinese investments, participating countries should not hope for “generous conditions.” Countries can pay a high price for Chinese funding, including the “Sinicization” of their economies and cultures. For Xi, the BRI will remain a top priority for regional engagement as China continues to be the main donor for developing countries. Some BRI countries, however, will learn from the experiences of Pakistan and Sri Lanka and become more cautious about accepting Chinese investments with political conditions. Thus, the BRI is gradually transforming from a regional infrastructure development plan into a security strategy for Central Asia. Abbos Bobokhonov is a PhD student at the University of World Economy and Diplomacy, and Research Fellow at the Institute for Advanced International Studies. Previously, he was a Research Fellow at the Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies under the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, where his main areas of expertise were China’s foreign policy and SCO. His research interests include contemporary Chinese foreign policy in Central Asia, China’s Soft Power policy, BRI and AIIB.

There are no major alternatives to natural gas to ensure the stable and steady development of Uzbekistan’s economy and society. The idea of a new “gas union” was floated at a very consequential time, amid an unusually harsh winter in the region. Since the second half of November, several Central Asian countries have experienced unprecedented energy deficits and natural gas shortages. This coincided with a snap presidential election in Kazakhstan. So, it was during Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s first foreign visit — to Russia — after beginning his second term that the idea of a “trilateral gas union” was aired in late November. As press secretary for the Kazakh leader Ruslan Zheldibay commented: “…the talks between the presidents of Kazakhstan and Russia in the Kremlin focused on the creation of a ‘trilateral gas union’ between Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan with the purpose of coordinating their actions in order to transport Russian gas through the territories of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.” Over the next few days, the proposal was elaborated upon by Kremlin spokesman Dmitri Peskov, who talked about the creation of a joint company that would manage energy infrastructure. “The proposal implies the creation of a certain legal entity for cooperation between these three countries, and for infrastructure development, then for foreign markets,” said Peskov. This statement suggested Russia’s desire to expand its natural gas export routes in the direction of Central Asia and perhaps partially substitute for the losses of the European export market

In recent years, the EU has shifted how it views Central Asia. That effort culminated recently with the first EU- Central Asia leaders summit. At the end of October 2022, President of the European Council Charles Michel paid his first official visit to Astana and held a summit with the leaders of all five Central Asian states — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Download article

Editor’s note: In August, The National Interest organized a symposium on Afghanistan one year after the U.S. withdrawal and the Taliban takeover of Kabul. We asked a variety of experts the following question: “How should the Biden administration approach Afghanistan and the Taliban government?” The following article is one of their responses: One year after the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, the international community is still facing enormous challenges in dealing with the new reality in Central Asia. The withdrawal of international military forces, and the evacuation of only a small number of the Afghans who previously collaborated with them, considerably damaged the reputation of the United States and its Western allies. The chaos of the evacuation shocked millions of people around the world and Taliban rule has not brought long-expected peace, sustainable development, and prosperity. The Taliban cannot be blamed for all the current problems facing Afghanistan given that they inherited an underdeveloped state with high rates of poverty, an over-dependence on foreign aid, and an inefficient governing apparatus. The Taliban could improve the internal security situation but it is encountering substantial problems in governing effectively. The lack of an inclusive government and respect for the rights of women are the largest disagreements between the Taliban and the majority of the international community, which so far has not officially recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. To learn from its past experience of military and political involvement in Afghanistan, Western countries should focus on the following lessons: First, nation-building should be an internal process largely unaffected by foreign intervention. Afghanistan has continually proven that there is no “blueprint approach” that works and externally orchestrated reforms are fragile. There are no ready solutions for conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction. Some general principles and approaches for supporting countries after the end of conflicts still apply but each case requires attention to the importance of local communities taking the lead.  Second, building a highly centralized government under the leadership of strongmen did not work. Afghanistan has a historic tradition of decentralized administration and cannot admit the establishment of personalist regimes. Oddly, the United States and its allies decided to neglect their own principles and commitment to democratic procedures. From 2001-2021, Afghanistan’s presidents were legitimized under the direct coordination and interference of external actors. Despite Kabul’s efforts to consolidate power, the central government was predominantly perceived as being manipulated by the West and lacking the necessary internal support to implement post-conflict reconciliation and development policies. This experiment in Afghanistan clearly demonstrated that an over-centralized presidential model does not guarantee security and stability. Third, the West was ignorant of how regional countries could elaborate strategies on post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan. The future of Afghanistan cannot be considered and assembled without significant support from its neighbors. For various reasons, the United States avoided or minimized its cooperation with several regional countries on Afghanistan issues. Countries such as Pakistan were mainly used as transit routes and to host U.S. and Western military infrastructure essential for operations in Afghanistan. All major international gatherings discussing Afghanistan happened in Europe, the United States, and Japan. All are very far from the region and have a limited understanding of local traditions, context, and history. The concerns and proposals of states next to Afghanistan were barely considered as policy options by the United States and its allies. The Biden administration is willing to engage with Afghanistan in a limited manner. However, questions remain on how to deal with the Taliban’s tough ideological approach to many policy issues. There is now an ongoing debate on whether the Taliban should be recognized by the international community. The Taliban have faced difficulties in establishing their credibility to merit cooperation with other states. What can the Biden administration do to improve the security situation in Afghanistan?  First, there is a strong lack of trust between the Taliban and the United States. Conducting any substantive negotiations under such circumstances will not be effective. Especially after the U.S. drone strike against Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, there are many open questions about the credibility and honesty of the Taliban. However, collaboration on a limited number of issues important to the United States and its regional partners is critical. Drug and illicit arms trafficking, transborder threats, and border security are pressing problems that cannot be solved without cooperating with the Taliban. Second, it is essential for the United States and the West to keep supporting and cooperating closely with Afghanistan’s neighbors. Despite regular exchanges between regional countries and the West, there are still many gaps in mutual understanding. Promoting development and prosperity in the region requires improving connectivity. Western countries have already found ways to regularly send humanitarian support to Afghanistan while not violating sanctions against the Taliban. Therefore, funding connectivity projects in Central Asia would invest in its security, independence, and resilience. The main attention of the United States and allies in the international coalition should be given to the problem of socio-economic reconstruction and infrastructure development within Afghanistan. Improving the living standards of the Afghan people would help support U.S. policy, reduce the Taliban’s influence, and decrease interethnic struggles. Close cooperation with regional countries would ease the burden of interacting with the Taliban. No one wants to see a new civil war in Afghanistan and the United States has an interest in working to make sure that doesn’t happen. Akram Umarov is Director of the Center for Afghanistan Studies, University of World Economy and Diplomacy. His research covers security studies, conflict management, public diplomacy and development issues in Central Asia, Afghanistan and CIS countries. Twitter: @umarov_akram

he ease with which the Taliban was able to remove the government of Ashraf Ghani from power created an illusion about the group’s power, consolidation, and readiness to take full control of the country. The international community expected the Taliban to stabilize Afghanistan and put the entire country under reliable control in order to establish sole power and eliminate security challenges such as terrorism and drug trafficking. However, the U.S. strike on Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri raises questions about the credibility and honesty of the movement. In the eleven months since the Taliban came to power, the group has faced a number of serious internal problems, including increased factional clashes over engagement with foreign partners, the rise of Pashtun nationalism and the exit of ethnic minorities from the movement, and its inability to stabilize the state administration system. First, almost since the moment the Taliban seized power, there have been systematic clashes within the group over its leadership, pitting the future of the movement's agenda and cooperation with the international community between various factions. In the process of distributing leading state positions, the Taliban is facing serious confrontation between various factions. Despite Mullah Baradar's past success leading the Taliban, he has been demoted to holding a subordinate post as deputy prime minister for economic affairs. At the same time, Deputy Prime Minister for Political Affairs Abdul Kabeer has wide authority and the confidence of the country's supreme leadership. As a result of the growing influence and presence in power structures of radical and ideological factions with regard to women's rights, access to education, and freedoms for the population, the new government of Afghanistan has not compromised with the international community. The group of conservatives among the Taliban is personally occupied by the leader of the movement, Sheikh Hebatullah Akhundzad; other prominent representatives include Prime Minister Mullah Hassan Akhund, Chief Justice of the Islamic Central Court Abdul Hakim Haqqani, and Mayor of Kabul Mullah Neda Mohammad Nadeem. On the other hand, more moderate leaders include Deputy Prime Minister Mullah Baradar, Mining and Oil Minister Sheikh Shahabuddin Delawar, and Deputy Foreign Minister Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai. At the same time, several influential Taliban figures, such as Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani and Defense Minister Mullah Yaqoob, are trying to maneuver between these opposing camps without joining either. Second, in recent months, there has been a clear trend within the Taliban toward strengthening and significantly expanding the role of the Pashtun nationality. While the Taliban has previously been able to recruit Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Hazaras in the north and elsewhere to further its goals, the movement’s leadership is still dominated by the same radical Pashtun heads who ruled Afghanistan in the 1990s and oppose compromising on ideology and the balance of power. If the Taliban can find a formula to unite these factions, it will be able to strengthen the regime. Otherwise, this trend will weaken the group's hold on the country and may encourage some non-Pashtun groups to openly oppose the Taliban. One of the most important factors in the success of the Taliban in the summer of 2021 was the fact that Uzbek and Tajik groups joined the movement in northern Afghanistan and were able to effectively neutralize any resistance from local warlords and the armed forces of Kabul. However, in recent months, Makhdoom Alam, a Taliban commander of Uzbek origin, has been persecuted. In March, Haji Mali-Khan, the uncle of Sirajuddin Haqqani, was made deputy chief of staff of the Taliban’s armed forces to keep an eye on Kari Salahuddin Ayubi, the Tajik head of the armed forces. There has also been an increase in tensions between the movement and the Hazara ethnic minority in Afghanistan. In addition to a series of terrorist attacks directed against this ethnic group, some Hazaras collaborating with the Taliban have recently been subjected to unjustified persecution. If the movement’s leadership cannot find a way to solve ethnic problems internally, a substantial number of the non-Pashtun Taliban armed forces could join the ranks of the resistance groups or terrorist organizations based in Afghanistan. Third, despite being in power for a year, the Taliban has failed to demonstrate the ability to effectively govern the country. The Taliban, being a movement with a predominantly horizontal hierarchy, has always had a decentralized system of rule. Taliban forces on the ground acted within the framework of a single strategy approved by the leadership. However, at the same time, they had considerable autonomy in terms of choosing tactics to achieve their goals and independently determined their own operational tasks. Such an approach to management attracted a wide range of militants opposed to the government of Ashraf Ghani and helped the Taliban achieve its goals at the time. Since seizing power in August 2021, the Taliban has been trying to build a highly centralized system of government by directly appointing local chiefs from Kabul, predominantly of Pashtun origin, and creating a rigid vertical hierarchy. However, such decisions have broken the existing balance of power between local commanders and the country's top leadership. By redistributing sources of income as a result of these changes, transferring removed commanders to remote parts of the country, and filling vacant posts with Pashtuns, the Taliban has radically changed the balance of power within the movement and significantly weakened its ability to control events in the provinces. Generally speaking, in the last months, there has been a major split in various directions within the Taliban. The growing confrontation between different factions on issues related to strategy, ideology, cooperation with the outside world, and the inclusion of non-Pashtun ethnic groups in leadership positions is weakening the Taliban’s power, making a split in the movement’s ranks increasingly likely. The Taliban government faces systemic challenges under these conditions and is unlikely to overcome them in the near future. It can be expected that this discord will intensify the power struggle between the various factions of the movement. If influential external actors become disappointed with the Taliban’s inability to resolve the challenges facing the country, support for opposition forces may increase significantly. Accordingly, this may lead to a new round of a full-scale civil war based on interethnic confrontation. The Taliban, whose radical ideology and uncompromising position has been gradually moving it toward international isolation, cannot be excluded from this trajectory. However, by engaging in credible and open dialogue with the outside world, offering security guarantees to neighboring countries, cooperating in good faith on counter-terrorism, and enhancing trade relations with other states, the Taliban may be able to overcome its challenges and become a full-fledged member of the international community. Akram Umarov is Director of the Center for Afghanistan Studies, University of World Economy and Diplomacy. His research covers security studies, conflict management, public diplomacy and development issues in Central Asia, Afghanistan and CIS countries. Follow Akram on Twitter @umarov_akram.

Since ancient times, our people have been aware of the importance and value of a peaceful and prosperous life. The crowning achievement of this is the work of Alisher Navoi, who dedicated his humanistic work to the nation and all mankind. One of the main merits of the great poet is the chanting of universal human values, the promotion of goodness, benefactors, the call to all peoples to live in peace and harmony.It is also indicative that from the inside of the dome of the monument to Alisher Navoi one can read his lines: "People of the world, know: enmity is not a matter, love each other, all truth is in friendship." They demonstrate the highest goals of New Uzbekistan, consonant with the good ideas of the great poet. For example, in the Message of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev to the Oliy Majlis and the people of Uzbekistan, it is noted that we must cherish our peaceful and calm life as an invaluable, highest asset, protect it for the sake of happiness and the future of our families, children and future generations.Peace is a key condition for the confident movement of our country forward. This is especially important against the backdrop of the events taking place in the international community: the difficult geopolitical situation, the aggravating shortage of energy resources, and the growing need for food.It is in the conditions of peace that our country has achieved impressive results, namely: as a result of large-scale and effective reforms, the country's gross domestic product for the first time exceeded 80 billion dollars; in 2022 alone, eight billion dollars of foreign direct investment was attracted to the economy of Uzbekistan; the country's exports reached $19 billionObviously, all these indicators are possible only in conditions of stability. Thus, a comparative analysis of most foreign military conflicts (interstate and civil) in the period from 1990 to 2016 indicates an obvious decrease in GDP per capita (the figure reaches 64.3 percent) after the end of the conflict.According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, by mid-2022, more than 100 million people were forced to move to another place of residence due to persecution, conflict, unrest, and human rights violations. This figure is 15 percent higher than the result of the end of 2021. In other words, last year one in 77 people in the world was forced to leave their place of permanent residence, which is twice as many as a decade ago (one in 167 in 2012).According to research, out of the last 3,400 years of human history, 268 years (eight percent) were peaceful. Only in the last century, 108 million people died from wars. These negative processes do not subside even in our time.Conflicts also affect both domestic and foreign investors. Depending on the intensity of the clashes, they withdraw capital far abroad or transfer production facilities to other nearby regions.Domestic investments are most sensitive to armed conflicts, which in turn have a negative impact immediately on both financial and real investments. This is due to the fact that the stock markets and securities in the country of conflict instantly react to it, and investment in capital construction is suspended due to high risks, especially if objects are located in a war zone. At the same time, investors refrain from investing in the development of production due to uncertainty about the future.As a result, mass unemployment and horrendous inflation. In particular, within the framework of the relevant armed conflicts in Sierra Leone, the devaluation of the national currency in the first year alone amounted to 92.8 percent, in Algeria - 92.3, Serbia - 83.7, Rwanda - 76.9, Burundi - 77.6, Yemen - 70.The devaluation effect of the armed conflict is due to a complex of reasons. This is the destruction of infrastructure, the reduction in exports and foreign direct investment, the outflow of capital, including banking, the deficit in the foreign exchange market, trade blockades, the rupture of trade and economic ties, and more.The resettlement of the masses occurs as a result of both military operations and the destruction of social infrastructure, job cuts, and the destruction of businesses. In conditions of forced migration, the self-reproduction of households stops, which turns into poverty, leading to poverty. Thus, the effect of a cyclical increase in the conflict content of society arises, that is, poverty contributes to the emergence of new conflicts.On the one hand, poverty is a motivation for many people to actively participate in hostilities and use armed conflict as a means of earning money. On the other hand, the destruction of infrastructure, casualties among the civilian population, which means the loss of a breadwinner, the emergence of refugees and the displacement of citizens within the country, together turn into an increase in poverty. Thus, there is a certain cyclicity in the impact of poverty on the occurrence of clashes and its increase as a result of conflict.Therefore, it is important that, while maintaining a peaceful and calm life in the country, strengthening its independence, Uzbekistan continues the path of sustainable development at an accelerated pace. This is the main reason why the entire multinational people of the republic values ​​this priceless and highest asset.However, Uzbekistan's desire for peace and stability does not mean that we are defenseless. As noted by the head of state in the Message: "We are able to ensure the security and territorial integrity of our beloved Motherland." With well-deserved respect and pride in our country, they treat the defenders of the Motherland, who reliably ensure the inviolability of borders and peaceful life. For example, in the ranking of the armies of the world Global Firepower Index 2023, Uzbekistan ranked 62nd among 145 countries.The Address noted that in the context of ensuring peace in the country, the military-patriotic education of youth, the role of the older generation in raising children and young people, so that they grow up as harmoniously developed personalities, is of great importance.In general, emphasis is placed on ensuring that the life of every person in our country is peaceful and happy, that he is healthy, gets a good education, and ensures the well-being of his family. Azamat Seitov.Head of the sector of the Executive Committee of the Political Council of UzLiDeP,Doctor of sociological sciences.